really ready when the despatch was presented by Lyons on December 23, but Seward did not lay it before the cabinet until Christmas day, two days later, and it was discussed by the cabinet on that and the following days. The substance of it was that Wilkes, who was acting quite without instructions, was justifiable in stopping the Trent under suspicion of carrying contraband, and that he might properly have brought her into a United States port, to have her status adjudged by a prize court, but that he had no right to stop her, to take passengers from her as prisoners, and then to let her proceed. If she was carrying contraband, she should have been held and condemned. If she was worthy to be released, she was entitled to carry with her all her passengers. This argument was convincing, and Seward's reply to the British ultimatum was unanimously approved by the President and cabinet. Lyons was accordingly notified that the captives, who had meanwhile been treated with all consideration and not as common prisoners, would be returned to British custody. They were taken from Fort Warren on a United States ship, and transferred to a British vessel off Provincetown. While it was, as Chase, the secretary of the treasury, expressed it, "gall and wormwood" to release men whom the Government so desired to hold, yet the American people cordially acquiesced in this settlement of the case, on the ground of justice and consistency. There was some satisfaction in the consideration that Great Britain had been compelled to adopt the American principle which she had formerly denied and defied, and there was a pardonable pride in the circumstance that, even amid the dreadful exigencies of a war for life, and in the face of almost unparalleled provocation and temptation to do otherwise, the nation had subordinated passion and temporary gratification to the maintenance of principle. The credit for this settlement is doubtless to be given chiefly to Seward. For the story that it was dictated to him against his will by Lincoln, there is no adequate foundation. There is indeed proof that Lincoln at least for a time considered an entirely different method of settlement, namely, by submitting the case to arbitration. This method was also considered in England, though there is no reason to suppose that there was any relation between its suggestion there and Lincoln's meditation upon it. In the Con

federacy the amicable disposition of the case was regarded with disappointment, since it deferred if it did not destroy that hope of a war between the United States and England which alone could assure Confederate success.

A few weeks later a marked change in British sentiment was caused by the success of the Federal arms. The capture of Fort Henry and the tremendous victory at Fort Donelson, in February, 1862, undid, at least for the time, the impression which had been created by Bull Run and which had prevailed ever since that time; and the British and indeed all Europeans began to realize the strength of the Federal armies and the promise of the leaders whom they were developing. Controversy between the two continents thereafter turned for a time to other matters, particularly to the blockade, and to the treatment of Confederate ships in neutral waters. It was obvious that at the beginning of the war the United States had not a sufficient naval force to make entirely effective the blockade which it had proclaimed of the entire Confederate coast, from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande. As under international law a blockade to be lawful must be physically effective, the question was repeatedly raised whether European nations were required to respect the proclamation. But as the naval force of the United States steadily increased and with it, of course, the efficiency of the blockade, these questions were in time answered by the logic of events, and no grave complications arose over them.

As early as April, 1861, the question of the reception of Confederate vessels in European ports was raised at St. Petersburg, the American minister inquiring of the Russian government if it purposed to recognize such ships. Prince Gortschakoff replied that it did, and that commerce between the Southern States and Russia would proceed without interruption, regardless of the flag which the vessels might fly. It was quite logical for Russia thus to receive commerce from a country whose independence she had not recognized, since in fact she had never formally recognized the independence of the United States itself. A decree to that effect was issued by the Russian government, ordering that vessels from Confederate ports should be treated the same as United States vessels. Toward the end of June,

1861, the first Confederate merchant vessel appeared in British waters, at the port of London, and Adams at once asked the British government how it intended to treat it. The answer was similar to that which had been given at St. Petersburg, and the ship was accordingly received and permitted to enjoy the hospitality of the port, while flying the Confederate flag, just as though it had been a United States vessel. In this, it was observed, there was no recognition of Confederate sovereignty. When, however, the Spanish government in Cuba began to pursue the same course, Seward protested. Since the vessels came from United States ports, he insisted that they should be regarded as under the consular authority and laws of this country. The Spanish government persisted in its course, however, and the United States's protest was ineffective.

The most serious international question of the war was acutely raised in 1862 over the fitting out of Confederate vessels in British shipyards. The British government had ordered its ports closed against privateers of both sides. But it made no effectual effort to prevent Confederate cruisers from being built and fitted out in British shipyards, and being publicly despatched thence to prey upon American commerce. Adams was vigilant in detecting these gross violations of neutrality, and resolute in calling official attention to them and in protesting against them; but in vain. Early in 1862 he complained that a vessel was being built for the Confederates, but the British affected to believe that it was a British ship bound for the Mediterranean trade. It sailed from a British port in March, 1862, and raised the Confederate flag. For more than two years, as the Florida, it was a scourge of American commerce. During its career it put into Brest and, despite the protests of American officials, was there permitted by the French to ship a new crew and to proceed on its course. In October, 1864, it was found in port at Bahia, Brazil, by the American ship Wachusett, and the captain of the latter, ignoring the neutrality of Brazilian waters, attacked and captured it under the guns of a Brazilian fort, and took it home to Hampton Roads. For this gross breach of law the United States apologized to Brazil, recalled the consul at Bahia who had suggested the act, and sent the captain of the Wachusett be

fore a court martial, which reprimanded him. The Florida would perhaps have been released to Brazil, but it conveniently sprang a-leak and sank.

In June, 1862, Adams called the attention of the British government to the fitting out of another and more formidable cruiser, at Liverpool, known as No. 290. The matter was discussed in Parliament, and it was publicly notorious that the vessel was being prepared for the Confederate government. The Liverpool authorities, however, pretended that there was no proof of that fact, and the Government took no action. The American consul at Liverpool did secure conclusive proof of the character and purpose of the vessel. Sir Robert Collier, an eminent British lawyer, to whom Adams submitted it, declared this proof to be sufficient to require the detention of the ship by the British authorities. Adams laid the proof and this opinion before Russell, on July 22. The latter referred the case to the law officers of the crown. These gentlemen took their time, and on July 29 reported that the ship ought to be seized and held. But on that very morning the ship had already been permitted to sail. That was the Alabama, the most destructive of all the Confederate cruisers, which kept the seas for twenty-two months, during which time it was cordially welcomed and entertained in every British port it entered. In that time it captured and destroyed some sixty American merchant vessels. Russell afterward admitted that he ought to have detained the ship, without waiting for the opinion of the law officers, and Goldwin Smith truly said, in a public address in England, that no nation ever inflicted upon another a more flagrant or more maddening wrong than England had upon America in letting that destroyer loose. "No nation with English blood in its veins had ever borne such a wrong without resentment." Indeed, resentment arose in America, more than over anything else in our foreign relations in all the war. The result of the depredations of these and other cruisers was that American commerce on the high seas was practically annihilated. Before the war it had been second to only that of Great Britain. At its close it was nonexistent. Nor is it difficult to escape the thought that this was the intention of at least some members of the British government; to compass the destruction of Britain's most formidable commercial rival.

At the time our Government could do nothing but protest against these wrongs. At the close of the war it exacted the amplest possible reparation, though through peaceful means.

Even worse than this was designed by the Confederate agents and by their British and other European friends. The duel between the Merrimac and Monitor in Hampton Roads had opened the eyes of the world to the value of ironclad warships. Great Britain had unequaled facilities for building such vessels, and could do so far more speedily than the United States. The Confederates therefore, having raised a large loan in England and on the Continent, gave orders at British shipyards for the immediate construction of two powerful ironclad rams, to be by far the most formidable vessels in the world. These were to be sent over, first to destroy the United States blockading squadrons or drive them away and thus reopen the Southern ports to the cotton and other trade, and then to devastate all the Atlantic cities of the North, especially New York, Boston, and Washington. It is quite possible that they would have been able to do this. In anticipation of this reopening of the cotton trade the Confederates were easily able to raise a loan of $15,000,000, secured by a pledge of the cotton which was thus to be released. In fact, no less than $45,000,000 was subscribed, some prominent public men being among the subscribers. Adams protested against the loan, but in vain. During the summer of 1863 he repeatedly protested against the building of the ironclads, but Russell replied that the Government could not interfere in any way with those vessels. Of Russell's good faith and honor in the case there can be no doubt. He referred the question of the ironclads to the law officers of the crown, by whose counsel it was his duty to be guided, and they reported to him more than once that there was no legal ground whatever on which the vessels could be seized or detained. All the evidence was that they were being constructed in fulfilment of a French order. It was no doubt unfortunate that Russell was at the time absent from London, in Scotland, so that all intercourse between him and Adams had to be conducted by mail. Could the two honest and straightforward men have got together, face to face, for an hour, Adams could easily have convinced him of the facts and the vessels could have been stopped. But at long range this was not