Philosophical papers. 1, Examination of sir W. Hamilton's logic. 2, Reply to mr. Mill's third edition (of his Examination of sir William Hamilton's philosophy). 3, Present state of moral philosophy in Britain
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Stran 465 - Man knoweth not the price thereof; neither is it found in the land of the living. The depth saith, It is not in me; and the sea saith, It is not with me.
Stran 433 - If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypolhesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Stran 444 - I say, has convinced me, that the sense of touch, by itself, is altogether incompetent to afford us the representation of extension and space, and is not even cognizant of local exteriority ; in a word, that a man deprived of sight has absolutely no perception of an outer world, beyond the existence of something effective. different from his own feeling of passivity, and in general only of the numerical diversity, — shall I say, of impressions, or of things?
Stran 444 - ... had not been able to form from them the idea of a square and a disc, until he perceived a sensation of what he saw in the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the objects.
Stran 431 - ... consisted in merely calling all states of mind, however heterogeneous, by that name ; a philosophy now acknowledged to consist solely of a set of verbal generalizations, explaining nothing, distinguishing nothing, leading to nothing.
Stran 423 - Ttierefore, on the principle, that the part of a part is a part of the whole, the notion man also comprehends in it the notion free agent.
Stran 468 - Theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures j which knowledge may be truly termed divine, in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion...
Stran 434 - We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other parts by something in common which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves ; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the first and in the fiftieth, this common element is a permanent element.
Stran 441 - This is confirmed by the language he uses in answering Mr. O. Hanlon.' He admits "that there is a sphere beyond my consciousness;" and "the laws which obtain in my consciousness also obtain in the sphere beyond it." This, of course, refers to our conviction as to there being other minds as well as our own (p. 253). I am not sure that his argument for the existence of such minds is conclusive. " I am aware, by experience, of a group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, which I call...
Stran 411 - who had never seen but one rose, might yet have been able to consider its colour apart from its other qualities ; and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once abstract and particular. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be called a general abstract idea.