trolley, bicycle, and spurious butter and

cheese.

It appears from the foregoing that between 1889 and 1895 the wheat area of the United States shrank 4,100,000 acres, while that under maize gained 3,800,000, and those under rye and buckwheat lost 400,000 as against an equal gain by

oats.

Between 1895 and 1897, owing to the advance in the price of wheat and the decline in the price for corn, the wheat area expanded by the addition of 5,500,000 acres (bringing it nearly to a par with the wheat area of 1884), while the areas under maize, oats, barley, rye, buckwheat and potatoes show a loss of 5,300,000

acres.

The last change in crop distribution is in accord with conclusions reached, and stated, by the present writer when wheat was so over-abundant as to sell at the lowest price known in 300 years, such conclusion being based upon knowledge of the great and growing defect in the world's bread-bearing area, and the related fact that cotton seed and its derivatives (cotton seed meal, spurious lard, etc.) had displaced the product of 8 to 10 million acres of the maize fields, and that consequently our maize acreage was excessive in that measure, as was the acreage under oats in less degree. By a process of "natural selection," acres gravitate irresistibly to the product in greatest demand. The June and July (1898) reports of the Department of Agriculture show that for the harvest of 1898 some 3,000,000 additional acres have been diverted from maize, oats, and buckwheat to wheat production. It is altogether probable that similar conversions will occur until the corn-fields shall be reduced to a parity with- and possibly below-domestic requirements. Obviously, the world needs the wheat that can be grown upon our surplus corn lands, and such use will bring better returns to the cultivator than will the continued overproduction of maize, the market for which has been so largely appropriated by what was formerly a waste product of the cottonfield.

Probably the most notable fact, from an economic standpoint, brought out in the preceding tabular statement, is the constancy, since we ceased to add materially to the cultivated lands, of the area devoted to the great primary food-staples, notwithstanding radical changes in crop

distribution from year to year. It shows in the clearest possible manner how completely crop distribution is the creature of price, and with what substantial accuracy the farmer, if unconsciously, adjusts production to requirements.

Much misdirected effort has been expended in formulating statements to the effect that there could never again be dearth or famine, nor yet high prices for food, because steam transport had brought the fields of all countries within a few days of the consumer in all parts of the world; because a harvest was progressing in some part of the world in every month of the year, and because wheat-exporting nations had increased greatly in numbers. Did the stated conditions all exist they could in no material degree affect the world's supply of food unless the areas employed were thereby greatly increased. Only one of the three postulates has any support, even apparent, in fact. It is true that the steamship and railway have lessened the time required to transport food over great distances, but neither has added a particle to the productive power of given areas, and the proponents of these theories are evidently forgetful of the fact that before railways and steamships became the world's carriers little other wheat than that grown in the United States east of the Alleghanies was produced further from the importing consumer in Western Europe than across the narrow seas which separate Britain from the neighboring continent.

As to the vapid "stuff" about a continuous succession of harvests, it is enough to say that of some 2,500,000,000 bushels of wheat grown yearly in the whole world, quite 2, 100,000,000 are harvested between the middle of June and the middle of September; 120,000,000 in December and January, and 260,000,000 in February and March, leaving a pitiable 10 to 30 millions to be harvested in the remainder of the year, while of this latter quantity rarely does a single bushel enter commercial channels.

Itstead of there having been an increase of exporting countries the very opposite is true. India, Australasia, Argentina and Uruguay, and possibly Canada, are all the countries which have become exporters of wheat in any apprsciable volume within forty years, although both Roumania and Bulgaria are generally believed to belong in this category. Roumania,

Bulgaria and Servia exported more or less wheat when they were Turkish provinces. At most but five countries have become exporters within forty years, although many suppose that Chile should be added. Chile, however, exported wheat fifty years ago, and as long ago as 1851 furnished a great part of the wheat consumed by the miners of California, as well as that used by the populations inhabiting coastal regions between California and Chile.

On the other hand, Germany was a great exporter forty years ago; Spain a considerable one; as was Denmark up till as late as 1880, although now a considerable importer. Austria-Hungary has now ceased to be an exporter and is about to become an importer; Turkey in Europe, having lost her best wheat-growing provinces, not only imports about all the wheat grown in Asiatic Turkey, but very considerable quantities from Bulgaria, Roumania, and Russia. It is true that considerable quantities are still exported from (not by) Turkey, it being Bulgarian wheat seeking an outlet over Turkish railways having terminals at Salonika and at Dedegatch upon the Gulf of Enos. Egypt has not only ceased to be an exporter, although in years of abundant yield some wheat still goes abroad, but in the last five years much more wheat has been imported than exported. Tunis, formerly exporting some wheat, still sends some abroad when harvests are over the average, but imports since 1890 have exceeded the exports. Cape Colony has also become a considerable importer since the population was largely recruited by hordes of gold-seekers and diamond-diggers; and among the new importing forces there might well be included Switzerland, Greece, Norway, Sweden and Japan, although all but Japan imported a little wheat quite forty years ago.

Outside of Europe many island and continental tropical communities have become importers of wheat and flour within the past forty years. The aggregate of such imports has reached some 40,000,000 bushels a year, and is increasing more rapidly than any other part of the bread requirements of the world.

With little conception of the relation of bread-bearing acres to the rapidly increasing consuming element, and apparently but poorly equipped for the rôle of mentor, the commercial and political press is

ever engaged in the philanthropic work of advising the farmer how he should conduct his affairs, and is just now warning him that as the world is about to harvest a fair crop of wheat he cannot expect as good a demand from abroad as last year, nor is it safe to increase the acres under the great bread-making grain.

Careful tabulations of world production, covering the last 27 years, and of the breadeating populations to be supplied, show that each unit of such populations has, since 1888, consumed an average of 3.9 bushels yearly of wheat, and that the present acreage requires some 330,000,000 bushels for seed. As the "bread-eaters" now number more than 510 millions, the requirements of the bread-eating populations of European lineage, for bread and seed, exceed 2, 360,000,000 bushels for the coming twelve months. If, as appears probable, the harvest of 1898 must meet the requirements of an additional two weeks or more, then the harvest of 1898 should aggregate 2,440,000,000 bushels as there is evidently no reducible remainder from former harvests. From all parts of America, from Australasia, and from all parts of Europe, comes the report, authenticated by the fact that nowhere is old wheat available in sufficient quantities to keep the mills running until new wheat is obtainable, that stocks are absolutely exhausted. This is notably true in the Northwest, where the mills of Minneapolis have for weeks been doing what they have never done before: that is, making spring-wheat flour out of the new hard winter-wheat of Kansas, and even find it difficult to persuade the Kansas farmers to sell enough of their new wheat to keep the mills supplied. The Northwestern spring wheat, itself, is being harvested and coming into use two weeks earlier than usual, thus extending the season of supply in that measure. All these conditions indicate that the wheat harvested in 1898 must be stretched in a manner to meet about thirteen months' needs.

While it is altogether too early to make anything like a satisfactory estimate of the world harvest of 1898, yet it may be well to indicate, so far as official and other credible matter is available, what is the promise from the wheat-fields, premising by saying that the latest official utterances indicate a crop of some six hundred and fifteen million bushels in the United States, and one not above an average in

Should the harvests give an aggregate no greater than now indicated, supplies will be defective in the measure of some 200,000,000 bushels, unless what now appears to be an "irreducible remainder» from former harvests can be drawn upon to make good the difference between the outturn from the harvest of 1898, and the requirements of the 1898-99 harvest year. In any event, there is certain to be a brisk demand for all the wheat America now appears to have to spare, and both the farmer and the nation are reasonably sure of another year of prosperity, even if the maize crop is below the average, as is now probable. C. WOOD DAVIS.

A

T NO period during the hundred days or so of the late war could we reasonably withhold praise of President McKinley. It may truly be said that there is no one upon whom the cares and responsibilities of the contest have weighed more heavily than upon the nation's chief executive. There is no one who has more anxiously striven, moreover, to conduct the war operations, in all branches of the service, as well as the executive machinery of government, with advantage to our arms and with credit to the country. Throughout the trying period, President McKinley has spared himself in no degree, in the way of either thought or labor, nor have his toil and anxiety been without success, or failed to win for himself and his administration the ample confidence of the country and of all classes of the people. So notable throughout has been his work and so commendable his attitude, that he has not only won praise for himself at home, but has received hearty commendation abroad, alike from eminent people and from influential journals. An article in one of the latter, the London "Spectator," the most important as well as friendly of English weeklies, comments as follows on President McKinley's great services during the crisis. We gratefully endorse the eulogium, and have pleasure in reproducing part of it in our columns:

Without training in military business, or experience in diplomacy, or habitude in managing great affairs, he was suddenly called on to conduct a se

rious war which he only half approved, to create the necessary forces and to take resolutions certain to rouse the jealousy of half the Great Powers of Europe. He had, at one and the same time, to organize a fleet, to create an army, and to make it clearly understood that during war time the United States would suffer no interference. It seemed at first that, crushed by the weight of these responsibilities, the President might fail. The total unreadiness of the country for war, an unreadiness in which European statesmen could scarcely believe, deepened this impression, and for a moment it was generally held that Mr. McKinley, though a good man, would prove unequal to a task which might have oppressed a Bismarck.

The doubt has now disappeared. It seems probable that power, as occasionally happens, has developed latent forces in its possessor of which the world did not suspect the existence; but at all events it is certain that Mr. McKinley has risen to the height of his circumstances, and though he cannot be Abraham Lincoln, he convinces those around him that he has many of his great predecessor's best qualities. All disposition to wobble has gone out of him. He is aware, as Lincoln once said, that ultimate decision in executive matters must rest with him; that the responsibility before the people and before history rests on his shoulders; and with that certainty he has become as clear and firm as if he were a great man of business at the head of a great factory.

The enlargement in his conception of the work to be done is unmistakable. The President was, probably, at first, under the impression, shared by the whole of his countrymen, that the war would be a small affair; but that impression has disappeared, and America is fighting Spain as if Spain were a first-class Power. The man who steadily grows like this is a considerable man, even if he did choose some inferior advisers, and does not realize any more than Thiers did the effect of heavy tariffs upon the production of national wealth. Mr. McKinley's new demeanor has been answered by a new development of public confidence, and he is now, by far, the most influential personage in the United States.

HE present war has once more brought out the sterling qualities of the American volunteer soldier. It has filled the hearts of Americans with pride and has astonished the representatives of foreign governments who have been with our armies to note the course of events. None of us believe in war except as a last extremity. Most of us believe that this war is just, and that we can take proper pride in the rapid succession of victories that have attended our forces both by sea and by land. Already there has sprung up a demand for a much larger standing army, so that we may be prepared for future emergencies. While it must be admitted that our regular army, for many years back, has been below requirements, there are very good reasons for believing that it should not be largely increased. A tendency to militarism is the inevitable result of war, but let us hope that this country will not be led away after strange gods when the struggle is over. If we acquire as much foreign territory as now seems likely, there is no doubt that we shall need more soldiers; but for the public defence we shall not require a large army, because we have found how easy it is to raise one when needed from among the people in civil life. Nor is this the only instance. It has been our uniform experience, and though often raw levies have not been satisfactory we have never gone properly about raising an army with

Our Colonial

We are apt to forget that War History we had a colonial military history by no means insignificant. It were useless to go over it in detail, but no one can read the history of the French and Indian war without noting that the American militia bore the brunt of the various campaigns, and that the regulars from Great Britain made the most mistakes. Braddock's defeat was due to the commander's dependence upon his regulars and his contempt for the colonial militia, and his sole excuse was that he did not understand campaigning in the American forests; but at Montreal and Quebec the militia fought like regulars

and were highly commended. Before this, Massachusetts had furnished a small army and navy and had captured Louisbourg from the French, which at that time was the strongest fortification in the Western World, and the achievement awakened the admiration of military men in Europe. The American soldier fought then as now, not according to European methods, but adapting his plan of campaign to circumstances. It has come to be a byword that in every walk of life the American has shown more adaptability than any other race in the world. The American loves peace so well that he is willing to fight for it, and he usually fights so that he can get peace as quickly as possible.

The Case of It is hardly necessary to reBunker Hill hearse the story of Bunker Hill, but it was there that the American volunteer made an impression that has been lasting. His courage and determination on that occasion have been

typical of his successors in all our wars. The men at Bunker Hill were not without some military training, for in those days nearly every able-bodied man was more or less of a soldier, though it was as an individual rather than as a member of a company. There were "trainbands" in all the towns and “minute men» had been organized for some time. In those days the military preparations were far more general than now. Nevertheless, the farmers who fought at Bunker Hill could not be called an army. They were hastily entrenched and fought as individuals after they had seen the whites of the eyes of the advancing enemy. The British troops were regulars who had a contempt for the ununiformed militia. Like all soldiers of that day they were creatures of discipline. They did nothing except as ordered, and all firing was by volleys. Twice they were driven back by the farmers, who picked off the redcoats as they had been accustomed to shoot squirrels. If their ammunition had lasted, they might have held their ground. When they retreated it was with considerable satisfaction, as they had inflicted losses far heavier than their own. battle served to give the volunteers confidence, which was confirmed later when the British made a vain attempt to dislodge them from Dorchester Heights.

The