l'époque qui avait été fixée; mais le contre-projet du ministère Britannique, expédié par le fouffigné le 8 de ce mois, étant arrivé à Paris le 10, et fa Majefté Impériale ayant paru convaincue que fon allié ne fe refuferait point à un armiftice admiffible, le Premier Conful s'eft décidé de nouveau à faire retarder de huit jours la reprife des hoftilités. Les ordres ont été expédiés fur le champ aux armées d'Allemagne et d'Italie, et dans le cas où ces ordres fuffent arrivés trop tard dans cette dernière contrée, et qu'à la fuite de quelque opération militaire, les généraux Français euffent eu, quelques fuccès, il leur était ordonné de reprendre la pofition qu'ils occupaient le jour même du renouvellement des hoftilités. Le fimple expofé de ces faits fuffira fans doute pour démontrer que le gouvernement Français n'a jamais pu avoir l'intention de mafquer par des négociations fimulées une nouvelle attaque contre l'Autriche, et qu'au contraire il a apporté dans toute cette négociation la franchife, la loyauté, qui feules peuvent affurer le rétabliffement de la tranquillité générale que fa Majefté et fon miniftère ont tant à-cœur. En vain chercheroit on les preuves d'une intention contraire dans quelques expreffions refermées dans les communications officielles du gouvernement Français avec les alliés de fa Majefté. S'il s'agiffait furtout d'une des dernières lettres écrites à Monfieur le Baron de Thugut, que le fouffigné aurait pu communiquer luimême s'il en eut trouvé l'occafion, cette lettre prouverait que le gouvernement Français, toujours ami de la paix, n'a paru fe plaindre des intentions de la Grande Brétagne, que parcequ'il avait tout lieu de les croire contraires à un fyftème folide de pacification. Le fouffigné n'eft entré dans ces détails que parcequ'à la veille des négociations qui pourraient être entamées, il importe aux confeils des deux puiffances d'être réciproquement convaincus de la fincérité de leurs intentions, et que l'opinion qu'ils peuvent avoir de cette fincérité, eft le feul garrant du fuccès des négociations. Quant au fecond point de la note que le fouffigné a eu l'honneur de recevoir, il doit fe référer à fa lettre du 16, par laquelle il a prevenu fon Excellence Lord Grenville qu'il était chargé de donner des explications fatisfaifantes touchant les principales objections du gouvernement Britannique à l'armiftice propofé, en le priant inftamment de faciliter des communications verbales avec le ministère. Il était donc difficile de croire que le gouvernement Français s'en tiendrait fans aucune modification à fes premières ouvertures, car, dans ce cas il eut été trés-inutile de folliciter une entrevûe pour donner des explications fatisfaifantes. En parlant des compenfations requifes pour faire cadrer l'armiftice naval avec la trève continentale, le ministère de fa Majesté trouve qu'il y a de l'exaggération dans la balance établie par le gouvernement Français; une difcuffion formelle fur cet objet ferait fans doute deplacée. Après les fuccès variés d'une guerre qui a produit produit tant d'evènemens extraordinaires, il eft difficile de douter de l'influence morale de ces evènemens fur les armées, fur les peuples, fur les gouvernemens eux-mêmes; et les inductions que l'on peut en tirer dans le moment actuel paraiffent juftifier l'opinion que le fouffigné a cru devoir manifefter. S'il y a de l'exaggeration dans cette opinion, elle est partagée par les ennemis de la république eux-mêmes, qui ont tout employé pour prolonger la trève, et qui ne fe font fait aucun fcrupule de fe fervir même de la voie des négociations fimulées pour gagner du tems. Les préliminaires, fignés par M. le Comte de St. Julien et défavoués par fa cour, en font un example mémorable, et il faut bien que la continuation de l'armiftice continental foit un facrifice pour la republique, puifqu'on a tout fait pour le lui arracher. Mais en admettant même l'exiftence de ce facrifice le ministère de fa Majefté déclare formellement que l'on ne faurait exiger de lui un facrifice analogue. Il n'appartient certainement pas à la France de juger jufqu'à quel point les engagemens pris par fa Majefté envers fes alliés peuvent gêner fes difpofitions à cet égard, mais le droit de la France de demander le prix du facrifice qu'elle eft encore prête à faire, parait inconteftable. Le Premier Conful a donné à l'Europe des gâges réitérés de fes difpofitions pacifiques, il n'a ceffe de les manifefter envers les cabinets intéreffés dans cette lutte, et quand même fa modération releverait les efpérances des ennemis du gouvernement Français, elle fera toujours l'unique guide de fes actions. Malgré cette différence dans la manière de confidérer plufieurs queftions acceffoires, et préliminaires de la pacification projettée, le fouffigné doit fe feliciter de trouver dans toutes les communications qu'il a eu l'honneur de recevoir jufqu'ici les mêmes affurances des difpofitions de fa Majefté de travailler au rétablissement de la tranquillité de l'Europe; et il ne négligera aucune occafion de faire valoir ces difpofitions près de fon gouvernement. Hereford Street, 22d Sept. 1800 (1 Vendem. An 9). Tranflation. NOTE. (Signé) Отто. DURING the whole courfe of the negotiation with which the undersigned has been charged, he has had caufe to regret that the want of more direct communications with his Majefty's miniftry has rendered it impoffible for him to give to his official overtures the neceffary explanations. This inconvenience is rendered ftill more ftriking by the refult of his last communications, to which the note which he had the honour to receive on the 20th of this month is an answer. The The first part of this note appearing to intimate a doubt fpecting the fineerity of the difpofitions of the French government to begin negotiations for a general peace, the underligned cannot avoid entering into fome details upon this fubject, which will fully justify the conduct of the First Conful. The propofed alternative of a feparate peace, in the event of his Majefty's not accepting the conditions for a general armistice, far from evincing a want of fincerity, furnishes, on the contrary, the ftrongest proof of the conciliatory difpofitions of the First Conful it is a neceffary confequence of the declaration made by the undersigned the 4th of this month. In effect, he has had the honour to apprize the British miniftry "That if that armistice be not concluded before the 11th of September, hoftilities will have been renewed with Auftria, and that in that cafe the First Conful will no longer be able, with regard to this power, to confent to any except a feparate and complete peace." That armiftice was not concluded at the date fixed upon; it was therefore natural eventually to expect a feparate peace with Auftria, and according to the fame fuppofition, a peace in like manner feparate with Great Britain, unless it is though, that the calamities with which a great part of Europe has been for eight years paft oppreffed, fhould be continued without other hope of termination than that of the complete destruction of one of the belligerent powers. It is not therefore the French government which proposes to his Majefty to feparate his interefts from thofe of his allies; but having in vain attempted to unite them in a common centre, and finding them separated in fact by the refufal of England to lay down on the altar of peace fome fpecial advantages of which France had already made a facrifice, the First Conful has given a fresh proof of his difpofitions, by pointing out another means of reconciliation which the courfe of events will bring about fooner or later. In conformity with the advice which the undersigned had transmitted on the 4th of this month, notification was given of the ceffation of the continental armiftice at the term which had been fixed upon; but the counter-projet of the British miniftry, dispatched by the undersigned upon the 8th of this month, having reached Paris on the 10th, and his Imperial Majefty having appeared to be convinced that his ally would not withhold his confent to an admiffible armistice, the Firft Conful determined again to retard for eight days the renewal of hoftilities. Orders were immediately dispatched to the armies of Germany and Italy, and in the event of thofe orders arriving too late in the laft-mentioned country, and of the French generals having obtained fucceffes in confequence of any military operation, they are ordered to refume that pofition VOL. X. Ee which which they occupied on the precife day on which hoftilities were recommenced. The fimple relation of thefe facts will without doubt be fufficient to prove that the French government never can have intended to cover, by pretended negotiations, a freth attack upon Auftria; and that, on the contrary, it has acted throughout this negotiation with that frankness and loyalty which can alone enfure that re-establishment of general tranquillity which his Majefty and his miniftry have fo much at heart. It would be in vain to look for proofs of a contrary intention in fome expreffions contained in the official communications of the French government to the allies of his Majefty; more especially if fuch proofs were attempted to be drawn from one of the laft letters written to Baron Thugut, which the undersigned might have communicated himself, if he had found an opportunity. That letter would prove that the French government, always a friend to peace, appeared to complain of the intentions of Great Britain only because it had every reafon to believe them contrary to a folid fyftem of pacification. The underfigned has entered into thefe details only because, on the eve of negotiations which may be entered upon, it is of importance to the councils of the two powers to be reciprocally convinced of the fincerity of their intentions, and becaufe the opinion which they may have of that fincerity is the only pledge for the fuccefs of the negotiations. With refpect to the fecond point in the note which the underfigned has had the honour of receiving, he is to refer to his letter of the 16th, in which he informed his Excellency Lord Grenville that he was directed to give fatisfactory explanations relative to the principal objections of the British government to the proposed armiftice, and entreated him, at the fame time, to facilitate the means of verbal communications with the miniftry. It was therefore difficult to believe that the French government would adhere, without any modification, to its firft overtures; for in that cafe, it would have been quite ufelefs to folicit for an interview, in order to give fatisfactory explanations. In fpeaking of the compenfations requifite, in order to place the naval armistice upon a footing with the continental truce, his Majesty's miniftry think that there' is fome preponderance in the balance fettled by the French government; a formal difcuffion upon this point would undoubtedly be d fplaced. After the various fucceffes of a var which has produced fo many extraordinary events, it is difficult to doubt of the moral influence of thofe events upon armies, upon nations, upon governments themfelves; and the deductions which may be drawn from it at prefent, appear to jultify the opinion which the underfigned has felt it his duty to ftate. If there be any exaggeration in this opinion, it is shared with the enemies of the republic themfelves, who have employed every effort to prolong the truce, and who have not fcrupled to use the means of pretended negotiations in order to gain time. The preliminaries figned by the Count de St. Julien, and difavowed by his court, are a memorable example of this; and the prolongation of the continental armistice must neceffarily be confidered as a facrifice on the part of the republic, fince every effort has been employed to extort its confent to it. But even whilft his Majefty's miniftry admit the exiftence of this facrifice, they formally declare that an analogous facrifice cannot be expected to be made on the part of his Majefty. It certainly does not become France to judge how far his Majefty's engagements with his allies may counteract his inclination in this refpect; but France appears to have certainly an undoubted right to demand the price of the facrifice which the has made, and which fhe is ftill willing to make. The First Conful has given to Europe repeated pledges of his pacific difpofitions; he has never ceased manifefting them to the cabinets interefted in this conteft; and even although the hopes of the enemies of the French republic fhould be excited by his moderation, it fhall always be the fole guide of his actions. Notwithstanding this difference in the manner of viewing several questions acceffory and preliminary to the proposed pacification, the undersigned cannot but congratulate himself on finding, in all the communications which he has hitherto had the honour of receiving, the fame affurances of his Majefty's difpofition to employ his efforts towards the re-establishment of the tranquillity of Europe, and he will neglect no opportunity of placing this difpofition in its ftrongest light to his government. Hereford Street, Sept. 22, 1800 (1 Vendemiaire, Year 9). (No. 35.) NOTE. (Signed) Отто. LORD Grenville prefents his compliments to M. Otto, and has the honour to fend him herewith the official answer to his communication of the 23d inftant. He requests M. Otto to accept the affurances of his high confideration. Downing Street, Sept. 25, 1800. Ee 2 (No. |