Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign AffairsU.S. Government Printing Office, 1973 |
Iz vsebine knjige
Zadetki 1–5 od 100
Stran 7
... political arena . The constitutional basis of the War Powers Act ( S. 440 ) is the Con- gress ' powers enumerated in article I , section 8 , to deal with the orga- nization of the Armed Forces , the establishment of the Armed Forces ...
... political arena . The constitutional basis of the War Powers Act ( S. 440 ) is the Con- gress ' powers enumerated in article I , section 8 , to deal with the orga- nization of the Armed Forces , the establishment of the Armed Forces ...
Stran 10
... political wrestling process , because after we are deep into a Presidential war it is almost impossible for Congress effectively to check its continuance . So now , we must finally reject the premise of " Presidential " war . No longer ...
... political wrestling process , because after we are deep into a Presidential war it is almost impossible for Congress effectively to check its continuance . So now , we must finally reject the premise of " Presidential " war . No longer ...
Stran 22
... political reasons refused to convene an act , that defensive operation would have to stop . Senator JAVITS . No ; it would not , because the section provides , on page 7 line 8 , that " Except in cases where the President has determined ...
... political reasons refused to convene an act , that defensive operation would have to stop . Senator JAVITS . No ; it would not , because the section provides , on page 7 line 8 , that " Except in cases where the President has determined ...
Stran 30
... political thought . Certainly the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee , Senator Stennis , and I have differed greatly on the efficacy of our involvement in Indochina . We both believe , however , that the de ...
... political thought . Certainly the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee , Senator Stennis , and I have differed greatly on the efficacy of our involvement in Indochina . We both believe , however , that the de ...
Stran 33
... political and legal responsibility moot . The second emergency provision allows the President to . Repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States located outside of the United States , its territories and ...
... political and legal responsibility moot . The second emergency provision allows the President to . Repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States located outside of the United States , its territories and ...
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Druge izdaje - Prikaži vse
Pogosti izrazi in povedi
30 days action amendment appropriate armed attack Armed Forces believe BICKEL BIESTER BINGHAM BROWER Cambodia Chairman China circumstances Collective Defense Commander in Chief commitment committee Congress congressional approval congressional authorization constitutionally consultation Court decision declaration of war developed DOLE Dominican Republic EAGLETON effect emergency executive branch fact FINDLEY foreign policy Foreign Relations FRASER Fulbright Hearings Government gress Gulf of Tonkin hostilities House Joint Resolution imminent threat involvement issue Javits bill judgment Korea limit MATSUNAGA ment military peace President President's authority Presidential power problem Professor proposal protect American provision question repel require responsibility REVELEY SCHLESINGER SEATO SEATO Treaty Senator EAGLETON Senator Javits situation South Vietnam Southeast Asia specific statement statute subcommittee supra note territory tion Tonkin Gulf Resolution Tonkin resolution troops United Nations veto Vietnam war vote War Powers Act warmaking powers weather modification ZABLOCKI
Priljubljeni odlomki
Stran 390 - If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation, for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.
Stran 53 - Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Stran 55 - Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Stran 443 - The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Stran 43 - Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Stran 390 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Stran 321 - These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.
Stran 69 - The President is to be commanderin-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy...
Stran 46 - Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Stran 436 - And you are to observe and follow such Orders and Directions from Time to Time, as you shall receive from this or a future Congress...