offence was committed; but he may be tried equally well in any part of the kingdom in which the plunder was found in his possession. So, upon a charge of bigamy, the offender may of course be tried in the county where the criminal marriage took place; but he may be tried also wherever he may be apprehended or in custody. And the offence known as 'False pretences,' if made by letter sent from one county to another, may be tried and punished in either.

Let us suppose, however, the case of a prisoner brought before a Justice of one county, which we will call Cornwall, charged with an indictable offence committed in some other county, which we will call Northumberland, and not triable elsewhere. Under these circumstances, what is the Cornish Justice to do? He has full power, as we have seen, to entertain the charge. But obviously he cannot commit the accused for trial in his own county, a course which, by the supposition, would be simply nugatory. His duty is to examine the witnesses, and receive such evidence as may be produced before him, and if, in his opinion, the charge be sufficiently maintained, to commit the accused to some Northumbrian gaol, to await his trial in that county, binding over the prosecutor and witnesses to appear there in due course and do their duty. Of course the question of bail is not affected by this measure.

On the other hand, if the evidence tendered in support of the charge be not in his opinion sufficient to justify him in committing the accused for trial, he is not to discharge him then and there. He is entitled and bound to shift the responsibility upon some Northern Justice, and to send the accused by warrant 'before some Justice or Justices of the peace in and for the place where, and near unto the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed.' With the prisoner will be sent the information and depositions in the case, which are to be treated by the Northern Justice exactly as if they had been taken in his own court; and it

is he who will ultimately decide whether, under all the circumstances, a commitment or liberation ought to take place. Notwithstanding this rule, however, if the Cornish Justice be satisfied that he has before him the whole of the evidence available in the case, and that it is clearly insufficient to justify a commitment, he may safely discharge the accused without further ceremony. The expense of the above transmission, when carried into effect, is payable by the county or place to which the accused is forwarded.

The committal of a person for trial may in some cases be matter of the most ordinary routine, while in others it is a step involving very grave responsibility. Even upon the assumption that justice is certain to be done in the end, it is no light matter, when unconvinced by the prosecutor's evidence, to inflict upon a man the injury to character, anxiety of mind, and loss of time and money, which are the inevitable consequences of sending him before a jury. It is true that inconveniences of this kind must be resolutely inflicted and patiently endured when public interests are at stake. It is also true that very unpleasant surgical operations are at times indispensable. But, if any such operation might have been avoided by a little more judgment or experience on the part of the ordinary medical adviser, he will hardly, if he be wise, attempt to pacify his patient by any truism of the kind.

The Justice will at the same time recollect that it is not his

If

office to try the case. If the evidence against the accused be such as, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he feels is not sufficient to demand an answer, or if the answer given to it by the prisoner or his witnesses be practically complete, he will of course discharge him from further prosecution. on the other hand the incriminatory evidence be strong in itself, and cannot be absolutely disposed of by the other side, it is not for him to weigh the probabilities of a case which he has no commission to decide. Nothing is more common indeed than the indirect usurpation of such a function, as when a prisoner is dismissed upon the ground that the case

is one in which no jury would convict. But this can only be safely said where the prosecutor's evidence is inherently weak, and fails as a prima facie ground of committal, or where it is absolutely accounted for and overthrown by evidence on behalf of the accused.

It occasionally happens that, upon a prisoner being brought up, the prosecutor is anxious to proceed no further, and objects to offer evidence. In these cases (always assuming that there is no suspicion of a compromise having been effected), it is the practice, under special circumstances and after adequate explanation, to permit the charge to be withdrawn.

We may remark, in conclusion, that whenever a charge which may involve commitment for trial happens to be heard before two or more Justices-and in important or difficult cases it is very desirable that it should be so heard-a committal must be the act of the majority. Should there be an equality of opinions for and against, the proper course is to adjourn for the attendance of additional or other Justices and then to re-swear the witnesses and read over to them their previous depositions, as well as the prisoner's statement if any, when a majority may probably be obtained.

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION UPON INFORMATION-INDICTABLE

OFFENCES.

6

EVERY offence, as we observed a short time since, was originally indictable at the suit of the Crown. Every accused person, we may add, has by Magna Charta a right to be so indicted-in other words a right to stand exempt from punishment until convicted by the verdict of his peers. Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisionctur, nec super eum ibimus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terræ.' But to allow every petty offender to avail himself of this privilege would be absurd upon the face of it. We should be a nation of jurymen; slaves of the box and book. Therefore an immense number of minor delinquences have been removed from the indictable category, and given over to the more rapid handling of Justices with summary jurisdiction. And this inroad upon our 'sacred bulwark,' which was matter of sheer necessity, has as yet led to none of the disaster so mournfully prophesied by Blackstone.

It is obvious, however, that certain offences which still remain in the indictable class, and entitle the accused person to be tried before a jury, may lie pretty close beside the border line, and might occasionally be transferred across it with advantage, provided only that proper machinery could be arranged for that purpose. They may have been attended by mitigating circumstances. Or they may have been the errors of children, or young persons, whom it is desirable to spare, if possible, the exposure of a public trial. In short, for a variety of reasons, it may appear that the ends of

justice would be as well or better answered by the settlement of such cases before a bench of Justices, instead of by means of the far more dilatory and costly process consequent upon indictment. Provision has accordingly been made for these exceptional cases, without infringing in any instance upon the right of going before a jury should the person chiefly interested desire to do so. Few matters are of greater practical importance or require to be more thoroughly understood.

Two statutes, passed between twenty and thirty years since, -the 'Juvenile Offenders' Act' and the 'Criminal Justice Act' were directed to the above object. The former applied to young persons under sixteen: the latter to persons of any age whose offences were either trifling as measured by a pecuniary standard, or who preferred to plead guilty and accept such punishment as Justices were authorised to inflict, rather than take the chance of an acquittal, accompanied by the possibility of a sterner sentence elsewhere. Neither of these statutes were models of scientific legislation, but they are now beyond the reach of criticism, having been swept aside by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. The sections of this statute, which replace them, will, it is to be hoped, fulfil their purpose; and their provisions ought to be at the finger-ends of every Justice. They apply (1) to children; (2) to young persons; and (3) to adults.

It is necessary to observe at the outset that, by section 20, sub-sec. 8, no proceedings of this kind can be taken except by a petty sessional court, sitting on some day appointed for hearing indictable offences, of which public notice has been given, or at some adjournment of such court. Also that, by section 27, the procedure in these cases must, until the court assume the power to deal with the offence summarily, be the same, in all respects, as if the charge were to be dealt with throughout as an indictable one. Directly the court assumes such power, the subsequent proceedings will be the same, and subject to the same rules, as in a case punishable upon summary conviction