influence. In a great city, at a distance, I thought I saw two of the preachers suffer martyrdom. One of them was saidávaσxoλπið væ*—-to be beheaded, being a man of some dignity. The other was crucified, with his head downward—ws άulos ἀξιώσας πασειν. He was going out of the city to fly from the danger when he met his Lord, who told him that he was about to enter to be crucified again. It is needless to say that the disciple turned back, or rather, like me, he saw these things in a dream. Here the old man began to rock the boat, so that I thought I should fall into the river. I was about to call to him to stop, when I awoke, saying Here I have seen things strange and profitable, To shape my conduct, and also enable My heart the Gospel purpose to confess. O God, all gracious, can my soul do less Than trace these ancient wonders up to thee, He died for Adam's race, and O! he died for me. Here endeth the second vision of the wretched Andover Student. Eusebius' Hist. Lib. ii, c. 25. Do. Lib. iii, c. 1. ART. VI.-NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY AND INABILITY. A Discourse on Human Ability and Inability. By BENNET TYLER, D. D., President and Professor of Christian Theology, in the Theological Institute of Connecticut. 1854. A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Tyler, in Reply to his Discourse on Human Ability and Inability. By JOSEPH HARVEY, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Thompsonville, Conn. 1855. A Letter to the Rev. Joseph Harvey, D. D., in Reply to his Strictures on a Sermon of the Author, entitled "A Discourse on Human Ability and Inability. By BENNET TYLER, D. D. 1855. A Second Letter to the Rev. Dr. Tyler, on Human Ability and Inability. By JOSEPH HARVEY, D. D. 1855. A CONTROVERSY has arisen on this subject, in a quarter where it might least have been expected,-in New England, in Connecticut. Some months ago, the Rev. Dr. Tyler published a sermon on "Human Ability and Inability," in which he endeavored to show, in accordance with the views which have been long entertained on the subject, that men are naturally able to keep the commands of God; or, to use his own words, that "God does not require of men what they have no power to do." This he argues very conclusively from the just character of God, and from the nature of his requirements. It would seem that no one would listen to his reasonings on these topics, and not be convinced. And yet all are not convinced. The Rev. Dr. Harvey, formerly a Congregational minister, but now a Presbyterian of the old school, addresses a long letter to Dr. Tyler, in reply to his sermon. He objects to the doctrine of the sermon, that it is not contained in the text; that it is at variance with other parts of the discourse; that it is not sustained, either by the arguments adduced to support it, or by the authorities to which the author appeals, or by the Scriptures; and that it is highly objectionable, on account of its tendencies. Dr. Harvey believes that men are under obligations to obey the commands of God, because they are moral agents, and have all the faculties implied in moral agency; and yet that they have no ability of any kind to obey. To this Dr. Tyler replies, (in a published letter,) that Dr. Harvey's moral agency is the same as natural ability, in every thing except the terms; that where there are the faculties of moral agency, in a sane and healthy condition, there is natural ability, and vice versa; so that the controversy is one of mere words and phrases. In his second letter, Dr. Harvey expresses his satisfaction with the explanations of Dr. Tyler, but insists that his own use of terms is the best. It is safer to talk of the sinner's free moral agency, than of his natural ability, because of the equivocal character of the term ability; because the general usage of the church is against it; because it is unscriptural and antiscriptural, and calculated to mislead and deceive. It seems that Dr. Harvey was formerly a believer in natural ability, but he has grown wiser of late, and now prefers to ascribe to the sinner no more than an unembarrassed moral agency. Thus far, at this writing, the controversy has proceeded. It may be protracted to greater lengths, but we think not; because the question is now reduced to one of mere words, and Dr. Tyler says, at the close of his letter, "I now drop the discussion, with the full purpose not to resume it, unless there shall be more occasion for it, than I now anticipate. My age and the state of my health forbid my engaging in a protracted controversy; nor can I believe that such a controversy, on this subject, would be for the edification of the church." We propose not to remark on these pamphlets, farther than to say, that the venerable authors have discussed the question between them with much keenness and ability, and in a kind, fraternal spirit. They differ, it seems, only in words; and yet words have some importance attached to them. Next to clearness and correctness of thought, on any subject, is correctness of expression. Fatal errors in religion have sometimes arisen from an unguarded, unfortunate use of ternis. It should be the aim of every religious teacher, not only to maintain soundness in the faith, but to use "sound speech which cannot be condemned." We are believers in the distinction between natural and moral ability and inability; and in what follows, we shall endeavor to vindicate this distinction; to show its nature, and its importance in theology. It is a mistake to suppose that this distinction originated with President Edwards and his followers, or that it is confined to New England. It is as old, for aught we know, as the creation; as old, certainly, as the use of words, and the construction of sentences, by the human race. We find it in all lan guages, ancient and modern. We find it in all books, and in reference to all sorts of subjects; so that those who are inclined to repudiate it find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to succeed. The un duvapas of the Greek, the non possum of the Latin, the ne puis pas of the French, the little cannot of the English, are continually used in two different senses; the one expressing what is called a moral, the other a natural inability; the one a mere inability of disposition or will, the other an inability without the will, and over which the will has no power. We ask an obliging and pious friend to lift for us a weight of five hundred pounds. He replies, "I cannot do it." We ask him to go to some place of amusement on the Sabbath. He replies again, "I cannot do it." In both cases, he pleads (and pleads properly, as terms are used) an inability. But who does not see that here are two kinds of inability? My friend has no natural power to lift the weight. He could not lift it, if he would. He has the natural power to comply with the other request, and lacks only the willing mind. We ask a companion, who is with us in the field, to leap to the top of a precipice, fifty feet high. He says, "I cannot." But having clambered to the top, we ask him to leap down. He says again, "I cannot." His answer is the same in terms. He is unable either to leap up, or to leap down. But clearly, the inability in the two cases is not of the same nature. My companion could not leap up the precipice, if he would; but he could break his neck by leaping down, if he was so inclined. The distinction here illustrated is that between natural and moral ability, and inability. It is a distinction, as we said, which runs through all languagues, and all books. It occurs continually in common conversation. Not one of us passes a single day, unless we pass it in utter solitude, without repeat In replying to the sinner's plea of inability, the late Dr. Witherspoon says: "O that you would but consider what sort of inability you are under to keep the commandments of God! Is it natural, or is it moral? Is it a real want of ability, or is it only a want of will? Is it anything more than the depravity and corruption of your hearts?" Works, vol. i, p. 215. The Princeton Review says: "We readily admit that men have the natural faculties to obey God; in other words, that they are moral agents. And this is often what is meant by natural ability. We admit, also, that the inability of sinners is a moral inability, inasmuch as it relates to moral subjects, arises from moral causes, and is removed by a moral change." Bib. Repertory, vol. 14, p. 432. In a sermon, entitled "Adam and Christ," by Rev. E. C. Wines, D. D., lately published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication, the writer ascribes no other inability to the sinner, than that of will, and says expressly: "Through this mighty Restorer (Christ) it is in the power of every one of you to rise from the death and shame, and misery of sin, to a life that shall know no end." p. 70. edly using the words can and cannot in the two senses above indicated. This distinction shows itself very often in the Bible, and that, too, in connection with a great variety of subjects. In the following passages, the inability spoken of is obviously natural. "When Eli was laid down in his place, and his eyes began to wax dim that he could not see. 1 Sam. iii, 2. "The magicians did so with their enchantments to bring forth lice, but they could not." Ex. viii, 18. The men in the ship with Jonah "rowed hard to bring it to the land, but they could not." Jonah i, 13. "I besought thy disciples to cast out the evil spirits, and they could not." Luke ix, 40. In the passages which follow, an entirely different kind of inability is spoken of. Joseph's brethren "hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him." Gen. xxxvii, 4. "How can that which is unsavory be eaten without salt?" Job vi, 6. "We cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard." Acts iv, 20. "I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come." Luke xiv, 20 In each of these cases, there is obviously no lack of capacity, of natural power. The inability is wholly of a moral nature,-the inability of will. In establishing the fact of the distinction in question, we have indicated, to some extent, the nature and grounds of it. Natural ability has respect to the natural capacity or faculties of an individual. Moral ability has respect to the disposition, the concurrent will, or which is the same, to the predominant motive, with which the will always coincides. We have the natural ability to do whatever is within the reach of our natural capacity, faculty or powers,-those with which the God of nature has endowed us. We have the moral ability to do whatsoever, under the influence of the predominant motive, we are inclined, disposed, or willing to do. We Some writers who admit the distinction between natural and moral ability in respect to outward actions, doubt whether it can be applied to our internal exercises and affections. are morally able to perform an outward act, when we are disposed to perform it. But this disposition is itself an internal moral exercise; and when are we morally able to put forth that? Will it be said, "when we are disposed to put it forth?" But this implies a disposition before the first, which is absurd. The difficulty here arises from overlooking the ambiguities of this chameleon word disposition, and confounding the different senses in which it is used. This word occurs in common conversation, and in our discussions on moral subjects, in the three following senses: 1. There is the ulterior disposition,-a state of mind, and not an exercise, a proclivity, preparation, |