whose advice is called for on rights or liabilities accrued to or incurred by British shipowners in foreign waters. The second volume, which has recently appeared, contains the codes of Holland and Belgium, two countries whose geographical position, as Judge Raikes says, make it extremely likely that, if one code is wanted, the other will also be wanted. And as they differ widely one from another, it is highly important that they should be ready of access and accessible in a form which makes comparison easy. The volume under review is just what is wanted. It is small in size; the translation is in good English, though sufficiently literal to be accurate; the notes, whilst not too voluminous, are enough to put the reader on the track of the chief decisions of the courts; above all, the cross-references to other codes which are appended to each article are likely to be of great use— particularly in international discussion of maritime law, or for comparative criticism of codifying bills such as that on Marine Insurance recently before Parliament. The index, however, though useful in showing the parallel articles of the two codes, is not quite satisfactory. A code and a treatise on a branch of case-law do not, it is true, require the same kind of index. An index of what may be called the head-note' type, that is to say, classification of principles in alphabetical order of subjects, such as is to be found in books like Benjamin on Sale, or Carver on Carriage by Sea, is almost a necessity to a book of case-law, whereas a code is itself an index of principles, and a perfect code is nothing else; a full index of the head-note type would be as long as the code, and all that is wanted is a 'contents' arranged alphabetically. But where a code attempts in a set of detailed rules to apply principles to the varying circumstances of concrete cases, it ceases to be a mere index of principles, and a fuller index to it becomes both possible and useful. Speaking generally, the Dutch Code is, in the above sense, less perfect than the Belgian; it enumerates a great number of principles but it also attempts to apply those principles to a much greater number of particular cases than the Belgian Code, and for this reason this translation of it would have been more easily accessible had the index been fuller. : Judge Raikes, in his preface to the Dutch Code, says that it is perhaps the most minute and careful piece of legislation to be found in any state, at all events prior to the adoption by Germany of the present code of maritime commerce'; and it is marvellous how the code, laying down as it does the principles of legislation, has been found capable of adoption to the varying conditions of trade,' in contrast, as he says, with 'the inelastic provisions' of our own maritime legislation. This statement is open to criticism. In the first place, the Dutch Code contains many inelastic provisions, and is much less limited to declaration of principles than the Belgian. The subject of collisions will illustrate the point. The Belgian Code contains only two articles upon the principles affecting collisions, §§ 228 and 229, by which it is laid down that (a) in the case of inevitable accident each ship bears its own loss, (b) where one ship is solely to blame, it will bear all the damages, even though a pilot is on board, (c) where both ships are in fault, the two ships bear the total damages between them proportionately to the degree of their faults. No attempt is made to apply these principles to concrete cases. The Dutch Code, on the other hand, declares the principles affecting collisions in eleven articles (534 to 544), but in addition to declaring the principles, directs their application to particular cases according to certain fixed rules. The following is an epitome of the eleven articles :-§534. Where one ship is solely to blame, it will bear the whole damage (which Judge Raikes explains in his note has been decided to include only material damage,' i. e. excluding demur rage, loss of charter, &c.). § 535. If both ships are in fault, and (§ 536) in case of inevitable accident, even though (§ 537) one ship is in ballast, each ship bears its own loss. § 538. In case of inscrutable fault the total damage of ships and cargoes is borne by each of them in proportion to their values. $539. If a ship is lost on its voyage after a collision, the loss is presumed to have been caused by the collision. § 540. A ship which, without fault, collides with a ship at anchor, will pay half the damage sustained by the ship at anchor, unless the latter might have prevented the loss. § 541. A ship which, getting adrift, cuts the cables of a ship at anchor, is liable for any damage the latter may sustain by parting from her anchors. § 542. Where ships in harbour or dock fall foul of one another by reason of an abnormally high tide, heavy sea, or gale, each bears its own loss. § 543. A commander who refuses to shift his birth at the request of a ship aground is liable for any damage done to the ship aground. § 544. Commanders are liable for any damage resulting from failure to buoy their anchors. The tendency of the Dutch Code to pass beyond enunciation of principle into enumeration of concrete cases leads indirectly to two bad results. Firstly, many of the provisions are arbitrary. This defect is apparent in the law of collisions epitomized above. But it is illustrated by many other provisions: e.g. the definitions of the twenty-three different cases of general average (art. 699), or of the seven different cases of particular average (art. 701); art. 457, which provides that in Holland or Dutch colonies, in the absence of provision in the charterparty, fifteen lay-days are allowed to load or discharge or art. 464, which enacts that when a charterer has, within the lay-days, loaded no cargo, the shipowner is entitled at his option either (1) to demurrage for the time he waits after the lay-days, or (2) to consider the charterparty broken, and to claim half the agreed freight, primage, and average, or (3) after three days' notice to proceed on the voyage without cargo, and claim the full freight and demurrage. Secondly, some of the rules laid down are really rules of evidence, and should not be treated as rules of substantive law at all. It is a commonplace that this defect characterizes much continental law; but the Dutch Code shows that the defect originates in the use of a code for describing concrete cases instead of for declaring abstract principles. And it is because continental law is contained in codes that it is so often vitiated by this fault. Judge Raikes praises the Dutch Code which has sufficed without material alteration to meet the needs of maritime business in Holland for over sixty years, and disparages British legislation on merchant shipping, to which he says almost every year some statute is added. But this comparison is misleading. It is true that there have been, since the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, some forty Merchant Shipping Acts, now codified by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. There, however, the justice of the comparison ends. The Dutch Code and British Merchant Shipping Legislation differ in kind. The Dutch Code declares or purports to declare the common law and admiralty law of Holland. The British Merchant Shipping Acts, on the contrary (unlike the Bills of Exchange or the Sale of Goods Acts or the Marine Insurance Bill), lay down no principles of law, and are concerned only with the regulation and management of ships and their crews: their provisions are not declaratory, but directory, making, not stating the law. But after all, the preface to a translation is not the most important part of the book, and the translation seems well done and must certainly be useful. Outlines of English Legal History. By A. T. CARTER. London: Butterworth & Co. 1899. 8vo. viii and 216 pp. (108. 6d.) THIS is a most useful book in a small compass, and the only general objection we have to make is that the title is a misnomer. It does not cover the outlines of legal history' in general; in fact there is very little about substantive law, and not much about procedure. What is really dealt with is the history of jurisdictions, with some incidental explanation of the process of the courts, but not of the pleadings and other acts of the parties. In this field Mr. Carter has brought together a great deal of information which not only beginners but trained lawyers and students of history might find it by no means easy to lay hands on. The learned reader can verify this if he pleases by turning to the chapters on the King's Council and the Star Chamber. We have a few criticisms on points of the earlier history. The fable of the Mirror about Alfred hanging unjust judges ought not to be repeated even in any qualified form.-The much cited twelve thanes of Ethelred's laws were, for all that appears, peculiar to the Danelaw, and it is not safe to connect them with the English grand jury (see L. Q. R. ix. 278).There was no feeling of 'hardship' about trying a man by jury when he refused to put himself upon the country; the trouble was the supposed want of jurisdiction. After all it is only of late years that the Court has acquired power in civil matters to do for and in the name of an obstinate party an act which he ought to do, such as executing a conveyance. The present writer has seen in an abstract of title an actual case of persons going to prison and staying there several years rather than convey some land to a railway company.-Then, to go a little farther back in time, the great plea on Penenden Heath in which Lanfranc recovered the rights of the see of Canterbury had nothing to do with a jury or inquest of any kind. It was a special county court at which the king directed his officers to secure the attendance among the suitors-not as a separate body-of a sufficient number of Englishmen acquainted with the old customs. Mr. Carter's language about a mixed jury of French and English who apparently are not sworn' carries its own contradiction with it. So again 'dicunt homines comitatus' in Domesday can only mean a doom of the county court. When jurors dicunt' it is 'super sacramentum suum.' The whole account of juries should be revised in the light of Prof. Thayer's work, which Mr. Carter does not seem to have used. ... There is a certain want of proportion about the book as it stands, which we hope to see removed in an enlarged second edition. The Law of Negligence. By THOMAS WILLIAM SAUNDERS. Second 1898. THIS book (really a new book, though in name a new edition) appears likely to fulfil its purpose of giving practitioners a guide to the subject which will suffice for all ordinary purposes and be handier than Mr. Beven's monumental work. It is clear and, so far as we have tested it, accurate, though some of the finer distinctions are overlooked, e. g. the difference between responsibility for the negligence of an independent contractor' and the still more stringent rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Mr. Wright abandons the attempt to make anything more of 'gross' in the term ‘gross negligence' than a vituperative epithet; and we think this the better. opinion. To say that a man is liable only for gross negligence is at best a clumsy form of saying that he is bound only to exercise the prudence of an ordinary unskilled person. Under the head of contributory negligence it might have been well to notice the American doctrine that the plaintiff is bound in the first instance to show that he was using due care. It is not sound doctrine in our opinion, or supported by English authority, but it is perhaps not safe to disregard the risk of its being used in argument. We should have liked, in the interest of law as a science, to see a little more weighing and a little less counting of authorities; but for Nisi Prius purposes it may be more useful to have authority of some sort, and as much of it as you can, than to have a critical estimate of its value. One more question: Why does almost every writer who mentions the rule of the road omit to mention its statutory confirmation (see 14 & 15 Vict. c. 92, s. 13)? Studies in International Law. By THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1898. 8vo. viii and 314 pp. (108. 6d.) PROFESSOR HOLLAND disclaims any pretensions on the part of this volume to be more than a collection of by-studies on some special points of International Law. Most of the papers have already been published as review articles, and they are now reprinted substantially as they were originally written, though brought up to date where necessary by additional notes. Such collected articles on special branches of a subject, presented to the public from time to time as the results of careful study, unaccompanied by the commonplace materials which go to the making of a textbook, are always valuable. Among other interesting subjects dealt with are the Bombardment of Open Coast Towns, Pacific Blockade, and the International position of the Suez Canal. On the last of these subjects Professor Holland has added a note which explains Mr. (now Lord) Curzon's statement in the House of Commons of July 12, 1898, that the terms of the Suez Canal Convention of October 29, 1888, 'have not been brought into practical operation,' p. 293. Great Britain made a reserve at the last sitting of the Conference of Paris on June 13, 1885, which was repeated by Lord Salisbury on October 21, 1887, only three days before the Convention was signed on behalf of the Governments of France and Great Britain, and 'which was afterwards carefully brought to the knowledge of all the powers concerned' that the application of the provisions of the Treaty was subject to their being compatible with the transitory and exceptional state of things in Egypt and with the freedom of action of the British Government during the occupation of Egypt by Her Majesty's forces. This reservation is apt to be overlooked by those who talk of the neutralization of the Suez Canal. It will be remembered that the Convention was signed on behalf of Great Britain and France at Paris on October 24, 1887, and after receiving the approval of the other Powers in succession, that of the Porte being delayed till June 29, 1888, was eventually signed at Constantinople on October 29, by the Plenipotentiaries of the nine Powers, and was ratified on December 22, 1888. Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War. By SAKUYÉ TAKAHASHI. Cambridge: University Press. 1899. 8vo. xxviii and 219 PP. SOME time ago (1896) we had occasion to review a book by Professor Ariga, who acted as legal adviser to the Japanese army in the Corean campaign; and we now have a book by Professor Takahashi, who acted as legal adviser to the Admiral commanding the Japanese fleet during the same war. The two books complete each other, as the author states in his preface, the present work being confined to International Law at sea, as Professor Ariga's was confined to its application in the operations of the land forces. The interesting note on the Gaelic' and continuous voyages by Professor Westlake, published in the January number of this REVIEW, is given as a part of an introduction contributed by our learned friend, and the official documents of which translations are given as appendices are a valuable addition to the raw material of the international jurist. The author's system is first to show what is the principle admitted by acknowledged authorities on International Law, and then how the Japanese naval authorities under his advice applied it. As regards prize law the chief authorities followed were the English Naval Prize Act, 1864, and the German Prize Act of the same year. Japan, however, has very properly departed from the European models in giving no prize to the captors, who are deemed to seize property at sea on the ground of some breach of law connected with it, for the sake of their country and not for their own sake,' P. 12. A prize court was established at Sasebo, but, though some hundred vessels were visited by Japanese cruisers only one was taken in for adjudication. Professor Takahashi reviews the different cases which gave rise to questions, viz. those of the Kow-Shing, Gaelic, Sydney, Yik-sang, Chaochow Foo, Kwang-chi and Too-nang, and discusses the surrender of the Chinese squadron, Cameron's case, Dr. Kirke's claim, the bombardment of Tung-chow, the Japanese requisition regulations, and winds up as follows: 'The most interesting feature of the above facts is that they furnish additional proof of Japan's resolve to conduct the war in accordance with the most civilized modern principles: and it must be noticed how honourable these actions are to Japan, especially when we remember that she was fighting against a nation which acknowledges no law of war, makes no provision whatever for the proper treatment of the private property of the subjects of a hostile state, and does not attempt by a resolute effort to restrain its troops from pillage and incendiarism even within its own territories,' p. 164. A Digest of the Death Duties (alphabetically arranged), with numerous examples illustrating their incidence, an Index of Titles, and an Appendix of Statutes. By A. W. NORMAN. Second Edition. London: Wm. Clowes & Sons, Lim. 1899. La. 8vo. xli and 532 pp. (258.) THE second edition of Mr. Norman's book is an improvement on the first and that is saying a good deal. The alphabetical arrangement now followed has many advantages: it is easier to find the law on a given point, and the huge index in the first edition-larger than the text itself has in the natural course of things disappeared. This edition seems to exhaust the law on this complex subject. One can find the points in Lord Cowley's case ('98, 1 Q. B. 355, C. A.) or Lord Wolverton's case ('98, A. C. 535) or the scale of Probate and Succession Duties in force in a British self-governing Colony. The diversity of Colonial practice is not encouraging to the advocate of fiscal unity within the Empire. Natal is shown to be an ideal place for the beneficiary, for no death duties are levied: while its neighbour, the Cape Colony, encourages charity by exempting from duty gifts to hospitals. Manitoba charges nothing to ancestors or lineal descendants |