policy of Congress has been the most absurd and ridiculous imaginable, pouring in militiamen who come and go every month. A military force established upon such principles defeats itself. People coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life are not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over dead men, to hear without concern the groans of the wounded-I say few men can stand such scenes unless steeled by habit or fortified by military pride. There must be a good army established; men engaged for the war; a proper corps of officers; and then, after a proper time to discipline the men, everything is to be expected. The Congress goes upon a penurious plan. The present pay of the officers will not support them, and it is generally determined by the best officers to quit the service unless a more adequate provision is made for their support. The present establishment is not thought reputable. The Congress has never furnished the men voted by near one-half, certainly by above a third. Had we had numbers we need not have retreated from Long Island or New York. But the extent of ground to guard rendered the retreat necessary; otherwise the army would have been ruined by detachments. The enemy never could have driven us from Long Island and New York if our rear had been secured. We must have an army to meet the enemy everywhere; to act offensively as well as defensively. Our soldiers are as good as ever were, and were the officers half as good as the men they would beat any army on the globe of equal numbers. a Anxious to promote the welfare and reputation of the troops of his native State, Greene wrote to Governor Cooke, on the 11th of October: His Excellency General Washington will transmit you a list of officers to constitute the two new regiments to be raised by your State. The most of those officers are gentlemen whose conduct has been approved by those under whom they have served. The success of the cause, the defeat of the enemy, the honor of the State, and the reputation of the army altogether depend upon the establishing a good core, or corps, of officers. My little experience has fully convinced me that without more attention is paid by the different States in the appointment of the officers, the troops never will answer their expectations. * I am sensible that America has as good material to form an army as any State in the world, but without a good set of officers the troops will be little better than a lawless banditti, or an ungovernable mob. * * The Americans possess as much natural bravery as any people upon earth, but habit must form the soldier. The remaining military events of the year can be quickly told. Upon the advance of the enemy, Washington, for want of good troops, retreated to White Plains, where on the 29th of October he offered battle. Declining this, the British fell back on New York and took Fort Washington on the 16th of November with 2,000 prisoners. They then transferred the scene of operations to New Jersey, forcing Washington with some 5,000 men to cross the Delaware into Pennsylvania, as he was powerless to make even a show of resistance while the mili tia and other troops of the flying camp were disbanding. This retreat was followed on the 26th of December by the brilliant surprise of the Hessians at Trenton, where Washington, with a force of 2,400, took over 900 prisoners without losing a man. A week later the battle of Princeton ended the campaign, the British losing over 400 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. A large British detachment which went to the South under Clinton and Cornwallis got back in time to take part in the operations about New York, after being handsomely repulsed at Charleston in an attack on Fort Moultrie, on the 28th of June. In Canada, at the beginning of May, the American troops in front of Quebec numbered but 1,900 men, of whom 900 were sick with the a Greene's Life of General Greene, vol. 1, pp. 222, 223. smallpox. Attacked by a superior force they began their retreat on the 6th of that month, evacuating Montreal in June, and arriving at Crown Point in July. Thence they fell back on Ticonderoga, being without supplies and provisions. Carleton followed as far as Crown Point, and on the 3d of November returned to Canada and went into winter quarters. TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1776. The following table," submitted to Congress by the Secretary of War in 1790, shows the number of troops furnished by the States during the year 1776: a In the table as published--American State Papers, Vol. XII, p. 15-there is an error in addition in the total of the left-hand column and another in the aggregate of militia and Continentals for Maryland. These have been corrected here, assuming that the quotas of individual States are correctly given. Conjectural estimate of militia employed in addition to the above. The table does not show that the 46,901 men were on the Continental establishment, but as the 26,060 militia were called out for six months, and the conjectural militia for periods varying from four to eight months, the average army maintained during the whole year may be reckoned at between 40,000 to 50,000 men. The highest estimate of the British numbers opposed to this large force does not exceed 34,000, yet the only offensive operations we were strong enough to undertake were in the vicinity of Boston, at Trenton, and at Princeton. The disparity between the resources employed and the results obtained is another proof of the wastefulness of a policy based on the employment of raw troops. During this year several resolutions were passed showing that Congress was alive to the importance of enlisting men only "for the war, ," but upon representations that the uncertainty as to its duration was deterring enlistments, Congress so modified the resolution of September 16, as to permit men to enlist for "three years" or for "during the war," the former to have but $20 bounty, the latter to have $20 and 100 acres of land. November 21, Congress authorized the States to enlist men for "three years," but expressed the opinion that the service would be benefited by enlistments "during the war." BOUNTY. The bounty system was a child of the Revolution, called into being when the colonies denied Congress the power of compelling enlistments. It grew steadily during the long struggle for independence, only to reach its full maturity in our late civil war. During the year 1776 Washington frequently recommended the granting of bounties. In a letter of his to the President of Congress, dated September 24, the following passages occur: With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the continuance of the war ought they to be engaged, as facts incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistment increase with time. When the Army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war. After this they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence by remarking, that, to get in their militia in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short enlistments, I took the liberty in a long letter to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such reasons for it as experience has since convinced me were well founded. At that time $20 would, I am persuaded, have engaged the men for this term. But it will not do to look back; and if the present opportunity is slipped I am persuaded that twelve months more will increase our difficulties fourfold. I shall therefore take the freedom of giving it as my opinion that a good bounty should be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least a hundred or a hundred and fifty acres of land and a suit of clothes and blanket to each noncommissioned officer and soldier; as I have good authority for saying that, however high the men's pay may appear, it is barely sufficient, in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in clothes, much less afford support to their families." On the 19th of January Congress, in order to expedite the raising of troops for Canada, advised the colonies to give a bounty of six dollars and two-thirds to every man who would present himself "properly clothed for service, and having a good firelock with bayonet and other accouterments," and "four dollars to men without like arms and accouterments.' June 26, Congress resolved: "That a bounty of ten dollars be given to every noncommissioned officer and soldier who would enlist to serve for the term of three years. To secure "equalization," which must inevitably follow when once the bounty system has been inaugurated, Congress resolved, July 16, to apply the resolution of June 26 "to all men in the Continental Army, and all others who will enlist for three years after expiration of the present term of enlistment." Having increased the bounty two fold between January and June, Congress more than doubled it again by its resolution of September 16, creating the 88 battalions, which promised a bounty of $20 and 100 a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, p. 112. 66 acres of land to every noncommissioned officer and soldier who would agree to serve during the war." September 18, another resolution of "equalization" followed, extending the bounty voted on the 16th to all who are enlisted or shall enlist for during the war. The bounty of ten dollars which any soldiers have received from the Continent in account of former enlistments to be reckoned as part payment of the twenty dollars allowed by said resolution." October 8, Congress bound itself to give annually to every noncommissioned officer and soldier who would enlist "during the war 99 a suit of clothes valued at $20, or the same sum in money on certificate from his captain that he had procured the suit for himself. To reimburse officers for expenses incurred in recruiting, they were allowed $1.33 for every man enlisted. While Congress was thus bidding for men, the States began to bid in opposition, both for recruits for the Continental Army and for the militia. October 30, Congress asked Maryland to reconsider its resolution giving a $10 colonial bounty in lieu of 100 acres of land, assigning as a reason that other soldiers would demand the same bounty and require Congress to grant it. The following letter from Washington to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, written on the 10th of November, explains the difficulties imposed upon the General Government by the bounty offered to the soldiers of the Connecticut quota: I was yesterday evening favored with a call by the gentlemen appointed commissioners from your State to arrange your officers and to adopt some line of conduct for recruiting the quota of men which you are to furnish. In discussing this subject the gentlemen informed me that your assembly, to induce their men to enlist more readily into the service, had passed a vote advancing their pay 20 shillings per month over and above that allowed by Congress. It is seldom that I interfere with the determinations of any public body or venture to hold forth my opinion contrary to the decisions which they form; but upon this occasion I must take the liberty to mention, especially as the influence of that vote will be general and continental, that, according to my ideas and those of every general officer I have consulted, a more mistaken policy could not have been adopted or one that in its consequences will more effecually prevent the great object which Congress have in view and which the situation of our affairs so loudly calls for, the levying a new army. That the advance allowed by your State may be the means of raising your quota of men sooner than it otherwise would perhaps may be true; but when it is considered that it will be an effectual bar to the other States in raising the quotas exacted from them when it is certain that if their quotas could be made up without this advance coming to their knowledge the moment they come to act with troops who receive a higher pay jealousy, impatience, and mutiny will immediately take place and occasion desertions, if not a total dissolution of the army, it must then be viewed as injurious and fatal. That troops will never act together, in the same cause and for different pay, must be obvious to everyone. Experience has already proved it in this army. That Congress will take up the subject and make the advance general, is a matter of which there can be but little probability, as the addition of a suit of clothes to the former pay of the privates was a long time debated before it could be obtained. a Two days later, November 12, the bounty legislation of the year was closed by a resolution of Congress disapproving of the increased pay already promised by the colony of Massachusetts. Although Congress, for reasons beyond its control, was forced to continue the bounty system, the facts as given above show that all the evils which follow in its train were laid bare during the very first year of its existence. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, p. 170. It may be laid down as an axiom, based upon historical proof, that any Government which foregoes its rights to compulsory military service, becomes more and more enslaved by depending solely upon voluntary military service induced by gifts of money, land, and clothing. DICTATORIAL POWERS GRANTED TO WASHINGTON. The campaign of 1776 demonstrated in a remarkable manner the dangers to which liberty was exposed by an unwise and feeble military policy. In his letter of September 24, Washington referred to the feeling that a standing army was a menace to liberty, yet for the lack of an adequate force of this character he found himself repeatedly compelled to exercise unwarrantable powers. Washington's embarrassing position is best portrayed by the following extract from his letter to the President of Congress, describing the measures adopted to secure the troops needed for the battles of Trenton and Princeton: Since their arrival we have been parading the regiments whose term of service is now expired, in order to know what force we should have to depend on, and how to regulate our views accordingly. After much persuasion, and the exertions of their officers, half or a greater proportion of those from the eastward have consented to stay six weeks on a bounty of $10. I feel the inconvenience of this advance, and I know the consequences which will result from it; but what could be done? Pennsylvania had allowed the same to her militia; the troops felt their importance and would have their price. Indeed, as their aid is so essential, and not to be dispensed with, it is to be wondered at that they had not estimated it at a higher rate. I perceive that Congress, apprehensive of this event, had made unlimited provision for it. a The condition of his army is again fully set forth in another letter to the same person, dated December 20: It is needless to add that short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. We find, sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball by rolling, will increase unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while, also, and the militia of those States which have been frequently called upon will not turn out at all; or, if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could anything but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia? Can anything (the exigency of the case indeed may justify it) be more destructive to the recruiting service than giving $10 bounty for six weeks' service of the militia who come in, you can not tell how; go, you can not tell when, and act, you can not tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment? These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence; this is the basis on which your cause will and must forever depend till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy. I therefore beg leave to give it as my humble opinion that eighty-eight battalions are by no means equal to the opposition you are to make, and that a moment's time is not to be lost in raising a greater number, not less, in my opinion and the opinion of my officers, than a hundred and ten. It may be urged that it will be found difficult enough to complete the first number. This may be true, and yet the officers of a hundred and ten battalions will recruit many more men than those of eighty-eight. In my judgment this is not a time to stand upon expense; our funds are not the only object of consideration. The almost total dissolution of the Army, the rapid advance of the British through New Jersey, and the apprehended fall of Philadelphia, the capital of the United Colonies, inspired Congress with such alarm that, on the 27th of December, it not only voted the increase recommended for the Army, but vested Washington with dictatorial a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, pp. 254,255. |