position of the Catholic Church had been secured by the Quebec Act of 1774, and any attempt to anglicize the province would have been resisted, as making for the triumph of heresy. But although the division of Canada and some of its consequences may have been inevitable, none the less the political situation in both provinces became difficult and wellnigh impossible. The FrenchCanadians were without apprenticeship in local selfgovernment and were for the most part wholly uneducated, so that they became as wax in the hands of their popular leaders. For many years an eloquent and genial demagogue, Louis Papineau, was the uncrowned king of the French-Canadian democracy; whilst there were marshalled in reserve on the side of law and order the forces of the Catholic Church. In the long quarrel between the English Executive and the French-Canadian Assembly there were faults on both sides. Not till nearly the close of the controversy did the French leaders begin to realize that responsible government would give the solution of their difficulties; and, in their demand for an elected Legislative Council, they were opposed by the full strength of the British minority, who knew enough of the doings of the French majority in the Assembly to fear their complete dominance in an elected legislature. When Lord Gosford's Commission found themselves compelled to reject the proposal which was the sheet-anchor of the FrenchCanadian demands, it became clear that some wholly new solution must be found if neither a policy of coercion nor of renunciation was to be adopted.

Meanwhile in Upper Canada causes, in appearance the same though in their essence altogether different, had brought about a political situation hardly more satisfactory. Here the grievance of an irresponsible Executive, confronted with an Assembly genuinely representative, was aggravated by the treatment of the clergy reserves question, which secured for the Church of a small minority of the popula

tion the favoured position of the Church establishment at home. Archdeacon Strachan, a stalwart champion of his Church in its most militant mood, supplied political opposition with a weapon which it soon learnt how to wield. As in Lower Canada so in Upper, a single leading demagogue was able to put a match to the fire; though in the case of Upper Canada William Lyon Mackenzie's efforts would probably have been unavailing had they not been abetted by the eccentric and egotistical proceedings of the British Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head. The conclusion was that in both Provinces there was an abortive insurrection, from a military point of view trifling enough; but most menacing, so far as it seemed to mark the breakdown of British colonial government. The next act in the drama is sufficiently familiar. Lord Durham's mission of 1838 was soon followed by his repudiation in the matter of the political prisoners banished to Bermuda, and his consequent resignation. In the following year the publication of his memorable Report marked an epoch in the history of colonial self-government, forcing as it did the hands of the Home Government, and involving a new state of things which as late as 1837 had seemed to the liberal mind of Lord John Russell incompatible with the continued existence of the colonial connexion. Lord Durham (as I have already mentioned) entered on his task with the idea that the solution of difficulties was to be sought in the application of the federal principle; but he found on his arrival that, while what had to be done must be done quickly, the French-Canadians were in no mood to become friendly partners in a federal British America. (There was the further difficulty, which I have already noted, that neither were the Maritime Provinces prepared at this time for such a solution.) But if federation was impossible, the only alternative seemed a complete union of the two Canadas. Such a union had been intended in 1822, when the difficulties with regard to the share of the Upper Pro

vince in the customs duties received at Quebec and Montreal threatened an impasse. The measure had been then withdrawn in the face of the opposition of the French and of many of the English colonists; but the French-Canadians were now brooding in sullen despair, so that union could hardly add to their ills; whilst the outbreak in Upper Canada had sufficiently shown that the system of 'family compact' government could not ignore the writing on the wall. Moreover, Lord Durham believed that his other remedy for the existing evils, viz. the granting of complete responsible government, would finally appease all popular disappointment. It is worth noting that even Durham's conception of responsible government did not include the management by the colonial authorities of questions of trade, the Crown lands, or military defence. He recognized that, as things were for the moment, it would be impossible to give complete self-government to the French Province. As an Imperialist, he had no intention to diminish the British Empire; but the first act of a French-Canadian Executive, irresponsible except to its own Legislature, might have been to announce a peaceful secession. Responsible government was the goal; but responsible government postulated that the majority of the people in question were loyal subjects of the British Empire. Had Lower Canada stood alone, there might have been no answer to the dilemma; but bly the presence of Upper Canada pointed to the solution. Durham at once recognized, and it is to his credit that he so recognized, that, in spite of family compact government and William Lyon Mackenzie and his tragi-comedy of a rebellion, there was no real doubt as to the loyalty of Upper Canada to the British Crown. Could, then, a fusion be made of the two Provinces, the Upper Canadian electors might be trusted to secure the permanence of the British connexion. It was true that the population of the Lower Province was still greatly superior in numbers, but Durham was willing to trust to

time, along with the presence of the British minority in the Lower Province, to secure the predominance of British institutions. In his insular self-confidence he believed that the superiority of Anglo-Saxon ways and methods was so self-evident that it needed but due opportunity for its trumpet-call, and the walls of French Nationalism and language would come crumbling down from their sheer insufficiency. The new creed of Nationalism was soon to give forth a gospel very different from the imaginations of Liberals of the type and temper of Lord Durham.

What would have been the result of a real union, such as that advocated by Lord Durham, it is impossible to say, because such a union was never attempted. In its stead the two divisions of the Province were treated as separate entities, each having under the Act of Union of 1840 an equal number of members. At first the grievance was on the side of the French; but, as the population of Upper Canada grew by leaps and bounds, the burden was shifted on the other shoulder; till at the time of the British North America Act a majority of some 400,000 Canadians in the upper division had only the same representation as the population of the lower division. In other ways the Union only served to emphasize racial distinctions. The FrenchCanadians believed, and a perusal of Lord Durham's Report might justify them in that belief, that the Act of Union was intended as a blow to their separate nationality, and therefore sought by all possible means to prevent the blow taking effect. It must be remembered that in Lower Canada union was not the deliberate choice of a free people, but was superimposed on the people by a special council nominated by an autocracy. The French-Canadians had therefore no affection or respect for the system introduced. At the same time the majority were wise enough to see that their interests lay not in standing aloof from the new system, as the extremists advised, but in moulding that system to their interests. If the intention was to

swamp the French nationality in an Anglo-Saxon Province, the more necessary it was to maintain a separate FrenchCanadian organization for the attainment of FrenchCanadian ideals. During the time of Lord Sydenham's Government the French remained suspect, the memories of the rebellion being still fresh in the minds of men, and Sydenham was not prepared to accept the full consequences of responsible government, so far as it meant party government by a parliamentary majority. He aimed at being his own first minister and to rule through the best men chosen by himself on other than party grounds. Sydenham's attitude was well adapted for a period of transition, but it postulated a very strong Governor and a very simple Colonial Assembly. Meanwhile the French-Canadians had joined forces, for the purposes of opposition, with the Reformers from Upper Canada, and Sydenham's successor, Sir Charles Bagot, recognized that it was impossible to refuse as ministers those who represented the will of the majority. The next Governor, Metcalfe, in his heart distrusted the system of responsible government; and it was not till the government of Lord Elgin in 1848 that it can be said to have triumphed permanently. But simultaneously with that triumph, the internal difficulties in the way raised their head. Responsible government means party government, and party government means the ascendancy, at least, of two distinct parties. But in the Canadian Assembly there were four, if not five, distinct parties. There were the Upper Canadian Reformers, who held Radical opinions, the Conservatives from that Province, and the small faction which maintained the family compact tradition. The French-Canadians were, at first, for the most part unanimous on the side of opposition, but when once they had been admitted within the portals of the Government, it was inevitable that their natural tendency to Conservative opinions should find expression; so that in time there developed a French-Canadian Conservative