service, and also whether at some distance of time you could so place an additional force, and how much? and at what time? Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. March 18, 1861.-LETTER TO ATTORNEY-GENERAL BATES. Sir: I shall be obliged if you will give me your opinion in writing whether, under the Constitution and existing laws, the executive has power to collect duties on shipboard off shore in cases where their collection in the ordinary way is by any cause rendered impracticable. This would include the question of lawful power to prevent the landing of dutiable goods unless the duties were paid. Your obedient servant, THE HONORABLE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. A. LINCOLN. March 26, 1861.-MESSAGE TO THE SENATE. To the Senate of the United States: I have received a copy of the resolution of the Senate, passed on the 25th instant, requesting me, if in my opinion not incompatible with the public interest, to communicate to the Senate the despatches of Major Robert Anderson to the War Department during the time he has been in command of Fort Sumter. On examination of the correspondence thus called for, I have, with the highest respect for the Senate, come to the conclusion that at the present moment the publication of it would be inexpedient. WASHINGTON, March 26, 1861. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. March 29, 1861.- ORDER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 29, 1861. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF WAR. Sir: I desire that an expedition to move by sea be got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached, and that you coöperate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object. Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN. [Inclosure.] Steamers Pocahontas at Norfolk, Pawnee at Washington, Harriet Lane at New York, to be under sailing orders for sea, with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred men to be kept ready for departure from on board the receiving-ships at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to leave Governor's Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for one hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant shipping. A large steamer and three tugs conditionally engaged. March 29, 1861.-OPINIONS WRITTEN BY MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AT THE VERBAL REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, AT A CABINET MEETING HELD TO DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF SENDING AN EXPEDITION TO RELIEVE FORT SUMTER. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, wrote: First. The despatch of an expedition to supply or reinforce Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve a war at that point. The fact of preparation for such an expedition would inevitably transpire, and would therefore precipitate the war, and probably defeat the object. I do not think it wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston, and in rescue of an untenable position. Therefore I advise against the expedition in every view. Second. I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. Aided by his counsel, I would at once, and at every cost, prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas: to be taken, however, only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and authority of the United States. Third. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from Sumter forthwith. Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, wrote: If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain possession of Fort Pickens. I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens, and just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that attempt be resisted by military force, Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reinforced. If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be best begun in consequence of military resistance to the efforts of the administration to sustain troops of the Union, stationed under the authority of the government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service. Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, wrote: I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off Charleston with supplies of provisions and reinforcements for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communicating at the proper time the intentions of the gov-. ernment to provision the fort peaceably if unmolested. There is little probability that this will be permitted if the opposing forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in provisions without reinforcing the garrison at the same time might not be advisable; but armed resistance to a peaceable attempt to send provisions to one of our own forts will justify the government in using all the power at its command to reinforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies. Fort Pickens and other places retained should be strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made impregnable. The naval force in the gulf and on the southern coast should be increased. Accounts are published that vessels having on board marketable products for the crews of the squadron at Pensacola are seized-the inhabitants we know are prohibited from furnishing the ships with provisions or water; and the time has arrived when it is the duty of the government to assert and maintain its authority. Mr. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, wrote: Viewing the question whether Fort Sumter shall be evacuated as a political one, I remark that the effect of its evacuation upon the public mind will depend upon the concurrent and subsequent action of the government. If it shall be understood that by its evacuation we intend to acknowledge our inability to enforce the laws, and our intention to allow treason and rebellion to run their course, the measure will be extremely disastrous and the administration will become very unpopular. If, however, the country can be made to understand that the fort is abandoned from necessity, and at the same time Fort Pickens and other forts in our possession shall be defended, and the power of the government vindicated, the measure will be popular and the country will sustain the administration. Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be successfully defended, I regard its evacuation as a necessity, and I advise that Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally withdrawn. At the same time I would adopt the most vigorous measures for the defense of the other forts, and if we have the power I would blockade the Southern ports, and enforce the collection of the revenue with all the power of the government. Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, wrote: First. As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in his judgment on the questions of the day. His political views control his judgment, and his course as remarked on by the President shows that whilst no one will question his patriotism, the results are the same as if he was in fact traitorous. Second. It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely delivered from the authority of the United States it will strike a blow against our authority from which it will take us years of bloody strife to recover. Third. For my own part, I am unwilling to share in the responsibility of such a policy. Mr. Bates, Attorney-General, wrote: It is my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key West ought to be reinforced and supplied, so as to look down opposition at all hazardsand this whether Fort Sumter be or be not evacuated. It is also my opinion that there ought to be a naval force kept upon the southern coast sufficient to command it and, if need be, actually close any port that practically ought to be closed, whatever other station is left unoccupied. It is also my opinion that there ought to be immediately established a line of light, fast-running vessels, to pass as rapidly as possible between New York or Norfolk at the North and Key West or other point in the gulf at the South. As to Fort Sumter, I think the time is come either to evacuate or relieve it. April 1, 1861.-ORDER TO LIEUTENANT D. D. PORTER. EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861. Lieutenant D. D. Porter will take command of the Steamer Powhatan, or any other United States steamer ready for sea which he may deem most fit for the service to which he has been assigned by confidential instructions of this date. All officers are commanded to afford him all such facilities as he may deem necessary for getting to sea as soon as possible. He will select the officers to accompany him. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Recommended, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. April 1, 1861.- INSTRUCTIONS TO LIEUTENANT D. D. PORTER. EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861. LIEUTENANT D. D. PORTER, United States Navy. Sir: You will proceed to New York, and with the least possible delay, assuming command of any naval steamer available, proceed to Pensacola Harbor, and at any cost or risk prevent any expedition from the mainland reaching Fort Pickens or Santa Rosa Island. You will exhibit this order to any naval officer at Pensacola, if you deem it necessary, after you have established yourself within the harbor, and will request coöperation by the entrance of at least one other steamer. This order, its object, and your destination will be communicated to no person whatever until you reach the harbor of Pensacola. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Recommended, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. April 1, 1861.- ORDER TO COMMANDANT ANDREW H. FOOTE. NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861. TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE NAVY-YARD, Brooklyn, N. Y. Fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment under sealed orders. Orders by a confidential messenger go forward to-morrow. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. April 1, 1861.- ORDER TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY. WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861. All officers of the army and navy to whom this order may be exhibited will aid by every means in their power the expedition under the command of Colonel Harvey Brown, supplying him with men April 1, 1861.-MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY SEWARD. Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, April 1, 1861. First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign. Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters. Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country. Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action. Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION: In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of patriotism or union. The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the Union men in the South. I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity. For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the ports in the gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law. This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South. FOR FOREIGN NATIONS. I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, Would convene Congress and declare war against them. But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly. Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. It is not in my especial province; But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility. |