[Prepared statement of Dr. Weiss follows:]

PREPARED Statement of DR. EDITH BROWN WEISS*

WEATHER WARS ARE COMING?

Mr. Chairman, in the coming decades the United States and the international community could face a great threat from the use of techniques for changing weather and climate as weapons of war. If we are to avoid this, it is important to begin now to prohibit this use and to channel research and development in weather and climate to peaceful purposes. Our scientific understanding of weather and climate patterns is still relatively primitive, which makes it hard to distinguish artificial changes from naturally occurring ones. However, our perception of what changes man's intervention has caused are often more important than the facts. If we let techniques for modifying weather and climate be used as weapons of war, it will turn the global weather systems into a highly contentious political arena. It will make it more difficult for people to regard bad weather and climate conditions as naturally induced. It can hinder the application for peaceful purposes of any techniques developed to modify weather conditions.

Ironically we have begun to recognize the danger of those techniques which are least developed-techniques for climate modification. In testimony before the Senate, a representative of the State Department indicated that the U.S. would not use climate modification for hositle purposes. However, techniques of weather modification, such as cloud-seeding, are much nearer being effective. The Department of Defense has finally admitted that it indeed already used cloud-seeding techniques extensively during the Viet Nam War, although public scrutiny quickly disclosed claims of dubious scientific validity regarding their effectiveness. Yet despite the fact that cloud-seeding techniques have been used in military operations, the United States Government has still not taken any policy position on the use of these techniques as weapons of war. I view the resolution now before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which focuses on prohibiting weather modification activity as a weapon of war, as a useful first step in filling this gap.

On July 3, 1974, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. issued a joint statement on the use of environmental modification for military purposes, which expressly referred to climate modification. The statement called for "the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes" and indicated that U.S. and Soviet representatives would meet to discuss the problem further. This statement is certainly a commendable first step, but future discussions are urgently needed to indicate what these effective measures would be and to get agreement to such measures not only between the U.S. and the U.S.S. R. but between all states.

It is also important to recognize the limitations of the Statement. The Statement calls only for the "most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes." This implicitly suggests that it is possible to use techniques of environmental modification for military purposes in acceptable ways. The explicit reference to climate modification, and not to weather modification, which is the more imminent problem, suggests some uncertainty as to whether any future agreement would cover techniques for modifying weather. It is left ambiguous whether the use of weather modification techniques raises "dangers" which need to be overcome. We need to guard against a "partial" U.S./Soviet arms control agreement on environmental modification which has the effect of legitimizing the use in warfare of some techniques for modifying weather.

My testimony today is directed to the reasons why we should try to prohibit the use of weather and climate modification for hostile purposes and to the measures we might initiate to manage the development of the technology for peaceful purposes. There are a number of possible initiatives for controlling the use of weather and climate modification techniques as weapons of war. These range from an agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., a U.Ñ. General Assembly Resolution calling for a ban on the use of these techniques for hostile purposes, followed by an agreement implementing the resolution. Institutional arrangements for controlling the use of these techniques as weapons of war while facilitating peaceful uses, perhaps analogous to the IAEA arrangements.

A significant step would be a comprehensive multilateral ban on the use of the technology for hostile purposes.

The views expressed are those of the author only.

1 The text of the Statement on the Environment appears in The New York Times, July 4, 1974, p. 2, col. 8.

There are a number of reasons to forego using weather modification for hostile purposes.

1. The techniques are still unpredictable in their effects. Either individually or in the aggregate, they could trigger irreversible changes in weather and climate, which no state could control. Hostile uses are more likely than other uses to get out of control, because decisions will be made on the basis of military exigencies, with probably little regard for environmental considerations. If several states resort to these techniques in war, they could together provoke unanticipated changes adverse to many states.

2. Weather modification in war, and even more so climate modification, may affect the weather of nearby neutral states, which would widen and intensify the conflict. States doing the modification may be unable to convince downwind neighbors that any bad weather conditions are in fact due to natural fluctuations, and not to their activities.

3. In many circumstances the use of weather modification techniques as a weapon would implicitly involve an attack on civilians and their facilities. Judge Lauterpacht has described as an "absolute rule of law" the prohibition against making civilians an "avowed or obvious object of attack." 2

4. Accepting weather modification techniques as legitimate weapons would further undermine the already shaky distinction between conventional and unconventional means of warfare and would legitimize techniques of environmenta[ modification as weapons of war. This is particularly undesirable in a world which is becoming increasingly vulnerable to unconventional means of warfare.

5. One of the most important reasons for banning the use of weather and climate modification techniques for hostile purposes is that even the chance that states would use these techniques in such a way casts suspicion on the development and use of the technology for peaceful purposes. It can endanger the international cooperative programs which now exist in weather forecasting and atmospheric research, and thus hinder efforts to understand and use weather and climate for the benefit of mankind.

6. If one state develops and uses these techniques for hostile purposes, she invites others to do so. There is an internal momentum to the development and use of weapons, which is often keyed to the perception by states that others will acquire and use the weapons. A ban on the use of these techniques for hostile purposes averts this interaction.

7. Finally, from the point of view of the state employing these techniques as weapons of war, there are significant disadvantages. The technology does not appear to offer an effective way to limit the resources of a country without bombing it. At least at the present time we cannot predict precisely or with certainty the effects of weather modification operations. The various techniques are only useful under certain meteorological conditions, which occur only at certain times of the year and only in certain regions. None of these variables are under the control of states relying upon weather modification technology as a weapon. It is difficult to limit the effects of the techniques or the areas affected. Since techniques of cloud-seeding, for example, are comparatively inexpensive and accessible, many countries could potentially use the techniques as weapons. It would be difficult to contain such proliferation.

In drafting an agreement prohibiting the use of weather and climate modification techniques as weapons of war, we can anticipate certain problems, which are analogous to ones that have arisen in efforts to control chemical and biological weapons. The first is whether such a ban should extend to the use of fog dispersal techniques in warfare. The analogy can be drawn between fog dispersal techniques and tear gas. In the latter case, a primary argument against distinguishing tear gas from other gases has been that by sanctioning the use of tear gas we may be opening a Pandora's box to the use of other chemical agents. By analogy, the use of fog dispersal in warfare, which in some cases involves techniques essentially similar to those for cloud-seeding operations, invites escalation to other forms of weather modification. Indeed the justification given by the Executive Branch for excepting tear gas from the Geneva Protocol of 1925, namely that it was commonly used domestically throughout the world to control riots, applies to cloud-seeding techniques, which may also be used to dampen domestic riots. A more effective approach would be to prohibit all applications of weather and climate mcdification techniques for hostile purposes, and if an exception is deemed necessary, to very carefully limit it to the dispersal of fog to facilitate landings on one's own

2 Lauterpacht, "The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War," BRIT, Y.B.I.L., Vol. 29 (1952), pp. 360-69.

or an allied airfield or ship. This approach would ban, for example, the use of fog dispersal to facilitate the effectiveness of other weapons.

An agreement prohibiting weather and climate modification techniques as weapons of war should cover all hostile uses, whether covert or overt, whether large or small in scale, whether in active combat or in a slow program of subversion. It should explicitly cover the use of these techniques to undermine or destroy the economies of other states. The latter is important in shaping perceptions about the intentions of other states and the applications of any techniques developed to change the weather.

We also need to consider having the agreement cover the use of weather modification techniques domestically for hostile purposes, as for civil wars, secessionist movements, or riots. Traditionally such matters have been regarded as ones of domestic jurisdiction. However, weather systems are oblivious to political boundaries. This makes the issue acute between states with narrow territorial limits. The problem is that these techniques are likely to be used under conditions making it difficult to ensure that there would be no effects on the weather beyond the state's own borders. More pressing goals of hampering the enemy would be likely to overcome any checks which might normally operate to protect the integrity of the weather system. Thus extending a ban to the use of these techniques domestically for hostile purposes may be the only viable approach.

If we are to have an acceptable arms control agreement in the weather field, we need to be able to detect violations. However, it is not important that we detect every violation, of whatever kind, but only that we detect major violations of the agreement. The ability to detect the use of these techniques as weapons of war will vary with the techniques used. We should be able to detect larger-scale modifications by using satellite photography, ground observations, and modeling techniques. For methods on a smaller scale, detection will be more difficult. We need to engage in more research to enhance our ability to detect smaller-scale operations and, above all, make the results of this research openly available on a global basis.

In any measures which are initiated, the psychological perception that other states do not intend to use the technology as a weapon is important. The agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on averting nuclear war, as part of the SALT-I agreements, is important for the psychological assurance that it provides against the use of nuclear weapons. Particularly where the perception of whether a state has caused bad weather can be more important than the scientific assessment, we need to develop effective measures to give assurance to states that the technology will only be used for peaceful purposes. An agreement prohibiting the use of weather and climate modification techniques for hostile purposes will only be one step in giving this assurance to states. A necessary corollary will be arrangements which regulate the peaceful uses of weather modification. Essentially we need to reduce the chance that states could use the techniques covertly against other states and the fear that others had done so. This requires a continuation and expansion of international programs for monitoring atmospheric and oceanic conditions, for forecasting weather, and for conducting atmospheric and oceanic research. It also suggests the need to initiate periodic international appraisals of the state of development of weather and climate modification technology and to ensure that all states have access to information on weather and climate and on techniques developed for modifying it. An international registry of all experiments and programs designed to modify weather or climate should, if respected, minimize suspicion between states.

In addition to greater international efforts to improve our understanding of weather and climate, we need to begin to develop new rules and procedures to implement principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and recommendation 70 of this Conference.3

These provide as follows:

Principle 21.-"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."

Principle 22.-"States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction."

Recommendation 70.-"It is recommended that Government be mindful of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate, and to this end;

(a) Carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climate effects and disseminate their findings to the maximum extent feasible before embarking on such activities;

"(b) Consult fully other interested States when activities carrying a risk of such effects are being contemplated or implemented."

Specifically, it is essential to begin to develop principles of advance notification, open dissemination of information, and consultation between states, as guidelines for conducting any weather modification experiments and operations which could have effects outside national borders. Large-scale experiments and projects which could have a significant effect on weather or climate should be prohibited in the absence of approval from the international community. In many cases compensation for any damage which may occur to neighboring states from weather or climate modification programs will either be impossible to provide or inadequate. For this reason, we should give priority to developing procedures for ensuring that the interest of all affected states are taken into consideration before the activity takes place. All states share a common global climatic system and common weather systems. Hence it is in everyone's interest to join in arrangements insuring an orderly development and use of techniques for changing weather and climate conditions.

There is a growing awareness of the problem of using weather and climate modification techniques as weapons, which could help stimulate policy initiatives. The international environmental movement and the international scientific community have been in the forefront in voicing this concern. Nationally, atmospheric scientists together with other scientists and environmentalists have been urging the dedication of weather modification techniques to peaceful purposes, and their prohibition for hostile purposes. In 1972, the Sierra Club and the Federation of American Scientists jointly wrote to the President urging him to announce that the United States would seek an agreement banning the military uses of weather modification. The National Academy of Sciences has called for dedicating the technology to peaceful purposes. The president of the American Meteorological Society has testified before the Senate in favor of prohibiting military uses of weather modification.

Internationally, scientists and environmentalists have also expressed concern about the budding technology. At the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in Oxford in September 1972, a Soviet and an American scientist jointly proposed an international treaty prohibiting the military use of weather modification. There have been informal bilateral talks between U.S. scientists and Soviet counterparts about arms control initiatives in weather modification. The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, while not explicitly concerned with this issue, did urge all governments "to be mindful of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate." The United Nations Environmental Program has expressed continuing interest in the field of weather and climate modification. What is needed is an international initiative which could serve as a catalyst for a national decision to forego developing and using weather modification as a weapon. The talks scheduled between U.S. and Soviet representatives later in this year could be a step in this direction.

Unfortunately, weather modification is only one of several potential techniques for modifying the environment which have at least been mentioned as future weapons. We need to view the development and use of weather and climate modification techniques for hostile purposes as but a first step in the potential development of new and unconventional environmental weapons, which threaten the environmental integrity of our planet Earth.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Weiss.

We will take about an 8-minute recess now to answer the vote on the floor, and then we will be back.

[A recess was taken from 2:53 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are holding these hearings at a time when the floor is unusually active. We have another amendment pending over there, so that we may be interrupted again soon.

Admiral, in your statement you cited the testimony of the executive branch in both the 1972 and 1974 hearings in the Senate, and you referred to the fact that that testimony, in effect, committed the U.S. Government not to use weather modification

Admiral DAVIES. Climate modification, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Well, perhaps that is the first distinction I need to pin down.

I said weather modification, and you said climate modification. Would you enlarge on the significance of the difference?

Admiral DAVIES. This is a semantic problem, as I mentioned, sir. If there are such things as climate modifications and weather modifications, the distinction is that climate modification is a long term, permanent effect; weather modification is a short term, temporary effect.

The length of those terms might be weeks or days for the short term and years and decades for the long term.

Mr. FRASER. What do you take to be the significance of the statements that the United States would not use climate modification techniques for hostile purposes? What does that mean?

Admiral DAVIES. That would say that in anticipation of some techniques being developed, and I think the testimony actually said if it were ever developed, that in anticipation of that, the executive department was saying they did not intend to use any such techniques as weapons of war.

Mr. FRASER. At the time that testimony was given, was it intended then to differentiate between weather modification techniques and climate-changing techniques?

Admiral DAVIES. I don't know directly from personal knowledge about the witnesses, but there has been for a number of years in the research and development community that sort of differentiation, so I would assume that they were making that difference.

Mr. FRASER. And through those statements they were not saying anything with reference to modification techniques? Admiral DAVIES. Weather modification?

Mr. FRASER. Weather modification.

Admiral DAVIES. That would be my understanding, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And then you have made the point that at the moment we don't think we know how to do climate modification?

Admiral DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. So that problem at the moment is conjectural?
Admiral DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. With respect to weather modification techniques, where do we stand?

Admiral DAVIES. The weather modification techniques, as I pointed out, are fairly conjectural, too, although there is a community of people who believe that they are scientifically sound, possible, and even have been achieved.

I think, to give you some idea of the status of them, I might with your permission read from the weather and climate modification report of the National Academy of Sciences.

Mr. FRASER. But my inquiry didn't go so much to the efficacy of it, but rather the policy issue, whether it is still the executive branch position that this is an acceptable option in conducting military operations. So far as you know, it is the position of the executive branch today that weather modification techniques are an option which may be pursued under appropriate circumstances?

Admiral DAVIES. Well, I am not sure that the executive department has ever taken such a stand except in the obverse. At the summit, as you know, in the joint statement, the President, jointly with the Soviet Union, said that we intended to do something to prohibit the use of these techniques as a weapon of war.