Until fairly recent years, when food imports increased substantially, governments had assumed that the production of food and livestock would take care of itself except in years of serious drought. Cash crops for export were favored owing to the foreign exchange earnings which were partly used to finance imports, a major, if not the principal, source of taxation for government revenues. In agriculture, foreign aid has centered on crops for exports, a pattern which began to change several years ago as mixed crops (export and food) were introduced together with several large-scale long-term projects to become selfsufficient in rice. The U.S. aid program has focused on grain production and storage, and livestock.

Donors have increasingly coordinated their aid efforts for countries in this region, especially in the last two years. Multi-donor regional aid coordination groups affecting both livestock and transportation have been established. It is hoped that this will in turn promote further regional cooperation among the recipients who have already set up or have proposed new regional groupings. Question 28. Why is the UNDP, presumably with U.S. agreement, about to launch a massive well-digging program without any reference to a centralized reconstruction program?

Response. The UNDP Governing Council in June 1973 approved $8.3 million for a program of emergency and long-term assistance to the six drought stricken West African countries in the Sahelian region; Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Senegal, Chad and Mauritania. Of the $8.3 million, $2.8 million is to go towards a $3.7 million well-digging program to be mounted jointly with UNICEF. UNDP and UNICEF will, in close cooperation with the Governments concerned, develop programs aimed at establishing permanent facilities for the improvement and maintenance of the water supply systems in the affected areas. In some cases the program will involve extension and modification of ongoing UNDP and UNICEF projects.

The UNDP/UNICEF program will cover a three-year period. The geological formations of most of the affected area make well-drilling a time-consuming and costly operation, which needs to be approached as a medium-term rather than a short-term operation. The funds will be used to strengthen well-digging teams already at work, as well as to field new teams where needed. The teams will try to deepen and rehabilitate existing wells, in addition to digging new ones.

While the UNDP does not seek formal approval for such activities from member governments, the U.S. joined in the consensus of Governing Council members in June favoring this assistance to the afflicted Sahelian region. The need to begin this phase of drought recovery is urgent. The work is being coordinated with the governments concerned, as well as with the activities of other donors. A centralized reconstruction program is in the process of being shaped, and the UNDP/UNICEF program will be an integral part of the total effort.

Question 29. Should the U.S. Government delay consideration of any reconstruction program in the Sahel until it has completed its one year "scope of work" study?

Response. The U.S. should not delay participation in any reconstruction program for the Sahel. In fact, the emphasis of a special A.I.D. Sahel Task Force has been on the development of specific reconstruction programs which can be implemented over the next 12-24 months. The impact of these activities hopefully will improve the capacity of the people of the region to return to selfsupporting activities as quickly as possible and, at the same time, provide them with the means to prevent a disaster of this magnitude from occurring again. Decisions regarding development activities which are clearly longer-range in their impact than the next 1-2 years and which require large capital and technical investments should, however, await completion of the one year "scope of work." It is our feeling that decisions on these activities should be made in a more knowledgable context about the potential of the region to support certain kinds of activities, if improvement of the land rather than further degradation is to be achieved. The scope of work, with its identification of feasible options and their implications for the region and its people, appears to be the kind of framework that is needed prior to any decisions regarding such long-term investments.

Question 33. Please list the emergency food operations in which the WFP (World Food Program) was engaged over the past five years, by year and by

continent and, where possible, please include the cause of the emergency or disaster in each case, what has been the U.S. contribution (and what proportion is this of the total contribution) to the WFP for each of the past five years; for FY 73; and what is the proposed U.S. contribution (and the proportion to the total contribution) in FY 74.

Response. See Attachment A below.

ATTACHMENT A

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM SHIPMENTS, FISCAL YEARS 1969-74-TOTAL SHIPMENTS AS COMPARED TO EMERGENCY

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM-5-YEAR REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, QUANTITY AND VALUE OF COMMODITIES

ATTACHMENT A

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM-5-YEAR REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, QUANTITY AND VALUE OF COMMODITIES

1 Ocean transport costs usually equal approximately 35 percent of commodity value.

Question 34. To what extent have the food aid commitments made under the WFP been fulfilled (again by year, for the past five years)?

Response. Commitments to the World Food Program are made on a biennial basis. The first pledge was for the period CY 1963-1965. Shipments extended through CY 1970. The pledge was 51.5 million dollars. Actual expenditures totaled 43.6 million. The second pledge was for the period CY 1966-1968. While the U.S. pledged a total of 130 million dollars, this was conditioned on other donors matching this amount of a 50-50 basis. The effective pledge reached 94 million dollars. Actual expenditures reached 89.6 million dollars. The third pledge covers CY 1969-1970. The U.S. pledged 100 million dollars again on a 50-50 matching basis. The matched pledge was 97.6 million. The amount was fully disbursed. The fourth pledge covers CY 1971-1972 with final shipments extending through December 1973. The total U.S. pledge is 125 million dollars with a 42 percent matching clause. The 125 million dollars has been matched, therefore the effective pledge is also 125 million dollars. Disbursement as of June 30, 1973 totaled 74.5 million dollars. We anticipated that the full 125.0 million dollars will be expended. The fifth pledge totals 136.0 million dollars and covers the period CY 1973-1974. This pledge is based on a 40 percent matching formula. To date 114 million has been matched. Expenditures total about 14 million dollars.

[From the column "Review and Outlook," The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1973]

"THE REAL IMPERATVES"

At first, there might seem to be little connection between the trade talks begun this week in Tokyo, or the monetary talks that begin next Thursday in Nairobi, and the grim warning from Mr. Prosterman on this page today of impending famines.

But, indeed there is a connection. The Tokyo talks on revising the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Nairobi IMF meeting address themselves largely to reducing barriers to the sale of each nation's surpluses, the goods and services they can produce beyond their own needs. That is without doubt a laudable endeavor, capable of permitting new efficiencies and divisions of labor beneficial to all the world's people. Yet increasing over the last year the most volatile issues of international trade have turned instead on the ancient specter of scarcity.

This could hardly be put in a more dramatic context than the developing scarcity of food in the developing nations. We can only hope that means will be found to prevent Mr. Prosterman's fears from becoming reality. But if his estimates are even partly realized, the tragedy in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and elsewhere will be enormous.

Large as it is, the danger of famine is not the only one to be reflected upon, nor are developed countries immune from the broader problem. Scarcity of important commodities, fuel and raw materials as well as food, presents political risks to the "have" nations as well as the "have nots."

The rising thirst for fuel by the developed nations, Europe, the United States and Japan, carries with it the possibility of conflicts among themselves and with the oil producing nations. The difficulties of continuing to maintain something approaching free markets in fuels, both domestically and internationally, grow more evident every day as national governments seek increased control over sources and marketing.

Embargoes on exports of other scarce commodities further inhibit world commerce. The U.S., alarmed at rising food prices, slapped a temporary embargo on exports of a wide range of agricultural commodities in the early summer. This brought protests from Japan, which claimed its heavy food purchases were part of its efforts to meet U.S. demands for a better balance in U.S.-Japanese trade. The European Community responded by threatening animal feed embargoes of its own. Elsewhere, Argentina banned wheat and flour exports because of shortage fears, affecting the supplies of Brazil and other trade partners.

These kinds of trade questions, brought on by scarcity, are more freighted with political danger than are trade barriers that merely inhibit a nation's ability to sell its products abroad. Any national regime gives the highest type of priority to protecting its citizens against scarcity.

Indeed, that may be one reason why there has been so little discussion of export restraints in the GATT and IMF forums. Few nations with the means to protect themselves against scarcities are eager to set up international rules that might limit their freedom of action. If sovereign rights mean anything they include the right of nations to protect their own citizens against scarcity if they have means to do so.

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But the problem cannot be resolved with so simple an assertion. The world has become a smaller place in which the fortunes of nations have become increasingly interrelated, as have humanitarian concerns. No nation has a monopoly on resources. That has become increasingly evident with oil, in which the U.S. was once largely self-sufficient. It would be unwise for any nation, including the U.S., to assume that it can preserve its own living standards whatever happens elsewhere in the world.

In short, if the world is fated to move from abundance to scarcity, the demand for cooperative international arrangements to protect free commerce and at the same time avert national tragedies becomes imperative. It may well be that the time for making such arrangements was yesterday and that today is already very late. So while we wish Godspeed for the negotiators at Tokyo and Nairobi, we wonder whether their conversations really are about problems of the future, or the past.