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nearly reach that number. He had destroyed McClellan's communications with York River, but Lee was now, on the evening of the retreat of the Union army, in a position which, if known to McClellan, and he had possessed the vigor and enterprise necessary for the required movement, would have made the capture of Richmond morally certain. Two-thirds of Lee's army was north of the Chickahominy, and McClellan's army was between it and Richmond. Had McClellan with his whole army struck at Richmond, it could not have resisted for a day. Magruder, who was in command of the forces left at Richmond, says:

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“I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion was on the other side of the Chickahominy. The bridges were destroyed. .

There were but 25,000 men between his (McClellan's) army of 100,000 and Richmond. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced against any point of our line, its momentum would have insured success and the occupation of our works."

But retreat was ordered, and the army was fighting its way to the James under Sumner. On the 29th, the rear guard, under the brave Sumner, repulsed a rebel attack in the bloody battle of Savage Station, and on the 30th, at Glendale. The stubborn heroism of the army, under Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearney and Porter, repelled the enemy whenever it turned at bay, and continually suggests the inquiry, that with such an army, why retreat at afl? Fighting and marching for seven weary days and nights; stifled with dust, faint with hunger and thirst and heat, yet never turning its face to the foe without driving him back; alas, how much less of suffering and of death, if that proud and gallant army had been led directly and boldly upon Richmond !

On the 30th of June, Heintzelman met a large force of the rebels, under command of Hill. They were again repulsed with terrible slaughter, and General Lee sent all his disposable troops to reënforce Hill. They were driven back, and the Union force following up their success, raised the cry of “On to Richmond !" A rebel officer describing the

scene which followed, says, “everything seemed lost. Regiments and brigades broke and fled; batteries dashed to the rear in headlong flight.”

Orders were given to Jackson to cover the retreat, and directions were sent to Richmond to get the public property ready for removal. But this success was not followed up, and the Union army resumed its march towards the James.

The troops reached the vicinity of James River on the 1st of July, and were massed on Malvern Hill. Here was high, open table land, a mile and a half long by three-quarters of a mile wide, crossed by several roads. Porter's corps held the left, Heintzelman and Sumner the center, and Keys the right. The left flank was protected by the gun-boats on James River. Here, after their terrible march through the White Oak Swamp, the gallant Army of the Potomac, with spirit yet unbroken, and with the ability yet to conquer, prepared to meet the whole rebel force. As the weary troops lay down to rest that night upon Malvern Hill, after five days of incessant fighting and marching, they knew the strength of their position and felt the ability yet to go into Richmond. They looked for the morning to wipe out the mortification of their retreat. With the morning came most fierce and persistent attacks upon this position; charge after charge was repulsed. The whole field was strewn with rebel dead and wounded. After being brought up again and again to the assault, and as often driven back with fearful slaughter, the rebels retired.

The next morning, the rebel army was in no condition to withstand an attack. General Trimble, of the rebel army, says: “at dawn the next morning I found the whole army in the utmost disorder.” An attack by the unbroken Union forces would inevitably have defeated it; but when the rebel army awoke, and looked up that hill from which they had been so often repulsed, the grim batteries and gleaming muskets and glorious banners had disappeared. The Union general had retreated from victory which seemed to invite his approach. McClellan had turned his back on victory and Richmond.

Many high-spirited officers like Kearney, and gallant 1 soldiers, begged permission to follow the discomfited Confederates into Richmond. McClellan, so far from following up this success, retired to Harrison's Landing, and thus ingloriously closed the Peninsular Campaign.

The faults of this campaign have been settled by the judgment of the brave officers and soldiers who took part in it, and have ceased to be the subject of partisan controversy. No troops ever fought better than the Army of the Potomac. No troops were ever worse handled by a commanding general.

The fatal errors of McClellan were - First, A month unnecessarily wasted at Yorktown. Second, A tardy pursuit after the success at Williamsburg, in a battle fought without his knowledge and against his wishes. Third, Long delay and hesitation at the Chickabominy-failure to strike when Jackson was away, and before reënforcements arrived. And yet, in spite of these faults, victory, and the capture of Richmond, was often within the reach of a bold, decided movement, and especially at Fair Oaks, and at Malvern Hill. Indeed the seven days' battles show that the rebels could not, at any time, have withstood a vigorous and persistent attack by the entire Army of the Potomac. The Union loss in the campaign was 15,249; the rebel loss, 19,000.

At Harrison's Landing, McClellan encamped, and began calling for reenforcements. He wanted 50,000 men; on the 3d of July, “100,000 men, rather more, than less.” To these calls, the President patiently replied:

“I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To reenforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men,

I

suppose,) and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5,000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send

you

another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care.

Save the army first, where you are, if you can; and secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gun-boats and the reënforcements mentioned above, o you can hold your present position; provided, and so long as you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

" A. LINCOLN." “P. S.-If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so."*

The postscript must have been read with a grim smile by those war-worn veterans, Sumner, Kearney, Heintzelman and others. Lincoln's keen sense of the ridiculous could not have overlooked the irony of the words —“If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so."

This whole campaign illustrates Lincoln's patience, forbearance, fidelity to, and kindness for, McClellan. His misfortunes, disastrous as they were to the country, did not induce the President to abandon him. Indeed it was a very difficult and painful thing for him ever to give up a person in mistortune, even when those misfortunes resulted from a man's own misconduct.

* Raymond's life and State papers of Lincoln, p. 295-6.

CHAPTER XVI.

MILITARY OPERATIONS TO THE CLOSE OF 1862-POPE - MCCLEL

LAN- BURNSIDE.

EN

GENERAL POPE ASSUMES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA –

His ADDRESS — LEE ATTEMPTS TO OVERWHELM HIM— MCCLELLAN ORDERED TO Join POPE— His DELAYORDERED TO HAST

- HE LINGERS · POPE OVERWHELMED BY NUMBERS AND DRIVEN BACK TO WASHINGTON — IS RELIEVED— MCCLELLAN AGAIN IN COMMAND-LEE CROSSES INTO MARYLAND-MCCLELLAN PURSUES-BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN — ANTIETAM -PRESIDENT VISITS THE ARMY — URGES MCCLELLAN TO ATTACK MCCLELLAN DELAYS—HE IS RELIEVED OF COMMAND — FAILURE - BURNSIDE-FREDERICKSBURG — MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST

BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE CORINTH VICKSBURG STONE RIVER.

AT

T this period, while at Harrison's Landing, Major Gene

ral McClellan found time to write and dispatch to President Lincoln, a long letter of advice upon the general conduct of the administration, civil and military.

The President seemed to think there was plenty of practical work for the General to do in his own camp, and on the 8th of July he visited the camp on the James. He found there an army of 86,000 effective men.' The great discrepancy between the sum of losses of the army of the Potomac, and its present and aggregate number, was accounted for by the statement of McClellan on the 13th of July, that 38,000 were absent on leave by authority!

The successes at the West, as contrasted with the failures at the East, failures attributable not to a difference in the soldiers themselves, but to a difference in leadership, suggested whether by transferring to the East some of those successful

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