which the grantee was authorized to remove from the premises all ore that might possibly be removed therefrom during the term of ten years, and by the further fact that the deed by its terms professed to sell and convey the mineral itself, as well as the right to search for and take it, it will be an absolute grant of the mineral. It is generally advisable to insert the actual consideration in all deeds, on account of the bearing of the consideration upon the intent of the parties, if there is otherwise any uncertainty. Independent of this question, however, in the absence of fraud or concealment, any valuable consideration will support the deed. This is elementary and settled beyond dispute. § 1113. Special covenants - Reference to other instruments.- Special covenants also tend to throw light on the general transaction, and so far as they serve as a guide for the interpretation of the instrument or a construction as to the intent of the parties, they are valuable. And where another deed is referred to as qualifying the one under consideration, either in matter of description or as covenants for title, it will be taken as a part of the transaction, and the two will be construed together." In an early New York case plaintiff conveyed to defendants all that certain mining lode or claim known as the John mine, and the conveyance referred to the deed by which the plaintiff acquired title, which conveyed all the dips, spurs and angles and metals, ores, gold and silver bearing quartz and earth, and all privileges and franchises thereto incident, etc. It appeared that plaintiff had theretofore executed a deed to another person of all that portion of the surface ground of the John mine lying and being south of the John mine, which meant the opening, commencing at the center of the vein and running its entire 1 Massott v. Moses, 3 S. C. 168; Lord Mountjoy's Case, Godb. 17; 2 Co. Litt. 165; Fairchild v. Dunbar Furnace Co., 128 Pa. St. 485, 18 Atl. Rep. 443. 2 Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. St. 263; Tuck v. Downing, 76 Ill. 71. See Maloy v. Berkin, 11 Mont. 138, 27 Pac. Rep. 442. 3 Wallace v. Silsby, 42 N. J. L. 1, 3 M. R. 390. length, which deed contained the following words: "This deed is intended to convey the south 100 feet of the John mine," etc. It was held that this latter deed conveyed only the surface ground and did not include any of the mineral rights, and, therefore, constituted no defense to an action for the price of the mining claim, all the minerals having passed by defendant's deed.' And where one deed conveyed one-half of the coal and minerals in a certain piece of land, except the minerals of all the precious kinds, and by another deed the same owner assumed to convey all the minerals, it was held that the latter deed created a cloud upon the title held under the former.2 § 1114. Appurtenances, incidents and fixtures also pass. We have seen that where a deed conveys a piece of mining ground, or an interest or separate estate in it, all the means necessary for its enjoyment are likewise conveyed. Not to repeat at too great length, when a thing is granted, all the means to obtain it and all the fruits and effects of it are also granted. The term "mines and minerals," and all the privileges thereof, conveys the right to the minerals and the right to dig for them. And where coal upon severance has become the property of the lessee, he has the right to enter and remove it, and to use the tramways or other modes of conveyance of the lessor on the premises for such purpose. It belongs to him and he has the right to take it. § 1115. Restricted to intent. It is a general rule that a deed will be restricted or enlarged to conform to the in 1 McIntyre v. Buell, 10 N. Y. Sup. 10 Atl. Rep. 48; Bushnell v. Proprie332. tors, etc., 31 Conn. 150, 3 M. R. 258; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. St. 475. But see ante, § 1100, notes 2 and 3, p. 913. 2 Pearne v. Coal Creek M. Co., 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S. W. Rep, 402. See also McCurdy v. Alpha M. Co., 3 Nev. 27; Stewart v. Northwestern Coal & I. Co.. 147 Pa. St. 523, 23 Atl. Rep. 882: Brophy M. Co. v. Brophy & Dale Co., 15 Nev. 101. 3 Griffin v. Fellows, 81 Pa. St. 114, 8 M. R. 657; Rowell v. Bodfish (Me.), 2 Lykens Valley Coal Co. v. Dock, 62 Pa. St. 232, 8 M. R. 570; Genet v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 122 N. Y. 527, 23 N. E. Rep. 922; Munn v. Stone, 58 Mass. 146. tent of the parties, as gathered from the instrument itself and surrounding circumstances, properly aided by parol testimony within the lines limited by the general rules of evidence, to explain it. And where the court is able, from any or all of these circumstances, to define and determine what was the real intent of the parties at the time, the deed must be construed in the light of such intent.1 The true rule is always to give effect to the intention of the parties if the words they have employed will admit of it. But if the words used, by their clearness and certainty, absolutely forbid the aid of extrinsic evidence in their interpretation, it would be changing a certain written contract of the parties to let in outside parol proof. The doing dominates the intent wherever there is an apparent conflict, on the implied principle that the intent is interpreted by the act.❜ ARTICLE C. Of Statutory Deeds. § 1119. Short statutory deeds obviating covenants. 1121. Curative statutes. § 1119. Short statutory deeds obviating covenants.— Wherever the statute of the state has established a form of conveyance, it is believed that the mining law is equally ingrafted into that as is the other or general law of real property; and that the statutory conveyance, whereby covenants are considered as expressed, although not contained in the deed, the entirety of the estate conveyed being also omitted, nevertheless, all the estate held by the grantor, with all 1 Wilcox v. Lucas, 121 Mass. 21, 3 M. R. 380; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24: Jones v. Clifford, 3 Ch. Div. 779; Wasatch M. Co. v. Crescent M. Co., 5 Utah, 624, 19 Pac. Rep. 198. Granite Co., 147 N. Y. 495, 42 N. E. 3 Vanatta v. Brewer, 32 N. J. E. 2 Armstrong v. Lake Champlain 268, 6 M. R. 358. rights and franchises, will be held to pass by the deed the same as if specific covenants therefor were contained in it.1 § 1120. Contrary rule-A peculiar case. In an early case in the circuit court of the United States for the district of California, which was a case under a Utah statute, passed when the state of Nevada was a part of the territory of Utah, it was held that the statute passed in said territory on the general subject of real property and the conveyance thereof did not apply to mining claims. But the probabilities are that no such doctrine would be announced by any court at this time, and that the rule as laid down in the preceding section may be said to be the true one. § 1121. Curative statutes.- Since the general rule throughout the entire country is that mining claims and mining interests are held as real property, obviously all statutes enacted for the purpose of affecting a correction as to defective conveyances will operate equally upon mining deeds and interests conveyed thereby.' ARTICLE D. Of Compromise Deeds. § 1124. Compromise deed generally operates as an end line in a lode claim. 1125. Metes and bounds produce a different rule. 1126. Miscellaneous deeds- Different names - Estoppel. 1127. Rule in other than lode mining — Parol evidence to explain. 1128. Deed without consideration. § 1124. Compromise deed generally operates as an end line in a lode claim.- Among the miners of the Pacific coast it is usually customary to convey an interest in a min 1 Evenson v. Webster, 3 S. Dak. 382, 53 N. W. Rep. 747, 44 Am. St. Rep. 802; Iron Co. v. Wright, 32 N. J. Eq. 252; Barksdale v. Hairston, 81 Va. 765. See also Montana M. Co. v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 102 Fed. Rep. 430. 2 Kinney v. Cons. Va. M. Co., 4 Sawy. 382, 14 Fed. Cas. 611. See also Blodgett v. Potosi G. & S. M. Co., 34 Cal. 227. 3 Carson v. Thompson, 10 Wash. 295, 38 Pac. Rep. 1116. ing claim by a certain number of linear feet, describing at the time the ground contained in the claim or a certain fractional part, undivided, of the claim.' It is often necessary, however, when conflicts arise, either as to the surface ground or subterranean lodes and bodies of ore, to compromise difficulties by establishing a compromise line, and deeding, one to the other, all ground on either side of it. As a general rule these compromise lines are drawn vertically. This is - especially so if they are drawn crosswise of the lode. If they are lengthwise and parallel to the lode line, they are drawn vertically as to surface rights, but include, just as a congressional grant includes, all veins of ore apexing therein throughout their entire depth. This, of course, in the absence of express covenant. Where the parties have expressly covenanted as to and fully described their rights, they will, of course, be held rigidly to their bed as they have made it. Thus, in a leading case from Nevada where two mining companies having claims adjacent to each other agreed upon a line of division between themselves, which should be continued downward toward the center of the earth, it was held that the line was to be extended downward through the zones of ore in the property in their course toward the center of the earth. And in the same case in the circuit court, before Justice Field and Circuit Judge Sawyer and District Judge Hilyer, it was held that this compromise line must be treated as an end line and carried downward vertically, and extended in its own direction the same way. The court in the opinion says: "The line thus designated, extended down in a direct line along the dip of the lode, would cut the Potts chamber (the ore in dispute) and. give the ground in dispute to the plaintiff. That it must be so extended necessarily follows from the character of some of the claims it divides. As the Richmond and Champion were vein or lode claims, a line dividing them must be extended along the dip of the vein or lode, so far as 1 See ante, §§ 1090-1093. 2 Richmond M. Co. v. Eureka M. Co., 103 U. S. 846, 26 L. ed. 557. |