nature, and were happy to find that they had not forgotten what had passed between us on that occasion. We had asked the interview, as we informed them, for the purpose of conferring on this subject, and of obtaining their sentiments in so distinct a form as to leave us under no embarrassment in the communication it was our duty to make to you on it. Nothing passed in this interview, on their part, to change the ground on which the business had been placed in the former one. They intimated, however, that it might be advantageous, and would certainly be proper for us, in the present stage, to confer with lord Howick on this subject, since any declaration from him could not fail, according to its import, to merit the peculiar attention of our government. We have accordingly seen and conferred with lord Howick upon this topick, whose sentiments appeared to correspond strictly with those which had been delivered to us by the British commissioners. He intimated, however, that it would be better for us to address the note which should contain a reservation of our rights to indemnity, to him than to the commissioners, to which we assented, as we could not perceive that that circumstance would make any difference in the case. We are engaged in preparing this paper, which we expect to present to his lordship in a few days, though we fear it will not be ready in time to enable us to obtain his answer to it to be forwarded to you with this despatch. We shall not fail to communicate to you, without delay, whatever may occur on this subject. We think it our duty, however, to add, that we do not wish our government to be too sanguine in the expectation of a satisfactory result. In the deliberations on this subject, it may, perhaps, be better to presume that such a one may not be obtained, as it is not provided for in the treaty. The above statement is nevertheless perfectly correct, and we beg you to be assured, that we shall continue to exert our best endeavours to secure an object which we consider of so much importance. We shall send you a statement of the cases of condemnation, and of the causes still depending, which is less extensive in both views than may have been supposed,

It happened, when the negotiation had reached a very advanced stage, that an account was received here of the decree of the emperour of the French at Berlin, of November 21, which declared Great Britain and Ireland in a state of blockade, and all British manufactures and the produce of British colonies lawful prize. This circumstance produced a strong impression on this government, which was very seriously felt in our concerns. It seemed

probable for some days that it would subject the negotiation to a long suspension, if it did not entirely defeat its object. The British commissioners informed us, that the decree of the government of France had opposed a powerful obstacle to the conclusion of any treaty with us, before our government should be consulted on the subject, and its answer obtained as to the part it might take in regard to it: that in case the United States submitted to a violation of their neutral rights by France in the manner contemplated by that decree, it would be impossible for Great Britain to respect them; that by concluding a treaty with the United States, by which they should not only bind themselves to the observance of such rights, but agree to concessions or relaxations of what they conceived to be their unquestionable rights of war, after knowing the contents of that decree, they might be understood to restrain themselves from counteracting the policy of France, which it would be improper to do, unless our government should engage to support its rights against the measures of France. In consideration of these circumstances, they proposed that we should proceed in the business so far as to agree on all the articles of the treaty, to reduce them to form, and then transmit the instrument to the United States, to become obligatory in case our government should enter into a satisfactory engagement of the kind proposed. We replied in very explicit terms to the British commissioners that we considered their proposition altogether inadmissible on our part, and not likely to accomplish, if we could agree to it, the object which they contemplated by it: that such a proposition to our government, under the

circumstances attending it, would amount, in substance, to an offer to it of the alternative between the treaty and a war with France, since, if our government refused to give the satisfaction which they desired, the treaty would be lost and if such satisfaction was given and the treaty concluded, and France should persist to execute her decree according to the construction given of it here, war seemed to be inevitable: that if it should happen that our government should approve the treaty, it was not to be presumed that it would make any sacrifice, or stipulate any thing not contained in the instrument, especially so very important an act as that alluded to, as the condition on which it was to be obtained; that the arrangement of our differences and other concerns with Great Britain was an affair which rested on its own ground, and had no connection with our relations with France; that his majesty's government ought to suppose that the United States would not fail in any case to support with becoming dignity their rights with any power, and that it must be sensible that it would be more at liberty to enter into suitable friendly explanations with the government of France, on the subject of the decree in question, after the adjustment of their differences with Great Britain, than while they existed, as it likewise must be, that the prospect of obtaining satisfactory explanations on that point of France would be better while they acted under their own impulse as an independent and friendly power, than it would be in case they entered into an engagement of the kind proposed with her adversary. The British commissioners admitted, that these considerations were entitled to much attention at length, however, after the subject had been, as we had reason to believe, maturely weighed in the cabinet, they informed us that their government still thought it incumbent on it to make a reservation of their right to counteract the policy of France, in case our government did not give them the satisfaction they desired, either by suitable assurances before the ratification of the treaty, or by its conduct afterwards. With this view they presented us a paper which

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we have the honour to transmit with this despatch. In transmitting to you this paper, it is our duty to observe that we do not consider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any the slightest degree our sanction. The incident which produced the paper was unexpected on our part, and without entering into its merits, we used our best exertions to diminish its effect in relation to the objects of our negotiation. The British commissioners brought the incident into view, and made it the subject of discussion in the manner above stated, as they did the part which it became their government to take in the depending negotiation in consequence of it. We therefore thought, not only that we were at liberty, but that it was imperiously our duty, to use our best exertions to make the paper which they proposed to present to us, in reference to the decree of France, as little injurious as possible, and even to urge that decree as a strong reason why Great Britain should be more explicit and satisfactory in her definition of neutral rights, as well for the purpose of vindicating herself against the strong denunciation it contained, as to enable our government to urge with more force with the government of France its objections to the decree. We were glad to find that these remarks were not altogether without effect, as will appear by the paper referred to, especially the definition it gives of a blockade, which is tolerably correct.

You will observe, that the commerce between the United States and the British colonies, which bound them to the east and north, has not been regulated by this treaty. The British commissioners refused to agree to any arrangement of it, in consequence of our declining to admit their Canada and Hudson bay traders into Louisiana. It has occurred to us, that it might be advantageous to the United States, and consistent with the views of our government, to comprise both these objects, under suitable regulations, in a separate convention, especially if they can be made instrumental to a satisfactory establishment of our boundaries. We have reason to think, that in the form of a new

act, in connection with these other objects, it would be more agreeable to this government to settle the question of boundary, according to the views of the President and Senate, than by ratifying the convention already entered into, with the exception of the 5th article. The British commissioners have expressed their willingness to proceed in the business, for the purpose of arranging all these topicks in a satisfactory manner, as lord Howick has likewise done; and it seems highly important to take advantage of this disposition, to settle amicably with this government, at the present time, every remaining cause of strife, so far as it may be practicable. Should we undertake to form such a convention, the commercial part of it will of course be limited to the same term, not to exceed that of the treaty. We shall also be attentive to the conditions on which the traders with the Indian tribes are to be admitted into Louisiana, by being particularly careful that it be done on such conditions as to render it impossible for them to do any injury. We are persuaded that such regulations might be adopted, as would, even at this time, have that effect. We are confident, that our population will have so far spread over the whole surface of that country, by the time the treaty would expire, as to supersede the necessity of renewing it.

We have the honour to be, with great consideration, &c. JAMES MONROE,

TREATY

WM. PINKNEY.

OF AMITY, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

HIS Britannic majesty and the United States of America, being equally desirous to promote and perpetuate the good understanding and friendship which happily subsist between the subjects of the united kingdom and the citizens of the United States, and for that purpose to regulate the commerce and navigation between their respective countries,