undoubtedly be to-day a British dominion extending from Table Bay to Zambesi.'

It was part of the general ill-luck which for many years dogged the footsteps of Great Britain in South Africa that the question whether Sir George Grey was right in his policy of federation became confused with the wholly different question whether, as a Government official, he was justified in disregarding the direct instructions of the Secretary of State. Because of this disobedience he was recalled, and though, on the occasion of a change of Government in England, he was, through the intervention of the Queen, continued in office, it was on the express condition that nothing more should be said about South African federation.

Years passed in inevitable reaping of the seeds sown of disunion and distrust, yet the case for federation was so strong that the question was bound again to come to the fore. Sir Henry Barkly, the Governor of Cape Colony in 1871, expressed himself in favour of federation; and the Home Government, through Lord Kimberley, was now in cordial accord. At this time there was reason to believe that the Orange River Free State was willing to enter into such a federation. In opening the Cape Parliament in 1872 Sir H. Barkly described the difficulties in the way as not insuperable. He enlarged upon the benefits to be expected from federation in the way of uniformity of legislation, improvement of postal and railway facilities, and the promotion of a wiser and more consistent policy regarding the natives. Responsible government was now being introduced in Cape Colony, and its grant, Barkly believed, would pave the way for a redistribution of representation among the different districts, for an extension of the powers of self-government, and for eventually establishing a system of federal union, in which, sooner or later, all the Provinces of South Africa might be embraced.

In this state of things, Lord Carnarvon, who had been

Secretary of State at the time of the introduction of the British North America Act, may be forgiven if he thought the time ripe for pressing on the federation of South Africa. But he failed to remember that in Canada confederation had been a purely Canadian question, concerning which the rôle of the Imperial Government was mainly to give formal sanction to decisions arrived at by colonial statesmen. There was nothing in the experiences of 1865 1867, and to point to the conclusion that federation could successfully be imposed from without on people suspicious and determined to manage in their own way their own affairs. Nevertheless, Lord Carnarvon, in appointing Sir Bartle Frere to the Governorship of Cape Colony, informed him that he had been selected to carry my scheme of confederation into effect'. It is true that Lord Carnarvon was careful to explain that he had no desire to dictate, and that the action of all parties, whether in the British Colonies or the Dutch States, must be spontaneous and uncontrolled'; but the seeds of distrust were already implanted in a congenial soil. The Cape Colony Government carried opposition so far as virtually to deny to the Imperial authorities any voice on the question of South African federation; and the Orange River Colony was now hostile to the measure for fear that thereby its political independence might be endangered. In this state of feeling the moment was hardly opportune for a Conference on the subject in London. The Cape Premier, who happened to be in England, was precluded from attending by a vote of the Assembly. President Brand, who was also in London, attended the Conference to discuss the native question, but was unable to take into consideration the subject of federation. Lord Carnarvon, however, was still hopeful that by friendly discussion misunderstandings might be removed, and a draft Bill for establishing a South African federation was forwarded to South Africa, so that suggestions might be made for its improvement. Some

alterations were in consequence made, and the Bill as amended was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1877. The Act, which was merely an enabling one, followed in its main lines the provisions of the British North America Act, except that, doubtless in the interests of the natives, it gave more extensive powers to the Home Government to disallow provincial statutes. The Act was never put in force, and in 1882 ceased to have effect by efflux of time, so that its importance in the history of the subject is slight.

Meanwhile another question was coming into prominence which was to put back the clock of union for more than thirty years. At first it seemed as if the war between the Transvaal Republic and the natives was moving things in the direction of the union of South Africa; but it proved in the long run that racial jealousies between Europeans were stronger than the sense of a common peril from the natives. The annexation of the Transvaal may or may not have been at the time a necessity; it may or may not have been an act of political wisdom; but arousing as it did, at least after the first, and when the Zulu power had been put down by British arms, a fierce spirit of Dutch Afrikander patriotism, it shut the door for many years to any proposals for closer union. It is obvious that the

circumstances under which the Transvaal regained its independence, and the fact that the outcome of that independence was the emergence of a powerful Republic intensely hostile to Great Britain, and ready to enter into the lists with her for the hegemony of South Africa, seemed to put off all chances of closer union to the Greek Kalends. The discovery of gold in the Rand gave to the Transvaal the sinews of war; but while reaping the full benefit of the gold mines, the Boer Republic was not willing to give to the alien population of the Rand the full rights of citizenship. Great Britain, as the paramount power, claimed to have a voice on behalf of the outlanders' claims; and though the fiasco of the Jameson raid for some time

made British statesmen slow to interfere, they at last, though reluctantly and with great misgivings, came to the conclusion that the position of Great Britain in South Africa was not compatible with the pretensions of the Boer Republic. After a war which lasted three years, and at first threatened to exhaust British resources, Great Britain found herself in undisputed possession. The old enemies, who had fought so gallantly, accepted with equal frankness the decision of the sword; and the strange spectacle was seen of the general of a hostile Republic becoming within a few years the Prime Minister under responsible government of a loyal self-governing Colony. In the Orange River Colony, as well as in the Transvaal, the Ministers under responsible government were, to a great extent, the leaders in the war against Great Britain.

With the full triumph of the principle of responsible government the fact once more became manifest that in South Africa more perhaps than in any portion of the world there are common questions of general interest which can only be decided with safety by a general authority expressing the considered judgement of a United South Africa. Such union as existed prior to the Act of last year was due to the special interference of the High Commissioner, who acted as the mediator between the different Colonies in endeavouring to facilitate arrangements and accommodations among them; but such interference was unsatisfactory from the point of view of colonial selfgovernment, and could hardly have been exerted with success under the new system.

The three questions on which a common policy was most urgently necessary were the native question, the question of railway rates, and that of the tariff. The presence of a vast native population, which does not tend to disappear before the European advance, as the native population has disappeared in North America and Aus tralia, makes the problem of its future one of extreme

difficulty. Different ways may be proposed for dealing with the native question; but one thing is clear, that no way can be so bad as that of dealing with them differently in the different Colonies for no other reason except that politicians are of a different mind in the various States. As Lord Selborne wrote in the impressive Memorandum issued in 1907, which has been compared with Lord Durham's Report: 'Different policies applied at the same time in different parts of the country to the same races, the members of whom are in constant communication with one another, must together defeat the object at which each severally aims. The general result is sure to be something utterly unlike what any one of them was intended to produce; and proceeding from policies which are inconsistent and causes which are uncontrolled, will be accidental if not disastrous in its effects.'

But while the native question pointed to the necessity of some kind of union, it also put a serious obstacle in its way. In Cape Colony the policy had been adopted of giving natives who fulfilled certain qualifications the right to vote for members of Parliament. In the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony there was the strongest reluctance to adopt any such course. Some friends of the natives in Cape Colony preferred indefinitely to postpone federation rather than to sacrifice the forward policy of their Colony with regard to the natives; while in the Transvaal the great majority of the people were equally determined that the natives should not be allowed to vote. Considering this cleavage of opinion, the compromise was no doubt wise which maintained, for the present, the variety of systems prevailing in the different Provinces. The decision was severely criticized in England in the interests of the aborigines; but responsible statesmen of both parties have now come to recognize that with the people of South Africa must rest the settlement of such questions, and that it is idle to expect that the British Parliament, or