(1) That the Governor has the constitutional discretion, and that in view of the whole political situation a dissolution would not be desirable in the public interests. (2) That an adverse vote has been passed in the popular chamber against a Ministry on a purely administrative matter and not on a matter of legislation of great importance. (3) That the Governor deemed it his duty in existing circumstances to put himself into communication with the party by which the adverse vote has been carried and to endeavour to form a Ministry without being obliged to resort to a course which he considers would be a penal dissolution. (4) That there is a reasonable prospect for believing that existing difficulties in Parliament might be disposed of without resorting to a dissolution. (5) That there is no reasonable assurance that a dissolution would produce a working majority in favour of the defeated Ministry. (6) That no supply to carry on the public service has been granted by Parliament. (7) That a conditional promise of a dissolution has been granted the Premier upon his undertaking to form a new Ministry. (8) That a ministry has been defeated in the House of its own choice elected under its own auspices. Colonial Precedents for Refusing. The following are precedents of the refusal of a dissolution of Parliament by Colonial Governors, notwithstanding the advice of their Colonial Ministers : By Governor HEAD to the BROWN Administration in Canada By Viscount CANTERBURY to the DUFFY Administration in By Sir GEORGE BOWEN to the STAFFORD Ministry in New By the Marquis of NORMANBY to the GREY Ministry, New By Sir WILLIAM STAWELL, Lieutenant of Victoria, to the first By Governor WELD to the CROWTHER Ministry in Tasmania, in March 1878. By the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec to the JOLLY Ministry, in October 1879. By Sir JOHN MADDEN, Lieutenant Governor in Victoria to the ELMSLIE Labour Ministry in December 1913. In May 1877 Governor Weld in a despatch wrote to the Colonial Office: "In all cases the Representative of the Crown should be more careful in granting a dissolution than the Crown might be in England.” In refusing a dissolution to the ELMSLIE Labor Ministry in December 1913, Sir JOHN MADDEN, Lieutenant-Governor of Victoria, said: "A dissolution is, as I believe, never used as a penalty, but always to obtain a decision of the people as to the policy to be pursued by Parliament." Referring to the claim of the Labor Ministry for a dissolution on the grounds that the then Victorian Assembly was elected under the auspices of the opponents of the Ministry, Sir JOHN MADDEN said :-" The principle here adverted to is one which is important, when a member is invited to form an Administration, after having defeated a Government which held office when a general election was held, and which was supported by the electors; or which had been formed or sustained as the result of a general election. In such a case, if the member who defeats such a Government has a small or uncertain majority, he sometimes asks for a dissolution, to enable him to obtain adherents definitely pledged to him, and he frequently is given such a dissolution for the reason indicated by the Premier. In the present instance, if the Premier had asked for a dissolution as a condition of his undertaking to form a Government, and if he could have shown me that he had a reasonably well-founded belief that he could obtain a majority at an election to support his policy, I would have seriously considered that proposal." With reference to the contention of the defeated Ministry that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the adverse vote did not represent the opinion and wishes of the country and should be reversed by a new Parliament, His Excellency said :—“ I am not aware of any sufficient ground to so believe in this instance. It is true that the party which supports the Premier Mr. ELMSLIE did gain three out of five elections which have taken place at by-elections during the present Parliament, but no manifestation of import ance of any change of opinion, in the country nor of any marked resentment at the defeat of the Government now complained of has been made by the electors, and I think that that ground also is not well founded." Dealing with another ground, that the condition of parties in the House afforded no reasonable prospect of any Government obtaining sufficient support, His Excellency said :-" In my opinion, it would be impossible to form a just conclusion that the condition of parties in the present House is such as is indicated on this ground. A number of members, comprising a very large majority of the House, affirm that, though some of them have differed in the past, they are now generally agreed, and that a Government can now be formed from their number, which will have their united support": Argus, 20th December, 1913. Commonwealth Precedents. same. The history of the Commonwealth shows that the Representative of the King in Australia has not always been a passive instrument in the hands of Ministers defeated in Parliament advising a dissolution. There have been, altogether, three decisive ministerial defeats in the House of Representatives, followed in each instance by the defeated Prime Minister applying to the Governor-General for the dissolution of Parliament and as many refusals to grant the The first precedent occurred on the 17th August, 1904. on the defeat and resignation of the J. C. WATSON Labor Administration. On the 17th August, 1904 (vide Hansard, page 4265, vol. 21), Mr. WATSON informed the House of Representatives that he had offered certain advice to the Governor-General (Lord NORTHCOTE), upon which His Excellency did not see fit to act, and that he then tendered the resignation of himself and colleagues. It was assumed that this advice related to the dissolution, but the fact was not stated. On the 5th July, 1905 (vide Hansard, page 134, vol. 25), Mr. (afterwards Sir) GEORGE REID informed the House of Representatives that Ministers had decided to tender to His Excellency (Lord NORTHCOTE) advice for the dissolution of the House, and that His Excellency did not see fit to accept that advice, whereupon Ministers tendered to him their resignations. On 27th May 1909, the first FISHER Ministry was defeated on the address in reply and an adjournment carried against them on the motion of Mr. ALFRED DEAKIN who had joined the opposition under Mr. (now Sir) JOSEPH COOK and formed the Fusion party. Thereupon Mr. FISHER applied to the Governor-General (Earl DUDLEY) for a dissolution. A lengthy memorandum in support of the request was prepared by Mr. W. M. HUGHES, the AttorneyGeneral in the FISHER Government and was presented to the Governor General. On 1st June His Excellency gave a formal reply refusing to dissolve without assigning any reasons: Argus, 2nd June 1909. Double Dissolution. The foregoing observations and precedents do not apply to a double dissolution of the Senate and House of Representatives under the Constitution, section 57; as to that a different state of law and facts arise. See Note to section 57. Yearly session of Parliament. 6. There shall be a session of the Parliament once at least in every year, so that twelve months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the Parliament in one session and its first sitting in the next session. PART II.--THE SENATE. The Senate. 7. The Senate24 shall be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate. But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State be an Original State, may make laws dividing the State into divisions and determining the number of senators to be chosen for each division, and in the absence of such provision the State shall be one electorate. Until the Parliament otherwise provides there shall be six senators for each Original State. The Parliament may make laws increasing or diminishing the number of senators for each State, but so that equal representation of the several Original States shall be maintained and that no Original State shall have less than six senators. The senators shall be chosen for a term of six years, and the names of the senators chosen for each State shall be certified by the Governor to the GovernorGeneral. The Senate as framed by the Federal Convention was one of the most conspicuous and certainly the most important of all the Federal features of the Constitution, using the word Federal in the sense of linking together and uniting a number of co-equal political communities under a common system of government. The Senate was designed to be not merely a branch of a bicameral Parliament ; nor merely a second chamber of revision and review representing the sober second thought of the nation, such as the House of Lords is supposed to be in the British Constitution.; it was intended to be all that, but something more than that. It was to be the chamber in which the Australian States, considered as separate entities and corporate parts of the Commonwealth were represented. They were to be so represented for the purpose of enabling them to maintain and protect their constitutional rights against attempted invasions, and to give them every facility for the advocacy of their peculiar and special interests, as well as for the ventilation of their grievances. It was not deemed sufficient that they should have a Federal High Court to appeal to for the review of Federal legislation which they might consider to be in excess of the jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament. In addition to the legal remedy it was considered advisable that original States, at least, should be endowed with a parity of representation in one Chamber of the Parliament for the purpose of enabling them to effectively resist in the legislative stage, proposals threatening to invade and violate the domain of rights reserved to the States. The ideal Senate of the Convention has not been realized; the Senate has been one of the great disappointments of federation. In this case the framers of the Constitution did not build better than they knew. They designed and built according to their lights, |