adhering to its position and the Senate refusing to concur, the amendment was defeated.13

When it was announced in the Senate that the resolution had been defeated, Senator Stewart at once moved that the Senate adopt the joint resolution which had been: originally proposed in that body by Senator Henderson. After many substitutes had been offered for this resolution and each in turn defeated, it passed the Senate by a vote of 35 to 11.14 In the House, Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, moved to amend it so that it would read, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote and hold office should not be abridged or denied by any State on account of race, color, nativity, property, creed, or previous condition of servitude." After debate this amendment was passed, and the resolution as it came from the Senate, and as amended by the House, was then passed. Thereupon the resolution was returned to the Senate and another debate took place, Senator Stewart disagreeing to the House amendment and asking for a conference, which was carried. The President of the Senate appointed Senators Stewart, Conkling and Edmonds as conferees. On the part of the House the Speaker appointed Messrs. Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan. The result of the meeting of the conferees was a compromise, the House substantially receding from its amendment. The resolution, as agreed upon by the conference, was passed by each body, and the President was directed to send the article to the governors of the States for ratification.

The last of the great amendments growing out of the Civil War between the States in America, was thus passed. Since that day, though many amendments have been proposed, none has been added to the Constitution.

This amendment did not confer the right of suffrage.— In United States v. Reese et al.15 the court held: "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone. It prevents the States, or the United States, however, from giving preference in this particular to one citizen of the United States over another, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Before

13 Thorpe's Constitutional History, vol. 3, 437, 439.

14 Congressional Globe, 3d Session, 40th Congress, 1318, part 2. 15 92 U. S., 214, 217.

its adoption, this could be done. It was as much within the power of a State to exclude citizens of the United States from voting on account of race, etc., as it was on account of age, property, or education. Now it is not. If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be. Before this amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty against this discrimination; now there is. It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. This, under the express provisions of the second section of the amendment, Congress may enforce by "appropriate legislation."

The Fifteenth Amendment has reference solely to actions of the United States and the States, and not to any action of private individuals.16

This Amendment created a new constitutional right.In United States v. Cruikshank et al.,17 Waite, Chief Justice, said: "In United States v. Reese, supra, we held that the Fifteenth Amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right, which is, exemption from the discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From this it appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of race, etc., is. The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the last has been."

In Elk v. Wilkins18 it was held: that an Indian, not being a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, has been deprived, when

16 James v. Bowman, 190 U. S., 127.

17 92 U. S., 542, 555. 18 112 U. S., 94, 109.

McPherson v. Blocker, 146 U. S., 1, 38.

prevented from voting, of no right secured by the Fifteenth Amendment, and is, therefore, not entitled to vote. So in United States v. Harris,1 19 the court held: "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage on any one. It merely invests citizens of the United States with the constitutional right of exemption from discrimination in the enjoyment of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." But in ex parte Yarbrough,20 Justice Miller, speaking for the entire court, said: "The Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by its limitation on the power of the States in the exercise of their right to prescribe the qualifications of voters in their own elections, and by its limitation of the power of the United States over that subject, clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered to be of supreme importance to the National Government, and was not intended to be left within the exclusive control of the States. While it is true, as was said by this court in United States v. Reese (92 U. S., 214), that this article gives no affirmative right to the colored man to vote, and is designed primarily to prevent discrimination against him whenever the right to vote may be granted to others, it is easy to see that under some circumstances it may operate as the immediate source of a right to vote. In all cases where the former slave-holding States have not removed from their constitutions the words 'white man' as a qualification for voting, this provision did, in effect, confer on him the right to vote, because, being paramount to the State law, and a part of the State law, it annulled the discriminating word white, and thus left him in the enjoyment of the same right as white persons. And such would be the effect of any future constitutional provision of a State which should give the right of voting exclusively to white people, whether they be men or women. (Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., 370.) In such cases this Fifteenth article of amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer on the negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect and enforce that right.' This Amendment eliminates the word "white" from

19 106 U. S., 629, 637. 20 110 U. S., 651, 664.

State constitutions in reference to suffrage.—It was said in Neal v. Delaware: "Beyond question the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remove from the State constitution, or render inoperative, that provision which restricts the right of suffrage to the white race.

921

The doctrine announced in ex parte Yarbrough, supra, must be considered as a modification of the preceding decisions in reference to the securement of suffrage to the negro. While the Fifteenth Amendment does not in terms confer upon the colored man the right to vote, it removed what had formerly been the obstacles in the way of his doing so, and this was the equivalent of a provision declaratory of his right of suffrage.

Neither the Thirteenth, Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendments conferred the right of suffrage upon citizens of the United States or of the States. This was done by Congress.

This concludes our examination of the Amendments which have been made to the Constitution. It is highly praiseworthy to say of that great instrument that so

21 103 U. S., 370, 389.

"Judge Cooley said of this amendment. What is particularly noticeable in the case of this article is the care with which it confines itself to the particular object in view. The pressure of a particular evil was felt; the reproach of a great wrong was acknowledged; and that evil was to be remedied, and that wrong redressed. There was no thought at this time of correcting at once and by a single act all the inequalities and all the injustice that might exist in the suffrage laws of the several States. There was no thought or purpose of regulating by amendment, or of conferring upon Congress the authority to regulate, or to prescribe qualifications for, the privilege of the ballot. From the beginning the States had exercised that authority, and however diverse had been their action, there was no complaint of any resulting evil which in any case had become of national importance except the single one at which this article was aimed. The correction of this was consequently the immediate need, and whatever else was wrong or impolitic might properly be left to the action of the States where the subject was left when the Constitution was framed. At their hands, it may be trusted, will whatever else is unequal in due time be corrected, and whatever is inconsistent with republican înstitutions be discarded. This last amendment crowns the edifice of national liberty. Freedom is no longer sectional or partial. There are no longer privileged classes; the laws have ceased to be invidious, and all classes of citizens who are to be governed by them are admitted also to participate in their administration." Story on The Constitution, vol. 2, secs. 1972, 1973.

few amendments have been added to it. Praise, however, is equally due to the conservative judgment of the American people, who have been reluctant to change or add to their organic law. While only fifteen amendments to the Constitution have been adopted by Congress and ratified by the States nearly two thousand proposals to amend it have been introduced in Congress. Professor Ames in his admirable treatise on the "Amendments to the Constitution," says: "During the first century of our government's existence over one thousand eight hundred propositions to amend the Constitution were introduced into the National Legislature."'22

It must be conceded that, as the Constitution left the Convention that framed it, it was strangely defective in some particulars. The great safeguards relating to personal liberty and rights-that no person should be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; that no person should be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; that no person should be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that no person should be deprived of life or limb, liberty, or property, without due process of law; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused should have a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury; that he should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; that he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; that he should have compulsory process in his favor; that he should have assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail should not be required; that excessive fines should not be imposed; that cruel and unusual punishments should not be inflicted these were omitted from the original Constitution, and are embraced in the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments. Various reasons why these provisions were omitted from the Constitution have been assigned by statesmen and jurists, some of whom were members of the Constitutional Convention, but whatever may have been the cause, we find them in the amendments, and not in the original instrument.

In a republic like ours it would have been strange in22 Ames on Amendments to the Constitution, 19.