AMERICA'S

FOREIGN RELATIONS

T

XXI

THE CIVIL WAR-NEUTRALITY

HE United States at the outbreak of its epochal Civil War in 1861 was at peace with all the outside world and was nominally on terms of friendship with all nations. Various circumstances caused that friendship to be, however, somewhat less real than apparent, and there can be little doubt that some powers from the beginning looked upon the conflict among the States with indifference, while some would have been pleased to see the Southern Confederacy successful and the Union therefore dissolved. On the European continent the revolutionary movements of 1848 were still fresh in mind, and there was among the upholders of absolutism strong resentment against the United States for the sympathy which it had manifested toward them and for the asylum which it had given to innumerable political refugees; indeed, for the asylum which it was giving to those who in exile were still plotting or agitating against the régime from which they had fled. This feeling was strong in Austria because of the attitude of the United States toward Kossuth and the Hungarian rebellion, and also because of the sympathy which had been manifested here with Garibaldi and the Italian revolt against Austrian domination. It was perceptible in many other parts of the Continent, and was coupled with a willingness if not a desire to see republicanism fail in America in order that it might be discouraged and averted in Europe. In France the usurping emperor and his court were at heart hostile to the United States for many reasons-because of the Hawaiian episode, because of French designs upon Mexico which could hope to succeed only through the fall of the United States, and because

of the natural hatred which the treacherous assassin of one republic feels for another republic. Among Frenchmen, however, the United States had many warm friends; especially among the opponents of the emperor. In Russia there was little friendship for us, save for the sake of differing from the powers which had lately beaten her in the Crimean War and of furthering a desperate design of wreaking revenge upon at least one of them. In Great Britain there was a marked division of sentiment. The friction over Hawaii and over Central American affairs had undoubtedly caused some animosity toward us, and the spirit of commercial rivalry exerted an influence in the same direction. A large proportion of the people, however, moving even then toward that practical democracy which now dominates the kingdom, were cordial and sympathetic, and in their desire to see it make republicanism successful they hoped for the maintenance of the Federal Union.

In the latter part of 1860 and the beginning of 1861, when secession was merely threatened and voted, but was not yet supported by any overt acts, the tone of Europe was largely unfavorable to it and friendly to the Federal Government. That was chiefly because of hatred of revolutions and an unwillingness to encourage the spirit of insurrection against an established government in any country. It was not that they disliked America less but that they disliked revolutions more. The motive was similar to that which had a dozen years before prompted Russia to send an army to the assistance of Austria against the Hungarians. In November, 1860, the British foreign secretary, Lord John Russell (afterward Earl Russell), communicated to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, the "concern" with which the queen regarded the "danger of secession"; and in March following he expressed himself much more forcibly and elaborately to the same effect. The latter utterance was in reply to a circular letter which the secretary of state at the end of Buchanan's administration, Jeremiah Black, had sent to American ministers in Europe, directing them to "ask of all foreign powers that they should take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movements of the seceding States." The British foreign secretary replied that, "even if the Government of the United States had been willing to acknowledge the sepa

ration of the seceding States as founded in right, her Majesty's government would have seen with great concern the dissolution of the Union which bound together the members of the American republic; that the opposition of the Government of the United States to any such separation and the denial by them of its legality would make her Majesty's government very reluctant to take any step which might encourage or sanction the separation; that, however, it was impossible to state in what shape the question might present itself, nor was it in his power to bind the British government to any particular course of conduct in cases of which the circumstances and the significance were at present unknown." There is no doubt that a most unfortunate impression was created in England, and probably elsewhere in Europe, by the halting and pusillanimous course of the Buchanan government between the time of the election of Lincoln in November, 1860, and his inauguration in March, 1861. In his last annual message to Congress in December, Buchanan denied, it is true, the right of States to secede from the Union. But in the same document he proceeded at still greater length to argue that the Federal Government had no right to coerce a State-that is, to prevent it from seceding. Later, when an armed conflict between the South Carolina troops and the Federal forces at Charleston seemed imminent, Buchanan in his orders to commanders was far more intent on having them avoid a clash than on their protecting the Federal forts and other property and defending the honor of the flag. This led even the friends of America abroad to wonder whether the Federal Government had the spirit and purpose to maintain the Union.

Lincoln succeeded Buchanan as President, and William H. Seward succeeded Black as secretary of state, on March 4, and one of the first acts thereafter of the latter was to send a circular letter to American ministers in Europe repeating with added emphasis the sentiments and directions of his predecessor. He especially and most shrewdly suggested that the success of the Southern revolt "might tend by its influence to disturb and unsettle the existing system of government in other parts of the world," and he expressed the confident hope that this consideration, among others, "would prevent foreign governments from yielding to solicitations to intervene in any unfriendly way in

the domestic concerns of the country." To this Lord Russell replied that the British government regretted the secession and was "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and final"; but it was impossible to tell what its future course might have to be. A similar response was made by the French foreign minister, who said that no application for recognition had yet been received from the Confederate States, and that the French government was not inclined to act hastily in such matters; he believed that the maintenance of the Federal Union was desirable for the benefit of France as well as of all parts of America, and he could give assurances that no precipitate action would be taken. Yet he was bound to say that practice and usage had established the right of de facto governments to recognition when a proper case in their favor was made out.

Similar sentiments were reported from other courts by the American ministers. Spain "would have nothing to do with the rebel party in the United States." Austria was "not inclined to recognize de facto governments anywhere." Russia, "from the principle of unrelenting opposition to all revolutionary movements, would be the last to recognize any de facto government of the disaffected States of the American Union." All this was satisfactory enough. But it was all before the war actually began. As soon as Fort Sumter was fired upon, Seward wrote again to the ministers, conveying the news and expressing the desire, indeed the demand, of the United States that all foreign powers should maintain an attitude of strict neutrality. "The President neither expects nor desires any intervention," he wrote, "or even any favor, in this emergency. He will never invoke, nor even admit, foreign interference or influence in this or any other controversy in which the Government of the United States may be engaged with any portion of the American people. It has been his aim to show that the present, controversy furnishes no ground on which a great and friendly power can justly lend aid or sympathy to the party engaged in insurrection; and therefore he instructs you to insist on the practice of neutrality, . . . as all our representatives are instructed to insist on the neutrality of the several powers to which they are accredited."

The erratic genius of Seward, however, at this time narrowly

escaped plunging the United States into irremediable disaster. He appears to have had toward the President a decidedly patronizing if not contemptuous feeling, arising from his own far greater experience in public life, and to have been impatient of the careful deliberation with which Lincoln was making his way amid almost unparalleled embarrassments and dangers. On April 1, 1861, less than a month after the beginning of the administration, he wrote to Lincoln "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," in which he inferentially chided his chief for being "without a policy, either domestic or foreign." Then he proceeded to prescribe a policy, both domestic and foreign, of the most amazing kind, the gist of which was that we should provoke a gigantic foreign war and thus heal domestic dissension and reunite the country for the common defense. At that time the Spanish flag had been temporarily reëstablished over Santo Domingo, France was plotting for the reconquest of Mexico, and Great Britain and Russia if not privy to the latter scheme had at least been sounded upon it. "I would," wrote Seward, "demand explanations from Spain and France categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia. If satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, I would convene Congress and declare war against them." For the energetic prosecution of such a policy, it would be necessary for somebody to act the part, practically, of a dictator, and he bluntly intimated that if Lincoln did not care to undertake that, all he had to do was to stand aside and let his secretary of state assume the responsibility! Happily, Lincoln was gifted with a triumphant sense of humor, and he disposed of this amazing document so effectively that it never saw public light until many years after both he and Seward had died.

Fort Sumter was fired upon on April 12, and the war was begun. On April 17, Jefferson Davis, as President of the Confederacy, issued a proclamation inviting all who wished to engage in privateering against the commerce of the United States to apply to him for letters of marque. Two days later Lincoln responded with a proclamation condemning such privateers as pirates, and a few days later our Government undertook to get European nations to take the same view of them. It will be recalled that the United States had refused to join in the Declara