tion of Paris, because it was unwilling to forego the right of privateering unless the European powers would in return make all private property at sea exempt from seizure, except as contraband. Now, however, on April 24, 1861, Seward sent a circular letter to the American ministers to the various powers which had subscribed to that declaration, instructing them to negotiate for the belated accession of the United States thereto. This reversal of policy was obviously inspired by the knowledge that in the then existing circumstances it would be to the great advantage of the United States to have foreign nations refuse recognition to Confederate privateers. The British and French governments were at first inclined to accept this proposal, and indeed treaties to that end were actually being prepared, when a sudden and fatal interruption of the proceedings occurred.

This was caused by the recognition of the Confederate States as belligerents. The news of the firing upon Fort Sumter reached the British government on April 30. The next day the British foreign secretary gave George M. Dallas, the retiring American minister, to understand that no action looking toward recognition of Confederate belligerency would be taken until the latter's successor, Charles Francis Adams, had arrived and had had an opportunity to present his case. On Saturday, three days later, however, Lord John Russell had an interview with the commissioners whom the Confederate States had sent thither, with the result that without waiting for Adams, on the following Monday, May 6, he officially announced in Parliament that the British government had decided to recognize the Confederate States as belligerents. Of this repudiation of the promise to await Adams's coming, and of the repeated promises to take no hasty action, no explanation was given, nor did it seem to be susceptible of any that would be creditable to the British government. Seward was astounded, and expressed his surprise and even his resentment at such action, and endeavored to have it reconsidered, but in vain. Nor were such feelings confined to Americans. John Bright, the incomparable tribune of the English people, afterward declared that this recognition of the Confederacy had been accomplished "with unfriendly haste.' It may be added that recognition by Great Britain was promptly

followed by similar action on the part of other powers: By France on June 10; Spain, on June 17; Holland a little later in the same month; and Brazil, on August 1.

This recognition of the Confederacy ended the negotiations for American accession to the Declaration of Paris. For the British government presently added to the draft of the proposed treaty a stipulation that it should be prospective and not retroactive, and it declared that for itself it "did not intend to undertake any engagements which should have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal difficulties prevailing in the United States." This, which was also proposed by France, was held to mean that the United States government was no longer sovereign over the Southern States, and of course was quite unacceptable, and Adams declined to sign the draft containing it. On their part the British and French governments felt, properly enough, that they were in honor bound to make that stipulation after their recognition of the Confederacy. To do otherwise would be to repudiate that recognition. Less creditable was the conduct of those powers some weeks later, when through the agency of the British consul at Charleston, South Carolina, who went to Richmond, the Confederate capital, for the purpose, they undertook to negotiate with the Confederate government its acceptance of the Declaration of Paris with the exception of the provision against privateering, for which a new paragraph, specifically recognizing and authorizing privateering, was substituted. This garbled declaration was, of course, promptly accepted by the Confederate government. The United States government vigorously protested against the conduct of such negotiations by a British official who was still nominally accredited to this country, and canceled his exequatur. The British government sent a warship and took him home, but never expressed either regret or apology for the incident, which was certainly not only illogical and inconsistent with its professions, but was a grave violation of neutrality.

Reference has been made to the Confederate commissioners who visited Great Britain at the beginning of May, 1861. When Russell, as already related, assured Dallas that official action would await the arrival of Adams, he added that he intended to receive the Confederate commissioners, though unofficially.

Dallas reported this to Seward, who became passionately indignant, and penned a despatch which had it been sent would almost certainly have broken off diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and possibly would have led to war. In harsh terms it threatened Great Britain with war if she dared to recognize the Confederacy, and directed Adams to suspend relations with that Government if even an unofficial reception was accorded to the Confederate commissioners. This was an echo of his proposals in his "Thoughts for the President's Consideration," which indicated that he still aimed at a foreign war as a means of reestablishing domestic unity. Fortunately it passed through Lincoln's hands before it was transmitted, and that prudent and sagacious statesman promptly eliminated the mischievous expressions, and transformed it into a temperate but none the less efficient note of instructions for the guidance of the American minister.

The formal proclamation of British neutrality between the Federal and Confederate governments was issued on May 13, and was modeled closely after that which had been issued two years before in the case of the war of France and Sardinia against Austria. It recognized the fact that war had begun between the United States and "certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America," and commanded all British subjects to observe the provisions of the British Foreign Enlistment Act and other laws applicable to the situation. At the news of this there was a general outburst of mingled grief and indignation throughout the Northern United States, as though the British government had become hostile to this country. For this there was little or no foundation in fact or reason. If the recog

nition of the Confederates as belligerents had been made with "unfriendly haste," the two fundamental circumstances of the situation were undisputable. One was that a state of war between two organized governments actually existed; that it was, according to the proclamations of both governments, likely to be in part maritime; and that therefore the commercial interests of Great Britain would be directly affected by it. The other was that the United States government itself, through its secretary of state, had declared to the world that it desired other nations to observe strict neutrality, precisely the neutrality that was pro