department four Presidents were living when secession began. Of these, the only Southerner joined the rebels, another did the country more harm than an avowed enemy, while the others certainly were not over demonstrative in their efforts to preserve the Union. Belonging to the bench of the Supreme Court there were four Southern judges, of whom two remained loyal, one was strongly sympathetic with the South, and one joined the rebels. The Southern judges of the United States district courts sided with their own people. Of the Senators in Congress from the seceding States but one, and of the House of Representatives but three, remained loyal. Nearly all the agents of the State, Treasury, Interior, and Post-Office Departments residing in or from the seceding States espoused the rebel cause.

Over one-fourth of the officers of the Navy on the active list resigned or were dismissed in 1860–61, nearly all of whom, being Southerners, probably joined in the rebellion. Of those appointed in the Army from civil life, nearly one-half, while but a little over one-fifth of the West Point officers, left the service and joined in the rebellion.

With these pregnant facts before us we would ask: Was it a greater wrong in an humble graduate to forget the Nation's fostering care in training him for four years at the Military Academy than for a President to renounce his allegiance to the country which for four years had encircled his brow with the Republic's crown? Was it more disreputable to forsake the flag beneath which the graduate had been reared, than to stain the revered and venerable ermine of the Supreme Bench with the upas of secession? Were the makers of the laws-Southern Senators and Representatives-who trampled the Constitution under foot, less guilty than graduates for violating their vows?

Strange to say, though so many of those highest officials of the land rebelled against the Union, we rarely hear Congress, the Supreme Court, the Executive and other departments of the Government stigmatized as nurseries of treason, while the Military Academy has been the butt against which every opprobrious epithet has been hurled by unscrupulous demagogues, as false to the flag and ungrateful to the nation, notwithstanding the statistics show that the West Point part of the Army has been by far the most loyal branch of the public service; that nearly four-fifths of its graduate-officers remained faithful; that one-half of those from the South stood firm by the Stars and Stripes; and in the battles for the Union that one-fifth of those engaged laid down their lives, more than one-third, and probably one-half, were wounded, and the survivors can point with manly pride to their services, here recorded, for the preservation of the nation.

Can Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Union, Princeton, or any other college in the land show a higher record of patriotism and sacrifice? Assuredly not, for their Southern graduates espoused the rebel cause almost en masse. Should, then, these noble seminaries of learning be aspersed as nurseries of treason because they did not retain all their éléves in the Union field? And is it just to launch anathemas at the Military Academy, which saved by the antidote of its loyal teachings one-half of its Southern pupils, who from infancy to early manhood, before they entered this, our truly national institution, had imbibed the poison of secession till the virus had permeated every fiber of their hearts and brains? That noble band of 162 Southern graduates, cradled and reared in State allegiance, but rescued from treason by West Point influences, bravely battled against rebellion, and no less firmly against every appeal of relative and friend to swerve them from loyalty and duty. These, with all Northern officers (save 16 who dishonored their alma mater), and 115 graduates from civil life who rejoined the military service, fought the good fight for the Union, though their merits were often overlooked to give place to those who had not learned, as Napoleon calls it "le metier des armes." a

While the above facts should sufficiently establish the relative loyalty of the officers of the Army, the claims of the enlisted men should not be forgotten. Mostly recruited in the North, only 26 are known to have joined the Rebellion. If to this number be added 313, representing the recreant officers, it will appear that out of an aggregate of 16,367 officers and men, but 339, or less than 3 per cent proved disloyal. No branch of the civil service can boast such a record. In the South, the personnel of every civil department joined the Rebellion en masse, but to the glory of the Army it should be said that although

a Cullum's Biographical Register of Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy, vol. 1, Prciace, pp. 12-14.

portions of it were betrayed into the hands of the enemy, no regiment, company, or detachment ever for a moment forgot its duty to the flag its members had sworn to protect.

FURNISHING MILITARY LEADERS FOR THE REBELLION.

The evil inflicted upon the country by discouraging regular officers from holding volunteer commissions, sinks into insignificance when compared with the calamities flowing from the policy of the Government in reference to officers who sought to join the Rebellion.

Long before the secession of South Carolina such of them as cherished the fallacy of State sovereignty proclaimed their intention to follow the fortunes of their section. Accordingly, as one State after another passed the ordinance of secession, they forwarded letters of resignation, which, with scarcely an exception, were promptly accepted. Their views of their duty to the Government and their construction of its action are thus explained by General Joseph E. Johnston:

The passage of that ordinance (i. e., ordinance of secession of Virginia) in secret session on the 17th of April was not known in Washington, where, as QuartermasterGeneral of the United States Army, I was then stationed until the 19th. I believed, like most others, that the decision of the country would be permanent, and that apart from any right of secession, the revolution begun was justified by the maxims so often repeated by Americans-that free government is founded in the consent of the governed, and that every community strong enough to establish and maintain its independence has a right to assert it. Having been educated in such opinions, I naturally determined to return to the State of which I was a native, join the people among whom I was born, and live with my kindred, and, if necessary, fight in their defense.

Accordingly, the resignation of my commission, written on Saturday, was offered to the Secretary of War Monday morning. That gentleman was requested at the same time, to instruct the Adjutant-General, who had kindly accompanied me, to write the order announcing its acceptance immediately.

No other officer of the United States Army of equal rank-that of brigadiergeneral-relinquished his position in it to join the Southern Confederacy.

Many officers of that army of Southern birth had previously resigned their commissions to return to the States of which they were citizens, and many others did so later. Their object in quitting the United States Army and their intention to enter the service of the seceded States were well known in the War Department, yet no evidence of disapproval of these intentions was given by the Federal Administration nor efforts made by it to prevent their execution. This seems to me strong proof that they were not then considered criminal.a

In seeking to repel the charge of perjury in breaking their oaths of allegiance, General Johnston continues:

The acceptance of an officer's resignation absolves him from the obligations of his military oath as completely as it absolves the Government from that of giving him the pay of the grade he held. An officer is bound by that oath of allegiance to the United States and obedience to the officers they may set over him. When the contract between the Government and himself is dissolved by mutual consent, as in the cases in question, he is no more bound under his oath to allegiance to the Government than to obedience to his former commander. These two obligations are in force only during tenure of office. The individual who was an officer has, when he becomes a citizen, exactly the same obligations to the United States as other citizens.

This principle was always acted upon by the United States. Whenever a military officer received a new appointment, either of a higher grade or of an equal one in another corps, he was required to repeat the oath of office, because the previous one, including of course that of allegiance, was held to have expired with the previous office, although the individual had not ceased to be an officer of the Army. When he left the Army, as well as a particular office in it, the case was certainly stronger.

a Johnston's Narrative of Military Operations, pp. 10, 11.
Johnston's Narrative of Military Operations, pp. 11, 12.

It is manifest from the above views, that had the first officers who betrayed signs of defection been placed in arrest, or if necessary imprisoned, all who regarded the sanctity of an oath would have been compelled to remain in the service, while such as were determined to join the Rebellion could only have done so by adding to disloyalty the double crime of perjury and desertion. As none of our statesmen, however, fully appreciated the value of loyal officers, it was not to be expected that the Government would foresee any special danger in permitting the disloyal to withdraw. On the contrary, instead of retaining them under surveillance or unemployed, it was deemed desirable to purge the personnel of the Army, like that of every other branch of the Government, of the last trace of disaffection. Accordingly nearly every officer who applied received an honorable discharge. This unfortunate policy deprived many officers of their last plea for remaining true to their country. Beset by the importunities of their kindred, reproached for forsaking them, left alone to decide the momentous question, whether it was to their States or to the Union that they owned a paramount allegiance, many at last with bitter regret cast in their lot with secession.

The responsibility for accepting the resignations rests with no particular individual. The policy was begun by a Secretary of War notoriously disloyal, but was continued by his successors, with the sanction presumably of two Presidents and their Cabinets.

The professional training voluntarily relinquished by the Government at the beginning of the great conflict is represented by the following figures, which show the number of general officers furnished the Confederacy from the Regular Army of the United States, most of whom resigned their commissions between December 20, 1860, the date of the secession of South Carolina, and January 1, 1862:

Confederate generals..

Confederate lieutenant-generals
Confederate major-generals.

Confederate brigadier-generals

8

15

48

111

Of the number who resigned after the attack upon Fort Sumter, 4 became generals, 6 lieutenant-generals, 21 major-generals, 38 brigadier-generals. Of the total number in the Confederate Army, 182 rose to command rank.

While contemplating with just pride the final triumph of the Union, if we but recall the fact that nearly every victory gained by the armies of the Rebellion was achieved under the leadership of these officers, it may safely be affirmed that never did statesmen commit a greater mistake in managing the military resources of a nation.

Instead of leaving the Confederacy to exhaust itself, under the military system of 1792, its troops enlisted for but twelve months, its armies for the most part commanded by generals of no military experience, its officers elected by its men, we gave to it the skilled leaders who for four years jeopardized our liberties and deluged the country with blood."

a After having been the medium of accepting the larger part of the resignations of disloyal officers, the Secretary of War, in his report of July 1, 1861, admitted that "but for this startling defection the rebellion never could have assumed formidable proportions." (Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, p. 234, Doc. 67.)

34760°-16-16

MILITARY ADVENTURERS.

The failure of our Government to appreciate the value of a regular officer entering the Army from whatever source was all the more aggravated by the discrimination it made in favor of military adventurers.

Notwithstanding the exception of many good officers, the same class of men who vexed Washington in the Revolution returned in increasing numbers, and possessing the advantage of foreign military education, persistently urged upon the Government their claims for employment.

No better proof of the glaring inconsistency of our policy can be presented than the correspondence between the two Cabinet ministers who at the beginning of the Rebellion presided over the Departments of War and of State.

The correspondence is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D. C., December 6, 1861.

SIR: I inclose a copy of a letter to me of the 4th instant from the chief of the staff of the Commander in Chief, which seems to be rather discouraging as to the further employment of foreign officers in the military service of the United States. Being sure that if we do not provide honorable employment for such officers as may come hither in quest of it, they will seek and probably obtain similar employment in the forces of insurgents, I would suggest that a circular be addressed to Governors of States requesting them to make such arrangements as may prevent such a result. If your avocations should not allow you leisure to prepare such a circular, I will cheerfully prepare it myself.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Washington, D. C., December 4, 1861.

My DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of several communications from you, relative to the employment of foreign officers in our Army. I have endeavored to find places for these gentlemen, and in a few instances have succeeded; but the difficulty I have encountered is that all the regimental officers are appointed by the governors of the States, and when vacancies occur they are filled by election, so that the only positions that remain available for such applicants are upon the staffs of some of the general officers, and I have therefore advised the gentlemen to apply to them; but the generals have for the most part organized and filled their staffs with officers of their own selection.

I should regard it as highly important if the services of educated officers who speak our language could be secured with our volunteer regiments, and if the governors of States would appoint them to the higher positions, or if they could be elected to fill vacancies, I feel confident they would contribute greatly to the efficiency of the Army.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

In answer to the letter of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War sent the following circular to the governors of States:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, December 23, 1861.

SIR: Large numbers of foreign officers of military education and experience have tendered their services to the Government, which has to the extent of its ability

availed itself of their offers. Many, however, yet remain unemployed, and the Department deeming it of great importance that their services should be secured to our volunteer forces, respectfully recommends that, when practicable, they be selected for regimental positions for which they may appear to be qualified. The Department is confident that their employment would tend to increase the efficiency of our volunteer forces by giving to inexperienced officers competent instructors and to regiments able and skilful commanders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.

Their Excellencies, the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.

It thus appeared that to prevent "foreign officers of military education from seeking employment in the forces of the insurgents," the War Department, which six months before refused regular officers commissions in the volunteers, recommended the governors of States to appoint mere adventurers on the ground that their employment "would tend to increase the efficiency of our volunteer forces by giving to inexperienced officers competent instructors and to regiments able and skillful commanders."

BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

The acceptance before the 1st of July, of more than 200,000 volunteers for the term of three years, did not deliver the Government from the temptation of again testing the folly of short enlistments.

Mistaking numbers for strength, and forgetting, too, that the fame of the militia at Bunker Hill and New Orleans was acquired behind formidable entrenchments, Congress and the Cabinet, the press and the people, united in demanding that before their discharge the 75,000 three-months' men should be led into battle.

The disaster that ensued demands that the causes leading to it be carefully considered. First among them was the popular but mistaken belief that because our citizens individually possess courage, fortitude, and self-reliance, they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. And next to this error was the fatal delusion, that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for battle.

Military commanders were not wholly deceived. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General McDowell, who was selected to command the army in front of Washington, stated:

I had no opportunity to test my machinery, to move it around and see whether it would work smoothly or not. In fact, such was the feeling, that when I had one body of eight regiments of troops reviewed together, the general censured me for it, as if I was trying to make some show. I did not think so. There was not a man there who had ever maneuvered troops in large bodies. There was not one in the Army. I did not believe there was one in the whole country. At least I knew there was no one there who had ever handled 30,000 troops. I had seen them handled abroad in reviews and marches, but I had never handled that number, and no one here had. I wanted very much a little time, all of us wanted it. We did not have a bit of it. a

To his representations that the troops were green and uninstructed, the ready reply was:

You are green, it is true, but they are green also; you are all green alike, a

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, p. 38.