The decay of the Reichstag, Group System at work.

particularly patent to Bismarck, whose mind was always possessed by a dread of hostile combinations. He met it characteristically by concluding an alliance with the Austrian Monarchy. But he had already determined to throw over the Liberals and their policy with them. It is proof of the absence of any feeling for Parliamentary government in Germany that the Chancellor did not resign. He changed his programnie and continued in office.

There was another cause which moved Bismarck to a change of tactics. There was no doubt that German Liberalism was a decaying force. It had not been popular in its origin; it was an intellectual movement, bound to decline as soon as the masses had been made articulate by the grant of universal suffrage. A programme of practical Radicalism as an alternative attraction was inconceivable in a country where popular government had never existed. What was offered to the working classes, and accepted by them, was a new theory-and that theory was Socialism. Now to Bismarck Socialism was necessarily anathema. He was utterly destitute of democratic sympathies, and it was to the democracy that Socialism addressed itself. Moreover, as a result of constant and untiring energy he had at last turned the dream of a united Germany into a reality, and here was Socialism preaching Revolution. Bismarck was not the man to sit still while his work was being undone. He proclaimed that the Empire was in danger, and demanded drastic legislation. The Liberals exasperated him by refusing to put shackles on individual freedom. An accident gave the Chancellor his opportunity. In 1878 two attempts were made on the life of the Emperor, and in the second he was wounded. In the resulting panic Bismarck got his way; but his breach with Liberalism was already complete.

III.

Before the Empire was ten years old the process of Parliamentary disintegration was already fairly advanced. There were five parties in the Chamber-the Pro-Bismarckian and the AntiBismarckian Conservatives, the Pro-Bismarckian and the AntiBismarckian Liberals, and the Roman Catholic Centre. But for repressive legislation there would have been a sixth-the Social Democrats; and, indeed, some Socialists had managed to get elected. So disunited a body was unlikely to assert Parliamentary sovereignty, and an incident had already occurred which revealed its impotence. The military authorities felt that continuity of administration was hampered by an annual vote for men. They demanded that the establishment should be fixed for a period of seven years. The Chamber protested that it would not, and could not, give a vote which must inevitably weaken the authority of its successor, and from time to time the protest has been renewed. But it has always been overcome; though by way of concession the period of seven years has been reduced to five.

In 1878, however, an event occurred which was to shatter, apparently for ever, all dreams of Parliamentary government. The existing Tariff had been framed mainly in accordance with

orthodox principles. Bismarck had not, however, acted in any way out of deference to the professors. His business had been to exclude Austria from Germany, and he had accordingly established a Tariff in which that highly Protectionist Empire could not participate. By 1871 his object had been achieved, and there was nothing to prevent a reconsideration of the whole question and the establishment of a new Tariff with a different object. During the previous thirty years the Protectionist writings of Friedrich List had been steadily gaining ground, and at last Bismarck proclaimed himself converted. The Liberals were horrified and the Conservatives delighted, but both the horror of the one and the delight of the other were premature. Bismarck was no Protectionist of the old school. His Conservative supporters were landowners to whom Protection meant simply the exclusion of foreign cereals and foreign cattle. Bismarck, on the contrary, was clear that, although Prussia might not be a Western Power, the German Empire was, and accordingly he set himself to further the development of German industry, and he was not without allies. A number of members of the Liberal Party who were also business men approved of Protection for the infant industries of the Empire. The resulting Tariff was a compromise between the two views; it provided both for duties on food and for duties on goods. Neither side was fully satisfied, but both sides had partially attained their object.

The German Tariff has never lost the character imposed upon it in 1878. Periodically revised, it has always been carried by a composite majority of manufacturers and agrarians; and the only party it really suits is the Centre, which contains both these elments. Each successive Tariff is only regarded as a temporary measure; for the fiscal struggle has produced a new line of political cleavage in Germany. On the one side is the Right, whose stronghold is the East, desirous or protection for agriculture, but angry at the high price of goods, especially of agricultural machinery, and suffering under the high price of money and the migration of its best labour which industrial development has brought about. On the other side is the Left, whose stronghold is the West, desirous that the home market should be secured to its supporters, but protesting that the high rate of wages, consequent on the high price of food, is a most serious obstacle toward successful competition with foreign States in neutral markets. This cleavage between Agrarians and Industrialists is as real, and seems likely to be as permanent as the cleavage between Protestants and Roman Catholics. There are thus two simultaneous lines of party division in Germany, a fact which makes Parliamentary government impossible. For Parliamentary government presumes a responsible Opposition, and a responsible Opposition can never exist in a State where there must inevitably be three parties, a Right, Centre, and a Left. The result has been to concentrate all real power in the hands of the Executive, which relies on a composite majority differing, if need be, with each successive Bill. On the other hand, the parties have crumbled away under the corroding influence of the Tariff question. Not one is sufficiently powerful to carry its own policy

through as a whole. Consequently each has broken up into quite a number of groups representative of isolated and particular interests. When the Tariff comes up for reconsideration each group is ready to make a bargain with the Executive; and even the Social Democrats can be trusted to counterbalance Conservative opposition to a reduction of duties on food. It is at such moments as this that the Centre has its opportunity. Representing, as it does, every class in the State, it necessarily supports a Tariff which makes some effort to uphold a balance between all classes. It is thus a trustworthy and consistent supporter of the Executive, and the Tariff of 1905 could never have been carried without its aid. Now that it has done its work it has been thrown aside with characteristic violence; but the present Tariff will not endure for ever, and the next revision will give the Centre a chance of reasserting its influence.

We left the Social Democracy crippled but not crushed by the repressive legislation of 1878. The franchise of the working classes having been reduced to a farce, Bismarck assumed the role of a benevolent despot, and carried through a scheme of old age pensions, together with other social reforms. Meanwhile the leaders of the Socialist movement settled down to their work in London and Geneva, and, despite the vigilance of the police, quantities of leaflts and newspapers were smuggled into Germany. In 1890 the restrictive laws expired, and his defeat on the question of their renewal was the final though not the formal cause of Bismarck's retirement. Autocratic as ever, Bismarck submitted to his Imperial master proposals which would apparently have led to the disfranchisement of a large section of the population. To his lasting credit the Emperor refused to sanction them He was, he said, a young and untried man, and he was resolved not to begin his riegn with an act of tyranny. The Chancellor gave way, and the Workman's Law of 1890 is a comparatively mild enactment, under which Social Democracy has flourished and expanded. No such result, however, was intended or even foreseen. There is no doubt that the young Emperor was sincerely desirous of enlisting the masses in the work of government. Socialist, of course, he was not. But he was prepared to consider, and probably to support, any reasoned and moderate practical scheme of social reform put forward by the representatives of the proletariat. The Socialists had a glorious opportunity, of which they signally failed to take advantage. They refused to budge one inch from their attitude of irreconcilable opposition to the existing system. They would not modify what they intended to overthrow. Even in the Socialist ranks the wisdom of this step was much questioned both at the time and subsequently. At the present moment ground is being won by the Revisionists, who hold that Socialism should assert itself, promote useful though no doubt insufficient legislation, and make itself a real force in the State, abandoning its present position of theoretic dignity and practical sulkiness. The Revisionists may win a complete victory, but they are not likely to get another chance during the present reign. It was the Emperor himself who

offered peace, and his offer was rejected with scorn. His Imperial Majesty is not the man to forgive a snub. His denunciations of the Socialists have been continuous and uncompromising, and he has repeatedly asserted that Socialism and Patriotism are utterly incompatible.

During the present century there has been some improvement in the state of the Reichstag. The credit for this is due to the Centre, undoubtedly the best influence in German politics. Claiming, as it does, to represent not a class but a people it has met with natural approval from the Emperor, whose own ideal is to be the head of a nation and not of a clique. In Opposition it does not disintegrate; on the contrary, it is even stronger than when in office, for it has the support of the Deputies from Alsace-Lorraine, who are naturally reluctant to record a vote in favour of a Government they detest. Such an Opposition has a cohesive influence over the groups composing the majority, which consist at the moment of a bloc of Liberals and Conservatives. Its solidarity remains very doubtful, but it contains the elements of a national party, backed chiefly by the middle-class electors and comprising both agriculturists and merchants. The Chancellor has made efforts, up to the present not wholly successful, to deal with his majority as a party-not as a fusion of groups. This has especially been the case with his Naval and Colonial policy. There are many who fear that Prince Bülow has undertaken an impossible task; but all who are anxious that German policy shall be the consistent and indubitable expression of the wishes of the German nation as a whole, not of the interests which happen to predominate at the moment, will watch the new experiment with deep interest and with earnest wishes for its success.

IV.

Chancellor.

The Executive of the German Empire as recognised by the The Executive, Constitution consists of two persons, and of two only-the Emperor Emperor and and the Imperial Chancellor. The Chancellor is appointed by the Emperor, can be dismissed by him, and is responsible to him. He is President of the Federal Council, and it is convenient that, as chief Prussian delegate, he should also be chief Prussian Minister. All the other Imperial Ministers are subordinate to the Chancellor. Technically they are merely superintendents of the various departments of the Imperial Chancellery. They may, indeed, be endowed with plenary powers, as was the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Schön, at the time of the Imperial visit last autumn; but the right of conferring such powers is vested in the Chancellor, not in the Emperor. Inasmuch as one of the Emperor's main functions is to represent Germany in her dealings with foreign States it is desirable that the Chancellor should not be ignorant of diplomacy. Accordingly, of the four Chancellors of the Empire three have held Ambassadorial posts. The one exception, Caprivi, was a soldier, but his period of office was neither successful nor prolonged. It is clear that the relations between the Emperor and his only Minister must be peculiarly intimate; and that it must be hard to determine

the exact origin of any particular policy. Certainly the present Emperor felt himself unable to exert his proper influence while Bismarck was in office; and it is usually assumed in this country that Prince Bülow is simply the mild-mannered mouthpiece of his Imperial master. That is an exaggeration. One of the chief duties of a Chancellor is to manage the Reichstag; if he fails to do so he must either resign, as Prince Hohenlohe did, or fight the people, as Bismarck was ready to do. The Emperor consequently is not expected to identify himself with any particular piece of Parliamentary tactics. Still, that is what the present Emperor

has been induced to do.

The quarrel with the Centre was primarily Prince Bülow's quarrel; he had no right to expect active backing from the highest quarter. Nevertheless, at the last election the Prince was permitted to put the Imperial arms on his election posters, so to speak, and his success was greeted with open Imperial approbation. The Emperor thus showed the most signal loyalty to his Minister; a fact which will make his position extremely difficult if the bloc breaks down and the Prince has to resign. On the other hand, it would also be an exaggeration to say, as a German once said to the writer, that the Chancellor has the Emperor in his pocket, adding that the only European monarch who is capable of conceiving and accomplishing a policy entirely his own is the King of England-a view, by the way, which is not seldom expressed in Germany. As a matter of fact Prince Bülow and the Emperor work together with remarkable harmony; but it is probably correct to say that while in domestic policy the initiative is usually due to the Chancellor in foreign politics it is due to his master.

The constitutional position of the Emperor is every whit as anomalous as that of the Roman Cæsars whose title he bears. By the arrangements of the North German Confederation the Prussian King was given a position exceptional in three respects. In the first place the presidency of the Confederation was perpetually vested in Prussia. In the second place the Prussian King was made Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Armies in time of war. In the third place the Prussian Navy was transferred to the Confederation, while its command remained as before in the hands of King William. The possession of these special attributes offers a temptation to the King of Prussia as such to assert some form of superiority over his fellow Sovereigns, thus destroying the Federal character of the Union. Accordingly it was decided in 1871 to elevate these attributes into a separate office. The title finally selected as that least likely to wound particularist feelings was "German Emperor "-a title which was always to be borne by the King of Prussia. To the Constitutional lawyer, then, the Imperial style is simply an appanage of the Prussian Crown. As such it was always regarded by the first Emperor, who remained at heart and in conduct King of Prussia to the last. Indeed, as we know from his letters to his wife, he only accepted the new title with reluctance and even with sorrow. William II., on the other hand, is every inch an Emperor. In certain circles, both in