might have been a decisive victory. If fifteen thousand repulsed the enemy, fifty thousand would probably have secured Richmond. Indeed, the Prince de Joinville, on the personal staff of General McClellan said, "It was not until 7 P. M., that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at day-break to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was entertained. It was now too late; four hours had been lost, and the opportunity, that moment so fleeting in war as in other circumstances, had gone."

It was on this field that Prince de Joinville, admiring a bed of beautiful Virginia roses, and plucking one, recoiled with his hand covered with blood; beneath the fragrant flowers had crept a wounded soldier, seeking their slight shelter from the burning sun, to bleed and die!

The river rose during the night and following day, and swept away the bridges. This left the troops of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keys, on one side, and those of Porter and Franklin, on the other. The next day, the rebels renewed the attack, throwing upon that portion of the Union army all their then available force; but after a severe battle, were repulsed with great slaughter and driven back upon Richmond, to which they fled, carrying consternation. It was expected naturally, that the victorious troops would follow up their success, and attack the rebel Capital.

One half of the Union army had beaten the rebels. Jackson was returning from the Valley from which, as we have stated, he had escaped from all the efforts of Fremont and McDowell, to close in upon him. General McClellan had remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy. On the next day, June 2d, General Heintzelman sent a reconnoitering party under Hooker, within four miles of Richmond, and met no enemy; but though informed of this fact, McClellan ordered the force to fall back to its old position. Then followed weeks of inactivity on the part of McClellan.

Beauregard and Bragg had evacuated Corinth with a large force, and their soldiers, it was known as many of them as could be spared, would fly to the defense of Richmond. Mr. Lincoln, conscious of all this, telegraphs to

McClellan, "the time is near when you must attack Richmond, or give up the job." But there was no attack. On the 5th of June, McClellan calls for more troops. Five new regiments, and McCall's division of McDowell's corps are sent to him. And yet, on the 12th of June, induced by a simple request from McDowell that McCall's division, which had been detached from his corps, might be so placed as to be in a position to join his other forces as they came down from Fredericksburg, McClellan said to the President, "If I cannot fully control all his (McDowell's) troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the result." Such was the querulous impatience, and ill temper of McClellan, when the President was doing his utmost to send him troops. On the 11th, he says, he has information that Beauregard had arrived, and that troops were to follow him.

General Johnston, of the rebel army, having been wounded at Fair Oaks, General Robert E. Lee, after having acted for sometime as Chief of staff to Jefferson Davis, was assigned to the command. Meantime McClellan telegraphs to the President and Secretary of War, of rain, of bad roads, of mud - but of no advance. On the 21st of June, from his camp on the Chickahominy, General McClellan again telegraphs to President Lincoln, that he should like to have permission "by letter or telegraph, to lay before your Excellency my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country.” Lincoln replies with much good nature, and a little irony, "If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I should be glad to hear your views on the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country." For nearly a month, General McClellan had been talking of a great battle, but he made no advance, always waiting to be attacked. He had divided his army, it being separated by the Chickahominy.

It was at this time that the rebel General committed the blunder of uncovering Richmond in such a way, that had General MeClellan had the boldness to have struck directly for that city, he would have found it an easy con

quest. Jackson was returning from the North with his victorious forces, and Lee supposed McClellan was with his main army North of the Chickahominy. The rebel Generals A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, were ordered with between thirty and forty thousand men, to cross the Chickahominy above the right of the Union lines, and form a junction with Jackson. This left between McClellan's army and Richmond, only Huger's and Magruder's divisions, and some detached troops, numbering in all not more than twenty-five thousand men. Lee's army, after crossing the river, was in a position that it could not again unite; and if McClellan with his whole force had marched upon Richmond, he would have crushed Huger and Magruder before the forces sent across could have come to their rescue.*

General McClellan seemed to believe that Jackson was in strong force at Gordonsville, but about the 25th of June he became convinced that this enterprising leader was about to assail him. Jackson had been gathering a force with which to attack McClellan's right and centre. Why, when Jackson was far away in pursuit of Banks, before reinforcements had arrived at Richmond, did not McClellan attack? Why wait until Jackson returned and attacked him?

The President, on the 26th of June, in reply to a complaining telegram from McClellan, in which that General sought in advance to throw the responsibility of apprehended defeat on others, said: †

"Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

"The later one of 6.15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume, that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit no opportunity to send you reënforcements, whenever I possibly can.

*Swinton, in his "Army of the Potomac," the apologist for McClellan, while he admits that this movement ought to have been made, says it was too bold for that General.

† Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 338-0.

"P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better toward York River, than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the Capital, please confer with him through the telegraph." "A. LINCOLN."

The Hills, and Longstreet, marched out of Richmond to coöperate with Jackson, and McCall was vigorously attacked at Mechanicsville. The position of McCall was a strong one, with a deep creek in the Union front. Hill not waiting for a junction with Jackson, attacked with great vigor, and was defeated with severe loss.

It seems that McClellan before this attack, had been anticipating a retreat, for he says in his report, that "more than a week previous," that is on the 18th, he had prepared for a retreat to the James, and sent supplies to that river. The attack at Mechanicsville, clearly indicated the purpose of Lee to crush the right of the army of the Potomac. It has been suggested by able military critics, that the leader of that army might have adopted with success either of two expedients; he might have brought over his left wing, and thus strengthened his right and secured a victory; or he might have withdrawn his right across the Chickahominy. He did not, however, attempt a concentration of his army, but left his right, consisting of about thirty thousand, to withstand the whole rebel force, and to fight the bloody battle of Cold Harbor, or Gaines' Mill, on the 27th of June, when Porter's command, after maintaining its position for a long day, and repeatedly repulsing and driving back the enemy, was finally, as night approached, driven back by superior numbers and fresh troops. But what threatened to be a rout was prevented by the gallantry of Meagher's and French's brigades, which came up at evening and checked the rebel advance. While the forces of Porter, weary and exhausted with the long struggle, were giving way, and pressed with numbers, the retreat was likely soon to become a rout, a shout announced the presence of the gallant Irishman, and his fighting brigade, the General leading in his shirt sleeves. They came on with a rush, and the fugitives stopped and reformed; the rebels were checked and driven back. The presence of these troops two hours, or one hour earlier,

might perhaps have given Porter a victory. As it was he had inflicted greater loss on the rebels than he received. Union loss was 4,000, rebel 9,500.

On the evening of that day, McClellan announced to his corps commanders, his intention to retreat to James river. It was no longer a question of taking Richmond, but of saving his own army as he thought. While on this retreat, and while his gallant army was struggling across the White Oak swamp, McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War, "If I save this army, I tell you plainly, I owe no thanks to you, nor to any one at Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army."

Such a message, so insolent and false, so mutinous and insubordinate, would, if addressed to any other Government than that of which the forbearing Lincoln was the head, have insured his arrest and trial.

But Mr. Lincoln, with a forbearance which many thought had long "ceased to be a virtue," sent the following reply:*

"Save your army at all events. Will send reënforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reënforcemonts. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago, you notified us that reënforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition or aspect of things."

The great army, with its spirit unbroken, retreated doggedly at times turning at bay, and repulsing the attacking columns of the rebels.

Lee had indeed been victorious, but at a heavy loss. Up to the retreat of McClellan, the rebels' loss, in killed and wounded, exceeded 10,000, while the Union loss did not

*Report on Conduct of War, Part I, p. 340.