tions of peace and war. I shall not take the time to repeat these arguments. Let me just point out that President Nixon has in effect asserted the authority to take this country into wars without the consent of Congress and has acted as if he had that authority.

This raises a question which goes to the heart of our democratic system. If the Congress does not act to redress the balance, if the Congress by inaction lets the President's assumption of power stand unchallenged, then the provision of article I of the Constitution giving to the Congress the power to declare war is a dead letter.

It has been suggested-by you, Mr. Chairman, and by othersthat any bill we pass that attempts to limit the President's power to make war will be vetoed and that therefore, we should not pass such a bill.

SOLEMN OBLIGATION OF CONGRESS

With all respect, may I express the contrary view that we as legislators, sworn to defend the Constitution, are under a solemn obligation to pass whatever bill we believe is necessary and proper. We should not base our action on speculation as to what the President will or will not approve.

If both houses of the Congress pass a bill limiting the President's power and if he does veto the bill, then at least the constitutional issue will be clearly drawn and the American people can react-at the polls or otherwise. The issue will not be clearly put before the people if Congress fails to pass a meaningful bill.

I have another reason for being unhappy about the kind of bill which the House of Representatives has twice passed and which I voted for, with some expressed reservations: A bill that simply asks the President to report on military operations that he has embarked on, without the consent of Congress, implies that the President has the power to engage in war even if the Congress disapproves.

House Joint Resolution 2, which you, Mr. Chairman, have introduced this year does contain a new section 3 which undertakes to specify when the President has such authority, but I would submit that the wording of clause (1) of this section is very broad and in effect gives the President total discretion.

GRAVE FAULTS OF JAVITS BILL

I should like to turn now to what I regard as the grave faults of the Javits bill. I realize, of course, that this is the same bill that was overwhelming passed by the Senate last year and that has been widely accepted by those who believe, as I do, that the Congress should act to limit the President's power to make war; and I have the greatest respect for Senator Javits and others who support his bill. Yet, I am constrained to say that, for all its good intentions, the Javits bill might well turn out to be worse than no bill at all.

First, I believe it is a mistake to attempt to define, as section 3 of the Javits bill does, those situations in which the President has the authority to engage in hostilities without prior congressional approval. Any such list is likely to be either too broad or too narrow, or both, as is indeed the case with Senator Javits' list.

His list is too narrow because it is easy to imagine a situation not covered by the bill when a President ought to be in a position to move rapidly.

Moreover, section 3(4) of the Javits bill appears to rule out a quick response to an attack on a fellow NATO member.

At the same time, Senator Javits' list can be said to be too broad and subject to abuse. Protection of American citizens has often been used in the past as an excuse for American military intervention, and section 3(3) of the Javits bill would expressly permit such action in certain circumstances.

It will be recalled that Mr. Nixon justified the invasion of Cambodia on the ground that it was necessary to protect the safe withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Under section 3(3) of the Javits bill, similar reasoning could be used to justify all kinds of military action: The President would merely state that such action was necessary to protect the evacuation of Americans, and there could be no appeal from this finding.

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO TAKE ACTION SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE

It seems to me preferable to leave the President's authority to take action uncertain and always subject to challenge-than to spell it out as Senator Javits has attempted to do. The very existence in a statute of four categories of situation where military action could be taken might well constitute a kind of invitation to Presidents, present and future, to embark on military adventures.

The other grievous flaw in the Javits bill, as I see it, is the rigid 30-day period within which the Congress must act. First of all, in many cases it would be difficult if not impossible to determine when the 30-day period begins to run. If the Javits bill had been law during the fifties and sixties, on what date would the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam have been said to begin-when the first military advisers were sent out by President Eisenhower, when the number of advisers was raised to 20,000 by President Kennedy, when President Johnson ordered American planes or ground troops-into action?

An even more serious objection is that the 30-day limit is wholly arbitrary. Thirty days might be too long, permitting a President to involve the United States irrevocably. Or it might be too short a period for Congress to act wisely and with full information (remember how long it took for the full story of the Bay of Tonkin incident to emerge).

It would require the Congress to say, "Yes," or, "No," to an operation at a fairly early stage. At the end of 30 days, a given military operation might still be a very limited one, involving a small number of planes and personnel.

On that basis, the Congress might give its approval, and the President would then, in effect, have carte blanche to escalate the level of hostilities and multiply the size of the operation.

Also, the 30-day deadline may come at a time when the implications of the operation are by no means clear, when the operation may still be popular with the American people, who do not realize the morass it may lead into.

PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL

Obviously, however, if congressional approval is to be required for a Presidential war, then a deadline or time limit must be imposed. The way to avoid the flaws of the Javits bill, as I see it, is to provide a mechanism for congressional disapproval of a Presidential war, that is to provide a mechanism whereby the Congress at any time may effectively call a halt.

It may be argued that this is not necessary, because Congress has the power to call a halt through the appropriations process. The fact that Congress has this power speaks to the constitutional question: Since Congress indubitably has the power to cut off the funds for a military operation that it disapproves, how can it be argued that Congress has no constitutional authority to interfere with the President's actions in plunging the country into undeclared war? But the power to cut off funds is a blunt instrument, and one which may not be quickly effective.

What is needed is a more precise instrument to give instantaneous effect to the underlying power of the purse. This is what I have attempted to provide in my bill, H.R. 317, which provides that either House of the Congress may by resolution at any time terminate the President's authority to carry on undeclared hostilities.

The question may well be asked: Why should either House have this power, why should not action by both Houses be required?

My answer is the following: A declaration of war requires the approval of both Houses; either House can say "No." Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that, when the President embarks upon undeclared war, he can continue so long as both Houses give their approval, expressly or tacitly.

PRESIDENT'S WARMAKING POWERS DANGEROUS

But if either House expressly says "no," then he must stop. Or to put the matter another way, the President's power to engage in hostilities is such an extraordinary, and such a dangerous, power, that he should not have it if either House says he should not.

There is, of course, a familiar precedent for the one-House-veto procedure. Under the Reorganization Act of 1949, the President is given the extraordinary power to propose governmental reorganizations and to put such plans into effect if the Congress takes no action within 60 days. No affirmative action of the Congress is required. But either House can say no by simple resolution.

One final point: I am not happy with section 5 of my bill which attempts to assure that resolutions of disapproval could not be blocked by delaying tactics. This provision was taken from the Javits bill. It poses difficult questions, and I have come to the conclusion that it is not needed in my bill.

I intend shortly to circulate my bill, omitting this section and making certain other minor revisions and to invite those members who are so disposed to cosponsor it. I will then reintroduce it, as amended.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM CHAPPELL, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, for 12 long years I watched the shadow of a war creep over this land bringing with it anguish, frustration, and despair as our people endeavored to understand America's involvement on another soil 10,000 miles away.

Neither praise nor condemnation of actions, past or present, but rather their unforgettable lessons, will avail us to a sensible direction for the future. One such lesson is that no government dare commit its people to prolonged armed conflict without a clear definition of the purpose of such commitment and the will of the people to pursue them to victory.

How then do we implement the lesson? We best do so by clearly implementing the respective responsibilities of the President and the Congress with reference to the constitutional power to make war.

House Joint Resolution 71, a resolution which I have again introduced, I believe, is a reasonable approach to such implementation. One hundred and fifty of our distinguished colleagues, most of whom cosponsored this measure during the 92d Congress, have joined with me to cosponsor House Joint Resolution 71.

DOES NOT ALTER PRESIDENT'S POWER

This resolution in no way alters the President's power to initially engage our troops to repel a sudden attack or to protect American lives and property. It simply requires the President, within 72 hours of committing any of our Armed Forces to action in any armed conflict outside the United States, to report such commitment to the Congress.

If the Congress shall fail to approve or otherwise act on such report within 30 calendar days after receiving it, the President shall within the next succeeding 30 days terminate such commitment and disengage all forces so committed.

This proposal embraces the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the thoughtful declaration of many great Americans after them.

The framers of the Constitution were very deliberate in balancing the powers of this Government and those of the Congress and the President, and they were deliberate for excellent reasons.

All too frequently, the American Colonies were drawn by the King's decree into England's wars. The leaders of the newly independent Republic resolved to make certain that their new country would never again be drawn into war at the direction and discretion of a single man. For this reason, it transferred the war power to the legislative branch of the newly created Government.

Indeed, the framers of the Constitution recognized that the President under certain circumstances might have to take defensive action to repel and subdue a sudden attack on this great Nation. But that was the extent of the warmaking power they were willing for him to exercise.

CONSTITUTION IS LIVING DOCUMENT

I deeply believe that the Constitution is a living document. The Congress of the United States must activate its responsibilities under the document for determining war and peace.

I feel most profoundly that had Congress either declared war or refused to allow our involvement in Vietnam at its outset, a clear-cut attitude would have been established and the national hurt of our people avoided.

The United States is the leader of the free world today, but this is not so because our citizens are anxious that we take the lead in military conquests; nor because our diplomats are the most expert; nor because our policies are the most faultless or the most popular.

The mantle of leadership has been placed upon our shoulders not by any nation, nor by our own Government or citizens, but by destiny and circumstance by the sheer fact of our physical and economic strength, and by our role as the only real counter to the forces of Communism in the world today.

If events in Indochina have taught us to better fulfill that role, then it is not a wholly dark story. While this resolution in no way affects our present involvement, it reminds us that the mistakes of the past. must be heeded in the future.

We in Congress, have the power to assure the American people that never again will we allow a situation like Vietnam to occur.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before your fine committee, and I deeply appreciate the thoughtful consideration that you are giving to this type of vital legislation.