Gen. William J. Worth's division.

Bvt. Col. John Garland's brigade: Second Artillery, Third Artillery, Fourth Infantry.

Col. Ñ. S. Clarke's brigade: Third Infantry, Sixth Infantry, Eighth Infantry, Light Company A, Second Artillery; Light battalion.

Gen. David E. Twigg's division.

Gen. P. F. Smith's brigade: First Artillery; Third Infantry; Rifle Regiment. Col. B. Riley's brigade: Fourth Artillery; Second Infantry; Seventh Infantry; Engineer company; Ordnance company; Light Company K, First Artillery.

Gen. Gideon J. Pillow's division.

Gen. F. Pierce's brigade: Ninth Infantry; Twelfth Infantry; Fifteenth Infantry. Gen. George Cadwalader's brigade: Voltigeurs; Fourteenth Infantry; Eleventh Infantry; Light Company I, First Artillery.

Gen. J. A. Quitman's division.

Gen. James Shields's brigade: New York Regiment; South Carolina Regiment; Marine Corps.

Lieut. Col. S. E. Watson's brigade: Second Pennsylvania Volunteers; H Company, Third Artillery; C Company, Third Dragoons.

Gen. Wm. S. Harney's brigade: First Battalion Cavalry; Second Battalion Cavalry. The relative composition of the army of regulars and volunteers should not escape the reader's attention. The President in his message asked Congress to give him "a large body of volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve months." Congress, going beyond the request, gave him authority to call out 50,000 for "twelve months," or to the end of the war," and yet, through his own mistake, when the crisis arrived there were but four half-filled regiments present to participate in the conflict.

But those regiments organized in December of 1846 had had the benefit of eight months' training, had already participated in the siege of Vera Cruz and the battle of Cerro Gordo, and were worthy of being called reliable troops. Advancing with an army of less than 10,000 effectives, the brilliant victories of Contreras, Cherubusco, El Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec opened the gates of the capital, which General Scott entered on the 14th of September. In the series of battles, beginning on the 20th of August, our largest force engaged was 8,479; our loss in killed and wounded was 2,703, which reduced the army when it reached the city to less than 6,000 men.

The aggregate strength of the three regiments of volunteers which participated in these battles-the fourth being left to garrison Puebla— was on the morning of the battle of Contreras 1,580. The aggregate strength of the Army, regulars and volunteers, on the same date was 11,052. The forwarding of troops after the crisis had passed was not unlike that which followed the battle of Palo Alto.

On the 19th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Scott that since the 24th of May he had heard of the arrival at Vera Cruz "of 4,603 regular troops (new levies and reorganized companies), 300 marines, and two companies of Pennsylvania volunteers 133 strong," making an aggregate of over 5,000 men."

a Official report of General Scott, dated National Palace, Mexico, September 18, 1847.-A. G. Ô.

House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 1003.

On the 6th of October he again wrote:

There is also a considerable volunteer force which was called out many months since, and has been slow in organizing, now on its way to your column. The Adjutant-General's estimate herewith of the total number of these troops and other detachments make the aggregate force en route under orders and being mustered into service about 15,000, since General Pierce's advance from Vera Cruz on the 14th of July, a

с

e

Notwithstanding these numbers it was not until October 18," that General Lane with 3,300 reached Puebla. November 10, General Patterson with 2,600 arrived at Jalapa; December 14, these combined reinforcements, advancing in two or three columns, concentrated at Puebla to the number of 9,000; d December 17, their advance reached the City of Mexico. In the meantime such was the sickness of the troops in the army at the capital that those present for duty on December 4, were reported by General Scott as only about 6,000. These figures show that in consequence of errors of statesmanship and a bad system of recruitment we needlessly exposed our army to the dangers of capture for a period of more than six months. Had the strength of the army during this time been calculated with nicety, based on a knowledge of the numbers and discipline of the enemy, we might applaud the apparent economy which achieved such results; but with the fact already stated, that for want of a bureau of military statistics, the chief of the most important department of supply could not learn at Washington whether wagons could be used in Mexico, we must ascribe the perils of our troops to the same mismanagement and want of reflection that supplied the means for military operations in 1812.

Notwithstanding the delays in forwarding men and supplies, such was the quality of our troops that the enemy, no longer able to oppose them, listened to propositions of peace, and on the 2d of February, 1848, ratified the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Pursuant to this treaty and the President's proclamation, our army on the 5th of the following July, 26 months after the commencement of hostilities, evacuated Mexican territory.

STATISTICS.

With the salient facts before us, that General Taylor fought the first battles of the war with 2,100 regulars, when, but for the defect of the law, he might have had, by a simple increase of the rank and file, a force of 8,000; that the 13 regiments of the Regular Army with which General Scott landed at Vera Cruz could have been raised to 15,000 men; that with such an army he could have entered the City of Mexico on the heels of Cerro Gordo; that at no time before the event his maximum force exceeded 13,500, and that after a brilliant series of battles he finally entered the Mexican capital with less than 6,000 men, let us next consider the number of troops the Government employed:

Regulars (old establishment).

Army of occupation, May, 1846...

Number of recruits and troops who joined the Army in Mexico....

Total......

a House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 1008.

Same, p. 1030.

Same, p. 1031.

a Same, p. 1039.

eSame, p. 1033.

Scott's Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 420.

3, 554 15, 736

19, 290

Regulars (new establishment).

1 regiment of dragoons, 8 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of voltigeurs.... 11, 186

Total, Regular Army..

Battalion of marines..

Total, regular forces.....

30,476 548 31, 024

Reenforcements for the old army to the number of 19,066 started for Mexico, leaving, after deducting 15,736 who joined, 3,930 who never reached their destination. The whole number of troops and recruits sent to the new establishment was 11,976, of whom 790 failed to join. For the old establishment from May 1, 1846, to July 5, 1848, 21,018 men were enlisted. For the new establishment during the same period the number was 13,991. Total 35,009.

Resolving the volunteer force of 73,260 into the different arms of

service, it consisted of

Cavalry or mounted troops..

Artillery..

Infantry

Resolving it into officers and men, it consisted of—

Officers.

Noncommissioned officers and privates

In this mass of men, who were totally inexperienced at the beginning of their service, there was a leaven of between thirty and forty officers who were in, or had been in, the Regular Army. The total force employed during the war, including 31,024 regulars and marines, was 104,284.

The actual number mustered in, exclusive of the army of occupation (3,554) and 548 marines, was 100,454.

From these figures it will be perceived that the regular troops, 31,024, exceeded more than six times the number of regulars and volunteers with whom Taylor at Buena Vista defeated the entire Mexican army; while, omitting the three and six months' men and adding 31,024 to the 60,659 volunteers for twelve months and the war, the aggregate, 91,683 regulars and volunteers, was nine times as great as the effective strength of the army with which Scott fought the decisive battles around the City of Mexico.

CASUALTIES.

The casualties among the different classes of troops were as follows:

Total wounded, killed, and died of wounds

Total killed, wounded, and died of wounds, Regular Army

62

5

67

5

71

76

Resignations.

Desertions

46

2,218

2,264

36

236

272

415

2, 946

92

602

The number killed, wounded, and died of wounds, in the three classes of troops was as follows:

The losses in killed and died of wounds among the volunteers were distributed as follows:

The deaths from disease and accidents were as follows:

16

439

152

607

Of the 16 killed or died of wounds among the three and six months' men (all held for three months), 15 belonged to the Texas rangers, two companies of whom were organized by General Taylor before leaving Corpus Christi, and who were with him in the skirmishes preceding Palo Alto.

This loss of but one man among the remaining 12,000, who were called out too late to participate in the battle of Palo Alto and for too short a period to be available for operations beyond the Rio Grande, indicates how useless was their service.

The same remark applies with almost equal force to the 33,000 volunteers for the war, called out to replace the 27,000 men who had had the benefit of a year's campaign and instruction. An analysis of their losses shows that of the 152 killed and died of wounds, 118 fell upon the four regiments (the Second New York, First and Second Pennsylvania, and First South Carolina), which were with Scott's army at Cerro Gordo and remained with it till the hour of its triumph. Thus it appears that, excepting the Texas rangers from the three and six

a The killed and wounded in the entire force of volunteers is taken from the Statistical Report of the Surgeon-General, Ex. Doc. No. 96, Senate, Thirty-fourth Congress, first session, p. 621. This number is taken in preference to 1,778, computed from Ex. Doc. No. 24, H. R., Thirty-first Congress, first session; both are based on figures of the Adjutant-General, compiled from the reports of commanders and regimental and company returns. As stated by the Adjutant-General, "The statistics of the war are given as close approximation only."

House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, Table C.

c House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 Table C.