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Decree reversed accordingly.
Cited-13 N. W. Rep., 139.

The appellants insist, however, that Johnson | manded, with instructions to enter a decree in & Goodrich had no insurable interest in the conformity with this opinion. buildings and machinery and, therefore, that they have no lawful claim to any part of the insurance in question. But it does not lie in the mouths of the appellants to make this argu. ment. If it has any force which it is not necessary for us to decide, it can only be urged by the Insurance Company, and they do not urge it.

Since, therefore, there is no proof that Johnson & Goodrich did not act with entire fairness in the whole transaction, and without notice of Green's covenant to insure; and since there was no privity between them and the appellants, we do not see how the latter can sustain any claim at law or in equity against them.

a

JOHN W. BROOKS ET AL., Appts.,

0.

BURLINGTON & SOUTHWESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY, FARMERS'
LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY ET
AL.

(See 8. C., 11 Otto, 443-452.)

Mechanics' lien-judgment on-extent of.

1. In Iowa, a mechanics' lien has preference over

prior recorded mortgage.

But as the debt due to Johnson & Goodrich will not exhaust the whole amount of the insurance, and as the balance rightfully belongs to Green, the question arises, whether, as to that balance, the claim of the appellants is not maintainable. It is, undoubtedly, the general rule that a mortgagee has no right to the benefit of a policy taken by the mortgagor, unless it is assigned to him. Čarter v. Rockett, 8 Paige, 437. But it is settled by many decisions in this country, that if the mortgagor is bound by | Argued Apr.13, 14, 1880. Decided May 10,1880. covenant or otherwise to insure the mortgaged

2. A judgment establishing the lien against a railroad company is conclusive of the formality of the prior proceedings, in a subsequent action to foreclose a mortgage on the same property. 3. The entire road is subject to a lien for work done on one part of it, although the road was built in sections.

[No. 258.]

ed States for the District of Iowa. The case is stated by the court.

Messrs. Jas. Grant & Grant, for appellants.

Messrs. B. J. Hall and Hubbard & Clark, for appellees.

the court:
Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of

premises for the better security of the mortga-APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unitgee, the latter will have an equitable lien upon the money due on a policy taken out by the mortgagor to the extent of the mortgagee's interest in the property destroyed. Thomas V. Vonkapff, 6 Gill & J., 372; n. to 3 Kent, Com., 376; Ang. F. and L. Ins., sec. 62; 2 Am. L. Cas., 834, 5th ed.; 1 Herman, Mortg., sec. 424, and cases there cited. And this equity exists, although the contract provides that in case of the mortgagor's failing to procure and assign such insurance, the mortgagee may procure it at the mortgagor's expense. Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R. I., 491. Of course, the mortgagee's equity will be governed by the scope and object of the agreement; as, if the agreement be to insure for a certain amount, the equity will not apply beyond that amount; and as its object is to afford better security for the payment of the debt, it will not be enforced further than is necessary for such security; if the debt is abundantly secured by the property which remains liable to the mortgage, a court of chancery would properly decline to enforce it. The present case, however, is not embarrassed by any questions of this sort. The appellants have proceeded to sell the immovable property mortgaged, which did not more than satisfy the first mortgage; and the amount of insurance money remaining after satisfying the claim of Johnson & Goodrich is less than the insurance stipulated for in the other mortgages.

The equitable doctrine upon which the appellants' claim is founded, undoubtedly obtains in Louisiana. It is derived from the principles of the civil law, which is the basis of the Civil Code of that State; and it is supported by the authorities cited from the Louisiana reports. See, Civil Code La., art. 1965; Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (N. S.) 22; Citizens Bk. v. St. Bk. 5 La. Ann., 12; Braden v. Ins. Co., 1 La., 220.

Our conclusion is, that the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed and the case re

The appellants here, who were plaintiffs below, are trustees in a mortgage made by the Burlington & Southwestern Railway Company on its road and other property to secure $1,800,000 of bonds put on the market and sold. They bring this suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, to foreclose that mortgage and in addition to the Railroad Company, they brought in, during the progress of chanics' liens on the road. Of these parties, only the suit, other parties who were asserting methe interest of O'Hara Brothers and Wells, French & Co., whose liens were by the court held to be paramount to that of complainants, remain to be considered in the appeal of the trustees from that decree.

the laws of Iowa to build a road from BurlingThe Railroad Company was organized under ton, on the Mississippi River, in a southwestern direction, to some point on the Missouri River.

NOTE-Priority, between mortgage and mechanics'

lien.

mortgages depends to a great extent on the statutes The priority as between mechanics' liens and of the several States. Brooks v. Ry. Co., supra; Mass. Gen. Stat., C. 150; Cal. Code Civ. Pro.. sec. 1186; Davis v. Bilsland, 85 U. S., XXI., 969; Cheshire Prov. Inst. v. Stone, 52 N. H., 365; Shepardson v. Johnson, 60 Iowa, 239: Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C., 450; Mellor v. Valentine, 3 Col., 258.

In some States the lien attaches from the commencement of the work, although the particular work for which the lien is claimed was done after the execution of the mortgage. Neilson v. Iowa, etc., R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 71; Dubois v. Wilson, 21 Mo., 214; Brooks v. Lester, 36 Md., 65; Hall v. Hinckley, 32 Wis., 362; Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S., XXIV., 283; Meyer v. Const. Co., 100 U. S., XXV., 593.

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From the initial point, at Burlington, to Viele, in Lee County, Iowa, they, by contract, used the track of a road already built between Burlington and Keokuk. From Viele to Bloomfield, in Davis County, they built and paid for their own track. From Bloomfield to Moulton, in Appanoose County, fourteen miles, they used the road of another company, already built, and from Moulton to Unionville, in Missouri, they built their own road. It is for the work and labor done and materials furnished in the latter piece of the road, that the lien of the appellees was allowed by the court on the road and right of way, stations, etc., of the Company from Viele Junction, in Lee County, to the South Iowa State line, in Appanoose County, in favor of O'Hara Brothers for $39,763.24, and in favor of Wells, French & Co., for $8,528.83.

It is a conceded fact in the case, that the work for which these liens were allowed was done for the Company by the parties claiming it, and no question is raised here as to the value of the work and the liability of the Company to pay for it. It is also an undisputed fact, that before any of this work was done or the contract, was made under which it was done, the mortgage of plaintiffs was executed and duly recorded.

It is also undisputed that both the appellees, whose claim is now contested, were subcontractors who had no direct contract with the Rail road Company. The contract which that Company made was with another organization, known as the Mississippi & Missouri Construction Company.

This was a purely artificial being, composed of the officers and some of the stockholders of the Railroad Company organized for the purpose of building this road, and belongs to a class whose operations have become well known of late years as instruments to enable the officers of railroad companies to make contracts with themselves to build the roads for their stockholders. In the present case, this instrument having sublet all the contract to one J. W. Barnes, very soon took itself out of the way, and by an agreement between it and the Railway Company, of which the following extract is found in the record, its existence ceases to be of any further significance in this contest:

the main line and branch of the B. & S. W. Railway Company, and the payment of all estimates due and to become due thereon.”

This leaves to be considered here the Railway Company, J.W. Barnes, the principal contractor for construction of the road, O'Hara and Brothers, and Wells, French & Co., subcontractors, and the trustees in this foreclosure suit. It is also to be observed that O'Hara & Co, and Wells, French & Co., had both commenced legal proceedings in the proper courts of the State to establish their liens before the present foreclosure suit was begun by appellants, and that in those courts, after a contest with the Railway Company, judgments were rendered establishing their liens, and it was after this that they were made defendants to the present foreclosure suit.

To these proceedings, Barnes, the principal contractor, and the Railway Company were par ties, and we take it for granted that as against them the judgment of the state court establishes the validity of the lien. The appellants being no party to these proceedings are not bound by that judgment, and both the validity of the lien as against them, and whether the lien, if valid, is paramount to that of the mortgage, are the questions for consideration here. These questions must be determined by the statutes of Iowa, as construed in regard to the facts of this case.

By the law in force when these transactions took place, a mechanic has a lien for labor done or things furnished, on the entire land upon which the building, erection or improvement was made, which has been held to include railroads, shall be preferred to all other liens and incumbrances which shall be attached to or upon such building, erection or other improvement made subsequently to the commencement of said building, erection or other improvement. Revision of 1860, sec. 1853; Code of 1873, sec. 2139.

This provision, it will be observed, relates to the land on which the improvement is made and gives a paramount or preferred lien only as against other liens and incumbrances created subsequent to the beginning of the work of the mechanic. Those made prior to that time, are unaffected by it. But section 1855 of the Revision, now section 2141 of the Code, makes s different provision in regard to the lien of the mechanic on the building, erection and improveex-ment for which the lien is claimed. It reads thus:

"Contract between B. & S. W. Railway Company and the M. & M. Construction Company. Dated February 6th, 1873.

The Railway Company assumes all outstanding liabilities of the Construction Company, cept officers' salaries. All previous contracts be tween the two Companies are annulled.

The Railway Company assumes the contract of J. W. Barnes for construction of portions of

Under other statutes, without actual or constructive notice as prescribed, the mortgagee is not affected by the mechanics' lien, and his being at work on the building is not notice. Gere v. Cushing, 5 Bush, 304; Foushee v. Grigsby, 12 Bush, 75. Under the Massachusetts Statute, the lien relates back to the time of the making the contract for the labor or materials. Mortgages subsequent to the contract are subject to the lien. Dunklee v. Crane, 103 Mass., 470; Batchelder v. Rand, 117 Mass., 176; Manchester v. Crane, 121 Mass., 418.

A mechanics' lien for materials for improving or enlarging a building does not take priority over an existing mortgage. Jessup v. Stone, 13 Wis., 466; Getchell v. Allen, 34 Iowa, 559; Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Slye, 45 lowa, 615; Norris' Appeal, 30 Pa. St., 122.

A purchase money mortgage is prior to a me

"The lien for the things aforesaid on work shall attach to the building, erections or improvements for which they were furnished or

|chanics' lien,although given subsequent to the commencement of the building. Campbell's Appeal, 36 Pa. St., 247; Rees v. Luddington, 73 Wis., 276; Clark v. Butler, 32 N. J. Eq., 664.

A mechanics' hen on a building is subordinate to the lien of a mortgage upon the land, executed before the building was commenced. Hershey v. Hershey, 15 Iowa, 185; Hazard Powder Co. v. Loomis, 2 Disn., 544: Jessup v. Stone, 13 Wis., 466.

Under statutes providing that ljen shall attach from the commencement of the building, the commencement of the building is the first labor done on the ground which is made the foundation of the building, such as beginning to dig the foundation. Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291; Dunklce v. Crane. 103 Mass., 470: Conrad v. Starr, 50 Iowa, 481; Brooks v. Lester, 36 Md., 65.

done, in preference to any prior lien or incum- | give notice to the owner of the land, before or brance or mortgage upon the land upon which at the time he furnishes any of the materials or the same is erected or put, and any person en- performs any of the labor, of his intention to forcing such lien may have such building, erec- perform or furnish the same, and afterwards he tion or other improvement sold under execu- shall settle with the contractor therefor, and tion, and the purchaser may remove the same having made the settlement in writing, the same, within a reasonable time thereafter." signed by the contractor and certified by him to be just, shall be presented to the owner. He is also required, within thirty days from the time the things shall have been furnished or the labor performed, to file with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the building is situated a copy of said settlement, and a correct description of the property to be charged with the lien, the correctness of which shall be verified by oath. As we have already seen, the Act of 1862 declares a failure to file this settlement shall not operate to defeat the lien as against everyone except purchasers or incumbrancers without notice, whose rights accrued after ninety days, and before the account or settlement or lien claim is filed.

The mechanic, therefore, has a lien upon the land paramount to all rights accruing after the commencement of his work, and upon what he puts upon the land paramount to all other claims, whether created prior or subsequent to that time. The decisions of the courts of Iowa are to this effect and the proposition is not disputed in argument here.

Have the appellees taken the necessary steps to establish their lien?

What is required to initiate the lien as to all other persons but subcontractors is to be found in section 1851 of the Revision of 1860.

"Section 1851. It shall be the duty of every person, except as has been provided for sub contractors, who wishes to avail himself of the provisions of this chapter, to file with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the building, erection or other improvement to be charged with the lien is situated, and within ninety days after all the things aforesaid shall have been furnished, or work or labor done or performed, a just and true account of the demand due or owing to him after allowing all credits, and containing a correct description of the property to be charged with said lien and verified by affidavit."

This section was subsequently modified by the following statute:

"An Act to Amend Section 1851 of Revision of 1860 relating to Mechanics' Liens.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, That the following words are hereby added to section eighteen hun dred and fifty one of Revision of 1860, to wit: 'But the failure to file the claim, account, settlement or demand, in the time named in this section and in section 1847, shall not operate to defeat the claim or demand, nor the lien of the person supplying the labor or material, as against the owner, nor the contractor, nor as against anyone except purchasers or incum brancers, without notice, whose rights accrued after the ninety days and before the account, or settlement, or claim, or lien is filed.'

Approved April 7, 1862."

Appellants are not within this exception.

The record shows that there was filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court of Ap panoose County, on the 31st of October, 1872, a statement by O'Hara and Brothers of a claim against J. W. Barnes, the principal contractor, and against the Railroad Company, of a mechanics' lien on their line of said road, from Viele, in Lee County, through Van Buren, Davis and Appanoose Counties, in the State of Iowa, for work and labor done and to be done and materials furnished under Barnes' contract, in which they said they had already done work to the amount of $265,000, of which $130,000 had been paid. This was verified by the oath of O'Hara. An agreed statement of facts in the present suit states that, in filing their respective claims for mechanics' liens, settlements had been made between the subcontractors and Barnes, and that the amounts claimed had been agreed to by Barnes in these several settlements.

It is now urged by appellants, against the validity of these liens, that the notice of the lien to the Railway Company, which the statute required from the subcontractor, was never given, and if any direct written notice was necessary to the establishment of the lien in this suit, it must be admitted that it is not proved.

But we think there are two sufficient answers to this objection:

1. It is obvious that this notice to the owner The statute, however, makes provision that of the property is for the purpose of enabling a subcontractor who shall do the work which him to protect himself in his dealings with the his principal had contracted to do shall, by principal contractor, so that he shall neither proper proceeding, secure to himself the lien overpay the amount of the contract with the which arises from the work done or materials subcontractor, nor embarrass himself by having furnished. In such case there is a more com- to deal with two contractors. This dealing with plex affair. There are, here, the owner of the two contractors instead of one being an obligaproperty, the principal contractor and the sub- tion which the law imposes on him for the bencontractor, who have rights to be affected, as efit of the subcontractor, this notice is required well as prior and subsequent incumbrancers or for his protection. It can have nothing to do lien holders. It may generally be supposed that with the validity of the lien beyond ascertainthe principal contractor has sublet his contracting the amount of it to which the subcontractor so as to leave a profit to himself. He is entitled, is entitled as between those three. With prior therefore, to see that his subcontractor does not take this profit. The owner is not bound for more than he agreed to pay the principal contractor. In view of these interests, section 1847 of the Revision, section 2131 of the Code of 1873, enacts that every subcontractor wishing to avail himself of the benefit of the Act, shall

liens it has nothing to do, and can have no effect on the rights of the holders of them. The initial proceeding for the establishment of the lien, on which all others rest, is the claim filed in the clerk's office of the proper court. In the case of Bundy v. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 207, the Supreme Court of the State held that the paper

thus filed by a subcontractor imparted notice, to the owner and principal contractor of the condition of the account between the parties.

2. Since this notice is designed for the protection of the owner, and was to be given to him, the judgment of the State Court of Iowa establishing this lien against the Railroad Company is conclusive on that subject, and with that question the complainants in this court have nothing to do.

The next objection, very strongly urged by counsel for appellants, is thus stated in the assignment of errors: the court erred in decree-cal, and at war with the principle in which liens ing a lien on the property in Davis, Van Buren and Lee, the first division of the road, for work done in Appanoose County, the next division, on a contract which was dated and work be gun after recording the mortgage in Appanoose County.

As we understand this objection, it is founded on the idea that while, if the whole road had been uninterruptedly built under one contract, the lien of the contractors and subcontractors would have been good against the whole road, though they had contributed only to the build ing of a limited portion of it, yet because these subcontractors were only employed on one division of the road, after another had been finished, and under a distinct contract with the Company made after that completion, the lien can only attach to the last section of the road, and even this is subordinate to the mortgage of the appellants.

One branch of the question here raised was very fully considered in the case of Neilson v. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 71. That was a case where, after the building of a railroad had been com menced, a mortgage was executed on its whole line, both where work had been done and where none had been done. After this the building of the road was continued under new contracts by persons who did work on the other parts of the road, and the question was, whether they had any lien prior to that of the mortgage, and if so, whether it extended to all the road or only to that part built under the new contracts.

The court, after mature deliberation, decided both these questions in favor of the contractors. It held that the road was an entire improve ment, within the meaning of the Act, and that the continuance of it was a matter to be taken into the calculation of the mortgagees when the mortgage was made, and the lien for that work was, by the statute, given on the road as one improvement. The court, speaking of the policy of the statute, said "It is not desirable that the execution of a mortgage upon land on which a building or other improvement is in process of construction should arrest the work and prevent its completion. Both mortgagor and mortgagee are interested in its completion. Without it the money already expended must ordinarily to a great extent be lost. Take the present case as illustrative. The interveners are holders of mortgage bonds upon a road, sixteen miles of which had been graded at the time the mortgage was made. The value of their security depended upon the further construction of the work. They foresaw that work and materials must be furnished by somebody, or nothing could be realized from what had been done.'

But the argument most confidently urged here is, that the road was built in sections and

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that there was such a separation in space and time in the construction of these sections that they cannot be considered as one improvement within the meaning of the statute. The argument is that the road from Viele to Bloomfield is one road; that then it is interrupted, and the track of another company is used from Bloomfield to Moulton; that there another road begins which was constructed under another contract, and that no lien for work done here can attach to the road between Viele and Bloomfield. The argument seems to us extremely techniare allowed for work done subsequently to the creation of a mortgage. That doctrine, or rather the statute giving a permanent lien under such circumstances, and the construction of it by the courts were in existence when the mortgage of the appellants was made. It entered into and became a part of their contract. They knew that the road was yet to be built, and that while such building would add to the value of their security, the law gave to the men whose labor and money built it a lien superior to that of the mortgage. Now that the venture in which both embarked is to end in loss to one or the other of them, there is no judicial propriety in straining the law to limit the rights of one party rather than the other. If that law, by its fair construction, gives the mechanic a lien for a few thousand dollars on the whole road, instead of a part of it, the law should prevail.

In every respect, except this one of its construction, the road is a unit, an entirety. Its route is selected and surveyed as one road. It is owned and built and run by one corporation. Its trains run over it all. The mortgage of appellants can have no lien on any of the road beyond the first few miles upon any other theory, for its descriptive language refers to the road as to one and not as several subdivisions. It is not easy to see how it can be held to be one road for the purposes of the mortgage, and two or three pieces of road for the purposes of the mechanics' lien. This continuation of the road beyond Bloomfield was as useful to the security of that mortgage as the part between Viele and Bloomfield. Though the work was done from Moulton under another contract, there was never any suspension of the work on the whole road beyond what is usual in roads built with limited means. There was never any permsnent arrest of the work, nor any intention to cease work on the road. The intersection of fourteen miles of another road between Bloomfield and Moulton does not destroy the identity of the improvement, nor convert it into two railroads.

The case of the Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wall., 561 [73 U. S., XVIII.,894], is much relied on by appellants, and in one of its features-that now under consideration-it bears some analogy to the one before us. In that case, however, the part of the canal first finished, and which was held not to be subject to a lien for work done on that constructed afterwards was not only finished but in full operation for some time. How long this was finished and in use before work was begun on the new part is not stated in the report of the case. It may have been long enough to justify the belief that for a time the further prosecution of the work was abandoned, and its resumption an afterthought.

In the case before us, the purpose of discontinuing the road was never for a moment entertained, and the actual work was resumed in a few months after its completion to Bloomfield. In that case the decision depended on the construction of a Statute of California which used the word "structure" where the Iowa Statute uses the word "improvement."

In that case, as was said in the opinion, we had no aid from any decision of the courts of the State. In the one before us we have several decisions of the Iowa court. Neilson v. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 71; Ins. Co. v. Slye, 45 Iowa, 615.

'A mechanic's lien," says the court in the latter case, can, it is true, become paramount to a mortgage executed upon a partially erected building, provided the work be done or materials furnished for the purpose of completing the building. This is the plain provision of the Statute and, to our mind, it is not unreasonable. Whoever takes a mortgage upon a building in the process of erection, should assume that the mechanics' work is to go forward, and he may form some estimate of the amount that will be required. The same is not true in regard to repairs or enlargements."

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If the case of the Canal Co. v. Gordon is at variance with the decision of the courts of Iowa construing her own statute, we must follow the latter. They also meet our approval.

Without examining other objections to the decree, or those to the lien of Wells, French & Co., we think what we have said covers the case, and the decree of the Circuit Court is af firmed.

Copy, foregoing opinion, duly authenticated by James H. McKenny, Esq., Clerk, Supreme Court, U.S.

Cited-101 U. S., 730; 112 U. S., 11.

THE STEAMSHIP CITY OF PANAMA,
Etc., THE PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP
PANY AND WILLIAM B. SEABURY,
ants, Appts.,

v.

JOHN S. PHELPS, Survivor.

See S. C., "The City of Panama," 11 Otto, 453-464.)
Territorial courts-damages.

3. The court erred in overruling the motion for, and denying the appellants' trial by jury. 4. The court erred in holding that the damages caused by the alleged tort constituted a lien upon the ship, City of Panama.

5. The court erred in holding that a contract to carry Mary Phelps was proven.

6. The court erred in holding that Mary Phelps was not guilty of contributory negli gence, and that she was entitled to recover damages from the appellants.

7. The district court erred in allowing $5,000, and the Supreme Court in allowing $15,000, because both are excessive, and more specifically in allowing $3,000 for injury to libelant's ability to labor and earn money, and $2,000 for inconvenience and disfigurement resulting from the injury.

8. The court erred in overruling appellants' motion for leave to withdraw paper designated as libelants' notice of appeal, and in ruling that the libelants had appealed from the decree of the district court to the Supreme Court of the Territory.

9. The court erred in ruling that libelants could look into appellants' bill of exceptions for the purpose of furthering libelants' cause and in increasing the damages.

10. The court erred in overruling the exceptions and points contained in appellants' bill of exceptions.

11. The district court erred in ruling that the libelants' were entitled to recover $5,000 damages, or any damages, and the Supreme Court erred in holding that the libelants were entitled to recover $15,000 damages, or any damages.

Mr. Austen G. Fox, Jas. McNaught and
Andrew Boardman, for appellants.
Mr. P. Phillips, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court:

Judicial power as well as legislative is conCOM-ferred upon the territorial government by the organic Act establishing the territory, the proClaim- vision being that the judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, District Courts, Probate Courts, and in Justices of the Peace. Appellate jurisdiction from the district courts to the Supreme Court is also given, and with that view the provision is that writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals shall be allowed under such regulations as may be prescribed 1. The territorial courts of Washington Territory by law, from which it plainly follows that the have such jurisdiction in admiralty causes as is vest-District Courts created by the Organic Act are ed in the Federal, District and Circuit Courts. 2. In a suit brought for personal injuries, the and were intended to be courts of general origdamages must be left to the good sense and delib-inal jurisdiction. erate judgment of the jury. [No. 266.] Argued Apr. 16, 19, 1880. Decided May 10, 1880. PPEAL from the Supreme Court of Washington Territory.

AP

The case is stated by the court.

The following were the assignments of er

ror:

1. The court erred in holding that it had admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

2. The court erred in holding that the Acts of Congress and the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, governing the Circuit and District Courts of the United States in admiralty practice, were in force in the courts of the Territory, and regulated the practice therein.

Provision is also made for writs of error and

appeals from the territorial Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations as are required to remove here the judgment or decree of the Federal Circuit Court for reexamination, where the value of the property or the amount in controversy exceeds $2,000, or where the Constitution of the United States or an Act of Congress or a treaty is brought in question.

Express power is also given to the District Courts of the Territory to have and exercise the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the Circuit and District Courts

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