which do not include looking after the passenger's luggage for an unreasonable time (Welch v. L. & N.-W. Ry., 1886, 34 W.R. 166; Hodkinson v. L. & N.-W. Ry., 1884, 14 Q.B.D. 228). An innkeeper is liable for property stolen or negligently lost by his servants (Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co. [1891], 2 Q.B. 11, and see Innkeepers Act 1863, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41). In the same way a master is liable for his servant's fraud if the servant is acting in the usual course of his master's business (Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, 1867, L.R. 2 Ex. 259), but not if the servant is merely serving his own personal ends (British Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Railway Co., 1887, 18 Q.B.D. 714; Limpus v. L. G. O. Co., 1862, 1 H. & C. 526; Ward v. L. G. O. Co., 1873, 42 L.J.C.P. 265). A master may be civilly liable for the criminal acts of his servant, as in the case of assault (Smith v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., 1891, 7 T.L.R. 459). On the other hand, a master can not be made liable for acts of his servant which are outside the scope of his authority (Mitchell v. Crassweller, 1853, 13 C.B. 237; Storey v. Ashton, 1869, L.R. 4 Q.B. 476; Rayner v. Mitchell, 1877, 2 C.P.D. 357; Charleston v. London Tramways Co., 1888, 36 W.R. 367). A distinction is made between acts which are entirely beyond the scope of the servant's employment and acts which, although within the scope of the employment, the master has expressly ordered the servant not to do. In the former case he is not liable, while in the latter he is. As a general rule, a person is not liable for the acts of the servants of an independent contractor whom he employs. LIABILITY OF SERVANT TO THIRD PERSONS.-On Contract. This liability depends on the ordinary rules of law applicable to principal and agent. Shortly, it may be said that if the servant openly contracts as agent for his master he incurs no liability, provided that he keeps within his authority. If he exceeds his authority or acts when he has no authority, he renders himself liable. He is also liable when he contracts as principal. In Cases of Torts.-A servant is liable to third parties for any misfeasance (Stephens v. Elwall, 1815, 4 M. & S. 259; Hollins v. Fowler, L.R. 7 H.L. 757). In case of non-feasance or omission to do his duty, however, it has been held that he is only liable to his master (Lane v. Cotton, 1701, 12 Mod. 473, 488). SERVANT'S CRIMES.-There are several crimes peculiar to the relationship of master and servant, a selection of which are here noted. The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86) makes it a misdemeanour punishable by a fine not exceeding £20, or imprisonment for three months with or without hard labour, for any servant of a municipal authority, company, or contractor, who has the duty of supplying gas or water, to wilfully and maliciously break his contract of service, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that his doing so, either by himself or in combination with others, will have the effect of depriving the inhabitants of the supply of gas or water (sec. 4). A like penalty is imposed on any servant who breaks a contract of service, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the probable consequences of his doing so, either alone or in combination, will be to endanger human life or cause serious bodily injury, or to expose valuable property, whether real or personal, to destruction or serious injury (sec. 5). Sec. 7 deals with intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise. Burglary.-A servant may commit burglary in his master's house as well as a stranger (see Smith, Master and Servant, 5th ed. p. 420; Russell on Crimes, 6th ed. vol. ii. p. 10). The Malicious Damage Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97) imposes heavy penalties on persons found guilty of damaging or destroying goods in the course of manufacture, while the Larceny Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), sec. 62, deals with the stealing of such goods. Larceny and Embezzlement by Servants.-The difference between these two offences is that in the former the property must be taken out of the master's possession, while to constitute the latter offence the servant must have received the property on his master's behalf and appropriated it before it reached his master's possession. The punishment is the same both for larceny as a servant and for embezzlement, viz., not less than three nor more than fourteen years' penal servitude, or up to two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour, and, if the prisoner be a male under sixteen years of age, with or without whipping. If the prisoner plead guilty, the offences may also be dealt with under the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49). By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 13, a prisoner indicted for larceny may be convicted of embezzlement, but a prisoner cannot be convicted of larceny if there is only evidence of embezzlement, though he may, on the same evidence and on the same indictment, be convicted of embezzlement (R. v. Gorbutt, 1857, 26 L.J.M.C. 47). A prisoner indicted for larceny as a servant may be convicted of simple larceny. Section 68 of the Larceny Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96) is as follows:"Whosoever being a clerk or servant, or being employed for the purpose or in the capacity of a clerk or servant, shall fraudulently embezzle any chattel, money, or valuable security which shall be delivered to or received or taken into possession by him for or in the name or on the account of his master or employer, or any part thereof, shall be deemed to have feloniously stolen the same from his master or employer, although such chattel, money, or security was not received into the possession of such master or employer otherwise than by the actual possession of his clerk, servant, or other person so employed." The necessary elements of embezzlement are these: (1) the relationship of master and servant (see R. v. Negus, 1873, L.R. 2 C.C.R. 34); (2) the property must be taken for or on account of the master; (3) the property, or some part thereof, must be fraudulently embezzled. See also the Larceny Act 1901 (1 Ed. VII. c. 10). The Misappropriation by Servants Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 103) enacts that servants taking their master's corn without authority, for the purpose of giving the same to their master's horses, shall not be guilty of felony, as they were before that act, but shall be liable, on conviction before two justices of the peace, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not more than three months, or to a fine not exceeding £5. The Fabrication of Accounts Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 24) enacts that if any clerk, officer, or servant shall wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book, paper, writing, valuable security, or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or shall wilfully, and with intent to defraud, make or concur in making any false entry in, or omit or alter, or concur in omitting or altering, any material particular from or in any such book or any document or account, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be liable to a punishment of seven years' penal servitude, or two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE.-The contract of service may be terminated (1) by the efflux of the time for which it was made; (2) by sufficient notice given by either party to the agreement; (3) by breach of the agreement by either party. The first of these headings calls for no remarks. Under the second heading the question naturally arises, "What is sufficient notice?" Where the agreement specifies what notice shall be given by the parties to terminate the agreement, such notice is naturally sufficient. There is a presumption that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, an agreement of service is for a year, and a yearly agreement can not be ended before the expiration of the year. In many cases the fact that the servant's wages are paid weekly will determine the hiring to be a weekly one, in which case a week's notice is all that the servant can demand. Many classes of agreements of service are, however, subject to custom in this respect, provided that the custom be not incompatible with the terms of the agreement. The commonest example of such a custom is that which gives domestic and menial servants and their masters the right to terminate the contract of service by a month's notice or the payment of a month's wages in lieu thereof. Should either party terminate the contract without giving the notice required, he is liable to an action by the other party. Actions by masters against their servants are rare, because in most cases the damage is slight, and the chance of recovering such damages and costs is slighter. Such actions, however, undoubtedly lie, and are sometimes brought. A master who dismisses his servant without just cause and without due notice is liable to an action for wrongful dismissal at the suit of the servant. For the measure of damages in such cases see Mayne's Treatise on Damages, 7th ed. pp. 238 et seq. SEDUCTION. A master has by English law a right of action against a person who seduces his servant. The action is based on the loss to the master of his servant's services. COMBINATIONS BY MASTERS AND SERVANTS, AND INDUCING SERVANTS TO BREAK THEIR CONTRACTS.-On this head see Mogul Steamship Co. v. Macgregor [1892], A.C. 25; Templeton v. Russell [1893], Q.B. 715; Allen v. Flood [1898], A.C. 1; Quinn v. Leatham [1901], A.C. 495; Read v. Friendly Society of Stonemasons [1902], 2 K.B. 88; Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903], 1 K.B. 118; [1903] 2 K.B. 545. ACCIDENTS TO WORKMEN.-Common Law.-Prior to recent legislation, a master was in few instances liable to his servant for injuries sustained during his employment. At Common Law the master is liable to his servants for injury caused by his own personal negligence, whether such negligence be in his own conduct or the management of his business (Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, 1856, 11 Ex. 781; Heaven v. Pender, 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 507). Examples of such negligence are the failure to supply suitable and adequate tools and machinery, or the adoption of a defective system (Bryden v. Stewart, 1855, 2 Macq. H.L. 30; Williams v. Birmingham Battery Co. [1899], 2 Q.B. 338). In Smith v. Baker [1891], A.C. 325, Lord Herschell stated: "An employer is bound at common law to so carry on his business as not to expose his workmen to unreasonable risks." Breach of statutory regulations, such as are imposed by the Factory Acts, amount to negligence which renders the employer liable (Groves v. Lord Wimborne [1898], 2 Q.B. 402). The doctrine of common employment in many cases prevented the servant from bringing a successful action against his employer. This doctrine has been enunciated as follows: "If the person occasioning and the person suffering injury are fellow-workmen engaged in a common employment, and having a common master, such master is not responsible for the consequences of the injury" (Ruegg, Accidents to Work men, 6th ed. p. 11). This doctrine was founded on the argument that the workman in entering the employment knew that there was a risk of injury "not only from his own want of skill or care, but also from the want of it on the part of his fellow-servants, and he must be supposed to have contracted on the terms that as between himself and his master he would run this risk" (Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway, 1850, 5 Exch. 343). The respective grades of the injured and the person causing such injury are immaterial, provided they be employed in the same industry (Searle v. Lindsey, 1861, 11 C.B. (n.s.) 429 (engineer and seaman); Hedley v. Pinkney [1892], 1 Q.B. 58 (master and seaman); Waller v. S.-E. Ry. Co., 1863, 2 H. & C. 102 (guard and platelayer); Wigmore v. Jay, 1850, 5 Exch. 354 (labourer and foreman)). The employer must be common to both the party suffering the injury and the party inflicting it (Johnson v. Lindsay [1891], A.C. 371). The master was, moreover, protected by the doctrine of "Volenti non fit injuria," as to which see infra, Employers' Liability, and by the fact that previous to 1846 he was only liable to the workman himself, and consequently was not liable to pay compensation in cases where death occurred before judgment was obtained against him (Actio personalis moritur cum persona). The defence of contributory negligence was also open to him. This defence is still available under the Employers' Liability Act, but not under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The master was not liable for the negligence of those to whom he had delegated the management of the business, but only for his own personal negligence. Lord Campbell's Act, or the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), provides that wheresoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then in every such case the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. Such action is brought for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased. The jury may apportion the damages between the parties for whose benefit the action is brought. An Amending Act, passed in 1864, enacts that where there is no executor or administrator, or where there is one and no action has been brought by and in his name within six calendar months from the death of the deceased, the action may be brought by and in the name or names of all or any of the persons for whose benefit the action would have been if brought by the executor or administrator. The action is still to be for the benefit of the same parties as before. The action can only be brought where there has been actual pecuniary loss or a reasonable expectation of benefits from the deceased; "and such reasonable expectation might well exist, though from the father not being in need, the son had never done anything for him" (Franklin v. S.-E. Ry., 1858, 3 H. & N. 215; Hetherington v. N.-E. Ry., 1882, 9 Q.B.D. 160). Employers' Liability Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42) did away with the defence of common employment in certain cases by enacting that where any workman suffered personal injury (1) by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer; or (2) by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst in the exercise of such superintendence; or (3) by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman at the time of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or (4) by reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer, done or made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that behalf; or (5) by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway, the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the workman, and any persons entitled in case of death (see these set out supra under Lord Campbell's Act), should have the same right of compensation as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work. A workman, however, has no right to compensation nor any remedy under the Employers' Liability Act in the following cases. Under heading (1) supra, unless the defect arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer or of some person in the service of the employer, and entrusted with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in proper condition; under heading (4) supra, unless the injury resulted from some impropriety or defect in the rules, bye-laws, or instructions. Any rule or bye-law which has been approved or has been accepted as proper by one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or by the Board of Trade, or any other department of the Government, under or by virtue of any Act of Parliament, shall not be deemed to be improper or defective for the purposes of this Act. Nor can the workman recover in any case where he knew of the defect or negligence which caused the injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give or cause to be given information thereof to the employer, or some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or such superior already knew of the defect or negligence. In order that a way should be defective within the meaning of the Act, the defect must be permanent or quasi-permanent in its condition. A mere temporary obstruction will not render a way defective (M'Giffen v. Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., 1882, 10 Q.B.D. 5; Pegram v. Dixon, 1886, 55 L.J.Q.B. 447; Bromley v. Cavendish Spinning Co., 1886, 2 T.L.R. 881; Willetts v. Watts [1892], 2 Q.B. 92; Tate v. Latham [1897], 1 Q.B. 502). The two latter cases also deal with the question of what constitutes a way. As to the meaning of works see Howe v. Finch, 1886, 17 Q.B.D. 187; Brannigan v. Robinson [1892], 1 Q.B. 344; Thomson v. City Glass Bottle Co. [1902], 1 K.B. 233. In Yarmouth v. France, 1887, 19 Q.B.D. 647, where a horse was held to be part of a wharfinger's plant, Lindley, L.J., held that the word included "whatever apparatus is used by a business man for carrying on his business-not his stock-in-trade which he buys or makes for sale, but all goods and chattels, fixed or moveable, live or dead, which he keeps for permanent employment in his business" (see also Haston v. Edinburgh Tramway Co., 1887, 14 Rettie, 621). Plant is defective if, though perfect in itself, it is used for a purpose for which it is unsuited (Heske v. Samuelson, 1883, 12 Q.B.D. 30; Cripps v. Judge, 1884, 13 Q.B.D. 583); but a workman cannot make his master liable if he uses the plant for purposes |