voter for giving a false answer at the poll, which stated that at a certain election for a member of Parliament for the borough of Stoke-uponTrent, the defendant appeared as a voter, and tendered his vote as such, and that he gave a false answer that he had the same qualification for which he was put on the register, whereas in truth he had not, was held to be bad, because it stated all the matters by way of recital, and neither stated the writ nor the precept for holding the election, nor that the defendant's name was on the register. (k) Where on the trial of an indictment under the same section, c. 45, s. 58, against the defendant for giving a false answer to the question, 'Have you the same qualification for which your name was originally inserted in the register of voters now in force for the city of Bristol?' the sheriff's deputy stated that on the defendant tendering his vote he had asked him the question as set out in the indictment, but did not, at the end of the question, read from the register the line in which his name and qualification were inserted, Lucy William, House, Lodge Street.' Wightman, J., held that the defendant must be acquitted, as the particular qualification ought to have been read over. (1)

The first four counts of an indictment upon 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 34 (now repealed), stated that the defendant, upon delivering in a voting paper, in the name of a burgess entitled to vote at the election, was asked by the presiding officer the three questions in the terms of the Act, and then alleged, to which questions (each of the two first) the defendant then and there falsely and fraudulently answered, “I am; and Williams, J., after consulting Patteson, J., held that these four counts were bad for omitting the word 'wilfully.' Wilfully to make a false answer to the question' proposed was the definition of the offence by the legislature itself, and it was a safe and certain rule that the words of the statute must be pursued. (m) The prisoner was indicted for falsely answering a question at a municipal election under the same section. The prisoner's father, William Goodman, had been a burgess in St. Alban's and those names remained on the overseer's lists; but he had been absent from home for a considerable time; and the prisoner, whose name was also William, resided in the same house, and paid the parish rates, &c. At a municipal election the prisoner offered to vote, and being asked, 'Are you the person whose name appears as "William Goodman on the burgess roll now in force,' answered 'Yes.' There was only one William Goodman on the roll. Wightman, J., held that there was no case against the prisoner. (n)

Upon an indictment against the defendant for a misdemeanor, in falsely swearing that he bona fide had such an estate in law or equity of the annual value of 300l., above reprises, as qualified him to be a member of Parliament for a borough; a surveyor stated that the fair annual value of the property was about 2001. a year, but another witness stated that it was badly let, and believed it was worth more than

(k) R. v. Bowler, C. & M. 559, per Patteson, J. The defendant was acquitted in this case. In R. v. Ellis, C. & M. 564, the indictment was in a similar form, the defendant convicted, and the judgment arrested in the Queen's Bench, no cause being shown.

(1) R. v. Lucy, C. & M. 510.

(m) R. v. Bent, 1 Den. C. C. R. 157, 2 C. & K. 179.

(n) R. v. Goodman, 1 F. & F. 502.

300l. a year, and that he told the defendant so, and that he did not think that the defendant had any reason to believe that the qualification, in point of value, was not sufficient. It was held that the jury must be satisfied, beyond all doubt, that the property was not of the value of 300l. a year, and that, at the time the defendant made the statement, he knew that it was not of that value. (0)

Administering an oath contrary to the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 13. The first count of an indictment upon the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 13, charged that the defendant, being a justice of the peace, did unlawfully administer to and receive from J. Huxtable a certain voluntary oath touching certain matters and things whereof the defendant had not jurisdiction or cognizance by any statute. The second and third counts slightly varied, and the fourth count negatived the proviso in sec. 13. There were other counts charging the defendant with administering oaths to two other persons. The defendant had made a complaint to the bishop against two clergymen, who officiated in his parish, that one had played at thimble-rig, and that both had neglected the duties of the parish. The bishop intimated that, before he could call on the clergymen to answer the complaint, the defendant must either bring before him the persons who proved the charges, or obtain statements in writing of the facts. The defendant obtained statements from the three persons mentioned in the indictment, and swore them before himself, as a justice of the peace, to the truth of the statements. The bishop had before appointed a day for hearing the charges, and had summoned the clergymen to attend; but on finding that the depositions had been thus sworn, he declined to look at them; he went, however, into the charges on other evidence. It appeared that the defendant was ignorant of the statute rendering the administering voluntary oaths illegal. It was contended that the enacting part of the statute must be construed with reference to the preamble; that the enacting clause, which prohibits any justice of the peace, or other person,' from administering oaths, other than in matters over which jurisdiction was given by statute, if taken by itself, would render unlawful the taking of many oaths which could be administered by the common law, that the enactment construed together with the proviso was still too stringent, and that the enactment and proviso must be governed by the preamble. Coleridge, J., in summing up, said, he was of opinion that the enacting part of the statute was not governed by the preamble; that he considered the enacting part of the section and the proviso preserved to justices of the peace all the jurisdiction they had, as well at the common law as by statute, to administer oaths; and that the inquiry before the bishop was clearly a matter in respect of which the defendant had no jurisdiction, either at common law or by statute. He directed the jury, that, if they were satisfied the defendant did administer the oaths, they should find him guilty. The jury found the defendant guilty of inadvertently administering an oath or oaths;' and Coleridge, J., held that that was a verdict of guilty. (p) But the judgment was afterwards arrested upon the ground

(0) R. v. De Beauvoir, 7 C. & P. 17, Lord Denman, C. J. A property qualifica tion for a member of Parliament is not now

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necessary, see 21 & 22 Vict. c. 26; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 66.

(p) R. v. Nott, C. & M. 288. See the section, ante, p. 327.

that the indictment did not in any count show what the nature of the oath was. There ought to have been a distinct allegation of the subject-matter of the oath, showing affirmatively that it was out of the jurisdiction of the magistrate. The question was matter of law for the Court, and though it was not necessary to set out the whole of the oath, still the facts should have been so stated as to enable the Court to form its opinion upon the question whether the oath was within the jurisdiction of the magistrate or not. (q)

False declarations.

Where a prisoner was indicted for making a false declaration before a justice in pursuance of the rules of benefit society, which required a loss by fire in certain cases to be verified by such a declaration; it was objected that the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 18, did not extend to any declarations except those mentioned in the preamble of that section; but Erskine, J., held that the section extended to all declarations generally. (r)

The prisoner was indicted for swearing a false declaration under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 18, that he had done no act to encumber certain lands, and that he was in possession of those lands, and in the receipt of the rents and profits thereof. The declaration was duly sworn and made in support of an application to a building society in 1861, for an advance of 150l. The mortgage deed of 1861 to the building society was produced, but the attesting witness was not called to prove it. The original conveyance of the property to the prisoner was put in. It was objected that the declaration was confirmatory of the mortgage deed, and as that was not proved, it was not shown that the matter sworn was material. It was answered that the declaration was made to confirm the original conveyance, and not the mortgage, which was executed after the declaration. Byles, J., 'I am of opinion that the objection is fatal. The preamble of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 18, (s) must be read with the enacting part; and as the deed, which rendered the declaration necessary, is not proved, this indictment cannot be sustained.' (t)

The prisoner was indicted under the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 12, (u) for making a false declaration before a justice for the borough of Liverpool that she had lost the pawn ticket of certain goods pledged by her. The clerk to the justice could only speak to the handwriting of the justice on the declaration, and, from the great number of these declarations, he could not remember when or where it was made. It was contended that there was no evidence that the declaration had been made before the justice acting as such or even within the borough; and Gurney, B., held that the objection was good. The justice might at all events have proved that he had never taken such a declaration out of the borough. (v)

(q) R. v. Nott, 4 Q. B. 768. In the argument it was contended that the defendant on the finding of the jury had been guilty of no offence, and Lord Denman, C. J., said, 'If the statute in terms create an offence, all persons are bound to know it. But if a statute enacts something, without in terms making it an offence, and you would convict a person of misdemeanor in having disobeyed such an enactment, are you not bound to show that the disobedience was wilful, and in the nature of a contempt?'

The prisoner was indicted for having at Stroud, in the county of Gloucester, made a false declaration before E. G. Hallewell, a justice of the peace, that he had lost a pawnbroker's ticket. It was opened that the prisoner told the pawnbroker that he had lost the ticket, and the pawnbroker told him he must make a declaration of the loss before a magistrate, and for that purpose handed the prisoner a copy of the ticket and a form, to be filled up according to the Act; the prisoner paid for the form, saying he would go to a magistrate; he returned the same day with the form properly filled up, and with his name and that of Mr. Hallewell attached. Mr. Hallewell was not able to recollect the fact of the declaration having been made, and therefore was not present; but the pawnbroker identified the declaration. But there was only one witness to prove that the prisoner had not lost the duplicate. Platt, B., 'As regards the proof of the declaration having been made by the prisoner, I think there may be sufficient evidence to support the indictment, if you can bring home to him a knowledge of its contents; but I am of opinion that the falsity of that declaration must be proved by the oaths of two witnesses as in a case of perjury, otherwise there would be but oath against oath.' (w)

(w) R. v. Browning, 3 Cox, C. C. 437. The ruling of the learned Baron was right on both points; though an idle doubt has been raised on the first point. If a man in writing admitted that he had made a declaration before a justice under the Act, no doubt can exist that such writing would be sufficient evidence against him; and in this case the prisoner produced a declaration in the form under the Act, signed by himself and the justice, and dealt with it, and obtained the goods by it, as a valid declaration; and it is perfectly clear that this was abundant evidence that he had made that

declaration in the manner and with the formalities described in it. In R. v. Spencer, 1 C. & P. 260, ante, p. 381, Lord Tenterden, C. J., said, 'The courts always give credence to the signature of the magistrate or commissioner; and if his signature to the jurat is proved, that is sufficient evidence that the party was duly sworn, and if the place at which it was sworn is mentioned in the jurat, that is sufficient evidence that it was sworn at that place.' And see R. v. James, and Brickell v. Hulse, ante, p. 388, and R. v. Westley, Bell, C. C. 193, ante, p. 383.

CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

OF ADMINISTERING OR TAKING UNLAWFUL OATHS.

THE 37 Geo. 3, c. 123, s. 1, recites that wicked and evil disposed persons had attempted to seduce his Majesty's forces and subjects from their duty and allegiance, and to incite them to acts of mutiny and sedition; and had endeavoured to give effect to their wicked and traitorous proceedings, by imposing upon the persons whom they had attempted to seduce the pretended obligation of oaths unlawfully administered. From this preamble it appears as if the statute were mainly directed against combinations for purposes of mutiny and sedition but in the enacting part, after dealing with offences of that description, it goes on in much more extensive terms, and embraces other more general objects. It enacts, that any person or persons who shall in any manner or form whatsoever administer, or cause to be administered, or be aiding or assisting at, or present at, and consenting to, the administering or taking of any oath or engagement, purporting or intending to bind the person taking the same to engage in any mutinous or seditious purpose; or to disturb the public peace; or to be of any association, society, or confederacy, formed for any such purpose; or to obey the orders or commands of any committee or body of men not lawfully constituted, or of any leader or commander, or other person not having authority by law for that purpose; or not to inform or give evidence against any associate, confederate, or other person; or not to reveal or discover any unlawful combination or confederacy; or not to reveal or discover any illegal act done or to be done; or not to reveal or discover any illegal oath or engagement which may have been administered or tendered to or taken by such person or persons, or to or by any other person or persons, or the import of any such oath or engagement; shall on conviction be adjudged guilty of felony, and be transported (a) for any term not exceeding seven (b) years; and every person who shall take any such oath or engagement, not being compelled thereto, shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of felony, and may be transported (a) for any term not exceeding seven (b) years.'

In one case a question was made, whether the unlawful administering of an oath by an associated body of men to a person, purporting to bind him not to reveal or discover an unlawful combination or conspiracy of persons, nor any illegal act done by them, (c) was within this statute; the object of the association being a conspiracy to raise

(a) Penal servitude by the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3, s. 2.

(b) And not less than three, 54 & 55 Vict.

c. 69.

(c) The oath was, 'You shall be true to every journeyman shearman, and not to hurt any of them, and you shall not divulge any of their secrets; so help you God.'