STRATEGICAL AND ECONOMICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL BY O. P. SPERBER Member National Geographic Society; Corresponding Member Commercial I T IS RATHER strange that the strategical and economical importance of the Panama Canal should be either over or under-valued, and that there are still some people who refuse to recognize the necessity for the United States of a fortified Canal, although it seems remarkable there can exist any doubt that this fortification really imposes itself. Besides being a necessity, the fortification of the Panama Canal by the United States will mean a public proclamation of her claim to an exclusive right of use of the Panama Canal for military purposes in case she should become involved in war, the claim to a right which must unreservedly be conceded her, and recognition of which will settle beforehand any idea of neutralization. Those opposed to the plan of fortification for the Panama Canal generally make reference, when discussing the matter, to the neutralization of the Suez Canal -a reference which does not tend to strengthen the force of their arguments, since the reasons which prompted the neutralization of the Suez Canal totally differ from those that now make the fortification of the Panama Canal a necessitv. The neutralization of the Suez Canal was recognized at the time by every one of the powers playing a part in the international political field, thus guaranteeing it, while nothing of the kind is the case with the Panama Canal, and it is this circumstance of an international agreement regarding the Suez Canal that furnishes the strongest argument in favor of a fortified Panama Canal. No power bound by the treaty may attack the Suez Canal without incurring the risk of depriving itself, forever, of the right to recur to any other treaty whatever, and it is not likely that any one will ever take its chance on this point and violate the neutrality of the Suez Canal. The Panama Canal, on the contrary, may, in case of war, be attacked by any power, with the exception of England, which stands under obligations assumed by a treaty with the United States, and, since the opening of the Panama Canal is really of secondary importance for European powers, it is only when hostilities shall break out between the United States and an Asiatic power that the strategical importance of the Canal and its fortification would be fully appreciated. The fact that the Panama Canal will be of small importance for Europe in general is reflected in the indifference shown by the various European powers in providing for a neutralization of this new waterway. Even England has shown but little interest in the matter, and has confined herself to a modification, in 1901, of the treaty of 1850, which was then adapted to modern requirements. On the other hand, it is not probable that a war will ever break out between the United States and any European nation, but even if the unexpected should really happen, the Panama Canal would be of no particular importance in such an instance, since the Atlantic Ocean would naturally be the scene of the struggle. Besides, the United States already controls the entrance to the Panama Canal on the Atlantic side, to which three routes lead; namely, between Cuba and Haiti, Haiti and Porto Rico, and Porto Rico and St. Thomas. As far as the Panama Canal is concerned, Cuba may be considered as being practically part of the United States' territory, as is shown by the existence of her Naval Station at Guantanamo. In case of need, Haiti could be easily occupied by an American army, while Porto Rico itself is an American possession. As to St. Thomas, which belongs to Denmark, it is not likely that this last nation would ever interfere in any struggle on the Atlantic Ocean. The only weak point to-day would be the Island of Jamaica, in the Caribbean Sea, belonging to Great Britain, which would probably never think of relinquishing it of her own free will in favor of the United States, inasmuch as the Panama Canal will be a new route to her possessions in the Far East, in the event that SAN FRANCISCO U. S. the Suez Canal should be closed to her for some unforeseen reason. But even this weak point could never prove an obstacle to any eventual scheme on the part of the United States, since England is too much in need of America's friendship, and even more interested in keeping this waterway open for herself, to be hostile, and thus jeopardize her valuable possessions in the West Indies. The matter has a different aspect when Japan is referred to as a possible adversary of the United States. To Japan the Panama Canal would be the only means of bringing her fleet within a few days from one ocean to the other. As long as this waterway is not open to navigation, or as long as there is a possibility of destruction, Japan would have to deal only with the American fleet stationed on the Pacific Coast at the time. Foresight and common sense must lead every American to the question. "Who N.ORLEANS NEW YORK 3277M HAWAII 4665 M Sea routes via Panama Canal. 1380 CUBA 1981 M HAITI S.THOMAS shall guarantee the neutralization of the Panama Canal at such a moment, if we do not fortify it and protect ourselves?" Japan would not even be pledged to regard the Panama Canal as neutral. In case of war, only unapproachable forts defended by effective batteries will be able to keep her men-of-war from the mouth of the Panama Canal. And who could have a right to protest against the fortification of the Panama Canal? Only England and Panama itself. Panama's protest would be readily disposed of, while here again England would rather prefer to incur the risk of losing Japan's friendship than America's friendship. The fortification of Singapore betrays the mistrust England is already feeling towards her ally of the Far East. This fortification is to prevent an unwelcome visit of the Japanese fleet in waters regarded by England as her own domain. Besides, the new friendly demonstrations which have taken place between Russia and Japan have been the cause of an alteration of the political situation in the Far East, which fails to be to England's liking. But we must go farther and admit here that the best forts, defended by a garrison of 4,000 of the bravest soldiers, will not afford sufficient protection to the Panama Canal, as these could not prevent the sudden landing of a corps of ten thousand men, whose first act would be the destruction of the Panama Canal, so as to render it impassable for months. A fortified Panama Canal will be of little practical value to the United States if, from the start, they do not have a sufficient number of warships stationed at Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, and at the Galapagos Islands, which this country has just acquired from Ecuador to defend the entrance to the Panama Canal from the Pacific outside. A fortified Panama Canal efficiently supported by these two naval stations would be the surest means to induce Japan to avoid all cause of conflict and confine her ambition to the Asiatic coast of the Pacific Ocean. The economical value of the Panama Canal is so closely connected with its strategical value that it can hardly be dealt with separately, but must rather be considered as part of the statement representing the importance of the Panama Canal for the civilized world. This economical importance of the Panama Canal is also greatly overvalued, as far as Europe is concerned, and it cannot be too intensively impressed that the economical value of the Panama Canal is of no more importance for the European powers than its strategical value, which has been discussed above. The following figures will be the best proof of the assertion made here on this subject: Sea Miles Hamburg via Suez to Hongkong..10,542 Hamb'g via Panama to Hongk'g..14,933 New York via Suez to Hongkong..11,655 New York via Panama to Hongk'g. 9,835 Hamburg via Suez to Melbourne..12,367 Hamburg via Panama to Melb'ne. 13,188 New York via Suez to Melbourne.12,500 New York via Panama to Melb'ne. 10,427 Hamburg via Suez to Yokohama..12,531 Hamb'g via Panama to Yokohama. 13,024 New York via Suez to Yokohama.13,564 N'w Y'k via Panama to Yokohama 9,835 As said before, these figures are the best proof that America will be the first to gain by the opening of the Panama Canal, as she will then be brought a great deal closer, from any point, to the Far East, to the great advantage of her commerce with these countries. Of not less importance for America is the fact that the opening of the Panama Canal will bring her Southern States into closer contact with the Far East, which will certainly contribute to promote their material development. And of greater importance still for America's trade and political influence will be the closer approach between the west and east coasts of both North and South America. Up to the present time, European influence. political and economical, has been predominant in the countries of the west coast of South America, but the opening of the Panama Canal, by creating an easier and shorter means of communication between the two American continents, will give the United States an advantage of which she will certainly make use to the extent allowed her by her commercial and productive capacities. Undoubtedly, the American masters of capital, when looking around for a remunerative investment, will now turn their attention, in a greater measure, to the opportunities offered in Central and South America, where they can readily gain a predominating influence. This does not mean that the advance of the United States in Latin America would necessarily mean the withdrawal of all European products from that market. Such surmise would simply tend to retard advance instead of accelerating it. machines in South America, America will remain first for all mass articles, while Europe will, as in the past, furnish LatinAmerica with all the articles of better quality and of a certain standard of artistic taste and workmanship. The time is not far off when America will outrank Europe in the production of mass articles, although there is another circumstance which is liable to handicap America's competitive force in the export market. Should the value of the soil and the wages of the artisans continue to increase in the future at the same rate as heretofore in the United States, she will scarcely ever be able to compete successfully in the neutral markets with other Owing to the great use made of countries. A VASE BY HERBERT HERON O whiter far than foam of rushing seas! The sun sets, and the pale thoughts leap to life: The reel and crash of empires in the dark! DRY VINEYARDS IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY BY ESTHER NORTON UR PARTY of three, the Man, sophisticated homeseeker. From the time the eleventh of November, 1908. It was not our first California experience, though on previous trips our interest had been merely that of the casual tourist; now it was the more personal interest of the homeseeker and possible settler. The choice of location proved difficult, as individual ideas differed so widely. The Man wanted a small place of two or three or five acres, where he could raise fruit and garden truck and perform the necessary labor himself. The Woman looked with longing eyes cityward, and had visions of a cozy flat near parks, libraries, churches, clubs and shops. The Boy's heart was set on a great cattle ranch where he could make use of his choice assortment of firearms, and become a genuine "broncho buster" and cowboy, his ideal hero being an imaginary combination of the "Virginian," Buffalo Bill and our beloved ex-President. With such diversity of wishes a compromise of some kind was a foregone conclusion; and after spending a few delightful weeks in and around beautiful Los Angeles and glorious Pasadena, we boarded the train for Fresno, the "Raisin City" of the world. Fresno County has been the subject of so much descriptive literature that any attempt to enlarge on its beauties and advantages is superfluous. Sufficient to say that one cannot over-rate the proven possibilities of this grand section of the San Joaquin Valley. Before coming to the Pacific Coast we were warned by many Eastern friends against real estate "robbers," "land sharks" and unscrupulous "promoters," all of whom were pictured as awaiting the arrival of each and every train from the East, with pockets full of figurative gold bricks, to unload on the innocent and un or After numerous automobile rides and railroad excursions in every direction, we finally decided on sixty acres of raw land without water rights, but conveniently near a large canal, in the vineyard section of the county; though it may quite as rightly be called the fig, orange, peach or other fruit section, as all are grown in this locality; however, it was with raisins in view that we purchased our "ranch," as every farm is called, whether made up of one acre or many. We spent the rainy season in Fresno, our land being fourteen miles east of that city and three miles from the lively village of Sanger, which place is as yet unincorporated, but is looking ambitiously towards a city charter in the near future. The accessibility of these places did much to make the city lover in our trio reconciled to the prospect of farm life; the Man found a few congenial spirits among the professional men, and the Boy adapted himself to the manners, speech and habits of the youthful population of Sanger as readily as a duck takes to water, and his new and exhaustive vocabulary was quick |