swamp to their baggage and horses; nor could they be again brought into action as a body, although efforts were made repeatedly by my staff to induce them to do so. The enemy, however, were promptly checked and driven back by the Fourth and Sixth Infantry, which, in truth, might be said to be a moving battery. The weight of the enemy's fire was principally concentrated on five companies of the Sixth Infantry, which not only stood firm, but continued to advance until their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, and his adjutant, Lieutenant Centre, were killed, and every officer, with one exception, as well as most of the noncommissioned officers, including the sergeant-major and four of the orderly sergeants, killed and wounded of those companies; when that portion of the regiment retired a short distance and were again formed, one of the companies having but four men left untouched.

Lieutenant-Colonel Foster with six companies, amounting in all to 160 men, gained the hummock in good order, where he was joined by Captain Noel, with the two remaining companies of the Sixth Infantry, and Captain Gillam, of Gentry's volunteers, with a few additional men, and continued to drive the enemy for a considerable time, and by a change of front separated his line, and continued to drive him until he reached the great Lake Okeechobee, which was in rear of the enemy's position, and on which their encampment extended for more than a mile.

* *

*

The action was a severe one, and continued from half past 12 until after 3 p. m., a part of the time very close and severe. We suffered much, having 26 killed and 112 wounded, among whom are some of our most valuable officers. The hostiles probably suffered, all things considered, equally with ourselves, they having left 10 dead on the ground, besides doubtless carrying off many more, as is customary with them when practicable. a

The tenacity with which, as a people, we cling to the delusion that a citizen with a musket is equal, if not superior, in courage to a disciplined soldier, was curiously illustrated by the publication of General Taylor's official report.

Incensed by the reflections on the behavior of her troops, the legislature of the State of Missouri appointed a joint committee, to investigate the case of the men whose conduct had been impeached.

On receiving this report the legislature, in February, 1839, nearly fourteen months after the battle, passed a series of joint resolutions, the first of which declared that the conduct of the Missouri volunteers and spies in the Florida campaign "was such as only could be expected from good soldiers and brave men." The second resolution declared "that so much of Col. Z. Taylor's report of the battle of Okeechobee, which charges that the Missouri volunteers and spies mostly broke and fell back to the baggage, and that the repeated efforts of his staff could not rally them, is proved to be unfounded, not to say intentionally false."

* * *

The third, fourth, and fifth resolutions declared:

That so much of said report which states that the Missouri volunteers and spies behaved themselves as well or better than troops of that description usually do, is not so much a compliment to them as a slander upon citizen soldiers generally; that Colonel Taylor, in his report of the battle of Okeechobee, has done manifest injustice to the Missouri volunteers and spies, and that said report was not founded upon facts as they occurred; that a commanding officer who wantonly misrepresented the conduct of men who gallantly sustained him in battle, is unworthy a commission in the Army of the United States.

a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 987, 988.
Barns' Commonwealth of Missouri, p. 237.

NUMBER OF TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1837.

This number can not be definitely stated. The return of the Adjutant-General for November 30, 1837, showed that there were in Florida, on that date, the following troops: "

Of the regular force, 2,870 were "present for duty;" of the volunteers, 4,012. Under the law these men could only be organized for either six or twelve months, and must therefore be discharged at the end of the next campaign. At this very time, the regular force in Florida could have been raised to more than 7,700 rank and file, during the war, by increasing the 77 companies to 100 enlisted men each.

In addition to the volunteer force as given in the table, 1,200 mounted men were supposed to be en route from Georgia, making a total of 5,476 volunteers.

The whole number of raw troops who had been called into service in Florida up to this time was 15,290, including about 900 Indian warriors.

Before the close of 1837, unfavorable comment was excited by the extravagance of the war, which was to a great extent due to the large proportion of mounted troops. Notwithstanding the well-established military axiom that cavalry require much longer training and instruction than infantry, the table shows that, exclusive of the 1,200 Georgians, nearly four-fifths of the volunteers were mounted. Among the regulars, on the other hand, the dragoons numbered less than oneseventh.

The dependence of the Government upon the caprice of raw troops, and its inability to control expenditures, were well shown in the case of the Georgia troops above referred to. Writing to Mr. Poinsett, the Secretary of War, November 22, General Jesup states:

By Lieutenant McLean, who arrived yesterday, I was informed that a force of 1,200 or 1,300 Georgia volunteers were on their march to Florida. I had requested the governor to send Colonel Nelson with a battalion or even a regiment, if he could raise the force; but, in reply, he informed me that you had countermanded the requisition on that State; and I had learned from Major Churchill, as well as from other sources, that the colonel was employed on the Cherokee frontier and would not be in Florida. I had, therefore, not calculated upon him.

a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 920.

On the 5th instant, I received information that the Colonel was on his march with a regiment. That force I believed I could employ usefully, if it should arrive, and determined to accept it, but I shall be rather embarrassed by the force now arriving. To refuse to accept it, however, might produce difficulty with the volunteers, which would probably be injurious to the service in any future occasion, where such a force might be required. As it is near at hand, I believe the better course will be to accept it, and give it active employment at once. I shall, therefore, take it into service, and it will enable me to cover every foot of the country where an enemy could find refuge. The greatest difficulty will be to supply this force; but the Quartermaster's and Commissary's departments will only have to redouble their energies. * * *

The day previous General Jesup wrote to the Secretary:

Congress, I preceive, are alarmed at the expenses of the war; they have gotten the country into it, and they will find that they must make three or four such appropriations, at the least, before they get clear of it. They broke the Army down in 1821, and are responsible for all the Indian difficulties which have since taken place. Had they left it as it was in 1818, it would have been competent, with the two regiments of dragoons since added, for every purpose of defense, as well as for the suppression of every hostile movement on the part of the Indians. a

On the receipt of General Jesup's letter, the Secretary of War, on the 1st of December, replied:

I received your letter of the 22d ultimo yesterday afternoon, and hasten to say that the great amount of force expected from Georgia was uncalled for, and can not be retained in the service. Such an additional number of mounted men will break down your army, destroy all the resources of the country, and consume the forage and provisions collected for the supply of the troops calculated for.

The next day he continued:

*

*

*

Alarmed at the immense accumulation of volunteer mounted men in Florida, and seriously apprehensive that we might not have the means of maintaining them in the field, I wrote you a hurried letter yesterday directing the Georgia militia to be discharged. If, however, you find that you can better spare the Alabama or any other troops, you can select the best. I do not think your operations would be at all retarded, or your army less efficient by limiting the number of mounted men to 2,000, including the regular cavalry, or, if absolutely necessary for escorts, the number may be carried up to 2,000 mounted volunteers.

* * *

I am not disposed, as you know, to jeopardize the success of the campaign by the exercise of an ill-judged economy, but the attention of the public has been called to the immense expenditures occasioned by this war, and they have become a matter of investigation by Congress, and we are called upon by our sense of duty and regard for the reputation of the service, to avoid the appearance of lavish or unnecessary expense. ** * The manner in which the volunteers have everywhere obeyed the call of their country, and by their eagerness to serve in this war, have led their officers to exceed the call made upon the States, is highly creditable to them, and is fully appreciated by this Department; and in declining their services at this moment, it is governed only by a sense of its paramount duty to the country. It has been represented that the volunteers on entering the service have had their horses appraised, some at the exorbitant price of $300; thus attempting to establish a claim for this unreasonable rate of compensation, for any loss they may hereafter sustain. It may be proper to inform all such persons that it is the determination of this Department, unless otherwise directed by the laws that may be passed for indemnity against such losses, not to allow more than $120 for any cavalry horse that may die in the service.b

As a private then received but $5 per month, it should be observed that the amount allowed by the Secretary, to volunteers for each horse dying in service, was equal to two years full pay of a regular soldier; the appraised value equaled his full pay for five years.

a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 889.
American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 855.

DETACHED SERVICE.

All defects in the peace organization of 1821 were brought to light during the first year of the Florida war, but none more conspicuously than the evil of detached service.

Much of this was due to the law and to the attempt to economize in the staff, at the expense of the line, by detailing officers from the latter, with no provision to replace them by supernumeraries.

The evil was not confined to the commissioned officers, but embraced the enlisted men, who were detailed in large numbers on extra and daily duty in departments, which in other armies, have their special organizations.

Its effect in reducing the Army to a mere skeleton, was fully set forth in the reports of military commanders.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Pierce, First Artillery, in a report dated Fort Heileman, September 13, 1836, stated:

I can not permit the express to depart, without stating to you the miserably deplorable situation of the regular troops in the Territory, as regards their efficient action in the field. There are here 11 companies of artillery; the whole presents a fighting force of 110 men; and while we are entitled to 55 officers, we have here only 6 for company duty.a

The colonel of the same regiment, February 2, reported:

There are only 7 company officers present for duty with the 9 companies (of the regiment), and not one of the officers attached to Companies C, D, and I are present with any of those companies. a *

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*

While such was the state of the battalions in active service in Florida, the condition of those ordered to the Creek country was but little better.

In the month of June, 1836, with 16 companies there were present 27 officers. Included in this number were 5 captains detached from their companies, either as battalion commanders, inspectors, or performing other duties as field officers.

The condition of the troops in Florida in 1836 was more specifically stated in the report of the Adjutant General dated February 27, 1837, pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives on the 13th of the same month.

In June, while the officers present numbered but 33, the absentees, deducting a few vacancies, numbered 81.

Of the detached officers "the greater number were absent on ord nance, engineer, and topographical duty, Indian service, etc."

March 2, 1837, the Adjutant-General submitted a supplemental

report showing the number of officers, during the year 1836, who were employed in any service which separated them from their respective regiments or corps.

From this report it appears that the number of officers detailed from the line were as follows:

The depletion will perhaps be better understood, by giving the complement of officers in each artillery regiment and then the absentees. This table does not include officers of artillery detailed as aid-decamp on recruiting service, or in the Quartermaster or Commissary Departments:

The officers of the Third Artillery were detached as follows:

16

16

1

5

3

1

22

The number of companies of dragoons, artillery, and infantry in the Army at the period of this report was 126, their complement of company officers was 456; the number left for duty after deducting 181 on detached service (2 officers on detached service were field officers) was 275, or less than 2 per company.

From the number 275, there were still to be deducted regimental and post adjutants, post quartermasters, the absent with leave, sick, and many other officers, the companies on the average being left with less than one-half of the complement required for field service.

The number actually detailed on detached service amounted to 37 per cent of the total number of officers 491, belonging to the line of the Army.