"Enough has been cited to show the firm position of the judiciary, that the courts ought State of Illinois, to the completion of the buildings connected with the Reform School. The institution went into operation as con-not and, in justice to the rights of a co-orditemplated by the Legislature. The present action was brought by Darlington upon some of the interest coupons, he, it is agreed, having become the legal holder thereof, in good faith, for a valuable consideration. The circuit court gave judgment against the County. Upon this writ of error the controlling question presented for our determination is, whether the Acts of the General Assembly of Illinois, under which the bonds were issued, are, as to the provisions authorizing municipal donations to secure the location of the Reform School, re pugnant to the 5th section of article 9 of the Constitution of the State, ratified in 1848. That section declares that "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. And the General Assembly shall require that all the property within the limits of municipal corporations, belonging to individuals, shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of law." The argument of counsel in behalf of the county consists mainly of two propositions, viz.: That, according to the settled construction by the Supreme Court of Illinois of the State Constitution, at the time the bonds in suit were is sued, the General Assembly could not invest the corporate authorities of counties or other municipal organizations with power to assess and collect taxes for any except corporate purposes; That it is equally well settled by the same court not to be a corporate purpose for a county or other municipal body to aid, by donation or otherwise, in the establishment of a state institution for the discipline, education, employment or reformation of juvenile offenders and vagrants. In determining whether the General Assembly of Illinois has transgressed the fundamental law of that State, we recall what this court said in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128, where it became our duty to consider whether a statute of Georgia was in conflict with its Constitution. "The question," said Chief Justice Marshall, "whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the Constitution is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station imposes. But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the Legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers and its Acts to be considered as void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other." The language was cited with approval in R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill.,268, where the Supreme Court of Illinois added: nate department of the State Government, cannot, declare a law to be void without a strong and earnest conviction, divested of all reasonable doubt, of its invalidity." Lane v. Dorman, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.), 238: People v. Marshall, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.), 672. Adhering to these doctrines as vital in the relations which exist between the legislative departments of the several States and the courts of the Union, we first inquire as to the state of the law in Illinois, as declared by its highest judicial tribunal, at the time, July 15, 1869, the bonds in suit were issued and put upon the market for sale. Prior to that date it seems to have been settled by that court: 1. In Harward v. St. Clair Drain Co.,51 Ill., 130, that, under the Constitution in force prior to that of 1848, and which contained no provision similar to section 5, article 9, of the Constitution of 1848, the right of the Legislature to confer upon municipal corporations the power of taxation for local or corporate purposes was constantly exercised and never denied or doubted; that section 5, article 9, of the Constitution of 1848, was not, therefore, intended as a grant of such power or to remove doubts as to its existence, but to define the class of persons to whom the right of taxation might be granted and the purposes for which it might be exercised; that, consequently, the Legislature could not constitutionally confer that power upon any other than the corporate authorities of a county, township, school districts, cities, towns and villages, or for any other than corporate purposes; 2. In Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 Ill., 75, re-affirmed in R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill., 268; Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill., 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill., 474; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill.,405, and other cases, that the subscription by a county to the capital stock of a railroad company engaged in the construction of a road running through the limits was a corporate purpose, for the accomplishment of which the corporate authorities of the county could, under legislative sanction, assess and collect taxes upon persons and prop erty within its jurisdiction; that such aid was a corporate purpose, because in the completion of such improvements "The whole community is either immediately or remotely interested, those near the line on which it passes in a larger, and those more remotely situated in a less degree, but all participate in its benefits;" that, among the corporate purposes for which a county may be taxed, are court-houses, jails, poor-houses, the opening and keeping of common highways, and the erection and maintenance of bridges. 3. In Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill., 9, followed by Henderson v. Lagow, 42 Ill., 360, 361; Briscoe v. Allison, 43 Ill.,291; Misner v. Bullard, 43 Ill., 470, and Johnson v. Campbell, 49 Ill., 317, that a tax levied by a township under legislative authority, and in pursuance of a popular vote, to pay bounties to persons who should thereafter enlist or be drafted in the Army of the United States, was a tax for a corporate purpose; that the framers of the Constitution intended to leave a large discretion to the Legislature as to what should be considered as falling within that phrase; that the phrase "corporate purposes" should not receive "So narrow a con- | nal by which it was determined, we are construction as to justify the courts in holding that strained to say, does not seem to be in line with a municipality should not tax itself, although its previous decisions, or with subsequent decis authorized by Aet of the Legislature, because ions to which we shall presently refer. We alit might be a debatable question whether the lude to Livingston Co. v. Weide, 64 Ill.,427, decidproposed tax would promote the corporate wel-ed more than three years after the bonds and fare or not;" that a tax for a corporate purpose is a "Tax to be expended in a manner which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the community which levies it; that every individual tax payer shall have a direct interest in the object for which the tax is levied, or be directly benefited by the expenditure, is unattainable in the very nature of things. General results are all that can be expected; and if it appears that a tax has been voted and levied with an honest purpose to promote the general well-being of the municipality, and was not designed merely for the benefit of individuals or a class, its collection should not be stayed by the courts. In Taylor v. Thompson [supra], the court, by way of illustrating the doctrine there laid down, said: "The creation of a police force, the establishment of a reform school for juvenile offenders or a hospital for persons ill with contagious disease, would not directly benefit a non-resident taxed for their support; and yet no person would deny that these are proper ends of municipal taxation, and justly included in the phrase corporate purposes.' This analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois sufficiently indicates what was, at the time these bonds were issued, the established authoritative exposition of the phrase "corporate purposes." It is to be observed that when these bonds, by the joint action of the county and state authorities, were transmitted to the State of Pennsylvania for sale to its citizens, there was, in the published decisions of the state court, the broad declaration that "The establishment of a reform school for juvenile offenders" was, beyond question, a proper object of municipal taxation, and was a corporate purpose within the meaning of the Constitution. It is necessary that we should now trace the course of decisions subsequently rendered by that court. In R. R. Co. v. Smith, already cited, it was ruled that a township donation, made under legislative authority, and with the sanction of a popular vote, was a corporate purpose for which a tax could be assessed by the proper authorities of such township. The court there said: "It is contended that the appropriation was not for a corporate purpose. If it was for a public purpose, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipality, then it would be for a corporate purpose. The latter cannot be distinguished from the former; and all that we have said in relation to the public purpose of the tax will apply with equal force to a corporate purpose. * In Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill., 9, this court defined a corporate purpose to mean 'a tax to be expended in a manner which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality which levies it.' We accept this definition," etc. R. R. Co. v. Pinckney, 74 Ill., 277; Middleport v. Ins. Co., 82 Ill., 562; Lippincott v. Pana, decided October, 1879 [92 Ill., 24]. * * coupons in suit were issued under legislative authority, and their proceeds received and used by the State. That was a suit in chancery, commenced in the state court by the Board of Supervisors of Livingston County against theCounty Treasurer, to enjoin the latter from paying out money which had been collected to meet the interest upon the identical bonds whose validity is here questioned. None of the holders of the bonds were made parties to the suit. No attempt was made to bring them before the court in any form. It is not, therefore, binding upon them as a final adjudication of the questions now before us. Brooklyn v. Ins. Co. [ante, 416]; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 Ŭ. S., 714 [XXIV., 565]; Empire v. Darlington decided at the present Term [ante, 878]. It was held in Livingston Co. v. Weide, not to be a corporate purpose, in the constitutional sense, to provide a location for a state institution. After stating it to be the duty of the Legislature to determine for the whole people the necessity for a state reform school, and that it was degrading to the State, and reflected no honor upon it to accept a donation from a particular locality to secure the location of a state institution, the court proceeds: "What peculiar interest have the tax payers of Livingston County, or non-residents owning property therein, in such an institution being located in their midst? What corporate purpose does it specially promote by such location? What is a reform school? It is a penitentiary on a small scale, as is evident from the statute cited. How can it be a corporate purpose to establish what all admit is a necessary evil, a state reform school, in any town? It is a state, not a corporate purpose." Upon these grounds the bonds issued by the county were held to be null and void, by whomsoever owned. It is to be observed that the court, in that case, refers, but without disapproval, to the definition of corporate purposes as given in Taylor v. Thompson and, recognizing the inherent difficulty of laying down any precise rule applicable to every case, says: "The true doctrine is, such purposes, and such only (are corporate purposes) as are germane to the objects of the creation of the municipality, at least such as have a legitimate connection with those objects, and a manifest relation thereto." The binding authority of that case is disputed by defendant in error upon the ground that his rights accrued long prior to its decision, and under a settled construction of the State Constitution favorable to the validity of the Acts of 1867 and 1869. He further contends that the rule announced in Livingston County v. Werde was substantially abrogated, if not entirely overthrown, by subsequent decisions of the same court, particularly those in Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill., 455, and Hensley v. People, 84 Ill., 544. In Burr v. Carbondale the question presented was whether a tax, levied by a city under legislative authority, to pay interest on city bonds, We come now to a case which, with entire re-issued to secure the location, within its limits, of spect for the very able and enlightened tribu- a state institution, called the Southern Normal or contributing to their reformation, will protect the community in which they live from the evils and dangers which confessedly result from idleness and vagrancy amoung the young. University was or not a corporate purpose within the meaning of the Constitution of 1848. The court held that it was. And if we do not misapprehend altogether the grounds upon which the decision rests, they were: 1. That the uni- Had the Acts, under which these bonds were versity was, in the judgment of the court, an issued, provided for the establishment of a reactual benefit to the community in which it form school in Livingston County, for the diswas located. 2. That the bonds were issued cipline, education, employment and reformaafter a vote of the people who were to be taxed tion of juvenile offenders and vagrants within for their payment. That case was distinguished its limits, it would not be claimed, in view of from Livingston Co. v. Weide in these respects: the course of decisions in the state court, that that a state reform school was, in the judgment the Legislature has transcended its constitutional ⚫ of the court, an undoubted injury, not an ad- power. That the school established was a state vantage, to the community in which it was lo- institution, to be maintained after being estabcated and, therefore, to aid it by municipal tax-lished at the expense of the State, but in the ation was not a corporate purpose; and further, benefits of which the County where it was lothat the bonds, in that case, were issued with-cated could participate, does not, it seems to us, out a vote of the people. affect the question of legislative power. It is As to the objection that the bonds, under the a matter rather of public policy or expediency, State Reform School Act, were issued without the determination of which, the power existing, taking the sense of the people, it is sufficient to belongs to the Legislative Department. It was say that the Board of Supervisors were the cor- well said by the Supreme Court of Illinois, porate authorities of the County, and that the that, "In the enactment of laws the LegislaSupreme Court of Illinois had decided, under ture must exercise its judgment and discretion. the Constitution of 1848, as early as Keithsburg As to questions of pure policy and expediency, v. Frick, 34 Ill., 405, and again in Marshall v. no express or necessarily implied constitutional Silliman, 61 Ill., 218, and, finally, in 1870, in provision intervening, it is the sole judge. It R. R. Co. v. Morris, 84 Ill., 411, that it was "By has also the undoubted right to take a compreno means a necessary element in these (munic-hensive view in determining the necessity of a ipal) subscriptions that there should be a vote law, and the character of the purpose to be acof the inhabitants of a town or city authorizing complished by it. A court, with any propriety, them. It is competent for the Legislature to cannot arrogate to itself all power and wisdom bestow the power directly" upon those who, in in such matters; and if there be grave doubt legal contemplation, were the corporate author as to the nature of the purpose, the doubt must ities of the municipality. Roberts v. Bolles, de-always be solved in favor of the action of the cided at the present Term [ante, 880]. We express no opinion as to what, in our judgment, is the true exposition of those parts of the Illinois Constitution to which reference has been made, or as to the wisdom or propriety of such legislation as that under examination. Our purpose has been to ascertain what was the law of the State as expounded by its highest judicial tribunal. And while, perhaps, the judgment of the circuit court might, in view of our own decisions, be sustained upon other grounds, it is sufficient for the disposition of this case to say, that the adjudications of the state court do not show any such settled or uniform construction of the State Constitution upon the questions here involved as would justify us, with proper respect to the Legislative Depart ment of Illinois, in holding that it had transgressed the fundamental law of the State. The judgment is affirmed. Legislature." R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill., 273. In Hensley v. People [supra], it was held, upon In a previous case the court had said that "A the authority of Burr v. Carbondale, that a proper respect for the Legislative Department county tax levied in payment of bonds issued, requires us to regard its Acts as prima facie conunder legislative authority, to secure the loca-stitutional." Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill., 14. tion, within that county, of a state industrial university, was a tax for a corporate purpose. Upon this review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, our conclusion is that, testing the validity of these bonds by the decisions of that tribunal, rendered prior to and unmodified at the date of their issue, we would be obliged to hold they were issued for a corporate purpose. And, while the doctrines announced in Livingston Co. v. Weide, if applied here, would establish their invalidity, the principles enunciated in previous cases, and in the subsequent cases of Burr v. Carbondale and Hensley v. People, seem quite as clearly to sus tain their validity. If, as adjudged by the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was, within the true meaning of the Constitution of 1848, a corporate purpose to impose taxes to pay bounties to those who enlisted or were drafted in the Army of the United States, or to secure the location of a state normal or state industrial university, or to pay municipal bonds issued, by way of donation, to aid in the construction of a railroad; if taxation, in the constitutional sense, was for a corporate purpose whenever imposed for a public purpose; we do not perceive upon what just ground it can be held not to be a corporate purpose for a municipality to make, under express legislative authority, a donation to secure the location within its limits of a state reform school, wherein juvenile offenders and vagrants may receive such care, discipline, education and employment as, while effecting Cited-103 U. S., 570; 90 Ind., 29; 46 Am. Rep., 192. JOHN BECHTEL ET AL., Piffs. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 11 Otto, 597-601.) Copies of papers from Treasury, when evidenceconstruction of statute-error must be proved. 1. Under the Act of 1797, in every case of delin quency where a suit has been instituted, a tran 1. The admission of the documentary evidence from the Treasury Department; and, 2. The refusal of the court to instruct the jury to allow the deduction of ten per cent clained by the defendants. Our remarks will be confined to these subjects. We shall consider them in the order in which we have named them. The suit was commenced and put at issue by the pleadings, and the copies and transcript from the Treasury bear date more than two years before the Revised Statutes were enacted, but their enactment was prior were approved by the President on the 22d January, 1874, and then took effect. The repealing section, 5596, included the Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, 1 Stat. at L., 512; but section 5597 saved all rights which had accrued under any of the Acts thus abrogated. It declared that all such rights "Shall continue and be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal had not been made." Section 886 of the Re the plaintiffs in error, is not, therefore, the statutory provision by which the rights of the parties as to the point here in question are to be determined. They are governed by the 2d section of the Act of 1797, before mentioned, upon which section 886 of the later enactment is founded. They are materially different, and the latter is narrower than the former. On the 25th of November, 1871, the defend-vised Statutes, relied upon by the counsel for ants executed to the United States a bond in the penal sum of $20,000, conditioned that Bock, Schneider & Co. should account and pay for the stamps therein mentioned as therein prescribed, and should do the other things therein required to be done, then the bond to be void, otherwise to be in force. The declaration (which is upon this bond) avers that thereafter the United States delivered to Bock, Schneider & Co. such stamps of the value of $5,500, and that they had refused and neglected to pay for a portion of them of the value of $4,400. The defendants pleaded non est factum, performance and the non-delivery of the stamps. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict and judgment were rendered for the United States. Upon the trial, the United States offered in evidence a certified copy of the bond and certified copies of the receipts of Bock, Schneider & Co. for the stamps, both from the Treasury Department, and a treasury transcript of the account of Bock, Schneider & Co., showing a balance of $4,400 against them. The defendants objected to this evidence being received, and asked the court to instruct the jury to find in their favor. The court admitted the evidence, and refused the instruction. The defendants excepted as to both points. The defendants then asked the court to charge the jury and direct that the defendants were entitled to have deducted from the balance shown to be due by the treasury accounts ten per cent commission on the same, as allowed by the Act of Congress of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L., 294, amended in 1870, and incorporated in the Revised Statutes under section 3425, page 677. The court, after argument, denied the motion, and the defendants excepted. The court thereupon directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiffs for the sum of $4,400, principal, with interest from October -, 1872, to the date of said trial, at seven per cent per annum, being the sum of $1,052.30, making a total of $5,452.30; to which direction the defendants excepted. The jury rendered a verdict as directed." The brief of the counsel for the plaintiffs in error is confined to two points: The Act of 1797 was the first regulation upon the subject made by Congress. The 2d section declares that “In every case of delinquency where a suit has been or shall be instituted, a transcript from the books and proceedings of the Treas ury, certified," etc., shall be admitted in evidence, and the court trying the cause shall be thereupon authorized to grant judgment and award execution accordingly; and all copies of bonds," etc., "relating to or connected with the settlement of any account between the United States and an individual, when certified," etc., may be annexed to such transcripts, and shall have equal validity and be entitled to the same degree of credit which would be due to the orig. inal papers if produced and authenticated in court. This section clearly comprehends the case before us. The 1st section directs suit to be brought against "Any revenue officer or other person accountable for public money who shall become a defaulter. If it be said that the 2d section is limited by the 1st to the classes of persons named; in the 1st, there are several answers. It will be observed that the language of the 2d section contained no such restriction. It is general. Its terms are "in every case of delinquency," and again, "the settlement of an ac count between the United States and an indi vidual." The Act contains seven sections. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th apply indisputably to all debtors of the United States, without discrimination. The 3d section, fairly considered, must be regarded as no less comprehensive. The 2d section, being remedial in its charac ter and relating to the law of procedure, is to be liberally construed with reference to the pur pose of its enactment. Sedgwick, Statutory and Const. L., pp. 311, 315, and n. This precise question came before the circuit court in U. S. v. Lent, 1 Paine, 417. Mr. Justice Thompson there said: The construction contended for on the part of the plaintiffs in error, that this provision, as to the admission of authenticated copies, is restricted to certain cases, where suits are com menced under authority given by the 1st section of the Act, cannot be sustained, although it is not perceived why the present is not such a case. But the provision is general, and applies to all cases where the evidence is required, and is founded upon a proper precaution to guard against the loss of the original." See, also, U. S. v. Lee, 2 Cranch (C. C.), 462. As the Act of 1797 has been repealed, we forbear to pursue the subject further. A few words will be sufficient to dispose of the other point. It arises under the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, sec. 161. 13 Stat. at L., 294; R. S., sec. 3425. The deduction claimed of ten per cent is allowed by the statute to a purchaser "who fur nishes his own die," etc. The defendants declined to give any evidence to the jury, and it certainly does not appear by the record that any was adduced on this point. But it is said it was treated by the Government at the trial as a conceded fact. There is no such admission here by the counsel of the United States. We cannot look beyond the record, and that is silent upon the subject. It is said, further, that the transcript shows the deduction from a charge for stamps of $1,100, not here in controversy. It would be a long stride in dialectics, and one we are not prepared to take, from this fact to the inference, that the purchaser also furnished the die when the stamps in question were bought. The conclusion claimed from such premises would be a palpable non sequitur. It is rather to be inferred that the allowance was made in one case because the die was fur nished, and refused in the other because it was not. Error must be affirmatively shown. It is not to be presumed. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. DELPHINE TRENIER, Admrx., of JOHN TRENIER, Deceased, ET AL., Piffs. in Err., v. ISABELLA P. STEWART. (See S. C, 11 Otto, 797-810. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. P. Phillips and W. Hallett Phillips, for plaintiffs in error. don, for defendant in error. Messrs. J.T.Morgan and Thos. H.Hern Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Claims to land, when the Province of Louisiana was ceded to the United States, were, in many instances, incomplete, arising largely from the fact that the Governor of the Province, during Spanish rule, never had authority to issue a patent. Laws were, accordingly, passed by Congress very early after the jurisdiction was transferred, making provision for the adjustment of such inchoate claims, which in one form or another have been continued in force even to the present time. Concessions of the kind having never received the sanction of the supreme power of the Province, they did not have the effect to segregate the tract conceded from the mass of the public lands, from which it followed that when the jurisdiction of the Province was transferred by the Treaty the legal title to all such tracts vested in the new sovereign until confirmed. Complete titles, of which there were a few, mostly derived during the dominion of the French, needed no confirmation, as they were fully protected by the Treaty. Sufficient appears, to show that the plaintiffs derive their title from Nicholas Baudin, an old French claimant, whose title, as the plaintiffs allege, was confirmed by an Act of Congress. 4 Stat. at L., 240. They rely upon the action of the commissioners appointed under that Act of Congress, and the proceedings of the commissioners shown in the State Papers, and the confirmation of the same by the subsequent Act of Congress relating to the same subjectmatter. 4 Stat. at L., 358; 3 Am. St. Papers, pp. 19, 20; 5 Am. St. Papers, 130. Evidence was given by both parties, as is fully set forth in the transcript and in the report of the case as prepared in the court of original jurisdiction. Stewart v. Trenier, 49 Ala., 492. None of the other proceedings in the cause, prior to the bill of exceptions and the final judgment, removed here for re-examination, are Locality of land, question of fact-first title to material in this investigation, and they are court. Mexican grant-confirmation. 1. Whether the locality of a tract, as described in a Mexican grant, can be ascertained or not, is a question of fact to be found by a jury. Where evidence in respect to that issue was introduced by both parties, and it was properly submitted to the jury, their verdict is not open to revision in this 2. Where two titles to the same land depend exclusively for their validity upon the action of Congress, he who first obtains the title, and not he who first applied for it, has the better right. 3. If the title of the original donee was complete when the province was ceded to the United States, it is the superior title, and is protected by the Treaty of Cession. 4. Where Congress has confirmed the concession omitted, with the remark that the parties will find them all fully set forth in the statement of the reported case. Service was made, and the defendants having appeared pleaded the general issue. Both parties gave evidence, and the verdict and judg ment were in favor of the plaintiffs. Exceptions were filed by the defendants, and they appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment was affirmed. Still dissatisfied, the defendants sued out the present writ of error, and removed the cause into this court. Since the cause was entered here, the defendants have assigned three errors, as follows: (1) |