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very blaze of the enemy's volleys, Sullivan, who had just seen two aids fall by his side, forgetful of his own danger, rode up to him and begged him not to remain in such an exposed position, for the salvation of the army and country depended on his life. Washington wheeled away for a moment, but Sullivan, on looking back again, saw him riding as before, where the shot fell thickest. But the day was irrevocably lost-defeat had come in the very hour of victory, and the shout of triumph died away in the cry of fear. Such a sudden reverse, so unexpected an overthrow from the very height of success, was almost too much for Washington's firmness, and he expressed more chagrin and disappointment than at the result of any battle he ever fought. Discomfited, weary, though not dispirited, the army, weakened in killed, wounded and missing, by nearly a thousand men, retreated for twenty miles into the country, and finally reached their old camp in safety. When the separate divisions compared notes, all felt that they ha lost a battle already gained-been beaten after they ha conquered, and were now compelled to report a defeat in stead of a glorious victory. Several valuable officers were slain, and among them General Nash. Most of the officers behaved nobly-there were, however, some few exceptions, and among them General Stephens, who reeled in his saddle from drunkenness as he led his men into action. He was consequently struck from the army, and his command given to Lafayette. Cornwallis, in Philadelphia, eight miles distant, was startled at an early hour by the arrival of an officer, announcing the attack on the camp at Germantown Summoning a corps of cavalry and the grenadiers, he hastened thither. But the battle was over, and the day of his humiliation postponed.

There has been a vast deal written about this battle, and the contradictory accounts growing out of the state of the atmosphere, the utter impossibility of one division to

judge what another was doing, and the various causes that in different localities conspired to produce the same result will always involve it in more or less uncertainty. Washington ascribes his failure principally to the fog; another to the failure of the ammunition; a third to the neglect of Armstrong, and the delay of the militia under Smallwood and Forman on the left, which never came into action at all, thus breaking up the unity and efficiency of the combined movement. All these, doubtless, had their effect. Night attacks are always subject to many contingencies, especially if they are crippled by complicated movements. Different points cannot be reached at the specified and desirable moment. Unexpected obstacles will arise; delays not anticipated become unavoidable, and mistakes not only as to positions, but also as to the friendly or hostile character of troops concentrated in the darkness, very probable, and the firing in different quarters wrongly interpreted. The dense fog made this in reality a night attack, and hence subject to all the casualties of one. As a primary cause, therefore, not anticipated by Washington, he very naturally, and might very truly, regard it the true one. Had the morning been clear the result would, doubtless, have been different. But it must be remembered that the very fog which confused the Americans, confused still more the enemy. The former knew perfectly well what they were about, while the latter were wholly ignorant of the number of their assailants, or where the weight of the attack was to fall. After going over all the different authorities, the great mistake, it seems to me, lay in halting at Chew's house. Had the advice of Pickering, Lee, Hamilton, and others been taken, and a regiment left to occupy those in the building, should they attempt to make a sally, all the other casualties would have effected nothing in the general result. Howe's army would have been destroyed, and this calamity, followed so rapidly by

the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga, finished the war with a clap of thunder.

An unexpected heavy firing in the rear of an army, while the commander-in-chief is absent, will always prove disastrous. It was clear as noonday that the inmates of Chew's house, finding themselves watched by a regiment with artillery, would never have dared to sally forth on the rear of a victorious army, and the Battle of Germantown was lost by the very conduct which constitutes a martinet. Knox was the only general officer in the consultation held upon the building, and it was natural that Washington, who had, and justly, a high opinion of his military skill, should place more confidence in his judgment that in that of his young aids. But in battle, rules should never arrest fortune, or be used to stem the current of events, when setting favorably. Impulse in the heat and excitement of close conflict is often wiser than the sagest experience. At all events in this case it was applying a general rule where it did not belong, and arresting the whole practical action of a battle by a mere technicality; and although Washington attributes the failure to Providence, Providence will always be found against such bad management as that halt at Chew's house most indubitably was. Knox and Providence are by no means one and the same, and had the opinion of the general been less scientific, and more practical, the course of Providence would have taken a far different, and more satisfactory direction Not that I would intimate that Providence does not overrule all our actions and bring about the best results in the end I mean simply to say what no man doubts, that blunders, bad management, and unwise conduct, Providence generally allows to work mischief to those who are guilty of them It is not a difficult matter now, when every thing is under stood, to fix the turning point of the battle, or to locate the plame, but it is quite another thing to say how great, under all the circumstances, that blame was. Finding his entire

army enshrouded in a dense fog; knowing by the heavy and constant firing that the troops were nearly out of ammunition, and fearing to get entangled in a net-work of just such houses as that of Chew's, Washington may have well hesitated about advancing, unless he could make a clean sweep as he went. But so far as the regarding of this single house as a fort or castle, it is palpable as noon-day that the junior officers were right, and Knox totally, fatally wrong. The whole upper part of the building would scarcely hold a regiment, while not a hundred men could fire to advantage from it at a time. After the field in front had been swept, a flag sent to it would not have been fired on, and a valuable officer lost his life. Still, though chagrined, the troops were not dispirited. They had attacked the veterans of England, and enjoyed the pleasure of chasing them in affright from their own encampment. Neither did Congress mourn over the defeat. Almost a victory was rather a subject of congratulation, for it gave confidence to the troops and lessened their fear of the enemy. The British confessed it was the severest handling they had yet received, and although Howe, as usual, made his loss but trifling, it evidently amounted to about eight hundred men. Mr. Sparks thinks that this battle had nearly as much to do in fixing the wavering determination of France, respecting the recognition of our independence, as the capture of Burgoyne, remarking that Count De Vergennes said to one of our commissioners in Paris, "that nothing struck him so much as General Washington attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army; that to bring an army raised within a year to this, promised everything." This may have had its weight in the French Councils, but such a remark was doubtless more complimentary than serious, for one cannot imagine what an army is raised for, except to attack the enemy, and that, too, within less than a year.

CHAPTER X.

Fall of Burgoyne Sermon of Timothy Dwight-Letter from Washington to Howe-Attack on Fort Mercer, and Death of Count Donop-Gallant Defense and Fall of Fort Mifflin-Fall of Fort Mercer-March of Howe against Washington, and Address of the latter to his Troops-The Conway Cabal and Fate of the head Conspirators-Valley Forge-Sufferings of the Soldiers-Washington at Prayer-Labors of Washington, and Inefficiency of Congress-The HalfPay Establishment-Washington's Answer to the Complaint that he did not make a Winter Campaign-News of the Alliance of France-Celebration of it in Valley Forge-Baron Steuben and the Effects of his Discipline on the ArmyHowe resolves to Evacuate Philadelphia-Council of War in American Camp on the best course to adopt.

FOUR days after the failure at Germantown, the second battle of Saratoga was fought, and Burgoyne, now completely hemmed in, turned, as a last resource, to Sir Henry Clinton, who was endeavoring to force his way up the Hudson to his rescue. The latter had succeeded in taking both forts Montgomery and Clinton, though bravely defended by Generals James, and George Clinton. His effort, however, came too late. For six days Burgoyne gloomily bore up against the decree which he knew was written against him. But his unrelenting foes day by day gathered closer and darker around him. They pitched their balls into his uncovered camp, and from every height played with their artillery on his dispirited columns. Through the hall of council, where his officers were moodily assembled, through the very apartment where he sat at dinner, cannon balls would crash, while all around his camp the steadily increasing storm gave fearful indications of his overthrow. For awhile he turned and turned, like a scorpion girt with fire. but his proud, ambitious heart was at last compelled to yield, and that splendid army, on which he had fondly hoped to build his fame and secure rank and glory, laid down its arms. Forty-two brass cannon, five thousand

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