the maker, except by the indorsement of the payee. The note was protested when it fell due, and 2. A guaranty is not a negotiation of a bill or note, it is now held by the receiver of the Trust Comas understood by the law merchant. [No. 270.] Submitted Jan. 13, 1880. Decided Mar. 1, 1880. pany, and the collaterals, the municipal bonds, ed States for the Northern District of Il- difference between $5,000 and $4,868, the sum linois. standing to the credit of the Wyandotte Bank against the payee, the claimant offering to pay that sum. from the Circuit and bonds on payment the The case is stated by the court. Mr. Samuel W. Packard, for appellant. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: This case, as made by the bill, answers, rep lications and proofs, is as follows: on the 24th day of September, 1874, the First National Bank of Wyandotte, Kansas, made its promissory note at Chicago, Illinois, in these words: "[$5.000.] CHICAGO, Illinois, Sept. 24th, 1874. Four months after date we promise to pay to Cook County National Bank, of Chicago, or order, five thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of per cent per annum after due, value received, all payable at Cook County National Bank. (Signed) B. JUDD, Cashier 1st Nat'l Bank, Wyandotte, Ka's. $6,000 Wyandotte Co. and City bonds as collateral." In view of these facts, fairly deducible from the evidence, it is manifest that, as between the complainant and the Cook County Bank, there is a perfect defense against the note to the extent of $4,868, the sum standing to the credit of the Wyandotte Bank due from the payee. On the payment of $132 the maker of the note has a clear equity to have it surrendered, to gether with the municipal bonds held as collaterals. But it is claimed that the Trust Company having received the note before its maturity, and having discounted it in the usual course of business without any knowledge of any equities or defense against it, is entitled to hold it free from any defense which the maker could set up against the payee; that is, against the Cook County Bank. A large portion of the argument before us has been expended upon the questions whether, inasmuch as the note was given by the cashier of the Wyandotte Bank at Chicago, and was made payable at a future day, it was not void under the general banking law. We pass those questions as unnecessary to be considered. If it be conceded the note was valid at its inception, it is certainly true the maker had a good defense against while it was in the hands of the payee, and we do not perceive that the manner in which the Trust Company or its receiver ob tained it puts them or either of them in any better position than the payee occupied. The note was not indorsed to the Trust Com usual course of business by that mode of transfer in which negotiable paper is usually transferred. Had it been indorsed by the Cook County Bank, it may be that the Trust Company would hold it, unaffected by any equities between the maker and the payee. But instead of an indorsement, the President of the Cook County Bank merely guarantied its payment, and handed it over with this guaranty to the Trust Company. The note was not even assigned. There was written upon it only the following: The note was made and delivered to the Cook County Bank, in pursuance of an arrangement between that bank and Judd, the cashier of the Wyandotte Bank, by which it was agreed the latter should execute a four months' note for $5,000, with security, and have the same discounted by the Cook County Bank, and the proceeds placed to the credit of the Wyandotte Bank, but not to be drawn against so as to reduce the credit for such proceeds below $4,000, such note to remain with the Cook County Bank, and to be surrendered to the maker on the renewal or close of the account. It was distinctly understood be-pany, and it was not, therefore, taken in the tween the officers of the two Banks, when the note was given, that it should be held by the Cook County Bank as a memorandum, and not be negotiated or separated from the Wyandotte city and county bonds for $6,000 accompanying it, which were delivered contemporaneously with it as collaterals. Accordingly, the sum of $4,000, part of the proceeds of the discount, was suffered to remain on deposit, to the credit of the Wyandotte Bank, until the Cook County Bank failed, became insolvent and passed into the hands of a receiver. At the time of such failure and the appointment of a receiver there was also an additional credit of $868 due from the Cook County Bank to the Wyandotte Bank. When, therefore, the note matured there was due from the payee to the maker of the note, the sum of $4,868. But before its maturity, to wit: on the 7th day of October, 1874, the Cook County Bank, in violation of its agreement above mentioned, passed the note to the New York State Loan and Trust Company, by which it was discounted, without any know!edge of any defense which the Wyandotte Bank had against it, or any knowledge of the origin of the note and of the agreement between the two Banks, other than what the face of the note revealed. "For value received, we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity or at any time thereafter, with interest at ten per cent per annum until paid, and agree to pay all costs and expenses paid or incurred in collecting the same. B. F. ALLEN, (Signed) Pres't." In no commercial sense is this an indorsement, and probably it was not intended as such. Mr. Allen had agreed that the note should not be negotiated and for this reason, perhaps, it was not indorsed. That a guaranty is not a negotiation of a bill or note as understood by the law merchant, is certain. Snevily v. Ekel, 1 Watts & S., 203; Lamourieux v. Hewit, 5 Wend., 307; Miller v. Gaston, 2 Hill, 188. In this case, the guaranty written on the note was filled up. It expressed fully the contract between the Cook County Bank and the Trust Company. Being express, it can raise no implication of any other contract. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. The contract cannot, therefore, be converted into an indorsement or an assignment. And if it could be treated as an assignment of the note, it would not cut off the defenses of the maker. Such an effect results only from a transfer according to the law merchant; that is, from an indorsement. An assignee stands in the place of his assignor, and takes simply an assignor's rights; but an indorsement creates a new and collateral con tract. 2 Pars. Notes and B., 46 et seq., n. At best, therefore, the defendants below can claim no more or greater rights than those of the Cook County Bank, and the complainants are entitled to a return of the note and of the collaterals on payment of the sum of $132. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Cited-2 McCrary, 570; 92 Ind., 309; 47 Am. Rep., 147. R. R. Co. v. Ga., 98 U. S., 359 (ante, 185); McMahan v. Morrison, 16 Ind.,172; Lauman v. R. R. Co., 30 Pa., 42. There was no power vested in the electors, the corporate authority of the Township of Empire, under the charter of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, to hold an election and vote to subscribe to the capital stock of the Indianapolis, Bloomington and Western Railroad Company, and issue its bonds in payment therefor to that Company, the original company having been dissolved. Burroughs, Tax., 413; Nugent v. Supervisors, 19 Wall., 241 (86 U. S., XXII., 83); see, East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S., 801 (XXIV., 322); Big Grove v. Wells, 65 Ill., 263.. It is a rule of universal application, that where the power to make the contract for the corporation never existed on the part of the officers of the township, negotiable securities issued by them are invalid in the hands of all persons. Middleport v. Ins. Co., 82 Ill., 562; School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 Ill., 189; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 III., 249; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S., 260 (XXIV.,154), McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S., 432 (XXIV,, 129); Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall., 683 (77 U. S., XIX., 1042); School Directors v. Sippy, 54 Ill., 287. The Missouri cases can have no application to this case, for the reason that the Statute of Power of township to issue bonds-additional sub- that State is wholly different from the Statute scription-inconclusive decree. 1. The Township of Empire, in Illinois, by subscribing to the stock of and issuing its bonds to the Danville,etc., Railroad Company for $50,000, did not exhaust its power under the charter of that company, but was authorized to subscribe an additional amount of $25,000 to the stock of the Indianapolis, etc., Railway Company, formed by the consolida tion of the first named and another company, and issue its bonds therefor, under the Illinois Statute of Feb. 28, 1854. 2. The power of the Township of Empire to make an additional subscription, beyond the original of $50,000, was a right and privilege of the railroad company which, under the general law of the State, passed to the consolidated company. 3. A decree in an Illinois court perpetually enjoining taxation to pay such bonds, and declaring them void, did not conclude any bondholders pro ceeded against as" unknown owners and holders," who were not served with process and did not appear, nor bondholders residing in other States who were proceeded against only by constructive service. [No. 1097.] Submitted Jan. 15, 1880. Decided Mar. 1, 1880. of Illinois, and the rule of decision in the courts of that State is different from the rule in Illinois. Bissell v. Kankakee, supra; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill., 160; see, also, Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall., 468 (86 U. S., XXII., 164); South Ottowa v. Perkins, supra, 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., 524; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Ia., 199; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall., 676 (77 Ú. S., XIX., 1040); Chisholm V. Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584. Mr. S. M. Cullom, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: Under the provisions of an Act of the Legislature of Illinois, approved February 28, 1867, and in conformity to the result of a popular election duly called, and held on the 3d June, 1867, the Township of Empire, in that State, made a subscription of $50,000 to the capital stock of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of Illinois. company was given, by its charter, power to locate, construct and complete a railroad from Pekin, through, or as near as practicable to. certain designated towns, to the eastern boundary of the State. That In payment of the subscription, bonds of the Township, of like amount, were issued and delivered to the company. The case is stated by the court. Mr. L. Weldon, for the plaintiff in error: On the 20th day of August, 1869, that comBy the consolidation of the Danville, Urbana, pany consolidated with the Indianapolis, CrawBloomington and Pekin Railroad Company fordsville and Danville Railroad company, an with the Indianapolis, Crawfordsville and Dan- Indiana corporation, the consolidated company ville Railroad Company, a new corporation assuming the name of the Indianapolis, Bloomwas created, by the name of "The Indianapo-ington and Western Railway Company. The lis, Bloomington and Western Railroad Company" and the original companies were dissolved. consolidated railroad formed a continuous line of road from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Pekin, Illinois. On the 12th of October, 1869, an election was held in the Township of Empire for the purpose of ascertaining the sense of its people upon the proposition to subscribe, upon certain conditions, the sum of $25,000, as additional stock in aid of the construction and completion of the Indianapolis, Bloomington and Western Railroad. The election resulted in favor of the subscription, which being made, bonds to that amount were issued in the name of the Township and delivered to the company. The bonds were in the customary form,dated March 20,1870, and signed by the township supervisor and clerk. Each one contained a recital that it was issued "Under and by virtue of a law of the State of Illinois, entitled 'An Act to Amend the Articles of Association of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, and to Extend the Powers of and to Confer a Charter upon the Same,' approved February 28, 1867, and in accordance with the vote of the electors of said Township, at the special election held October 12,1869, in accordance with said Act. And the faith of the Township of Empire is hereby pledged for the payment of the said principal sum and interest as afore. said." The present action involves the validity of the bonds and the coupons thereto attached of the $25,000 issue, some of which are held by the defendant in error. Their validity is assailed upon several grounds, each of which will be briefly examined: First. It is contended that the election held on the 3d June, 1867, under the charter of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, whereby the subscription of $50,000 was made and bonds issued in payment thereof, exhausted the power of the Township under that charter, and that any additional subscription was without authority of law. This position is clearly untenable. The 12th section of the charter of the railroad company furnishes a conclusive answer to this proposition. That section declares that "To further aid in the construction of said road by said company, any incorporated town or townships in counties acting under the township organization law, along the route of said road, may sub scribe to the capital stock of said company in any sum, not exceeding $250,000." That the plaintiff in error belongs to the class of townships described in that section, is not disputed. Its right, consequently, to make subscriptions, from time to time, until they reached the prescribed limit, seems to be too clear to require argument in its support. The charter contains no word, clause or section indicating that the authority of the Township to make subscriptions ceased after the first subscription. The Legislature fixed a limit beyond which the Township could not go in its subscriptions to the company in question, but left it free-the people consenting by popular vote-to make subscriptions in such sums and at such times as it deemed necessary or proper, within the aggregate amount named in the section which has been quoted. Second. The next proposition urged upon our attention is, that by the consolidation to which we have referred a new corporation was created by the name of the Indianapolis, Bloomington and Western Railway Company, and the original companies dissolved; that there was no power vested in the electors, the corporate authority of the Township of Empire, under the charter of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, to hold an election, to subscribe stock and issue bonds to that new company. This proposition is equally untenable with the first. By a general statute of Illinois, in 1854, and in force as well at the date of the charter of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, as when it was consolidated with the Indianapolis, Crawfordsville and Danville Railroad Company, express authority was conferred upon all railroad companies then organized or thereafter to be organized, which then had or might thereafter have their termini fixed by law, whenever their road or roads intersected by continuous lines, to "Consolidate their property and stock with each other, and to consolidate with companies out of this (that) State, whenever their lines connect with the lines of such companies out of this (that) State." That statute further provided that the consolidated company, by the name agreed upon, should be a body corporate and politic, and "Shall have all the powers, franchises, and immunities which the said respective companies shall have by virtue of their respective charters, before such consolidation passed, within the State of Illinois." Ill. R. S. Gross, 3d ed., pp. 537, 538. It thus appears that whatever powers, franchises, and immunities were enjoyed by the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, under its charter, passed, upon the consolidation, to the consolidated company. The power of the Township of Empire to make as we have held it could, an additional subscription, beyond the original of $50,000, was in its essence, a right and privilege of the railroad company which, under the general law of the State, passed to the consolidated company. Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S., 682 [XXIV., 219]; Henry Co. v. Nicolay,95 U.S.,619 XXIV., 394]. It was evidently so understood by the parties concerned; for while the bonds very properly refer to the Act of February 28, 1867 (which is the charter of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company), as the statute which specifically authorized their issue, the petition of citizens asking an election, and the notice of the election of October 12, 1869, distinctly show that the additional subscription of $25,000 to be voted on was for additional stock in aid of the construction and completion, not of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad, but "of the Indianapolis, Bloomington and Western Railroad." If the popular vote had been, in terms, in favor of a subscription to the capital stock of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, and the subscription had been made in that form, there would be some reason to contend that the subscription would have been a nullity, since no such company then had a distinct separate existence. But when, as here, the vote was taken and the subscription made with direct reference to the construction and completion of the original line by the consolidated company, which had previously succeeded to all the powers, franchises and immunities of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company, there would seem to be no ground whatever to question the validity of the bonds issued and delivered to the company in payment of the subscription. variably held by this court, the courts of the United States, in enforcing state statutes, must adopt the clear construction of those statutes Third. It is scarcely necessary to say that the made by the highest tribunal of the State endecree in the Circuit Court of McLean County, acting the statute. This is not a question as to Illinois, rendered in 1878, perpetually enjoin- whether, by the general commercial law of the ing the assessment and collection of taxes for country, negotiable bonds are transferable by the purpose of paying the bonds and coupons mere delivery, but whether the Statute of Illiin question, and declaring said bonds and cou- nois on that subject makes them so transferapons to be void, did not conclude the rights of ble, as those bonds are issued or pretended to the defendant in error. The bondholders were be issued under and by virtue of the laws of proceeded against by constructive service, as that State. The court below should have adopt"unknown owners and holders." The defend-ed the ruling of the State Court, and held that ant in error was not served with process, nor plaintiffs were not the legal holders of said did he appear. If the decree was binding up- bonds. on the citizens and courts of Illinois, as to which we express no opinion, it was ineffectual as to bondholders residing in other States, who were proceeded against only by constructive service. Brooklyn v. Ins. Co.. 99 U. S., 362 [ante, 416]. Judgment affirmed. Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; U. S.v. Morrison, 4 Pet., 124; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet., 291; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet., 1; Harpending v. Dutch Church, 16 Pet., 494; Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S., 21 (XXIV., 370); Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S., 289 (XXIII., 710); Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599 (67 U. S., XVII., 261). 3. The election mentioned in the bonds de Cited 101 U. S., 413; 105 U. S., 76; 107 U. S., 545;clared on was a nullity because called without 55 Vt., 497; 45 Am. Rep., 635. Submitted Jan. 15, 1880. Decided Mar. 1, 1880. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United authority by the Town Clerk, the application to him to call the same having been signed by only twelve legal voters and tax payers instead of twenty-four, as required by the law, and only ten days' notice having been given by the clerk, when the law required twenty days. Private Laws, Ill., 1867, Vol. 1, 366, sec. 1; also, of 1869, Vol. 3, 361, sec. 1; People v. Cline, 63 Ill., 394; R. R. Co. v. Coyer, 79 Ill., 373; Marshall Co.v. Cook, 38 Ill., 44; Harding v. R. R. Co., 65 Ill., 90, and cases therein cited on p. 92. 4. As to innocent holders: I concede that it is the settled doctrine of this court, as first announced in Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539 (62 U. S., XVI., 208), and as stated in Coloma v. Eaces, 92 U. S., 484 (XXIII., 579), and restated in many other cases, That, where legislative authority has been given to a municipality or its officers, to subscribe for the stock of a railroad company, and to issue municipal bonds in payment, but only on some precedent condition, such as a popular vote favoring the subscription, and where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality IN to District of Illinois, were invested with the power to decide whether This action was brought in the court below, by the defendants in error against the plaintiff in error, upon certain bonds and coupons. The facts are stated by the court. Messrs. A. J. Bell and John W. Ross, for plaintiff in error: 1. By the statutes of Illinois, as uniformly construed by the Supreme Court of that State, the bonds described in declaration of plaintiffs below could not be transferred so as to invest the legal title in the bearer, except such bonds be indorsed in writing by the Hamilton, Lacon and Eastern Railroad Company. Hilborn v. Artus, 3 Scam., 344; Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill., 452. 2. The court below, in deciding that the title to said bonds was in the plaintiffs, enforced the Statute of Illinois making notes, bills, bonds, etc., assignable; and, by the uniform rule in NOTE.-Negotiability of railroad bonds. See note to White v. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., 62 U. S., XVI., 221. the condition precedent has been complied with, their recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them, and held by a bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding on the municipality, for the recital is itself a decision of the fact by the appointed tribunal." But this rule of estoppel, as above cited, depends upon the fact that the statute can be construed so as to constitute the officer, designated to issue the bonds, the tribunal to decide the fact as to whether the precedent conditions were com plied with or not. The statute in this case, as construed and decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, does not constitute the supervisor or the town clerk, either separately or associately, such tribunal; therefore, the sound rule of this court, above set forth, does not apply in this case. Williams v. Town of Roberts, 88 Ill., 12; Marshall Co. v. Cook (supra); Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill., 181; Clark v. Hancock Co. 27 Ill., 305. 5. When the bonds in this case were issued, it was the well settled law of the State of Illinois, that when the Legislature of the State authorized a municipality to subscribe stock to a railroad company and issue bonds in payment thereof, the law must be pursued in all its material requirements, else the bonds, when issued, will be void, in whosesoever hands they may be found. Schuyler Co. v. People (supra); Clark v. Hancock Co. (supra); Marshall Co. v. Cook (supra). The construction which prevails in the state courts at the time municipal bonds are issued, upon questions touching their validity, enters into and forms 'a part of them, as the settled law of those contracts; and the municipality is suing the bonds and the purchaser of the same are each bound by such construction. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175 (68 U. S., XVII.,520); Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678 (83 U. S., XXI., 382); Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall., 294 (70 U. S., XVIII., 38); Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall., 270 (71 U. S., XVIII., 350); Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall., 196 (71 U. S., XVIIÏ.,322); 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., 2d ed., sec. 416 b; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill., 555, 1871; Bk. v. Iola. 2 Dill., 353, 1873. Mr. Geo. O. Ide for defendants in error: The municipal bonds offered in evidence were payable to bearer and negotiable by delivery and, consequently, were properly admitted in evidence without any written indorsement of the nominal payee, the railroad company. In contemplation of law, commercial paper drawn payable to a specified individual or bearer, is solely payable to the person who is or may become the bearer. There is no difference in this respect between paper payable to bearer alone, and that payable to a particu lar person or bearer. Both pass by delivery and no indorsement is necessary. Bk. v. Wister, 2 Pet., 319, 326; Bonnafee v. Williams, 3 How., 577; Bradford v. Jenks, 2 McLean, 130; Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mas., 243; Dean v. Hall, 17 Wend., 216; Seabury v. Hungerford, 2 Hill, 83; Dole v. Weeks, 4 Mass.. 451; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr., 1516, 1524; Story, Prom. N., 51, sec. 36, 7th ed. 3 Kent, Com., 91 (marg., 78); Edw. Bills, 646, 647; Byles, Bills, 228; 2 Abb. U. S. Pr., 19. The Illinois Statute only requires an assign ment of notes when drawn payable to a partic ular payee. It does not in terms require a note payable to "bearer" to be indorsed. On the contrary, the 8th section of the Statute of Negotiable Instruments expressly provides that the title to such commercial paper shall pass by delivery. Gross, Stat. of Ill., p. 461, cap. 73, sec. 4; Rev. Stat. of Ills., p. 719, sec. 8. Prior to the enactment of the 8th section of the present statute, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State were to the effect that notes payable to bearer were negotiable by delivery, and no indorsement was necessary to enable the holder to sue upon them. Bank notes also, payable to a particular person or bearer, were held to have been negotiable at common law without the aid of any statute, and are not within the operation of the Illinois Statute. McHenry v. Ridgely, 2 Scam., 310; Br. Co. v. Perry, 11 Ill., 468. Municipal bonds are put by the Illinois Supreme Court on the same footing as bank-bills; and thus, like bank-bills, although payable to a railroad company or bearer, are transferable by delivery. Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 Ill., 93: Mercer Co. v. Hubbard, 45 Ill., 143. Whether or not the bonds in suit were negotiable, merely, is a question of commercial law, in the solution of which this court is not bound by the opinions of the State Court. Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall., 784 (72 U. S., XVIII.,559); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet., 18; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall., 105 (74 U. S., XIX., 50); Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall., 666 (86 U. S,, XXII., 227). In this court, the decisions have uniformly treated municipal bonds, payable to a specified railroad company or bearer, as negotiable by delivery merely, so as to vest the legal title in the holder. Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall., 84 (68 U. S., XVII., 548); Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black, 389 (66 U. S., XVII., 122): Moran v. Comrs., 2 Black, 722-731 (67 U. S., XVII., 342-347); Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S., 643 (XXIII., 753). The same rule has been applied to Illinois bonds, issued and sold in the same way without indorsement. Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 (XXIII., 579); Warren Co.v. Marcy, 97 U. S., 96 (XXIV..977); Randolph Co. v. Post, 93 U. S., 505 (XXIII., 957); Nugent v. Supervisors, 19 Wall., 244, 253 (86 U. S., XXII.. 83, 90); Kenicott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 459 (83 U. S., XXI., 319). There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to the third and fourth pleas. The plaintiffs below were bona fide purchasers of the bonds before due, for value paid, and without notice of the alleged defenses. They were protected by the recitals of compliance with the law, contained in the bonds. They were also vendees of previous bona fide purchasers, as to whom no notice is alleged. Coloma v. Eaves (supra); Warren Co. v. Marcy, (supra); Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U.S., 638 (XXIII., 748); Kenicott v. Supervisors (supra); Supervisors v. Schenck (supra); Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall., 356, 373 (82 U. S., XXI., 170, 174); St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall., 644, 662, 665 (83 U. S., XXI., 328, 337, 338); San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S., 314 (XXIV., 817); Comrs. v. Bolles, 94 U. S., 108 (XXIV., 47). Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: This case involves the validity of certain township bonds, bearing date April 7, 1871, issued in the name of the Town of Roberts, in the County of Marshall, Ill., and made payable to the Hamilton, Lacon and Eastern Railroad Company, or bearer, on the 7th of April, 1874, with interest from date, payable annually, on the presentation and surrender of the interest coupons as they matured. Each bond, signed by the supervisor of the Town, attested by its clerk, and certified upon its face to have been duly recorded in the township registry of bonds, as directed by law, recites that it "Is one of a series, amounting in the aggregate to $30,000, and consisting of thirty bonds, numbered from 1 to 30, inclusive, each of which is for $1,000, and all of which are of |