are and shall be divested from such
owners, and are and shall be vested in His
Majesty's said Government (that is, of the State
of Queensland) absolutely freed from any
mortgage, charge, lien, or other encumbrance
thereon whatsoever, and all the title and
property of such owners are and shall be
changed into a right to receive payment of the
value thereof

By a Proclamation of the 30th June, 1915,
all raw sugar, the product of the 1915 crop
of sugar cane, was vested in His Majesty's
Government of the State of Queensland, abso-
lutely freed from any mortgage, charge, lien,
or other encumbrance thereon whatsoever, and
the right of ownership previously existing in
such raw sugar was converted into a right to
receive payment of the value thereof, in the
manner, and to the extent, to be there-
after determined and declared by a further
proclamation or proclamations. The Proclama-
tion also provided that such raw sugar should
be held for the purposes and kept for the dis-
posal of His Majesty's Government of the State
of Queensland.

The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, s. 5,
validated this Proclamation; and s. 10 of that
Act enabled the Governor-in-Council, by
proclamation, to extend the operation of the
Act so as to authorise the acquisition by His
Majesty of raw sugar to be manufactured in any
future year, or of any foodstuffs, commodities,
goods, chattels, live stock, or things
whatsoever (all of which were in the Act referred
to as commodities) in such Proclamation men-
tioned; and provided that thereupon any such
commodity might be acquired by a proclamation
containing provisions similar to those of the
Proclamation of the 30th June, 1915, with such
modifications as might be deemed necessary,
and that the Act should extend and apply to
the commodity mentioned in such proclamation
to the same extent and in the same manner as
if such commodity were expressly mentioned

.

to be thereafter deter-
mined and declared by a further proclamation
all owners shall give immediate and
peaceable possession to the Treasurer," and the
Proclamation authorised any State officer to
seize and take possession by force, if necessary,
and inhibited any dealing, and declared all
contracts before and after the date of the
Proclamation void and of no effect.

Mooraberrie Station and the stock thereon
were owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant
Theodore, the Treasurer of Queensland, in-
structed the defendant Balfour, a police con-
stable, to take possession on behalf of the
Government of Queensland of all the cattle
then on the plaintiff's station; and the defend-
ant Balfour carried out these instructions by
going to the station with another police con-
stable, and taking possession of the cattle as
the property of the Government of Queensland.
Subsequently the defendants withdrew from
possession, and restored the cattle on certain
terms entered into between the parties.
The plaintiffs brought two actions against the
Government Queensland and against
Theodore and Balfour, claiming damages for
trespass and alternatively for use and occupa-
tion of the station; and the actions were
consolidated.

of

The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of
1914 declared its pre-eminence over other Acts,
rules, regulations, judgments, and instruments;
it impressed stock and meat, with certain
rights, in favour of the Imperial Government,
and provided that the stock and meat should be
held and kept for the disposal of the Imperial
Government, and prohibited dealing with the
stock and meat except under certain directions
and orders, and changed the owner's right of
property in the cattle and meat into a right
to receive payment of the value thereof which
was estimatable in the manner provided by
the Act.

Held, that as the defendants had not complied
with the conditions of The Meat Supply for
Imperial Use Act of 1914, their action was not
justified under that Act.

Held (Lukin J. dissenting), that The Meat
Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914 did not
preclude The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915 from
being extended to the classes of property
dealt with in the former Act; that the Procla-

TRESPASS-Continued.

mation of the 12th November did not conflict
with the provisions and objects of the former
Act, and that the Proclamation was a valid
and effectual exercise of the powers conferred
upon the Governor-in-Council by s. 10 of The
Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, and authorised
the acquisition by the Government of cattle
now or hereafter to come within Queensland
by means of a further proclamation containing
provisions similar to those of the proclamation
set forth in the Schedule to the Act, with such
modifications as might be deemed necessary.
Held, that the Proclamation of 1st June,
1916, purporting to acquire rights in the pro-
perty of a particular person only, was incon-
sistent with the provisions of that Act, and
could not be regarded as an effectual exercise
of the powers conferred by that Act.

Held, that the seizure of the plaintiff's stock
was a trespass from which the defendants
were jointly liable, unless relieved by some
protection of law.

But held (Lukin J. dissenting), that the pro-
visions of the Act, ss. 7 and 13, afforded pro-
tection to the dependants, and was a bar to the
plaintiff's claim.

Held, The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act
of 1914 came into force on the day on which it
received the Royal assent.

DUNCAN AND ANOTHER v. THEODORE AND
ANOTHER; DUNCAN AND ANOTHER v. BEAL.
F.C. 250

real and personal property and all the rents
and profits accruing therefrom unto his children,
share and share alike, for life, and from and after
the death of all such children, directed the
residue to be divided equally between the grand-
children of his sons.
No trustees were ap
pointed by the will.
Defendants were ap-

pointed trustees by the Supreme Court.
Held, the trustees had power to realise and
convert into money the testator's personal
estate and to re-invest in the investment speci
fied in s. 4 of The Trustees and Executors Act of
1897, and from time to time to vary such invest-
ments.

Part of the estate consisted of shares in a
company. The company created new shares,
and offered these shares to shareholders in
proportion to the shares held by them on certain
terms, including the llability for payment of
certain calls, and the benefit of a bonus distribu-
tion which was applied towards payment for
the shares. The acceptance of these new
shares conferred a material pecuniary advantage
upon the trust estate, and the trustees accepted
the offer, and the shares were issued to them.
They did not consult the beneficiaries on taking
this course. There was no money in the
estate available for payment of calls on these
new shares, and the trustees advanced the sum
required for that purpose from their own
moneys at 5 per cent. interest.

Held (following Bouch v. Sproule (12 A.C.
385), that the bonus was capital of the testa-

tor's estate.

Held, that the trustees had not committed a
breach of trust in acquiring the shares.

Held, that the moneys advanced by the
trustees for the acquisition of these shares was
not chargeable to the income or the capital
of the trust estate; but, semble, there probably
was some form of relief against the trust estate
for the reimbursement of those moneys.

Held, that the will created cross-remainders
between the life tenants and the share of any
child of the testator dying after his death
devolved upon the surviving children for life.

Held, that rates and taxes payable in respect
of the testator's real estate were chargeable to
income.

In re JONES, HOCKINGS v. QUEENSLAND
TRUSTEES LIMITED
F.C. 74