raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, cloathed, armed and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, cloath, arm and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men so cloathed, armed and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled."

The Articles of Confederation proved entirely inadequate, as is well known. Congress made requisitions on the States, and the States did whatever they chose. The obligation of the States was clear, but there was no means of enforcing it. The obligation of Members of the League to comply with the decision of the Council under Article 10 seems equally clear, although for the enforcement of this obligation no means are provided.

The language of Article 16 is somewhat different in its terms. The Article provides:

"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the

League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

In this Article there is no primary obligation on the part of any Member of the League to furnish any armed forces whatever. The action of the Council is purely advisory, and is a mere recommendation. In Article 10, on the other hand, there is a positive inchoate obligation on the part of the Members of the League to preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members of the League. The advice of the Council under Article 10 is not a mere recommendation, but is an act making the inchoate obligation definite and complete. The fact that the language is obscure does not do away with the fundamental principle of interpretation, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Article 10 must have been intended to impose some obligation upon the Members, and to define that obligation. As the obligation expressed is not adequately defined by the Covenant, the definition of that obligation is left to the Council, and unless the action of the Council is regarded as defining the obligation in question, that obligation is necessarily void for uncertainty.

Article II contains the following provision:

"Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council."

This Article clearly confers legislative authority upon the League to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations," in case of “any war or threat of war." This legislative power is given to the League. Under Articles 3 and 4, the legislative power of the Assembly and of the Council is concurrent. Article 11, how

ever, seems intended to limit the power of action in the case specified, to the Council.

Article 13, providing for the submission of disputes to arbitration, and for the compliance with the award by the Members, contains the following clause:

"In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto."

The word "propose" is about as uncertain from a legal standpoint as any term that could be used. A proposal is made to some one, but the Article does not say to whom the proposal is to be made, whether to the Assembly, or to the Members of the League in general, or to the Member whose award has not been complied with by the other Member. Again, a proposal requires acceptance or approval by someone before it takes effect, and there is no reference in the Article to any such acceptance or approval by anyone. The clause is absolutely unintelligible unless the word "propose" is to be construed as equivalent to "decide." If the Council decides what measures shall be taken, it acts in a legislative capacity, determining the sanction for the performance of the Member's obligation to comply with the award. If the Council does not decide, who does decide? The fact that the measures to be taken are to be taken, not by the Council, or by the League, but by the Members themselves, and that the Council has no means of compelling them to take such measures, does not alter the situation. If the Council decides that Members may take certain measures against the defaulter, its position is equivalent to a judgment of limited outlawry, as will be seen later in examining the sanctions provided for the enforcement of obligations of Members of the Permanent Organization of Labour. If the Council decides that the Members shall take certain measures, this is equivalent to a judgment of execution in which the Members act as the agents or officers of the League in enforcing the obligation of the defaulting Member. Article 17 provides for inviting States not members of the

League to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of dispute, and provides that "if both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute." This clause gives the Council general legislative authority in regard to the disputes. The words "may take such measures" are sufficient to include, (1) an order of the Council to the Members of the League to boycott the other States; (2) an order of the Council to the Members of the League to make war on the other States, in the nature of a war to enforce peace.

Under Article 24 the Council has legislative authority to include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat, the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

II. The Legislative Power in the Permanent Organization of Labour.

The Permanent Organization, being merely a rudimentary political society, has no definite provisions for a legislative body. The constitution of that Organization contains legislative provisions imposing certain obligations on the Members, but for further legislation, either by the Permanent Organization itself, or by the General Conference, there is no express provision. Notwithstanding this fact, legislation by the Organization may take place in one of two ways: First, by the adoption of an amendment to Part XIII of the Treaty under Article 422, just as the legislative provision prohibiting the sale of liquor was written into our Constitution by the Eighteenth Amendment. The second method of legislation is quite peculiar. Under Article 405 the General Conference adopts proposals, or recommendations, or conventions. These proposals have in themselves no legal effect. Article 405 provides that

"If on a recommendation no legislative or other action. is taken to make a recommendation effective, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the Member."

When a draft convention, however, proposed by the General Conference under Article 405, is ratified by two or more Members, it is a law of the Permanent Organization that the Members so ratifying shall comply with the terms of the convention. Such convention is not like an ordinary treaty, because the parties cannot abrogate it by mutual consent. An ordinary treaty is analogous to an ordinary contract. A draft convention proposed by the Conference and ratified by the Members is more analogous to the contract of marriage, which is not to be abrogated by the consent of the parties. A draft convention when ratified, can only be superseded by another convention proposed by the Conference and ratified by the Members who ratified the previous draft convention. By the joint action, then, of the General Conference and of the Members ratifying the Treaty, a law of the Permanent Organization is adopted requiring the Members so ratifying to comply with the convention. This law may be amended or repealed by the subsequent proposal of a new draft convention by the General Conference, ratified by the Members ratifying the previous convention.

The more difficult question arises as to the effect of legislative action taken by a Member of the Permanent Organization upon the recommendation of the General Conference. The language of Article 405 is quite obscure. It is provided that,

"If on a recommendation no legislative or other action is taken to make a recommendation effective, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the Member."