But the true effect of the proposition would be to open an indirect trade with Great Britain, which, through St, Bartholomew and Havana, Lisbon, Cadiz or Gottenburg, would receive, at prices reduced by glutted markets, and for want of competition, all the provisions, naval stores, raw materials for her manufactures, and other articles which she may want. Whether she would be satisfied with that favourable state of things, or whether, considering that boon as a pledge of unqualified submission, shẹ would, according to the tenour of her orders, interrupt our scanty commerce with Russia, and occasionally, under some new pretext, capture rather than purchase the cargoes intended for her own use, is equally uncertain and unimportant. Nor can it be doubted that a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents, would be war with the other. Considered merely as a question of profit, it would be much more eligible at once to raise the embargo in relation to Great Britain, as we would then, at least, have the advantages of a direct market with the consumer. But the proposition can only be defended on the ground that France is the only aggressor, and, that having no just reason to complain of England, it is our duty to submit to her orders. On that inadmissible supposition, it would not only be more candid, but also a more dignified, as well as more advantageous course, openly to join England, and to make war against France. The object would be clearly understood, an ally would be obtained, and the meanness of submission might be better palliated.

It appears unnecessary to pursue any further the examination of propositions, which the difficult situation of the United States could alone have suggested, and which will prove more inadmissible, or impracticable, as the subject is more thoroughly investigated. The alternative is painful; it is between a continued suspension of commerce, and war with both England and France. But the choice must ultimately be made between the two; and it is important that we should be prepared for either the one or the other.

The aggressions of England and France collectively,

affecting almost the whole of our commerce, and persisted in, notwithstanding repeated remonstrances, explanations, and propositions the most candid and unexceptionable, are to all intents and purposes, a maritime war waged by both nations against the United States. It cannot be denied, that the ultimate and only effectual mode of resisting that warfare, if persisted in, is war. A permanent suspension of commerce, after repeated and unavailing efforts to obtain peace, would not properly be resistance: it would be withdrawing from the contest, and abandoning our indisputable right freely to navigate the ocean. The present unsettled state of the world, the extraordinary situation in which the United States are placed, and the necessity, if war be resorted to, of making it at the same time against both nations, and these the two most powerful of the world, are the principal causes of hesitation. There would be none in resorting to that remedy, however calamitous, if a selection could be made on any principle of justice, or without a sacrifice of national independence.

On a question of such difficulty, involving the most important interests of the union, and which has not, perhaps, until lately, been sufficiently considered, your committee think the house alone competent to pronounce a decisive opinion: and they have, in this report, confined themselves to an exposition of the subject, and to such introductory resolutions, as will be equally applicable to either alternative. The first of these, being merely declaratory of a determination not to submit to foreign aggressions, may perhaps, at a first view, appear superfluous. It is, however, believed by the committee, that a pledge, by the representatives of the nation, that they will not abandon its essential rights, will not, at this critical moment, be unacceptable. The misapprehensions which seem to have existed, and the misrepresentations which have been circulated, respecting the state of our foreign relations, render also such declaration expedient. And it may not be useless that every foreign nation should understand, that its aggressions never will be justified or encouraged by any

description of American citizens. For the question for every citizen now is, whether he will rally round the government of his choice, or enlist under foreign banners? Whether he will be for his country, or against his country?

MESSAGE

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN MR. CANNING

AND MR. PINKNEY. JAN. 17, 1809.

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. STATES.

I COMMUNICATE to Congress certain letters which passed between the British secretary of state, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Pinkney, our minister plenipotentiary at London. When the documents concerning the relations between the United States and Great Britain were laid before Congress, at the commencement of the session, the answer of Mr. Pinkney to the letter of Mr. Canning had not been received, and a communication of the letter alone would have accorded neither with propriety, nor with the wishes of Mr. Pinkney. When that answer afterwards arrived, it was considered that as what had passed in conversation had been superseded by the written and formal correspondence on the subject, the variance in the statement of what had verbally passed was not of sufficient importance to be made the matter of a distinct and special communication. The letter of Mr. Canning, however, having lately appeared in print, unaccompanied by that of Mr. Pinkney, in reply, and having a tendency to make impressions not warranted by the statements of Mr. Pinkney, it has become proper that the whole should be brought into publick view. TH: JEFFERSON.

[TRIPLICATE.]

SIR,

LONDON, SEPT. 24, 1808.

I AM now enabled to transmit to you a copy of Mr. Canning's answer, received only last night, to my note of the 23d of August.

This answer was accompanied by a letter, of which also a copy is enclosed, recapitulating what Mr. Canning supposes to be "the substance of what has passed between us at our several interviews, previous to the presentation of my official letter."

To the accompanying paper, I think it indispensable that I should reply without delay; supporting, with politeness, but with firmness, the statements, which I have already had the honour to make to you, of the conversations in question, and correcting some errours upon points, which Mr. Canning has thought fit to introduce into his letter, but which I had not supposed it necessary to mention in detail in my despatches.

I shall not detain Mr. Atwater with a view to this reply, but will take care to forward a copy of it by an early conveyance. My official note and the answer to it being perfectly explicit, Mr. Canning's misapprehensions (for such they are) of previous verbal communications can scarcely be very important in a publick view; but it is, nevertheless, of some consequence that, whatever may be the object of his statement, I should not make myself a party to its inaccuracies, by even a tacit admission of them.

I do not perceive that a formal reply to the more official paper can now be of any advantage; but I shall probably take occasion to combine with my reply to the one paper some observations upon the other.

I regret extremely that the views which I have been instructed to lay before this government, have not been met by it as I had at first been led to expect. The overture cannot fail, however, to place in a strong light, the just and liberal sentiments by which our government is animated,

and in other respects to be useful and honourable to our country. I have the honour to be, &c.

The Hon. JAMES MADISON, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

[COPY.]

WM. PINKNEY.

FOREIGN OFFICE, SEPT. 23, 1808.

In laying before the king your letter of the 23d August, and in communicating to you the enclosed answer, which I have received his majesty's commands to return to it, I confess that I feel some little embarrassment from the repeated references which your letter contains, to what has passed between us in conversation; an embarrassment arising in no degree (as you are perfectly aware) from any feeling of distrust in you personally, but from a recollection of the misrepresentation which took place in America of former conferences between us. You gave me on that occasion the most satisfactory proof that such misrepresentation did not originate with you, by communicating to me that part of your despatch in which the conferences particularly referred to were related, and related correctly; but this very circumstance while it establishes your personal claim to entire confidence, proves, at the same time, that a faithful report of a conference on your part, is not a security against its misrepresentation.

It was for that reason principally that, after hearing with the most respectful attention all that you had to state to me verbaily on the subject of the present overture, I felt myself under the necessity of requiring as "indispensable," a written communication upon the subject.

It is for that reason also, that as, in your written communication, you refer me to our late conversations for the "bearings and details" of your proposal, I feel it necessary to recapitulate, as shortly as I can, what I conceive to have passed in those conversations, beyond what I find recorded in your letter.

The principal points in which the suggestions brought