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was decided in the Tasmania Case that in the interpretation of the Constitution reference might be had, as matter of history of legislation, to the draft Bills of 1891, 1897, and 1898, prepared under the legislative authority of the several States. But the account of the conventions given in the judgment of Barton J., at p. 350, clearly shows that those references were to the completed drafts as they left the several conventions. This is entirely different from looking at an inchoate document such as the draft Bill offered for our consideration here. While Griffith C.J., at p. 333, distinctly stated that expressions of opinion of members of the conventions should not be referred to, which, on the authorities abovementioned, are on the same basis as interim drafts of the Bills before they were settled by the conventions. The same very learned Judge also said, at p. 335-"We have to decide what the Legislature means by what it has now said. There has been a change in the language, and therefore the argument from the draft Bill of 1891 is against the plaintiffs. These tentative drafts do not affect the construction of the final form."

This shows that the assistance to be derived from even the completed drafts is not very great. The case, therefore, is no authority for this Court looking at the draft of the Industrial Arbitration Bill as it left the Legislative Council. If we could refer to it, it might be open to question whether it would not hurt rather than help the respondents' argument.

I now pass on to consider whether, on the usual principles of construction, by examining the words actually used by the Legislature, the Industrial Arbitration Act gives power to order preference to unionists.

The jurisdiction of the Court extends to all "industrial matters" which are, in the first instance, defined generally in s. 4 as "matters or things affecting or relating to work done or to be done, or the privileges, rights, or duties of employers or employees." Isaacs J., in Australian Tramway Employees' Association v. Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (17 C.L.R. at p. 693), said in reference to the very similar definition contained in the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1904 to 1911, s. 4, that the word "privilege in it signifies some right which carries with it an advantage relatively to others, who would but for the privilege be on an equal footing with the person having it." The question there was the right to wear a badge, but the dictum is also applicable to a claim for preference to unionists. Without limiting the ordinary meaning of this definition, the Act goes on to include at great length a number of matters, in particular, in subclause (b), "the hours of employment, the sex, age, qualification, or status of employees, and the mode, terms, and conditions of employment or non-employment, including the question whether any persons shall be disqualified for employment ."; and, in subclause (d), the employment of children, young workers, or improvers, or of any person or persons or class of persons, including the disqualification of any persons for employment by reason of sex or age, or disease, or a claim to dismiss or to refuse to employ any particular person or persons or class of persons Very similar provisions to these came before the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in 1900 in the case of Taylor and Oakey v. Mr. Justice Edwards (18 N.Z.L.R. 876), which was a unanimous decision of four Judges. There it was decided that the Court of Arbitration constituted under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1894 (N.Z.), had jurisdiction to direct that preference of employment is given to unionists, the question of such preference being an industrial matter which might form the subject of an industrial dispute as defined in that Act. The principal reason for the decision was that it was a matter of general knowledge and must have been taken to be known to the Legislature that questions as to how far unionists and non-unionists should be compelled to work together was one of the most common causes of industrial disputes-see per Williams J. at p. 887. In the Prahran Case (17 C.L.R. at p. 715), also Powers J. said—“ The claim to prevent the employment of non-unionists with unionists, it is well known, has for many years past been the cause of industrial disputes or disturbances." This reason applies with equal force to Queensland at and before the time when the Industrial Arbitration Act was passed. The definition of "industrial matters in the New Zealand Act of 1894 is very similar in effect to, but not as widely expressed as that in our Industrial Arbitration Act, and like it the New Zealand Act contains no express provision empowering the Court to grant such preference The provisions relating to industrial matters expressly referred to by Williams J. in his judgment are s 2 (b)— "The hours of employment, sex, age, qualification, or status of workmen and conditions of employment" (which is very similar to part of subclause (b) of clause 4 of the Industrial Arbitration Act); and (c) The employment of children or young person or of any person or persons or class of persons, in any industry,

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or the dismissal of or refusal to employ any particular person or class of persons therein." This is practically identical with subclause (d) of clause 4 of the Industrial Arbitration Act, except that the latter says or a claim to dismiss or to refuse to employ," &c., instead of the dismissal of or refusal to employ"-a variation which does not, in my opinion, make any real difference. It was sought to distinguish the case from the present on the ground that in the New Zealand Act employees not belonging to any union or association were excluded from its operation (see per Stout C.J. at p. 883), but this circumstance really makes the case all the stronger in its application here as, by s. 7 (1) (i.) of the Industrial Arbitration Act, any twenty employees (whether members of a union or not) can make a reference to this Court to regulate the conditions of any calling by an award, and by s. 18 any person bound or affected or aggrieved by any decision, recommendation, direction, appointment, reference, or other act made or done by the Court may apply to have it varied or re-opened. Under the New Zealand Act of 1894 non-unionists had no opportunity to come to the Court to be heard in opposition to a claim for preference. Here every facility is given to them to apply to it. The case is, in my opinion, a strong authority in favour of the view that the power in question does exist.

Section 4 (g) of the definition of "industrial matters in the Industrial Arbitration Act, which was not in the New Zealand Act on which Taylor's Case was decided, is as follows:- Any matter which is included in an industrial agreement, or which has caused or in the opinion of the Court is likely to cause disagreement or friction between employers and employees."

It strengthens the inference in favour of the existence of the power drawn from subclauses (b) and (d), as does subclause (1), which was fully dealt with in the judgments in the Mount Morgan Case, and so need not here be considered further. It is true that in the various New Zealand Industrial Acts passed since 1900, in those for New South Wales and the Commonwealth, express provisions are made for granting preference to unionists, but this may have been done either to limit the general power on the principle referred to by Jessel M.R. in Ex parte Stephens (3 Ch. D. at p. 660), cited by Griffith C.J. in New South Wales Railway and Tramway Service Association Case (4 C.L.R. at p. 519), or for the sake of greater clearness, and it does not, to my mind, import that unless there is some express reference to it the power does not exist. In one of these Acts, The Industrial Arbitration Act, 1912 (New South Wales), s. 5, under the heading of "industrial matters," subclause (c) runs thus-"The employment of children or young persons or of any person or class of persons in any industry, or the right to dismiss or to refuse to employ or reinstate in employment any particular persons or class of persons therein "[So far it is almost identical with subclause (d) of the definition of "industrial matters" in s. 4 of the Industrial Arbitration Act, except that right" is used instead of "claim "to dismiss, &c., and then goes on]" but not so as to give preference of employment to members of Industrial Unions except in accordance with the provisions of section twenty-four.

This seems to me a clear intimation by the New South Wales Legislature that the first part of the subclause did give a power to grant preference which it proceeded to confine within certain limits. This New South Wales Act of 1912 is one that was well known to our Legislature, as appears from the references to it in the marginal notes to the Industrial Arbitration Act. The Industrial Peace Act of 1912, which was repealed by the Industrial Arbitration Act, expressly forbade any such preference. In subclauses (c) and (g) of the definition of "industrial matters to be found in s. 3 of that Act, which are in effect identical with subclauses (b) and (d) of the present Act, these words are included-" for any reasons other than their membership or non-membership of any industrial associa tion." They have been omitted from the present measure, it must be assumed deliberately. Section 34 also provides that-"No person shall be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on account of membership or nonmembership of any industrial association. No person who is an employer or employee shall be discriminated against or injured with in any way whatsoever on account of membership or non-membership of any industrial association.” This section also was not re-enacted, and the inference to be drawn from these omissions from the Industrial Arbitration Act surely must be that the Legislature rescinded the prohibition against preference to unionists contained in the Industrial Peace Act intending to allow it in the future under the Industrial Arbitration Act. It was also contended that, as the power to grant preference to unionists infringed on the liberty of the subject, this could only be done by express words and not by mere general provision such as those contained in the Act.

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The principle relied on was clearly stated in the Commonwealth v. the Progress Advertising and Press Agency Company Proprietary, Limited (10 C.L.R. 457). Griffith C.J., said, at p. 460, “In case of ambiguity the presumption is in favour of liberty."

In my opinion there is no ambiguity in the definition of “industrial matters in the Industrial Arbitration Act, which as already stated is framed in the widest

terms.

O'Connor J., at p. 464, said—“In ascertaining what was the real intention of the Legislature two well-known principles of interpretation must be applied. The first is that, as any citizen is at liberty prima facie to carry on his business in his own way within the law, it will not be held that the Legislature has intended by any statute to impair that liberty unless it has expressed that intention by plain words or by necessary implication from the language it has used The second rule is, that general words in a statute will ordinarily be construed with no wider meaning than is necessary to carry into effect its object and purpose."

Here the general object of the statute must be considered. Like its predecessor, the Industrial Peace Act, it in many ways interferes with the liberty of both employer and employee, by providing methods of fixing wages and conditions of work, where they are unable to agree, instead of leaving them to the operation of the law of supply and demand.

The Industrial Arbitration Act goes much further than the Industrial Peace Act in recognising industrial unions. Under it they have power to bring any industrial matter before the Court by a reference (s. 7 (1) (i.)); to apply to have awards codified (Id. (iii.)); and to apply to have awards varied (s. 18 (1)). Elaborate provisions are contained in Part III., ss. 26 to 37, for their registration; and industrial agreements, Part V., ss. 51 to 56, can only be entered into between them and employers, while under the Industrial Peace Act, s. 30, such agreements had to be made between employers and employees directly. Considering the great scope of the Industrial Arbitration Act in regulating the relations between employers and employees, the repeal of the former prohibition against preference, the enlarged recognition of industrial unions, taken with the original general definition of "industrial matters and subclause (b) and (d) thereof, as interpreted by the decision in Taylor's Case, and subclauses (g) and (1), in my opinion the Industrial Arbitration Act is sufficiently plain in its wording to abrogate the presumption against interfering with the liberty of the subject explained by O'Connor J.

The question before the Court should accordingly be answered in the affirmative. IN THE MATTER OF EMPLOYEES IN WOOL STORES AND OTHERS, 22nd and 23rd May and 9th June, 1917, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION (MCCAWLEY J. AND MACNAUGHTON J.). Counsel: Stumm K.C. and E. A. Douglas; H. D. Macrossan.

42. Solicitor-Admission-Law agent of Scotland-Production of original certificate of admission-Dispensing with production on conditional admission-Rules of Court relating to admission of solicitors, 12th October, 1898, rr. 42 (3), 43, 54.

The production of the original certificate of admission of a person recently admitted as a law agent in Scotland was dispensed with by the Court when granting a conditional admission under r. 44 of the Rules of Court relating to the admission of solicitors.

In re CAMPBELL, 21st August, 1917, FULL COURT (COOPER C.J., REAL AND LUKIN JJ.). Counsel: McGill; Real.

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43. Solicitor-Admission in England-Certificate of admission Production of original certificate - Destroyed certificate. Conditional admission-Rules of Court for the Admission of Solicitors as of 12th October, 1898, rr. 7, 42, 43, 44, 54.

The production of the original certificate of admission as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England was dispensed with on proof that it had been almost entirely destroyed.

In re NELSON, 8th June, 1917, FULL COURT (SHAND AND LUKIN JJ.). Counsel: Stumm K.C.; Real.

44. Administration and probate-Practice-Application for re-seal -Power of attorney, sufficiency of.

REFERENCE BY REGISTRAR.

By his will D.R. appointed his father R.R. sole executor thereof. R.R. proved the will in England, and appointed I. Rae his attorney for the purpose (inter alia and so far as is material) "generally of doing and executing all such other matters and things as may be necessary for proving the will and administering the estate in Australia as fully and effectually as if I were personally present and did the same."

Under the authority conferred by this power of attorney, I. Rae applied to the Registrar for a re-seal of the grant. The Registrar referred, under O. LXXI., r. 7, the question whether the power of attorney conferred sufficient authority to enable him to re-seal the grant in Queensland, as no express power to re-seal was given.

Real, for the applicant, contended the power was sufficiently wide, and referred to Re Hewitt (23 V.L.R. 499), Re Johnson (14 V.L.R. 218), Re Shannon (1915, V.L.R. 64).

The Deputy Registrar referred to Re Lawrance, 25th September, 1912 (unreported), where the power of attorney was held to be insufficient. Under this power of attorney, the applicant is entitled to a grant of administration cum testamento annexo, in which case security would be required, whereas if a re-seal is granted, no security is required. Mortimer on Probate Law and Practice, p. 493; O. LXXI., r. 65; Tristram and Coote, 14th Ed., p. 173. In the case of Re Lawrence power was given "to apply for and obtain probate apply for and obtain letters of administration (with the will and other testamentary documents annexed) of the estate and generally for me and in my name and on my part and behalf to do, execute, and perform all such other acts, matters, and things as shall be necessary and expedient to be done in and about the premises or in any manner relating to the estate.

or to

CHUBB J. was of opinion that the power of attorney was sufficient to support the application for a re-seal.

Re DOUGLAS RODGER, 4th October, 1917, CHUBB J. IN CHAMBERS. Counsel: Real. Solicitors: Thynne & Macartney.

[It is preferable that express power to apply for and obtain a re-seal should be included in powers of attorney. The two following extracts are taken from powers of attorney which have been received in the Registry as sufficient :

(1) ". To apply for and obtain from the Supreme Court of the said State of Queensland a grant of re-sealing of the letters of administration with the will of the said deceased annexed granted by the Supreme Court of the State of New South Wales, at Sydney aforesaid, or original letters of administration of the personal estate and effects of the said deceased, with a copy of the said will thereto annexed or to procured the said attorney to be constituted as the attorney of [administrator] the administrator of the personal estate and effects of the said deceased in the said State of Queensland, and for this purpose and as the act and deed of the said [administrator] to give and otherwise make, enter into, execute,

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and deliver such advertisement, petitions, affidavits, bonds, inventories, accounts, covenants, undertakings to pay probate and succession duties or other obligations, as shall be required upon the grant of such re-sealing of letters of administration with the will annexed, or original letters of administration of the personal estate and effects of the said deceased, with a copy of the said will annexed or otherwise, and generally to sign and execute all such instruments or documents as shall be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining such re-sealing of letters of administration with the will annexed, or original letters of administration of the personal estate and effects of the said deceased, with a copy of the said will annexed, or for constituting the said [attorneys] or any of them the personal representatives or representative of the said [deceased) in the said State of Queensland

(2) ".. to apply to the Supreme Court of the State of Queensland, or to some other Court of competent jurisdiction in that State, that the said probate or a certified copy thereof may be sealed with the seal of the said Court in pursuance of the law in that behalf existing in that State, and for all or any of the purposes above mentioned in the name of the said [executor]. or in the name of the said attorneys or attorney or one of them, as may be required to make, sign, and execute all such notices, affidavits, bonds, and instruments as the said attorneys or attorney may think proper. And generally to do all such things for carrying out the powers hereby conferred as the said [executor] could do if personally present. ."]

45. Practice Discontinuance of action-Nonsuit-O. XXX., r. 2— 0. XXXIX., rr. 35, 36–0. LX., r. 5.

Leave to discontinue an action was granted to the plaintiff on the terms that the costs of the action be paid before any further action in respect of the same cause of action be brought, and that in the event of instituting such further action security for the costs thereof be given.

SHARPE v. WREN, 27th March, 1917, REAL J. Counsel: A. D. Graham; H. D. Macrossan. Solicitors: Atthow & McGregor; O'Shea & O'Shea.

46. Public Curator-Local Deputy Public Curator-Election to administer intestate estate by Local Deputy Public CuratorSubsequent discovery of will appointing Public Curator executor -The Public Curator Act of 1915 (6 Geo. V., No. 14), s. 37— O. LXXI., r. 84.

MOTION.

The Local Deputy Public Curator at Townsville, on behalf of the Public Curator of Queensland, filed an election to administer the estate of one John Cameron, deceased, under s. 37 of The Public Curator Act of 1915. At the time of filing the election the Local Deputy Public Curator believed, on reasonable grounds, that the deceased had died intestate. However, it was subsequently discovered that the deceased had left a will whereof the Public Curator of Queensland was appointed Executor. On motion, on behalf of the Public Curator of Queensland, the Court revoked the election.

In re CAMERON, 10th August, 1917, SHAND J. [IN THE NORTHERN COURT]. Solicitor J. P. A. Quinn, Northern Crown Solicitor.

[Vide also In re Hadnett, Chubb J., 9th November, 1917.]

J.P.A.Q.