While the abandonment of the fort would doubtless to some extent create surprise and complaint, I believe that public sentiment would fully justify the action of the government when the reasons which prompt it shall be explained and understood. I therefore respectfully answer the inquiry of the President by saying that, in my opinion, it would not be wise under all the circumstances to attempt to provision Fort Sumter. I am, with respect, Your obedient servant, CALEB B. SMITH. Opinion on Fort Sumter from the Postmaster-General. POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, March 15, 1861. Sir: In reply to your interrogatory, whether in my opinion it is wise to provision Fort Sumter under present circumstances, I submit the following considerations in favor of provisioning that fort. The ambitious leaders of the late Democratic party have availed themselves of the disappointment attendant upon defeat in the late presidential election to found a military government in the seceding States. To the connivance of the late administration it is due alone that this rebellion has been enabled to attain its present proportions. It has grown by this complicity into the form of an organized government in seven States, and up to this moment nothing has been done to check its progress or prevent its being regarded either at home or abroad as a successful revolution. Every hour of acquiescence in this condition of things, and especially every new conquest made by the rebels, strengthens their hands at home and their claims to recognition as an independent people abroad. It has been from the beginning, and still is, treated practically as a lawful proceeding, and the honest and Union-loving people in those States must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the new government, and, though founded in wrong, come to regard it as a rightful government. I, in common with all my associates in your council, agree that we must look to the people in these States for the overthrow of this rebellion, and that it is proper to exercise the powers of the Federal Government only so far as to maintain its authority to collect the revenue and maintain possession of the public property in the States, and that this should be done with as little bloodshed as possible. How is this to be carried into effect? That it is by measures that will inspire respect for the power of the government, and the firmness of those who administer it, does not admit of debate. It is obvious that rebellion was checked in 1833 by the promptitude of the President in taking measures which made it manifest that it could not be attempted with impunity, and that it has grown to its present formidable proportions only because similar measures were not taken. The action of the President in 1833 inspired respect, whilst in 1860 the rebels were encouraged by the contempt they felt for the incumbent of the presidency. But it was not alone upon Mr. Buchanan's weakness the rebels relied for success. They for the most part believe that the Northern men are deficient in the courage necessary to maintain the government. It is this prevalent error in the South which induces so large a portion of the people there to suspect the good faith of the people of the North, and enables the demagogues so successfully to inculcate the notion that the object of the Northern people is to abolish slavery, and make the negroes the equals of the whites. Doubting the manhood of Northern men, they discredit their disclaimers of this purpose to humiliate and injure them. Nothing would so surely gain credit for such disclaimers as the manifestation of resolution on the part of the President to maintain the lawful authority of the nation. No men or people have so many difficulties as those whose firmness is doubted. The evacuation of Fort Sumter, when it is known that it can be provisioned and manned, will convince the rebels that the administration lacks firmness, and will, therefore, tend more than any event that has happened to embolden them; and so far from tending to prevent collision, will insure it unless all the other forts are evacuated, and all attempts are given up to maintain the authority of the United States. Mr. Buchanan's policy has, I think, rendered collision almost inevitable, and a continuance of that policy will not only bring it about, but will go far to produce a permanent division of the Union. This is manifestly the public judgment, which is much more to be relied on than that of any individual. I believe Fort Sumter may be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with little risk; and General Scott's opinion, that with its war complement there is no force in South Carolina which can take it, renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the rebellion. The impotent rage of the rebels, and the outburst of patriotic feeling which would follow this achievement, would initiate a reactionary movement throughout the South which would speedily overwhelm the traitors. No expense or care should, therefore, be spared to achieve this success. The appreciation of our stocks will pay for the most lavish outlay to make it one. Nor will the result be materially different to the nation if the attempt fails, and its gallant leader and followers are lost. It will in any event vindicate the hardy courage of the North, and the determination of the people and their President to maintain the authority of the government; and this is all that is wanting, in my judgment, to restore it. You should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in this enterprise. They willingly take the hazard for the sake of the country and the honor which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free government in all lands. I am, sir, very respectfully, TO THE PRESIDENT. M. BLAIR. Opinion on Fort Sumter from the Attorney-General. The President of the United States has requested my opinion, in writing, upon the following question: Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" This is not a question of lawful right or physical power, but of prudence and patriotism only. The right is, in my mind, unquestionable, and I have no doubt at all that the government has the power and the means not only to provision the fort, but also, if the exigency required, to man it with its war complement of 650 men, so as to make it impregnable to any local force that could be brought against it. Assuming all this, we come back to the question, "Under all the circumstances, is it wise" now to provision the fort? The wisdom of the act must be tested by the value of the object to be gained, and by the hazards to be encountered in the enterprise. The object to be gained by the supply of provisions is not to strengthen the fortress so as to command the harbor and enforce the laws, but only to prolong the labors and privations of the brave little garrison that has so long held it with patient courage. The possession of the fort, as we now hold it, does not enable us to collect the revenue or enforce the laws of commercial navigation. It may indeed involve a point of honor or a point of pride, but I do not see any great national interest involved in the bare fact of holding the fort as we now hold it and to hold it at all we must supply it with provisions - and it seems to me that we may, in humanity and patriotism, safely waive the point of pride in the consciousness that we have the power, and lack nothing but the will, to hold Fort Sumter in such condition as to command the harbor of Charleston, cut off all its commerce, and even lay the city in ashes. The hazards to be met are many and obvious. If the attempt be made in rapid boats, light enough to pass the bar in safety, still they must pass under the fire of Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Morris Island. They might possibly escape that danger, but they cannot hope to escape the armed guard-boats which ply all night from the fort to the outer edge of the bar. These armed guard-boats would be sure to take or destroy our unarmed tugs, unless repelled by force, either from our ships outside the bar or from Fort Sumter within-and that is war. True, war already exists by the act of South Carolina; but this government has thus far magnanimously forborne to retort the outrage. And I am willing to forbear yet longer, in the hope of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties. I am most unwilling to strike-I will not say the first blow, for South Carolina has already struck that- but I am unwilling, "under all the circumstances," at this moment to do any act which may have the semblance before the world of beginning a civil war, the terrible consequences of which would, I think, find no parallel in modern times; for I am convinced that flagrant civil war in the Southern States would soon become a social war, and that could hardly fail to bring on a servile war, the horrors of which need not be dwelt upon. To avoid these evils I would make great sacrifices, and Fort Sumter is one; but if war be forced upon us by causeless and pertinacious rebellion, I am for resisting it with all the might of the nation." I am persuaded, moreover, that in several of the misguided States a large proportion of the people are really lovers of the Union, and anxious to be safely back under the protection of its flag. A reaction has already begun, and if encouraged by wise, moderate, and firm measures on the part of this government, I persuade myself that the nation will be restored to its integrity without the effusion of blood. For these reasons I am willing to evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning of civil war. The port of Charleston is, comparatively, a small thing. If the present difficulties should continue and grow, I am convinced that the real struggle will be at the Mississippi; for it is not politically possible for any foreign power to hold the mouth of that river against the people of the middle and upper valley. If Fort Sumter must be evacuated, then it is my decided opinion that the more southern forts, Pickens, Key West, etc., should, without delay, be put in condition of easy defense against all assailants; and that the whole coast, from South Carolina to Texas, should be as well guarded as the power of the navy will enable us. Upon the whole, I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort Sumter. Most respectfully submitted. EDWD. BATES, Attorney-General. March 16, 1861.-MESSAGE TO THE SENATE. To the Senate of the United States: The Senate has transmitted to me a copy of the message sent by my predecessor to that body on the 21st of February last, proposing to take its advice on the subject of a proposition made by the British government through its minister here to refer the matter in controversy between that government and the government of the United States to the arbitrament of the King of Sweden and Norway, the King of the Netherlands, or the Republic of the Swiss Confederation. In that message my predecessor stated that he wished to present to the Senate the precise questions following, namely: "Will the Senate approve a treaty referring to either of the sovereign powers above named the dispute now existing between the governments of the United States and Great Britain concerning the boundary line between Vancouver's Island and the American continent? In case the referee shall find himself unable to decide where the line is by the description of it in the treaty of June 15, 1846, shall he be authorized to establish a line according to the treaty as nearly as possible? Which of the three powers named by Great Britain as an arbiter shall be chosen by the United States?" I find no reason to disapprove of the course of my predecessor in this important matter; but, on the contrary, I not only shall receive the advice of the Senate thereon cheerfully, but I respectfully ask the Senate for their advice on the three questions before recited. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. WASHINGTON, March 16, 1861. March 16, 1861.-REPLY TO THE MINISTER FROM NICARAGUA. MR. MOLINA: I am happy to receive the letters you present, and to recognize you, sir, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Nicaragua near the United States. In conferring a higher rank upon you as a token of regard, on the part of the government and the people of Nicaragua, toward this country, they have done our government and people an honor for which we are truly grateful; while they have also manifested an increased confidence in you, which we can attest is deserved; and thereby have done you a distinguished honor upon which we congratulate you. On behalf of the United States I fully reciprocate, toward your government and people, the kind wishes and friendly purposes you so generously express toward ours. Please communicate to His Excellency the President of Nicaragua my high esteem and consideration, and my earnest wish for his health, happiness, and long life. Be assured, sir, I do not allow myself to doubt that your public duties and social intercourse here will be so conducted as to be entirely acceptable to the government and people of the United States. March 18, 1861.-LETTER TO SECRETARY SEWARD. HON. SECRETARY OF STATE. EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 18, 1861. My dear Sir: I believe it is a necessity with us to make the appointments I mentioned last night-that is, Charles F. Adams to England, William L. Dayton to France, George P. Marsh to Sardinia, and Anson Burlingame to Austria. These gentlemen all have my highest esteem, but no one of them is originally suggested by me except Mr. Dayton. Mr. Adams I take because you suggested him, coupled with his eminent fitness for the place. Mr. Marsh and Mr. Burlingame I take because of the intense pressure of their respective States, and their fitness also. The objection to this card is that locally they are so huddled up -three being in New England and two from a single State. I have considered this, and will not shrink from the responsibility. This, being done, leaves but five full missions undisposed of Rome, China, Brazil, Peru, and Chili. And then what about Carl Schurz; or, in other words, what about our German friends? Shall we put the card through, and arrange the rest afterward? What say you? Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN. March 18, 1861.- LETTER TO SECRETARY CHASE. EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 18, 1861. Sir: I shall be obliged if you will inform me whether any goods, wares, and merchandise subject by law to the payment of duties, are now being imported into the United States without such duties being paid or secured according to law. And if yea, at what place or places, and for what cause, do such duties remain unpaid or unsecured? I will also thank you for your opinion whether, as a matter of fact, vessels off shore could be effectively used to prevent such importations, or to enforce the payment or securing of the duties. If yea, what number and description of vessels in addition to those already in the revenue service would be requisite ? Your obedient servant, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. A. LINCOLN. March 18, 1861.- LETTER TO SECRETARY WELLES. EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 18, 1861. Sir I shall be obliged if you will inform me what amount of naval force you could at once place at the control of the revenue |