in speaking upon the subject of removals from office, he said: "You will remember, sir, that the Constitution says not one word about the President's power of removal from office. It is a power raised entirely by construction. It is a constructive power, introduced at first to meet cases of extreme public necessity. It has now become coexten, sive with the executive will, calling for no necessity, requiring no exigency for its exercise; to be employed at all times, without control, without question, without responsibility. When the question of the President's power of removal was debated in the First Congress, those who argued for it limited it to extreme cases. Cases, they said, might arise in which it would be absolutely necessary to remove an officer before the Senate could be assembled. An officer might become insane; he might abscond; and from these and other supposable cases, it was said, the public service might materially suffer if the President could not remove the incumbent. And it was further said that there was little or no danger of the abuse of the power for party or personal objects. No President, it was thought, would ever commit such an outrage on public opinion. Mr. Madison, who thought the power ought to exist and to be exercised in cases of high necessity, declared, nevertheless, that if a President should resort to the power when not required by any public exigency, and merely for personal objects, he would deserve to be impeached. By a very small majority-I think, in the Senate, by the casting vote of the Vice-President-Congress decided in favor of the existence of the power of removal, upon the grounds which I have mentioned; granting the power in a case of clear and absolute necessity, and denying its existence everywhere else. "Mr. President, we should recollect that this question was discussed and thus decided when Washington was in the executive chair. Men knew that in his hands the power would not be abused; nor did they conceive it possible that any of his successors could so far depart from his great and bright example as, by abuse of the power, and by carrying that abuse to its utmost extent, to change the essential character of the Executive from that of an impartial guardian and executor of the laws into that of the chief dispenser of party rewards. Three or four instances of removal occurred in the first twelve years of the Government. At the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration, he made several others, not without producing much dissatisfaction; so much so that he thought it expedient to give reasons to the people in a public paper,63 for even the limited extent to which he had exercised the power. In a speech on the 12th of October, 1835, in again discussing the subject of removal, Mr. Webster said: "I confess my judgment would have been that the power of removal did not belong to the President alone; that it was but a part of the power of appointment, since the power of appointing one man to office implies the power of vacating that office by removing another out of it; and as the whole power of appointment is granted, not to the President alone, but to the President and Senate, the true interpretation of the Constitution would have carried the power of removal into the same hands.''84 This, as we have already seen, was the doctrine of Hamilton.. The question seems to have first come before the Supreme Court in Ex parte Hennen,65 and was decided by that body in 1839, upon the following facts: Congress passed an act authorizing district judges to appoint the clerk of the court; a district judge exercised this right under the statute and appointed a clerk and thereby removed the one who was at the time filling the position. In the communication notifying the clerk of his removal and the appointment of his successor the judge said: "that the business of the office for the last two years had been conducted promptly, skilfully, and uprightly, and that in appointing Mr. Winthrop to succeed him, he had been actuated purely by a sense of duty and feelings of kindness towards one whom he had long known, and between whom and himself the closest friendship had ever subsisted." The right of the district judge to make this appointment was questioned and a difference of opinion. 63 Webster's Works, Vol. 1, 258-60. between him and the presiding justice of the Supreme Court of the United States having been certified the question was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Thompson, page 259, observed: "It cannot, for a moment, be admitted, that it was the intention of the Constitution, that those offices which are denominated inferior offices should be held during life. And if removable at pleasure, by whom is such removal to be made? In the absence of all constitutional provision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment. This power of removal from office was a subject much disputed, and upon which a great diversity of opinion was entertained in the early history of this government. This related, however, to the power of the President to remove officers appointed with the concurrence of the Senate; and the great question was, whether the removal was to be by the President alone, or with the concurrence of the Senate, both constituting the appointing power. No one denied the power of the President and Senate jointly to remove, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution; which was a full recognition of the principle that the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment. But it was very early adopted, as the practical construction of the Constitution, that this power was vested in the President alone. And such would appear to have been the legislative construction of the Constitution." 66 In Crenshaw v. United States, Mr. Justice Lamar, for the Court remarked: "A statute under which one takes office, which fixes the term of office at one year, or during good behavior, is the same one which adds to those provisions the declaration that the incumbents shall not be dismissed therefrom. The officer under it does not hold by contract. He enjoys a privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will; and one legislature cannot deprive its successor of the power of revocation." In Parsons v. United States," President Cleveland direct ee 134 U. S., 108. United States v. McDonald, 128 U. S., 473. ed the following communication to Lewis E. Parsons, Jr., District Attorney at Birmingham, Alabama: "Executive Mansion, "Washington, D. C., May 26, 1893. "Sir: You are hereby removed from the office of Attorney of the United States for the Northern and Middle Districts of Alabama, to take effect upon the appointment and qualification of your successor. "Grover Cleveland.' No charges had been preferred against the District Attorney, consequently it was not claimed that he was incapable of discharging the duties of the office, or that there was any cause for his removal. The district attorney replied to the President's communication as follows: "My commission bears date of February 4, 1890, and authorizes me to hold said office for the definite term of four years from the date thereof, fixed by law, and I am advised by counsel, and it is my own opinion, that you have no power to remove me, and I respectfully decline to surrender the office. "Very respectfully, "Lewis E. Parsons, Jr., "United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama." In deciding the case Mr. Justice Peckham said (p. 327): "The question here presented is whether the President of the United States has power to remove a district attorney, who had been duly appointed, when such removal occurs within the period of four years from the date of his appointment, and to appoint a successor to that officer by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.' It was claimed on the part of the district attorney that the President did not possess such power and that he was entitled to serve as such officer for the period of four years. Mr. Justice Peckham, in his opinion, reviewed the history of the subject of removal from office from the debate which occurred in the first session of Congress in 1789 until the last decision by the Supreme Court. The result reached was that the President can remove a district attorney though such removal falls within the period of four years after his appointment and though he was appointed "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" and his successor must be appointed "by and with the advice and consent of the same body." The court further held that the language of the statute that district attorneys shall be appointed for a of four years, and their commissions shall cease and expire at the expiration of four years, means that the term should not last longer than four years and that during that time the President could remove them if he saw fit to do so. The last case arose on these facts. A statute provided that the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate should appoint general appraisers of merchandise who may be removed from office at any time by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." President McKinley sent the following communication to one of these appraisers: "Executive Mansion, "Washington, D. C., May 3, 1899. "Sir: You are hereby removed from the office of general appraiser of merchandise, to take effect upon the appointment and qualification of your successor. "William McKinley." The officer resisted the attempt to remove him and brought suit for the recovery of his salary. He never resigned his office nor acquiesced in any attempted removal therefrom, and was never notified or informed of any charges made against him, either of inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, and he knew of no cause for his removal from the office having been ascertained or assigned by the President. It will be seen that this case presented the question whether or not the President could at will, and without assigning a cause therefor, remove an officer, when the statute under which he was appointed provided the causes for which he might be removed. The court held he could. Mr. Justice Peckham again delivered the opinion of the |