the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guaranties for the reëstablishment of order in Cuba.

"The powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognized and appreciated by the American nation."

The origin of that action has ever since been a disputed question. The British ambassador was made to appear chiefly responsible for it, but it seems far more probable, in view of some later revelations, that the initiative was taken by Germany, and that the British representative was inveigled into doing what he did partly because the initimate relations between this country and England made it more likely that he would be listened to than any other, and partly in order that the odium, if any, might fall upon him rather than upon the real authors of the scheme. McKinley did not follow the example of Seward, who during the Civil War had refused to listen to joint representations by two European powers. Instead he received the six envoys, recognized their joint action, and accepted their joint note. His reply was made to them at once, and was as follows:

"The government of the United States recognizes the goodwill which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the reëstablishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquillity of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity.

"The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own

earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation the idefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable."

At the same time McKinley decided to withhold his message from Congress until April 11. This was not because, however, of this action of the powers, nor yet in any expectation of further concessions at Madrid, but in response to a request from Lee, at Havana, that additional time should be given for the Americans in that city to get out of it, to places of safety. On April 9 the representatives of the powers at Madrid urged the Spanish government to make the offer of an armistice, at the request of the pope, independently of anything that the United States might do with its fleet in Cuban waters, and to this the government seems to have acceded. At any rate, on Sunday, April 10, the Spanish minister at Washington informed the secretary of state that the Spanish queen had yielded to the wishes of the pope and had ordered the immediate proclamation of an armistice, or at least suspension of hostilities. It was added that after the meeting of the Cuban Parliament on May 4 the Cubans would have ample liberty. The offer of submission of the case of the Maine to arbitration by impartial experts was renewed. All this, however, impressed the state department as merely an attempt to temporize, and the sole reply to the minister was that the President would report these latest proposals to Congress in his message the next day.

The message went in the next day, April 11. Much blame was thrown upon McKinley for not giving more weight to those final proposals of the Spanish government. It has been said if he had transmitted their full text to Congress, instead of merely a brief report of them, Congress would have acted very differently and war would have been averted. For this criticism there seems to be no good ground. The Spanish offer of an armistice was not definite and absolute, but was made quite dependent upon the discretion and wishes of General Blanco, and the promise of liberties after May 4 was altogether indefinite. It is really more likely that the submission of the full text to Congress would have added fuel to the fire of its angry zeal and would have made its action more prompt and radical than it was. That war would have been averted is not for a moment to be believed.

The President's message was a detailed and dispassionate review of the whole case, with only incidental reference to the destruction of the Maine as an indication of the inefficiency of the Spanish government for the safeguarding of important interests. Its conclusion was that the time had come when intervention was not only justifiable but necessary, in the name of humanity, for the protection of American interests in Cuba, and for the abatement of chronic conditions which were a constant source of menace to our peace and of expense to our government. The grounds of intervention, stated in his own words,

were:

"First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

"Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

"Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

"Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon the Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising-all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to

VOL. II-17.

keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.'

The reply of Congress came eight days later, after much debate and some differences of opinion between the Senate and the House of Representatives. On April 19 the two Houses agreed upon and adopted these resolutions:

"Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-five of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the Harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.'

The next day, April 20, the President signed these resolutions and they became law. The Spanish minister left Washington, Woodford left Madrid, and the war was on.

XXXII

RESULTS OF THE WAR

HE war with Spain began diplomatically with the sever

THE

ing of peaceful relations on April 20. From a military point of view it began with the firing of the first shots on April 22, when the American gunboat Nashville captured the Spanish vessel Buenaventura near the coast of Cuba.

It was made a

matter of legislative record on April 25, when Congress passed a resolution declaring that a state of war then existed and had existed since April 21. Each country attempted to throw upon the other the responsibility for beginning the war. In that both were right. The onus rested upon both. Spain was responsible for the conditions which provoked war, and the United States was responsible for acting upon that provocation.

With the detailed conduct of the war we shall not concern ourselves. Spain was from the beginning overwhelmed by the superior naval force of the United States; our actual superiority being greatly enhanced by the fact that the chief scene of war was just off our own coast, while Spain had to fight at a distance of three thousand miles. These circumstances were fortunate for the United States, for had the war been fought chiefly with armies instead of navies, and had its scene been as near to Spain's base of supplies as it was to ours, the result would probably have been far less easily attained. In a measure the circumstances of our War of 1812 with Great Britain were repeated. Our navy showed almost perfect preparedness and superb efficiency, while our army was found to be unprepared to a discreditable degree, and while there was no question of the valor of the officers and men, the military administration, particularly of the commissariat and sanitation, was scandalously bad. The men were fed on "embalmed" meat, and were herded in camps in which typhoid and other pestilences ran riot, until some of the officers rose in protest little short of mutiny. The conse