ledge and upon his own responsibility, that the facts represented either do or will exist; or (2) a mere declaration of his belief or expectation that such facts do or will exist; or (3) a mere communication of information which he has received from others respecting them.

Wherever the representation is a positive statement of the actual or eventual existence of some fact material to the risk, it is only distinguishable in form from a warranty by not being written on the face of the policy. From this distinction in form arises a very important distinction in effect. As a representation is not inserted on the face of the instrument, the assured is not tied down to the same rigid and literal compliance with its terms as he is in the case of a warranty. Unless a warranty is true to the letter and fulfilled with the most scrupulous exactness, the policy is avoided, for in such cases there is the breach of an express stipulation which the assured himself has inserted in the instrument as one of its terms. In the case of a representation, on the other hand, the very fact that the assured has declined to insert on the face of the policy the statement which he has yet represented to be true shows that he does not intend to be bound down to this exact and rigorous accuracy, and accordingly a substantial compliance with the terms of a representation is all that is required.

The language of the policy may itself be such as to imply a representation which will thus virtually form a part of the written instrument. An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to be inferred. Implied warranties are conditions not expressed in the policy, but implied in it by law, presumed from the fact of making the insurance. The only implied warranties which require to be noticed are those of seaworthiness and legality. In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the beginning of the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the adventure insured, and this warranty can only be excluded from the policy by express provision to that effect. The warranty is satisfied "if the ship is seaworthy when she first sails on the voyage; she need not continue so throughout the voyage, and the underwriter is liable if she becomes unseaworthy twenty-four hours after sailing" (Lord Mansfield, in Eden v. Parkinson, 1781, 2 Doug. 733). "Seaworthiness varies according to the place, the voyage, the time of year, the nature of the cargo, and even the nature of the ship (Brett, L.J., Turnbull v. Janson, 1877, 36 L.T. 635); and has thus a relative and not an absolute standard. Whether a ship is seaworthy within the warranty is a question of fact. In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at any stage of the adventure.

Another warranty implied in all policies is that the adventure insured is a legal one, and that so far as the assured can control the matter the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner. Where a voyage is illegal an insurance upon it is illegal.

Commencement of Risk.-In the case of time policies this is settled by the date from which the policy runs. When the subject-matter is insured at and from" or "from" a particular place, it is not necessary that the ship should be at that place when the contract is concluded, but there is an implied condition that the adventure shall be commenced within a reasonable time, and so that the risk shall not be materially varied, otherwise the insurer may avoid the contract. A fortiori, the contract may be voided by such delay as is evidence of an abandonment of the voyage insured. The implied condition may be negatived by showing that the delay was caused by circumstances known to the insurer before the contract was concluded, or that he agreed to the delay. In an insurance "from" a particular place

the risk does not attach until the ship starts on the voyage insured. The start must be bona fide, but once the ship has broken ground in order to proceed on the voyage the risk has begun. In the case of an express warranty to sail from a port by a given date, the vessel must be outside the port by that date.

Termination of Risk.—In all policies the risk ceases in ordinary cases in accordance with the bargain made-in the printed form as regards the ship after she has been moored at anchor in the port of destination for twenty-four hours in good safety, and as regards goods until the same be discharged and safely landed. In the latter case they must be landed in the customary manner and within a reasonable time after arrival, and if they are not so landed, the risk ceases.

Deviation.-If the ship without entirely abandoning the prosecution of the voyage described in the policy, yet voluntarily, and without justifying cause, departs from the prescribed course of that voyage, this is a deviation, and the underwriter is liable for no loss occurring after the point at which the ship first quits the prescribed course. If the ship either originally sail on a different voyage from that described in the policy, or if, after sailing, she entirely abandons all intention of prosecuting the voyage described in the policy, this is a change or abandonment of voyage, which avoids the policy from the moment the intention of so abandoning it is definitely formed; for it is an elementary principle in this branch of insurance law that the underwriter cannot be liable for a loss which does not take place in the course of prosecuting the very voyage described in the policy.

Losses covered by the Policy.-As a general rule the underwriter is liable under the policy to make good any loss due to perils insured against in it, but such loss must be proximately caused by such a peril, or he will not be liable. The underwriter is not liable for any loss attributable to the misconduct of the assured (or his agents) though a peril insured against be the proximate cause of loss. But such misconduct must be wilful, or the underwriter will be liable, e.g. negligent navigation by the assured, who is master of the ship, resulting in loss is covered by the policy (Trinder v. N. Queensland T.C., 1897, 2 Com. Cas. 216, Kennedy, J.)

An important limitation on the underwriter's liability is, that he undertakes to indemnify the assured only against loss caused by the direct and violent operation of the perils insured against, and not against the ordinary wear and tear of the voyage. Such is the undoubted rule; but its application is often a matter of great nicety. In fact, few things in the law of marine insurance have been found more difficult in practice than to discriminate between damage occasioned by the ordinary service of the voyage and that caused by the perils of the sea.

Total Losses.-Losses are either total or partial. Total losses are either actual or constructive. An insurance against total loss includes constructive as well as an actual total loss, unless the policy shows a different intention, but such words as "without benefit of abandonment" will show such intention. An actual total loss takes place when the thing insured is (1) destroyed, or (2) irreparably damaged, or (3) where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof. Constructive total loss is when a thing insured is not actually lost, but its value is commercially gone, i.e. its worth at the place of destination is not equal to the expense of getting it there.

Partial losses consist of averages, salvage charges, and particular charges. Averages are either particular average or general average losses. A particular average loss is a loss caused by a peril insured against, which is not a general average loss, and which falls exclusively on the owner or other

person interested in insurable property, giving him no right of contribution against other persons who may be interested in the common marine adventure, and which is recoverable by the assured, whose property suffers the particular average loss, from his underwriter. Another kind of partial loss is salvage charges, which are recoverable in like as particular average losses. Salvage charges do not include the expenses of services in the nature of salvage rendered by the assured or his agents, or any person employed for hire by them for the purpose of averting a peril insured against. Such expenses when properly insured, may be recovered as particular charges, or as a general average loss, according to the circumstances under which they were incurred. J. E. R. STEPHENS.

Mark. Since 1873 the gold mark of 100 pfennige has been the monetary standard of the German Empire. The mark consists of 3982 grammes of gold 900 fine, and is equal to the English standard gold of the value of 11-747 pence. The smallest gold coin is the five-mark piece. The five-mark piece is worth 4s. 103d., in gold 916-6 fine at £3:17:10 per ounce, and the 20-mark piece 19s. 63d.

Market Overt.-This has been defined as "an open, public, and legally constituted market," and where goods are sold in market overt the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any defect or want of title on the part of the seller (Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 22). This section does not apply to Scotland, and does not apply to the sale of horses. Stolen goods if sold, revest in the true owner on conviction of the thief. Market overt in the country is only held on the special market days provided for particular towns by charter or prescription. In London every day except Sunday is a market day.

Markka.-The standard gold markka is the basis of the monetary system of Finland. The 10-markka piece is worth according to the English standard 7s. 11d, and the 20-markka piece 15s. 101d. The standard gold markka is equal to the franc.

Married Women's Policies of Assurance. - In England as well as in Scotland, a married woman may effect a policy of assurance on her own life or on that of her husband, for her separate use, and all benefit accrues to her accordingly. A husband may effect a policy of assurance on his own life expressed to be for the benefit of his wife or children, or both, and where this is done, a trust is created in favour of the wife, children, or both, as the case may be, and the moneys payable under such policies are not subject to the diligence of the husband's creditors, unless it be proved that the premiums were paid to defraud the creditors. (Married Women's Property Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, and Married Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 26.)

Married Women's Statutory Rights and Liabilities. By the old common law of England a husband and wife were regarded as one person, and that person was the husband. The wife could do nothing apart from him. Gradually, however, certain equitable rights over her own property were conceded to her by the Courts. Through the intervention of trustees she might acquire and dispose of property as a

separate estate. This separate estate became liable to make good all contracts which were made by her with express reference to it, but she was not liable personally to any extent, nor was her separate estate liable for general contracts which had no reference to it. Her rights were further extended by the Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1874. These Acts have both been repealed, and now the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 may be said to form the charter of her freedom. Under this Act a married woman can acquire, hold, and dispose by will, or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate property in the same manner as if she were a single woman, without the intervention of any trustee, and free from the legal control of her husband (sec. 1). If, however, the property is settled to her separate use without power of anticipation it is not in the sense of the Act separate property, and she has no higher rights over it than she would have had apart from the Act. She can enter into and render herself liable to the extent of her separate property on any contract, and she can sue and be sued in all respects as if she were a single woman, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant. Any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action are payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise (sec. 2). Under this section she can sign a bill, cheque, or promissory note and render herself liable for the debt so constituted to the extent of her separate estate. She can enter into partnership with third parties or her husband, and thus subject her separate estate to the partnership debts. The Act creates a presumption of law that every contract entered into by a married woman is in relation to her separate estate unless she can prove the contrary. In the event of the husband's bankruptcy any money that has been lent by the wife to him is treated as part of his estate. She can only get a dividend on such money after all claims of the other creditors of her husband for valuable consideration have been satisfied. This Act does not in any way protect a wife from herself. On the contrary, seeing that it gives her control over her separate property, she has become more liable to the undue influence of her husband than she was before the Act. He may induce her to surrender her own property to him, and the chances are that it will become merged in his assets, and primarily subject to the claims of his creditors. If it is wished, therefore, to protect her from the usual consequences of over-confidence in her husband, it would still be necessary to execute a marriage settlement with a clause against anticipation. The Act expressly saves the effect of settlements. made before or after marriage (sec. 19). All public stocks and funds, and all shares, debentures, etc., of any company allotted or transferred in the name of a married woman, are deemed to be her separate property (sec. 7). She may transfer any such stock or shares without the concurrence of her husband (sec. 9). She may effect a policy of assurance upon her own life, or the life of her husband, for her separate use. If the husband insures his own life, and the policy bear that it is for the benefit of his wife, the money payable under such policy does not form part of his estate, and is not subject to his debts, unless it be shown that the insurance was effected to defraud the creditors, in which case they will receive a sum equal to the premiums paid (sec. 11). Every married woman has the same remedies, either civil or criminal, in her own name against all persons, including her husband, as she would have had if a single woman for the protection and security of her own separate property. She cannot, however, take any criminal proceedings against her husband while they are living together (sec. 12). A woman remains liable after her marriage for all debts incurred, and all contracts entered into by her before her marriage, to the extent of her separate

property, and no restriction against anticipation contained in any settlement of her property made by herself has any validity against debts contracted by her before marriage (secs. 13 and 19). A husband is liable for his wife's debts and obligations incurred before marriage to the extent of all property belonging to her which he acquires from or through her. That is now expressly declared to be the limit of his liability (sec. 14). The husband and wife may be jointly sued for any such debt or liability (sec. 15). The wife is subject to the same criminal proceedings at the instance of the husband as he is liable to at her instance in relation to her property (sec. 16). She is liable under the Act for the maintenance of her husband if he becomes chargeable to any parish, and she is subject to the same liability as the husband for maintenance of her children and grandchildren. Certain amending statutes have been passed since the Act of 1882, but they are of minor importance, and need not be mentioned here.

In Scotland at common law, as in England, a married woman has no legal persona. Her person is sunk by the marriage, so that she cannot act by or for herself. The husband is regarded as the dignior persona and head of the house. The rigor of the common law was not relaxed until the Conjugal Rights Act of 1861 was passed. Under it a married woman who succeeds to property, or acquires it by gift, obtains the equity to a settlement-that is, her husband can only claim the property on condition of making from it a reasonable provision for her maintenance.

By the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1877 the husband's rights are excluded from the wages and earnings of his wife so far as acquired in service or trade, or in the exercise of literary, artistic, or scientific skill. On the other hand, the husband's liability for his wife's antenuptial debts is limited to the value of any property received by him from or through her.

In 1880 a small additional concession was given to the wife. By the Married Women's Policies of Assurance Act of that year she can effect an assurance on her own or her husband's life for her separate use. The husband, too, can effect an assurance on his own life in trust for his wife and children, so that neither he nor his creditors can attach the proceeds. In 1881 married women in Scotland obtained various concessions, which, however, are not so liberal as those given in the following year to married women in England. By the Scottish Act the whole movable or personal estate of the wife, whether acquired before or after marriage, is vested in her as her separate estate. But as the husband's right of administration is not excluded, except to the limited extent aftermentioned, his consent is still necessary to any deeds by her affecting this separate estate. she sue or be sued without his concurrence, and no power has been given to her to sell or burden her heritable estate. She can, however, uplift and discharge the income from her movable estate, and also the rents of her heritage, without her husband's consent (secs. 1 (2) and 2 of the Married Women's Property Act (Scotland) 1881). The Act does not exclude or abridge the power of settlement by antenuptial contract of marriage.

By the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, which applies to the United Kingdom, the mother of an infant becomes the guardian on the death of the father (sec. 2). The term "infant" means a child under 21 in England and Ireland, and a boy under 14 or girl under 12 in Scotland (sec. 8). The mother may also appoint a guardian to act after her own and the father's death; or, after her death, to act jointly with the father (sec. 3 (1) (2)). ALEX. ROSS.

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