publics," and that "their union would be for ever indiffoluble." Thefe declarations, made long after America had avowed its neutrality, and had avowed its acquiefcence under the principle that a belligerent power, unreftrained by particular treaty, may of right take out of the bottoms of a neutral, the goods of its enemy, demonftrate that neither that neutrality nor that acquiefcence induced the want of a proper regard for France. The government of the United States ftill cherishes the hope, that this true and fair eftimate then made of its conduct, may foon be refumed by a nation whose friendship it has affiduously and unremittingly cultivated, by all thofe means which good faith and juftice would permit it to ufe.

After the difcuffion of this interefting question was fuppofed to have been clofed, and France was believed to have been entirely content with that fyftem in which the United States found themfelves bound to perfevere, fome complaints were made, not against the principles adopted by the government, but against the application of thofe principles to particular cafes fuppofed not to come within them. The neutrality of the United States could not permit prize to be made of those veffels belonging to nations with whom they were at peace, within their jurifdiction, or by privateers fitted out in their own ports. Regulations to this effect were neceffarily made, and to enforce the obfervance of those regulations was a duty not to be difpenfed with. The right of one of the belligerent powers to obtain the release of a veffel captured under fuch circumftances, was as facred as the right of the captor to a veffel taken on the high feas, and which according to the ufage of war was lawful prize. The United States were bound to refpect the rights of both. To do so, it was neceffary to examine the facts; for which purpose, a tribunal, in which both parties might be fairly heard, was unavoidable. Some complaints were made of particular vexations, and each complaint has been particularly attended to. It is believed to be unnecessary to review thefe feveral cafes, because the underfigned are entirely perfuaded that the explanations already given must have been completely fatiffactory. Should any one of them be still confidered as furnishing fubject for complaint, the undersigned will proceed to its inveftigation, with the moft fincere defire to attain truth, and to redress the wrong, if any has been committed.

During this period, the causes of complaint against France, on the part of the United States, were by no means inconfiderable. Their commerce was not exempt from depredations, be lieved to be entirely unwarrantable, made upon it by the cruifers of this republic.

On the 9th of May 1793, the National Convention paffed a decree relative to the commerce of neutrals, the firft article of which is in these words: "The French fhips of war and privaVOL. VII.

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teers

teers may ftop and bring into the ports of the republic fuch neutral veffels as are loaded, in whole or in part, either with provifions belonging to neutrals, and deftined for enemies ports, or with merchandife belonging to enemies." In confequence of the remonftrances of the American minifter, the Convention, on the 23d of May, declared, "that the veffels of the United States are not comprifed in the regulations of the decree of the 9th of May." On the 28th of the fame month the Convention repealed the decree of the 23d; on the ft July they re-established it; on the 27th July it was again repealed. Under the decree of the 9th May, the veffels of the United States were captured, brought into the ports of France, and their cargoes difpofed of. Could this decree, Citizen Minifter, be regarded otherwife than as infringing the laws of nations, the rights of neutrals, and the particular engagements fubfifting between France and the United States?

When, on the 8th June in the fame year, the British government iffued a fimilar order, its injuftice produced a ferment throughout America, indicating ftrong difpofitions immediately to oppofe its execution by force. The letter of Mr. Jefferson, the then fecretary of ftate, to the minifter plenipotentiary of the United States at London, dated the 7th September 1793, and remonftrating against the order of the 5th June, contains fo much juftness of sentiment and ftrength of argument, as to have been quoted by your predeceffor in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the 9th March 1796.

It cannot escape you, Citizen Minifter, that the arguments of Mr. Jefferfon, concerning the order of the 8th June, apply conclufively to the decree of the 9th May; and that to them are to be added thofe arguments which are to be drawn from the hardship of being abfolutely compelled, without any alternative, to part with the cargoes in France, and thofe alfo which are drawn from the duties impofed by an exprefs and folemn treaty.

Nothing can demonftrate more conclufively the real temper of the United States, than the difference between the reception given. to the decree of the Convention of the 9th May, and that which was given to the order of the British cabinet of the 8th June.

A large number of American veffels, too, were for a long time detained at Bourdeaux, very much to the injury of the owners, without affigning a motive for fuch detention, or putting it in the power of the government to conjecture the cause of a measure which fo deeply affected the intereft of their fellow-citizens. Thefe and other embarraffments were experienced; but they could not diminish the attachment of the United States to France. In the midst of them, prayers were offered up through the whole extent of the American continent for the fuccefs of this republic. The government feeling the fame fentiment, difplayed it, at least

as

as far as was compatible with the decent deportment required from a nation not a party in the war, and profeffing neutrality. Such would not have been the conduct of a government and people in fecret unfriendly to France.

Very strong and just refentments were at that time infpired by the hoftile conduct of Britain. The inftructions of June 1793, whereby American veffels laden with provifions for France were brought into the ports of Britain, there to fell fuch cargoes, or to give fecurity to fell them in other ports in amity with England, and the ftill more offenfive order of November the 6th, in the fame year, whereby veffels laden with the produce of a French colony were ordered to be brought in for adjudication, added to the pre-existing causes of mutual irritation, had produced fuch a ftate of things, as to render it obvious, that the injuries complained of by America must be entirely done away, or that war was the inevitable confequence.

This state of things was not fo altered by the order of the 8th of January 1794, revoking that of the 6th of November 1793, as to promife a different refult. But, as a nation preferring peace to war, will ever make a peaceful demand of reparation for injuries futtained, before that reparation is fought by the fword; and as the policy of America has ever been, to purfue peace with unremitting zeal, before the last refource, which has fo often been the fcourge of nations, and could not fail to check the advanced profperity of the United States, was contemplated;" an envoy extraordinary was deputed to his Britannic Majefty: "carrying with him a full knowledge of the exifting temper and 'fenfibility of his country, it was expected that he would vindicate its rights with firmnefs, and cultivate peace with fincerity."

Truly defirous as the American government were of preferving peace with Britain, its determination was unalterable, not to preferve it, nor to receive compenfation for injuries fuftained, nor fecurity against their future commiffion, at the expense of the fmalleft of its engagements to France. Explicit and pofitive inftructions to this effect were given to Mr. Jay, and those inftructions were freely communicated to the minifter of this republic, then at Philadelphia. The negotiation of the American envoy terminated in a treaty, in many refpects defirable to the United States.

But however defirable its objects might be, the government of the United States would not have hesitated to reject them, had they been accompanied with any ftipulation violating or weakening its engagements to France. But it has been able to difcern no fuch ftipulation. The 25th article of that treaty guards the rights of this republic by the following claufe: "Nothing in this treaty contained fhall, however, be conftrued to operate contrary to former and exifting public treaties with other fovereigns or Hh2

ftates."

ftates." The treaty with France being "a former and exifting public treaty," and it being thus provided, that nothing contained in the treaty with Britain "fhould be conftrued to operate contrary to it," the government of the United States did not apprehend that the treaty with Britain could be confidered as affecting its relations to France. But fuch was its attention to its ally, that the inftrument was, previous to its ratification, fubmitted to the confideration of the minifter of this republic, who was invited to communicate freely to the government of the United States fuch obfervations upon it as he might judge proper. Mr. Adet, in a letter addreffed to Mr. Randolph, dated 12th Meffidor, 3d year of the French republic (30th June 1795), expreffes his fenfe of this procédure in the following words: "This frank measure is to me a fure guarantee of the American government towards France, and of the fidelity with which it always marks its conduct towards a faithful ally." He then stated those reflections to which the reading of the treaty had given birth. The articles which relate to enemies goods in neutral bottoms, are mentioned without a comment. He contended that the lift of contraband was fwelled; and that the 23d, 24th, and 25th articles of the treaty with Britain, ceded to that power advantages inconfiftent with the previous ceffions to France. This letter was anfwered by Mr. Randolph on the 6th of July following, who proves, that no article was enumerated in the lift of contraband in the treaty between the United States and Britain, which was not of that defcription previous to its formation; and independent of it, noticed briefly the subject of enemy goods in neutral bottoms; and demonftrated, that the objections of Mr. Adet to the 23d, 24th, and 25th articles, were entirely founded on a mifconstruction of them. This mifconftruction was fo apparent, that Britain has never claimed it, nor would the American government ever have admitted it. The letter of Mr. Randolph clofes the fubject of enemy contraband, and of enemy property taken out of neutral bottoms, with a paragraph, to which, Citizen Minifter, your attention is folicited: "Hitherto, however," fays he, "I have fpoken upon principles of right: upon any other principles, and more efpecially upon thofe of hardship and injury to a friend, it fhall be a topic of the negotiation now opening between us. With the temper which will pervade the whole of it, I cannot doubt, that fome modification may be devised, and it may be feparated from the general treaty, fo as not to be delayed by it."

It was then apparent, that the government of the United States, actuated by that friendship which tranfcends the line of ftri&t obligation, was willing gratuitoufly to release her ally from thofe ftipulations of a former treaty, which, in the courfe of events, were deemed to operate unfavourably to her. This readinefs to

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Concede marks that friendship the more ftrongly, as the fituations in which the two nations found themselves could not have been unforeseen, but was the very fituation for which the article provides. The anfwer of Mr. Randolph concludes with requesting an opportunity to remove any remaining doubts, fhould there be fuch, by farther explanation: no remaining doubts were stated; and therefore, as well as for its contents, the letter was believed to be fatisfactory to Mr. Adet: and it was hoped that this government, as well as that of America, would confider the treaty with Britain as an accommodation defirable by the United States, and not difadvantageous to France.

It is not cafy to exprefs the chagrin felt by the American government on learning that in this treaty the United States were fuppofed to have "knowingly and evidently facrificed their connexion with this republic, and the most effential and leaft contefted prerogatives of neutrality." With the firmnefs of confcious integrity, the United States aver, that they have never, knowingly, facrificed or impaired their connexion with this republic nor the prerogatives of neutrality; but that they have, according to their beft judgment, invariably fought to preferve both.

The undersigned will endeavour faithfully to ftate the impreffrops of the government they reprefent on this interefting fubject. The objections made to this treaty by your predeceffor in office, in his note to Mr. Monroe, dated 19th of Ventofe, 4th year of the French republic, one and indivifible (9th March 1796),

are :

ift. That the United States, befides having departed from the principles established by the armed neutrality, have given to England, to the detriment of their firft allies, the moft ftriking mark of an unbounded condefcenfion, by abandoning the limits given to contraband by the law of nations, by their treaties with all other nations, and even by thofe of England with the greater part of the maritime powers.

2d. That they have confented to extend the denomination of contraband even to provifions. Inftead of pointing out particu larly, as all treaties do, the cafes of the effective blockade of a place, as alone forming an exception to the freedom of this article, they have tacitly acknowledged the pretenfions raifed by England to create blockades in the colonies, and even in France, by the force of a bare proclamation.

Mr. Adet, in his letter to Mr. Pickering, dated 25th Brumaire, fifth year of the French republic, one and indivifible (15th Nov. 1796), repeated the fame objection, and has been pleafed alfo to fuperadd fome obfervations relative to the formation of fuch a treaty generally, and the circumftances attending its negotiation, in terms not to have been expected by the first and almoft [only] voluntary friend of the republic.

Thefe