pardon or reprieve any such offender without first receiving in capital cases the advice of the Executive Council for Our said Commonwealth, and in other cases, the advice of one, at least, of his Ministers; and in any case in which such pardon or reprieve might directly affect the interests of Our Empire, or of any country or place beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Our said Commonwealth, Our said Governor-General shall, before deciding as to either pardon or reprieve, take those interests specially into his own personal consideration in conjunction with such advice as aforesaid.

IX. And whereas great prejudice may happen to Our service and to the security of Our said Commonwealth by the absence of Our said Governor. General, he shall not, upon any pretence whatever, quit our said Commonwealth without having first obtained leave from Us for so doing under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or through one of Our Principal Secretaries of State.

INSTRUCTIONS to the

Governor-General and Commander-in Chief of the
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

V.R.I.

It will be seen that these instructions fully recognise the principle of responsible government under the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The Governor-General is directed and enjoined to exercise the prerogative of pardon pursuant to the advice of the Executive Council of the Commonwealth. These instructions stand out in remarkable contrast to those imparted to Sir CHARLES DARLING, Governor of Victoria, signed "V. Rg." bearing date 23rd June 1863, which contained the following paragraph

XIII. Now, We do hereby direct and enjoin you to call upon the Judge presiding at the trial of any offender who may from time to time be condemned to suffer death by the sentence of any court within Our said Colony, to make to you a written report of the case of such offender and such report of the said judge shall by you be taken into consideration at the first meeting thereafter which may be conveniently held, of Our said Executive Council, where the said judge shall be specially summoned to attend, and you shall not pardon or reprieve any such offender as aforesaid unless it shall appear to you expedient so to do, upon receiving the advice of our Executive Council therein, but in all such cases you are to decide either to extend or to with-hold a pardon or reprieve according to your own deliberate judgment, whether the members of Our said Executive Council concur therein or otherwise; entering nevertheless on the minutes of the said Council a minute of your reasons at length, in case you should decide any such question in opposition to the judgment of the majority of the members thereof

The circumstances under which those instructions were afterwards altered as the result of persistent protests by the Hon. GEORGE HIGINBOTHAM, in his capacity as a private citizen, as well as a statesman and a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, constitute a very interesting episode in constitutional history. It is but just to Sir HENRY HOLLAND (afterwards Lord KNUTSFORD) to say that when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies in July 1898, he

having considered Mr. HIGINBOTHAM's representations and protests communicated to him through Governor Sir HENRY LOCH, redrafted the Colonial Governor's instructions, substantially in their present form, omitting those inconsistent with the principle of responsible government so strenuously objected to by Mr. HIGINBOTHAM. The amended instructions were published in the Victorian Government Gazette on 2nd September 1892.

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Lord KNUTSFORD went out of office toward the end of 1892 and one of his last official acts was the issue of the new instruction which were signed V.R.I." on the 9th July of the same year. "The Victorian newspapers" (wrote Professor EDWARD E. MORRIS, in his Memoir of George Higinbotham) " commented on the change and praised the wisdom of the Colonial Office in making it, but no one remembered the Victorian politician whose persistent efforts were at last successful. The number of the Gazette was published only four months before GEORGE HIGINBOTHAM'S death"

Salary of Governor-General.

p. 229.

3. There shall be payable to the Queen out of the Consolidated Revenue fund of the Commonwealth, for the salary22 of the Governor-General, an annual sum which, until the Parliament otherwise provides, shall be ten thousand pounds.

The salary of a Governor-General shall not be altered during his continuance in office.

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§ 22. SALARY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.”

LEGISLATION.

In addition to the official salary of the Governor-General, Parliament makes annual provision for the payment of certain charges and expenses in connection with the office and in connection with the upkeep of Government Houses in Sydney and Melbourne. In 1917-18 these expenses were as follows :-Official secretary's office salaries £1,980; contingencies, including cost of cables to British Government £8,424; repairs, fittings, furniture, lighting £6,351 ; supervision of work £120-Total £16,875.

Provisions relating to Governor-General.

4. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the Governor-General extend and apply to the Governor

General for the time being, or such person as the Queen may appoint to administer the Government of the Commonwealth; but no such person shall be entitled to receive any salary from the Commonwealth in respect of any other office during his administration of the Government of the Commonwealth.

Sessions of Parliament.-Prorogation and Dissolution.

5. The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve23 the House of Representatives.

Summoning Parliament.

After any general election the Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return of the writs.

First session.

The Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than six months after the establishment of the Commonwealth.

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§ 23. MAY DISSOLVE THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES."

The Dissolution Power.

In the United Kingdom the power of the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament is called a prerogative of the Crown, being derived from time immemorial. In the Colonies and Dominions it is rather a statutory power than a common law prerogative. Whatever be its proper designation it is an authority of immense value and utility in bringing about harmony and co-operation between the various branches of the Legislature, or in establishing a proper workable relation between the executive and the Legislature. This power may be exercised by the Sovereign or by a Representative of the Sovereign at any time, subject only to the constitutional rule, which, under parliamentary government, necessitates that it shall be

advised by a Minister of State directly responsible to the Chamber having the initiative of supplies. It has been termed the most popular of all the prerogatives of the Crown, which can never be exercised except for the benefit of the people, because it makes them arbiter of the dispute." It appeals to the people, in the last resort, to determine the policy which shall prevail in the government of the nation, and the Minister by whom that policy shall be carried out : Todd's Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, 2nd ed., p. 759.

It is, however, a power which should be resorted to with great caution and forbearance. Frequent, unnecessary or abrupt dissolutions of Parliament inevitably tend to "blunt the edge of a great instrument, given to the Crown for its protection"; and, whenever they have occurred, they have been fraught with danger to the Commonwealth. It must be exercised by the Sovereign and by a Representative of the Sovereign, after due inquiry, in the exercise of an unfettered judgment. Upon such an occasion, the Sovereign or his Representative ought by no means to be a passive instrument in the hands of his Ministers. It is not merely his right but his duty to exercise his judgment in the advice they may tender to him; though, by refusing to act upon that advice, he incurs a serious responsibility, if they should in the end prove to be supported by public opinion. There is, perhaps, no case in which this responsibility may be more safely and more usefully incurred than when Ministers have asked to be allowed to appeal to the people from a decision pronounced against them by the House of Commons. For they might prefer this request when there was no probability of the vote of the House being reversed by the nation and when a dissolution would be injurious to the public interests. In sich a case the Sovereign ought clearly to refuse to allow a dissolution: Todd's Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, 2nd ed., p. 760.

The Sovereign has an undoubted constitutional right to withhold his consent to the application of a Minister that he shorld dissolve Parliament. If the Minister to whom a dissolution as been refused is not willing to accept the decision of the Sovereign, it is his duty to resign. He must then be replaced by another Minister, who is prepared to accept full responsibility for the act of the Sovereign and for its consequences, in the judgment of Parliament. It is evident, therefore, that when in the exercise cof this

prerogative a dissolution is either granted or refused, the Sovereign must be sustained and justified by the advice of a responsible Minister. If this be constitutionally necessary in the case of the Sovereign, it is doubly so in the case of his Representative in the Colonies and Dominions. For the Sovereign is not personally responsible to any earthly authority; but a Governor is directly responsible to the Crown for every act of his administration. It rests with the Sovereign, in the United Kingdom, or, in a Colony or Dominion, with the Representative of the Sovereign-to determine the question whether, in a particular instance, a dissolution of parliament shall or shall not be allowed: Todd, id., 761.

Reasons for Granting a Dissolution.

The following have been generally accepted as reasons justifying the exercise of the power of dissolution by a Colonial Governor on the advice of his Ministers.

(1) That the Ministry has been defeated in the House originating supplies on some great question of legislative importance on which an appeal to the electors is desirable.

(2) That the Ministry has been defeated in a House which was elected under the auspices of its opponents.

(3) That there is reasonable ground to believe that an adverse vote carried in the popular chamber against the Government does not represent the opinion and wishes of the country, and would be reversed by a new House.

(4) That the majority against the defeated Ministry is so small as to make it improbable that a strong Government could be formed from the opposition.

(5) That an appeal to the electors is necessary in order to restore harmony and reconciliation between the two contending Houses of Parliament.

(6) That the condition of parties in the popular chamber is such that there are no reasonable prospects of any Ministry obtaining sufficient support to enable it to conduct the public business satisfactorily.

Grounds for Refusing.

It is generally considered in Parliamentary practice that the following are reasonable grounds for a Colonial Governor refusing to act on the advice of his Ministers to grant a dissolution.