and political gain, and with an assurance of thus securing forever the stability of her sovereignty and peace on the isthmus, she deliberately and persistently refused to do it, in circumstances strongly indicating bad faith. That was the substance of President Roosevelt's account of the episode, and it stands approved.

The bad faith of Colombia was soon made manifest by the conduct of the Government. It was at first solemnly declared that that Government was prohibited by the constitution from alienating any of its territory, as the treaty would practically have done, and that therefore ratification was impossible. Yet immediately after the Panama revolution the Colombian government offered, if the United States would intervene to undo the revolution and restore the isthmus to it, to declare martial law and thereunder ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, or to call a special session of congress, with new and friendly members, to ratify it. It then sent General Rafael Reyes, perhaps the most eminent citizen of Colombia, to Washington to repeat that offer. If the United States would restore Panama to Colombia, he said, in effect, Colombia would revive and ratify the treaty, with an amendment waiving the $10,000,000 bonus.

Colombia continued to show resentment against the United States though friendly diplomatic relations were maintained. Various suggestions for a settlement of her claims against this country were made, but none was adopted. The Root-Cortez treaty, negotiated in 1909 by Elihu Root, secretary of state, and the Colombian minister, provided that Colombia should recognize the independence of Panama, and that Panama should pay to Colombia in ten yearly instalments the sum of $2,500,000 as her share of the public debt of Colombia which was contracted while the isthmus was a part of Colombia; but the Colombian congress refused to ratify it. A counter proposal was made by Colombia, that the whole matter should be referred to the International Tribunal at The Hague, but this the United States declined. Another proposal, by this country, was that the United States, as an act of grace and amity, should pay Colombia $10,000,000 as an omnibus indemnity, but this, too, Colombia declined. Finally, in 1914, William J. Bryan, secretary of state, negotiated a treaty, which was signed at Bogotá on April 7, by

T. A. Thompson, minister to Colombia, under which the Panama boundary line was to be readjusted in Colombia's favor, Colombia was to receive certain commercial advantages, and the United States was to pay an indemnity of $25,000,000. This was ratified by the Colombian senate, but the United States Senate indefinitely postponed action upon it, largely because the first article contained an expression of regret by the United States for anything that might have disturbed the friendship between the two nations, which was tantamount to a confession that this country had acted improperly in the matter of the Panama revolution.

Meantime, what of our relations with the Republic of Panama? On the very day on which this country recognized its independence, Philippe Bunau-Varilla was appointed Panaman minister to the United States. He at once began with Secretary Hay negotiations for a canal treaty, and that instrument was completed and signed on November 18. It gave to the United States a perpetual lease and absolute administrative control of a canal zone ten miles wide from sea to sea and certain islands in the Bay of Panama, including the ownership of the Panama Railroad, and the right to intervene if necessary for the maintenance of peace and order in Panama itself; in return for which the United States was to guarantee the independence of the isthmian republic and was to pay it a cash bonus of $10,000,000 and after nine years an annuity of $250,000 forever. This was ratified by the Senate on February 23, 1904, and was proclaimed three days later. Under this treaty the United States at once proceeded with the gigantic undertaking of constructing the canal. Since then several minor readjustments of details of relationship between the United States and Panama have occurred, and at several elections in the latter country American moral influence has been exerted, by request, for the preservation of order and the assurance of integrity. On the whole the American protectorate has been maintained over the isthmus as a separate republic with far less difficulty and friction than arose in the protection of our treaty rights and legitimate interests while it was a province of Colombia.

Another episode in connection with the isthmian canal must be recorded, as having to some degree affected our foreign re

lationships, unfortunately in a manner causing some reproach. In 1912 a bill was enacted by Congress providing for the operation of the canal, which was then nearing completion. An effort was made to insert in it a clause exempting all American vessels from tolls for passage, but upon the manifestation of vigorous opposition this was modified so as to exempt only American vessels engaged in the domestic coasting trade. To this also there was much opposition, both in Congress and throughout the country, but it was forced to enactment and the bill was signed by President Taft. The advocates of this measure at first pretended that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty permitted such discrimination, saying that the phrase "all nations" obviously meant "all other nations." This absurd contention was, of course, readily disproved by the record. It was proved-as already stated in these pages-that both Hay and Pauncefote, in making the treaty, and the Senate in ratifying it, understood and meant "all" to mean all, and American shipping to be inIcluded on the same terms as that of other nations. Then it was urged that that applied only to our foreign-bound commerce, since domestic coastal commerce could not under our laws come into competition with the shipping of other lands and therefore a favor to it would be no discrimination against or hardship to them. This was plausible, but the obvious answers were: first, that the treaty recognized no such distinction between coastal and foreign commerce; second, that to exempt any shipping from tolls would throw heavier tolls upon the rest, and thus violate the provision of the treaty that they should be "equitable"; third, that of all our commerce that of the coasts needed the favor least, since it was already protected against alien competition; and fourth, that we should need all possible revenue from the canal to pay its expenses and therefore could not afford to exempt any part of the commerce passing through it.

The British government made a formal protest, in moderate terms, against the exemption, as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; which it was. To this the answer of some was that no treaty should be regarded which stood in the way of American interests, and that as we had built the canal we had a right to manage it as we pleased, treaty or no treaty. This brutal and immoral view of the case was, happily, repulsive to the vast ma

jority of the nation, and a nation-wide demand arose for the vindication of our good faith by the repeal of the exemption. This demand became so strong that President Wilson, who during the first year of his administration had been noncommittal, was constrained to take it up and did so with much directness and vigor. On March 5, 1914, he delivered a message to Congress in which he urged the repeal of the exemption, declaring that no communication which he had addressed to Congress carried with it graver or more far-reaching implications than this. He argued that the exemption was a mistaken economic policy from every point of view, and that it was in plain contravention of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. A long debate ensued, which ended with the passage by the House of a bill repealing the exemption clause, on March 31, by a vote of 247 to 162. The Senate passed it by a vote of 50 to 35 on June 11, with a foolish and futile amendment to the effect that the bill should not be construed as a waiver of any treaty rights of the United States. Members of the Senate thus seemed to regard a treaty as something which could be impaired by Act of Congress; that is, a formal contract between two sovereign parties could be modified at will by one of them acting alone! The House accepted the amendment and repassed the bill by a vote of 216 to 71, and the President signed it, though he was undoubtedly disgusted with the amendment. Thus the reproach of treaty-breaking was removed, though not as gracefully as was to be wished, and not without a deplorable insistence upon the right to play fast and loose with international obligations, which it had been hoped the nation had outgrown.

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CHAPTER XXXV

SETTLEMENTS AND UNSETTLEMENTS

HE early years of the twentieth century were marked with the settlement by the United States of a number of longpending controversies and with a perceptible advance of this nation in friendship and intimacy with most of the countries of the world. By far the most noteworthy was the approachment which was effected between the United States and Great Britain. Between those countries, naturally, intercourse had from the first been most direct, transactions had been most frequent and important, friction had at times been most acute, and controversies had been most earnest and persistent. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth various circumstancs conduced irresistibly to the prevalence of a cordial feeling between them which amounted to little less than an unwritten alliance. Chief among these were the attitude of Great Britain toward America in the Spanish war, the attitude and sentiment of America toward Great Britain in the Boer war, the sympathy and coöperation between them in the Far East, and the personal influence of a number of statesmen in each country. On the British side Joseph Chamberlain, the Unionist leader and secretary of state for the colonies, and Lord Pauncefote, Sir Michael Herbert, and James Bryce, afterward Lord Bryce, ambassadors to the United States, were particularly influential; while on the American side the work of cultivating and confirming friendship was performed with signal felicity and efficiency by a distinguished succession of ambassadors, including John Hay, Joseph H. Choate, and Whitelaw Reid.

The chief issue between the two countries at this time remaining unsettled was the oldest of all, namely, that of American rights in the North Atlantic coastal fisheries. This had been a leading issue in the making of peace at the end of the Revolution, and again at the end of the War of 1812, and had been