182

preclude any other that might be proposed. That it probably never was the intention of the Federalists to allow the country to be plunged into war with England, is indicated by various private letters. Writing to a friend May 3, Oliver Wolcott says: "During this interesting period, the duty of an American citizen, above all, is to come to an absolute determination that we will on no account become a party to the war." On March 26, in an effort to prevent further depredations on American commerce, Congress authorized the President to lay an embargo for a term of thirty days on all ships and vessels in American ports bound to any foreign port or place.t Sedgwick's resolutions for raising troops were defeated, and he proposed "that measures ought immediately to be taken to render the force of the United States more efficient." This proposition was referred to a committee which sug

The embargo was laid March 26 and continued to May 25, 1794, when "amidst the hearty curses of the people," it was lifted. McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 173-174. See also Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., p. 8. Writing to his wife April 1, 1794, John Adams says: "The embargo begins to be felt by many who have been the most noisy and turbulent. * But the foolish tradesmen and laborers, who were so ready to follow the heels of their scheming leaders, are now out of employment, and will lose thirty dollars a head by this embargo. If they had been taxed half the sum to the most necessary and important measure, they would have bitterly complained. I can see little benefit in the embargo, except that it may cool down the courage of such kind of people."— John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 469.

gested that the military force of the country be augmented and that the President be authorized to call on the State executives to organize 80,000 militia for service at the call of the nation.*

Smith, of South Carolina, now urged the subject of indemnity to the owners of vessels and cargoes which had been captured by any of the belligerent powers, introducing a resolution to that effect. As he considered. it proper to designate the fund from which this indemnity should be paid, Jonathan Dayton, on March 27, introduced two resolutions for sequestering all debts due British subjects, and for taking measures to secure their payment into the United States treasury. † Before any action was taken on these resolutions, Clark introduced a resolution prohibiting intercourse with Great Britain until that country should fully compensate the citizens of the United States for all injustices done by any armed vessels or any person or persons acting under British authority, and until the western posts should be turned over to the United States government.‡

On April 4 the President submitted to Congress a letter from Mr. Pinck

*

McMaster, vol. ii., p. 186.

Ibid, note; Annals of Congress, 3d Congress, 1st session, pp. 535-556; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 283-284.

McMaster, vol. ii., p. 187, note. For the debates on the sequestration of British debts and non-intercourse with Great Britain, see Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. ii., pp. 482–498. See also Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., P. 10.

ney, enclosing copies of instructions issued to the commanders of British was vessels, dated January 8 and revoking those of November 6, by which such war vessels were directed to bring in neutral vessels only, laden with cargoes, the produce of the French Islands, and which were on a direct voyage from those islands to Europe. Pinckney transmitted also the details of a conversation with Lord Grenville, concerning the order in council of November 6, 1793. The Federalists were greatly interested by Pinckney's communication, and, believing that an amicable adjustment of the contentions between the two nations could still be made, opposed all measures calculated to irritate Great Britain, or that might be construed into a dereliction of the neutral character they desired to maintain. At the same time they lent their influence to such measures as provided for placing the country in readiness for war, should peace negotiations fail. The Republicans continued to oppose such measures and endeavored to keep alive and to increase the hostility toward England.‡ Marshall says: Language will

66

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 430, 431; Lodge, George Washington, vol. ii., p. 173.

† Irving, Life of Washington, vol. v., p. 215. John Adams says: "You cannot imagine what horror some people are in, lest peace should continue. The prospect of peace throws them into distress. Their countenances lengthen at the least opening of an appearance of it. Glancing gleams of joy beam from their faces whenever all possibility of it seems to be cut off."- Works, vol. i., P. 471.

VOL. IV-13

183

scarcely afford terms of greater outrage, than were employed against those who sought to moderate the rage of the moment. They were denounced as a British faction, seeking to impose chains on their countrymen. Even the majority was declared to be but half aroused, and to show little of that energy and decision which the crisis required."'*

In connection with the debate on the Non-Intercourse resolution, several facts are worthy of note: first, that though Great Britain had inflicted the greatest damage on the commerce of New England, the Congressmen of that district almost to a man opposed the measure, the ostensible object of which was to protect that commerce; second, that the Southern members, representing a non-commercial section, favored it almost unanimously; third, that the Federalists wished to adjust the dispute by negotiation, while in the meantime preparing for war (" to speak softly but use the big stick "); and fourth, that the Republicans opposed alike all peace negotiations and prepIt would not be arations for war. correct to state, however, that the antagonistic interests of the two sections were responsible for the differences between Federalists and Republicans. Madison did not favor commercial restrictions simply because the New England commerce, and not that of Virginia, would be hampered thereby, though probably

184

the attitude of Jefferson and Madison would have been somewhat different had Virginia been a commercial State (since the loss to their constituents would have had great weight with them and would have compelled them to scrutinize more carefully the arguments advanced to show how this loss would eventually be made good). The Republicans thought that the best policy for the country was to cultivate the commercial friendship of France rather than that of England.*

The Federalists were less eager to avoid war out of fear that it would tend to create a strong central government; yet the charge of Hamilton's enemies that he desired a war simply to strengthen the government, appears to have been groundless, for he was too astute a statesman not to see the disasters and disadvantages that a war would bring to the Nation. He, in common with all intelligent men of his day, realized that war would place a heavy burden upon the young government, would disarrange the finances, ruin many industries, and possibly endanger the stability of the Nation itself. The Republicans opposed negotiations probably because they thought commercial restrictions were sufficient to compel the acknowledgment of American commercial rights, and a treaty would only hinder this object. They thought the best treaty obtainable might deprive the country of its most power

ful weapon. Furthermore, they considered that France was fighting for liberty, and England for despotism, and therefore to make a treaty with the latter was to become an enemy of France and liberty. The effect of this "revolutionary madness" upon the people is clearly shown by the debates in Congress. In speaking of the debates on Madison's resolutions, Tracy says: "This discussion has assumed an appearance which must be surprising to a stranger and painful to ourselves. The Congress of the United States is seen deliberating, not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative circumstances of two European nations, and this deliberation has not for its object the relative benefit of their markets to us, but which form of government is best and most like our own, and what measures we can adopt which will best humble one and exalt the other."'*

Despite the conflicting opinions of Congressmen, newspapers, and private individuals, Washington was not to be driven from the course which he considered right and just. He looked upon war as a last resort and considered peace essential to the prosperity of the country. He wished also to prevent the consummation of any entangling alliance with France. He was convinced that the contentions between the United States and England had not reached a point

* See also Gordy, vol. i., pp. 235-236.