second or casting vote.

And here it may be observed that the decision of a Bench must in all cases be the decision of a majority. If, for instance, two Justices are competent, by statute, to convict of some particular offence, and there happen to be half a-dozen present, three of whom are in favour of a conviction and three the other way, no decision can be come to, and, unless proceedings be adjourned for the purpose of obtaining the attendance of other Justices, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged.

At all such sessions it is the business of the Clerk of the Division to assist the Justices generally; to advise them, when necessary, as to matters of law and of detail; to take minutes of the proceedings in every case; to receive and transmit all fines, and to perform an immense variety of duties which can only be satisfactorily executed by a gentleman of education, intelligence and discretion.

Thus much for our Divisional system, in which those Justices who act as Stipendiary magistrates take no part. They are appointed in provincial towns and populous districts, under the Municipal Corporation Act, and are distinguished from their less fortunate brethren by the very marked advantage of a salary. The local board of a city or place having 25,000 inhabitants may procure the appointment of such an official for their district.

A Stipendiary magistrate, it may be observed, has power, when sitting in his police-court alone, to do any act, and exercise any jurisdiction, which can be done or exercised by two or more ordinary Justices; even although such act or jurisdiction be expressly required by statute to be done or exercised by Justices in petty sessional court. But he has, as a rule, no authority to act as a Justice of the peace in business transacted at special sessions, or at Quarter sessions.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION UPON INFORMATION-PRELIMINARY

PROCEEDINGS.

In

To resume our account of the judicial duties of a Justice. These, as we have already seen, are of a twofold nature. the one case he sits, by virtue of his summary jurisdiction, to hear and dispose of those minor charges and complaints which are not matter of indictment, and over which (setting any question of appeal aside for the present) he has absolute authority to act as judge. In the other he has to deal with charges of a graver nature, which are brought before him for a totally distinct purpose, that of committing the alleged offender to take his trial before a jury elsewhere. We shall, in the first instance, speak exclusively of business of the former description.

It will naturally be asked, Where lies the dividing line between these two classes of offence? By what token are we to discern whether the accused, in any particular case, ought to be committed and indicted, or may be dealt with in a summary manner? The answer is not far to seek. Every offence was, at Common Law, indictable at the suit of the Crown. But whenever any offence has been made over by statute to the jurisdiction of Justices, the more formidable course of procedure has been, as a rule, thereby superseded. In some instances, as in that of assault, it is in the discretion of Justices either to deal with an offence under their summary powers, or to treat it as indictable and send it for trial, where, under the circumstances, it seems to deserve a heavier

punishment than any which they are themselves empowered to inflict. In other cases, as in that of dog-stealing, a second offence, after previous summary conviction, is declared to be matter of indictment. Their right to take cognisance of any particular offence is thus purely statutory, and must be created by special enactment. And this jurisdiction has sometimes been given to one Justice alone, sometimes to two or more, at the discretion or caprice of the Legislature. Previously to 1880, one Justice could send a man to six months' hard labour for maliciously damaging a garden, while it took, as it still takes, two to fine an old woman half-a-crown for being tipsy and troublesome. However, in all stages of every case, preliminary to the actual hearing, one Justice may always do every act that can by any possibility be required.

The leading rules relating to summary procedure have hitherto been written in the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, an enactment usually known as Jervis' Act (No. 2)—a household word on every bench. It applies to cases, generally, where an Information is laid before a Justice that some person has committed, or is suspected to have committed, an offence or act, within his jurisdiction, for which he is liable upon summary conviction to be imprisoned, fined, or otherwise punished. It applies also to another class of cases, to be considered hereafter, where a Complaint is made to any such Justice, upon which an order for the payment of money or otherwise may be founded. These last we will disregard for the present.

The first condition, then, of judicial interference is that the act should have been committed within the jurisdiction; the second, that an Information should be laid. As regards the first, we may observe, in addition to our remarks in the last chapter, that, under the Summary Jurisdiction Act (sec. 46):

1. When an offence is committed in any river, or other water running between or forming the boundary of the jurisdiction of two courts, it may be tried by either court.

2. When an offence is committed on the boundary of the jurisdiction of two courts, or within five hundred yards of such boundary, or is begun within one jurisdiction and completed in the other, it may be tried by either court.

3. When an offence is committed on any person, or in respect of any property, in or upon any carriage or vehicle employed on any journey, or on board of any vessel upon inland waters, it may be tried by any court of summary jurisdiction through whose jurisdiction such carriage or vessel may have passed in the course of the journey or voyage during which the offence was committed. And if the side, bank, centre, or other part of any road, river, or canal, traversed in the course of such journey or voyage, be the boundary of the jurisdiction of two courts, the offence is triable in either.

As a

An Information must generally be laid by the party aggrieved; but where the offence is not an individual grievance, but concerns the public at large, anybody is at liberty to come forward for that purpose. Where no time is indicated by the statute under which proceedings are taken, it must be laid within six months of the act complained of. In some cases, the statutory period is limited to forty-eight hours. In one, at least, it is extended to three years. general rule, an information should be in writing, although this formality is sometimes specially dispensed with, as in cases falling within the 'Cruelty to Animals Act,' the 'Railway Clauses Consolidation Act,' &c., and is not required within the Metropolitan Police District. It must, in certain cases, be verified upon oath. This is necessary in proceedings under the 'Game Act,' the 'Malicious Injuries Act,' &c., and always, as will presently be seen, where it is expedient to arrest the accused at once. One offence only must be charged, and that in a direct and positive manner, accompa nied by a statement of such facts as may be necessary show that the legal offence was actually completed, and took place within the jurisdiction of the Justice informed.

No

objection, it is true, is allowed to be taken in respect of any variance between such Information and the evidence subsequently adduced; but by such variance must be understood a mere difference between the way of stating and the way of proving what is virtually the same thing-not a divergence. which goes to the whole gist of the charge. Thus, upon an Information for assaulting a constable, it was held that the defendant could not be convicted, alternatively, of a common assault, the two offences being distinct, and created by differ ent statutes. Any mere variance as to the time or place of an alleged offence is not material, assuming of course that the offence be proved to have taken place within the period during which an Information may legally be laid, and at some place over which the Justices have jurisdiction. And if the latter should be of opinion that the defendant was really misled in any way by the manner in which the charge was stated, they may adjourn the hearing upon such terms as they may think fit, including any necessary amendment. Two or more persons who may have joined in committing an offence may be included in one Information. Finally, every defendant, however trivial his offence, may demand to be regularly informed against, before being subjected to further proceedings.

The next step is to procure the attendance of the person charged. Where he has been already apprehended, a step which, as we shall elsewhere see, may be taken without ceremony in a great many cases, of course nothing further is necessary. He is probably already in the lock-up, ready to be produced when wanted. Otherwise, it will be necessary to enforce his attendance in more formal manner.

The issue of process for this purpose is so far a judicial as distinguished from a merely ministerial act, that if, upon the facts as stated by the complainant, it be obvious that the latter has no right to institute the charge, or that it is idle and trumpery, or that further proceedings would be altogether nugatory, the Justice may decline to take cognisance of the