the Blue Ridge, his retreat could be cut off by troops moving eastward from the Shenandoah Valley. If he sought to advance down the valley, he must first overcome any force assigned for its defense. Elaborate as the system was designed to be, nearly all work was suspended upon it early in the spring of 1862. In fact, had the capital been captured for want of adequate entrenchments, the responsibility could in a measure have been traced directly to Congress, which, at the opening of the campaign of 1862, appropriated $150,000 for completing the defenses of Washington, with the proviso, "that no part of the sum hereby appropriated shall be expended on any work hereafter to be commenced."

The number of men required to garrison the works was estimated by a special commission, appointed by the Secretary of War, in October, 1862, to be as follows:

The total infantry garrisons required for their defense, computed at 2 men per yard of front perimeter, and 1 man per yard of rear perimeter, is about 25,000. The total number of artillerymen required (to furnish three reliefs for each gun) is about 9,000. It is seldom necessary to keep the infantry supports attached to the works. The artillerymen, whose training requires much time, having learned the disposition of the armament and computed the distances of the ground over which attacks may be looked for, and the ranges and service of their guns, should not be changed; they should remain permanently in the forts. The 25,000 infantry should be encamped in such positions as may be most convenient to enable them, in case of alarm, to garrison the several works; and a force of 3,000 cavalry should be available for outpost duty, to give notice of the approach of an enemy.

Whenever an enemy is within striking distance of the capital, able by a rapid march to attempt a coup de main which might result in the temporary occupation of the city, the dispersion of the Government, and the destruction of the archives, all of which could be accomplished by a single day's possession, a covering army of not less than 25,000 men should be held in position, ready to march to meet the attacking

column.

Against more serious attacks from the main body of the enemy, the capital must depend upon the concentration of its entire armies in Virginia or Maryland. They should precede or follow any movement of the enemy seriously threatening the capital.

It will be seen from the above report, that to prevent a successful coup de main, the maximum force for garrison purposes was placed at 37,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, while in addition there was to be a covering force of 25,000, or a total of 62,000. Having described the defenses and given the largest estimate of men needed to repel a sudden attack, we may now resume the discussion of the campaign.

When Wadsworth reported his force in "numerical strength and character" entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important duty to which it was assigned, the Secretary of War assumed no responsibility, but at once referred the question as to whether Washington had been left "entirely secure" by the commander of the Army of the Potomac, to General Thomas, the Adjutant-General of the Army, and General E. A. Hitchcock, recently assigned to special duty in the War Department.

a Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 15. This legislation was inspired by news of Thomas's and Grant's victories at Mill Spring and Fort Donelson, and Du Pont's victory at Port Royal.

Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 19. This commission was composed of "Brevet Brig. Gen. J. G. Totten, Chief Engineer, U. S. Army; Brig. Gen. M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. Army, formerly of the U. S. Engineers; Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery; Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer Defenses of Washington; Brig. Gen. G. G. Cullum, U. S. Engineers, Chief of Staff to the General in Chief." (Barnard, p. 18.)

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The following documents were submitted to them, from which they were to form their conclusions: First, the President's order of March 8, directing that no change of base should be made without leaving Washington entirely secure;" second, the report of the council of corps commanders convened at Fairfax Court House on the 13th of March; third, General McClellan's letter of April 1, stating that independent of the garrison of Washington, he had left a covering force of 55,456 men; fourth, the letter of General Wadsworth of April 2, already referred to.

The very day that this question was referred to these officers, April 2, they reported as follows:

It is, we think, the judgment of officers that some 30,000 would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000.

In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position.a

Referring to the 55,456 men, exclusive of the 19,022 present for duty under General Wadsworth, they added:

In the above enumeration, General Banks's army corps is included, but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, should be regarded as part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion.

After quoting from General Wadsworth's letter, showing the state and organization of his force, they concluded as follows:

If there was need of a military force for the safety of the city of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.

In view of the opinion expressed by the council of commanders of army corps, of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of opinion that the requirements of the President that the city shall be left "entirely secure", not only in the opinion of the General in Chief, but those of the "commanders of the army corps" also, has not been complied with.

The vital error in this report related to Banks's army.

Ignoring, or more probably overlooking, the fact that the destruction of the bridges over the Potomac would make the capital safe from attack in front, and that the only danger was from the rear, they evaded the question of Banks's 35,000 men, and then reported:

We are of the opinion that the requirements of the President-that the city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the General in Chief, but those of the "commanders of the army corps" also-have not been complied with.

On the false assumption that a force originally designed for one purpose could be used for no other, General Hitchcock in 1863, in explanation of his action, testified:

I did not consider the force in the Shenandoah Valley as available for the immediate defense of the capital, being required for the defense of that valley.c

The haste with which the two officers performed the duty assigned to them, precluded any personal investigation of the defenses of Washington, but the map could have shown them, that from the Potomac

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 317. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 318. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 304.

above Georgetown, extending via Arlington, Fort Albany, Fort Richardson, and Fort Scott, to the Potomac 2 miles south of Long Bridge, there was a high defensible ridge about 4 miles long, and crowned by no less than 15 forts or regular earthworks. Even abandoning these, neither the Long Bridge, Aqueduct Bridge, nor Chain Bridge could have been captured without first assaulting Forts Runyon, Corcoran, and Ethan Allen, which were constructed at their respective debouches. These facts, as well as the official documents, should have been considered, before expressing an opinion which was destined to hopelessly unsettle the mind of the President." They should have known that as a civil officer he could not pretend to analyze their report. He did not presume to act on his own judg ment or that of the Secretary of War, and probably had not time to consider General Wadsworth's significant statement, "I regard it very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this point."

If he read it or the more important admission of the two officers, that as the enemy had destroyed the railroads, it was "fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position," it is quite possible that neither statement made any impression on his mind.

There was but one part of the report that he could well comprehend, and that was the opinion unequivocally expressed, that his orders by the Secretary of War had not been complied with.

This bold statement, suddenly and unexpectedly presented, devolved upon the President new and grave responsibilities which, unaided, he was wholly at a loss to meet.

SECOND AULIC COUNCIL.

As one of the natural consequences of having no General in Chief, there sprang up about this time what has aptly been called the "Second Aulic Council." Its existence was soon recognized, for in the testimony given by General Meigs, before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, on the 14th of July, 1862, occurs the question by Mr. Chandler: "You are a member of the military council of war?" General Meigs replied:

I am a member of the body to which you allude. It has no legal existence; but the Secretary of War has invited some of us to come there for that purpose. c

From the testimony given by General Hitchcock, January 21, 1863, the council appears more specifically to have been composed of "the chiefs of the various bureaus of the War Department. These chiefs

a To avoid the possibility of misjudging in this controversy, the reader should bear in mind that in order to make Washington secure, Generals Thomas and Hitchcock estimated the garrison and covering force at 55,000. Nearly a year later the commission appointed by the Secretary of War estimated it at 62,000. General McClellan fully appreciating the strategic importance of a strong force in the Shenandoah Valley, as a defense to the capital, actually left as a garrison and covering force 73,456. Another important fact must not be overlooked. The subordinates of the Secretary of War did not base their report on the number of men actually left behind, but on the figures contained in the four documents submitted.

Official documents do not show whether the report of General Wadsworth was volunteered by him or called for by the Secretary of War. The latter is to be presumed from the date, as also from the fact that the information was conveyed by letter, instead of in the form of a monthly return.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 296.

were the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Paymaster-General, Surgeon-General, Chief of Engineers, and Chief of Ordnance. Whether General Meigs's expression, "some of us," included all of the above officers cannot be stated, but as to their qualifications it may be said of them, that for years they had ceased to perform the practical duties of a soldier, and had given their exclusive attention to the administration of their departments. It was this council that the President was forced to consult, when he was informed that his order for the security of the capital had not been complied with. General Hitchcock, the associate of General Thomas, in his testimony already referred to, states:

This report of course went to the President, and on the next day—if I mistake not, the 3d of April-the President came to the War Office, and held quite a long consultation with the chiefs of the various bureaus of the War Department, the Secretary of War being present. At the conclusion of that consultation, the President himself ordered that one of the corps of the Army of the Potomac, which were then in front of Washington, should be detained for the defense of the capital.a

It would further appear from the testimony of General Hitchcock, that the President's fears as to the safety of the capital were not excited, till Wadsworth's report and the opinions of Generals Thomas and Hitchcock were both laid before him. He stated:

The report made by General Wadsworth to the Secretary of War on the 2d of April, which I understand is in possession of the committee, will show the condition and character of the troops under his command. When this state of things became known to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, he required General Thomas and myself to make a report upon the execution of the President's order, the letter of General McClellan of the 1st of April, the report of General Wadsworth on the 2d of April, and one or two other papers connected with them, requiring us to give a distinct opinion whether General McClellan had complied or not, with the requirements of the order of the President.

Whatever explanation may be attempted as to the action of the Secretary of War and his two military advisers, the results of their error were unhappily destined to be felt. Two months later, as well as two years later, the Confederates demonstrated that the Shenandoah Valley, in which Banks's 35,000 men were posted, was the only route by which the national capital could be safely approached.

Up to the date of the Thomas-Hitchcock report, the only force detached from the Army of the Potomac was Blenker's division, but now, under the baneful influence of its opinion, the work of disintegration began in earnest.

April 3, the President directed:

The Secretary of War will order that one or the other of the corps of General McDowell and General Sumner, remain in front of Washington until further orders from the Department, to operate, at or in the direction of Manassas Junction, or elsewhere, as occasion may require; that the other corps, not so ordered to remain, go forward to General McClellan as speedily as possible; that General McClellan commence his forward movements from his new base at once; and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper be also made.c

The same day, by telegram from the Adjutant-General, the President deprived McClellan of all control over General Wool's 10,000 men at Fort Monroe, and forbade any of his troops to be detached, without the Executive sanction.d

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 305.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 304.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 319.

d General McClellan states: "This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it.”— McClellan's Report, p. 75.

April 4, the Secretary of War, without quoting the authority of the President, issued General Orders, No. 34, directing that the portions of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, should constitute the Department of the Shenandoah, commanded by Major-General Banks.

The second paragraph of the order directed that the portion of Virginia east, of the Blue Ridge, and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, including the District of Columbia, should constitute the Department of the Rappahannock, commanded by Major-General McDowell." It is needless to speculate how far personal and political considerations dictated the above orders. It is enough to know that within four weeks from the time the President assumed control of military operations, the States of Virginia and Maryland were divided up into five separate departments, under five independent commanders, while, as a wheel within a wheel, General Wadsworth was independent at Washington, and General Wool at Fort Monroe.

This condition of affairs, with the admission of the President, that in ordering Blenker's division to the Mountain Department, he had yielded to a "pressure" which he could no longer resist, was calculated to demoralize military commanders. With no recognized military chief, they were directed by the order of March 11, to report "directly to the Secretary of War," who could give any orders he chose, without consulting the President.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST YORKTOWN.

Even if their reports reached the latter, they soon became painfully aware, that without political support, their recommendations might be wholly disregarded. In this way they were tempted to abandon the only legitimate channel of military communication, in the hope that by approaching the President through friends of the Administration, they might cause their views to prevail. As evidence of this fact, General Keyes, on the 7th of April, with the concurrence of General McClellan, addressed Senator Harris, of New York, from the headquarters of the Fourth Army Corps, Warwick Court-House, Va., as follows:

The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the Navy should cooperate in the taking of Yorktown and also, (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River.

To-day I have learned that the First Corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the Second Corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the Navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James River for fear of the Merrimac. The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by MajorGeneral McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced to 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the Navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

*

*

*

a By direction of the Secretary of War, no allusion being made to the President, a Middle Department, as early as the 22d of March, had already been carved out of the Department of the Potomac. It was commanded by General Dix, and embraced the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, the eastern shore of Maryland, and Virginia, as also three other counties in Maryland, east of the Blue Ridge.