lodged claims and are present at the meeting, that the estate shall be dealt with thereafter as a summary sequestration, whereupon the provisions of the bill relating to summary sequestration shall take effect. Section 173 provides that the trustee shall have full power, with the advice of the commissioners, to realise the debtor's estate in the best possible manner, either by public or private sale, as he shall think fit, and that the trustee shall find security for his intromissions and the performance of his duties in terms of section 67 of the bill, which re-enacts, practically verbatim, the provisions of section 72 of the Act of 1856. The procedure subsequent to the presentation of the petition, and up to and including the bankrupt's examination, is governed by the rules applicable to ordinary sequestrations. Thereafter, with the exception that the bill provides that within seven days after the bankrupt's examination (instead of within seven days from the date of the extract of the decree of cessio) the trustee shall report to the Sheriff when he expects that the estate will be ready for realisation, the rules prescribed by the Act of Sederunt of 1882, contained in clauses 4 to 15 (inclusive), and applicable to the process of cessio, apply. Section 181 of the bill, slightly altering the provisions of the latter part of clause 11 of the Act of Sederunt, provides that the commissioners (not the Sheriff as formerly) shall fix the trustee's remuneration, and that his accounts, which must be produced at the second meeting of creditors, shall be audited by them, and not by the Auditor of the Sheriff Court. Section 205 of the bill provides that, in respect of proceedings in small estates within the meaning of section 169 (there appears to be a mistake in the number of the section quoted), no fees or Court dues shall be exigible.

It will be apparent, therefore, that the process of summary sequestration introduced by the bill may be perhaps not inaccurately described as a judicious combination of the merits of the process of cessio as a means for the speedy and inexpensive distribution of small estates with those of sequestration in the various respects in which that process admittedly possesses advantages in respect of efficiency over its rival. And it must not be forgotten that the benefit of the important amendments and alterations (such, for example, as the shortening of the periods for the payment of dividends) which the bill proposes. to effect with regard to the ordinary process of sequestration, and which will be briefly considered in a succeeding article, will equally accrue in the distribution of small estates as in those of larger amount. There may, perhaps, be some slight

dubiety as to the propriety of confining the benefits of the process of summary sequestration to the estates of those debtors whose assets available for distribution among their ordinary creditors do not exceed £200, and whether the purely arbitrary limit might not, with some advantage, be increased.

In one further point at least the bill introduces a change which cannot but be beneficial. Under the law as at present existing there are provisions by which a cessio may be converted into a sequestration, but, conversely, none exist by which a sequestration once awarded can be converted into a cessio. At present, where the liabilities of the debtor exceed £200, the Sheriff has a discretionary power, if it appears to him expedient, having regard to the value of the debtor's estate and the whole circumstances of the case, to award sequestration instead of cessio. But, conversely, no similar power exists in a sequestration, if it appears that the distribution of the debtor's assets might more conveniently and advantageously be distributed under a process of cessio, to convert the sequestration into the simpler and less expensive process. It will, however, be noticed that under the provisions of the bill any creditor who possesses the requisite pecuniary qualification for petitioning for ordinary sequestration (which the bill, by section 15, proposes to reduce to £50 for one or £50 in the aggregate for two or more creditors) may competently, if otherwise qualified, petition for ordinary sequestration, and that, once sequestration has been awarded, unless the creditors by a majority determine to wind up the estate summarily, the proceedings thereafter will be conducted as in an ordinary sequestration. It will be seen, therefore, that the bill, while it makes provision for the conversion of an ordinary into a summary sequestration, leaves it with the creditors themselves (not the Sheriff) to decide whether the estates of their debtor shall be distributed by an ordinary process of sequestration or be wound up summarily, in the case of a debtor whose estates have been sequestrated in ordinary form and whose assets do not exceed £200. Of course, no conceivable reason exists, and, consequently, no provision is made, for the conversion of a summary into an ordinary process of sequestration, since the reasons which made it sometimes desirable to convert a cessio no longer exist in the case of the corresponding summary process.

Though perhaps not strictly relevant to the subject of the article, incidentally it is interesting to notice, as indicative of what appears to be practically a settled course of legislative policy with reference to the powers and duties of the inferior

branch of the judiciary, that the appellate jurisdiction of the Sheriff, which was finally abolished fifty years ago in sequestration, now, so far as concerns all proceedings connected with bankruptcy, finally disappears under the provisions of the bill. The anomalous anachronism which our law still perpetuates in other branches of judicial procedure, of permitting an appeal from the decision of a single judge to that of another of co-ordinate jurisdiction and authority, has been the subject of endless and merited criticism. While no doubt it may be contended that the main reason for the abolition of the appellate jurisdiction of the Sheriff in matters connected with bankruptcy procedure is that it is essential that such proceedings should be conducted with the utmost expedition consistent with the equitable preservation of the rights and interests both of the bankrupt and of his creditors, it is at least difficult to understand why such a contention should be regarded as peculiarly applicable to bankruptcy proceedings, to the exclusion of the consideration of the rights of other litigants in other and equally important forms of civil procedure. It may be conceded that it is usually more expeditious, and certainly less expensive, to obtain the judgment of the Sheriff than that of the Supreme Court, and, where a litigant is fortunate enough to secure the judgment of both Sheriffs in his favour, an appeal to the Court of Session is generally and almost necessarily obviated, with the result that finality is attained at the minimum expenditure of time and expense. But it seems at least as obvious that, where the judgments of the Sheriffs are at variance, the chances of an appeal to the Court of Session are at any rate very greatly increased, if not rendered absolutely certain, with the result that the chances of a reversion to the decision of the judge of first instance, and of sustaining the appeal, are about equal. It will be remembered that, historically, while in England the Sheriff has gradually been deprived of his judicial functions, and has become purely an executive, though chiefly ornamental, official, in Scotland his judicial functions have been permitted to increase out of all proportion to his executive and administrative duties. There would appear, however, to be some justification for the belief that, as a result of future legislative activity, the duties of the Sheriff as a judge of appeal may be expected to suffer some further diminution, with the necessary, and perhaps desirable, result of expediting litigation, of increasing the authority of the Sheriffs-Substitute, and of permitting the Sheriffs to obtain more leisure for the performance of their purely administrative and executive functions.

The provisions of the bill relating to deeds of arrangement, composition contracts, and trust deeds will be considered in the immediately succeeding article.

(58. net.)

W. W.

A DIGEST OF LEADING CASES ON THE REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA. With an Appendix containing the Regulations of 1897, 1884, 1880, and 1863; Excerpt from Report of Trinity House Fog Signal Committee in 1901, &c., and Notes by David Wright Smith, M.A., B.L., member of the Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow. Edinburgh : Printed by T. & A. Constable. When it is remembered that, roughly speaking, any infringement of the regulations for the prevention of collisions at sea occurring immediately before a collision raises a presumption that the infringing vessel was the one in fault and caused that collision, it will be at once conceded that there is room for a handbook on these regulations intended for the use of shipowners and shipmasters, for, though it might plausibly be contended that these regulations speak for themselves," and, after all the amendments they have undergone in the light of experience, ought to be perfectly intelligible without commentary, it nevertheless remains the fact that questions as to their construction and as to their application in various difficult circumstances still frequently arise. There are, of course, other works dealing with the subject, such as Tudor's Leading Cases in Mercantile and Maritime Law and Black's Scottish Shipping Cases, but both of these books deal with many other topics, and are, besides, more suitable for lawyers than for laymen, if one may so describe the shipmaster, who in point of fact must have as many professions at his fingers' ends as the common sailor must have trades at his. There is also Marsden's Law of Collisions at Sea, dealing with precisely the same subject-matter as Mr. Smith, but it is too exhaustive a work for popular use, dealing, as it does, with the whole British and American case law on the subject. Mr. Smith's selection of cases seems judiciously made, in view of the object he sets before him, and the work of setting forth the facts of the cases and the principles of the judgments, as well as his annotations and observations, is very well done. He neither prints nor refers to any of the local rules, so far as our necessarily hurried perusal of the book shows, but, as these generally relate to narrow waters, where pilotage is compulsory, the omission, as tending to the simplification of the work and to the keeping of its bulk of a moderate and handy size, is perhaps to be commended. The small price of the book, as well as its handy size, is a recommendation; and, though intended primarily, as above stated, for the use of shipowners and shipmasters, lawyers having occasion to look

into the subject will find a good deal that is helpful within its exible crimson covers. The work proper is prefixed by (1) a good table of contents arranged under the names (being the names of the principal vessels involved) by which the cases are known, these names occurring in alphabetical order in the table of contents, that being the order in which the author has arranged the cases in the work; (2) by a list of all the reports in which the cases are found; and (3) by an alphabetical list of all the vessels involved. A very complete index concludes the work.

Seeing that the author has printed the Fog Signal Committee's Report in his appendix, would it not have been well to have added some information as to the recent highly successful experiments in the United States with subaqueous bells? As these, however, imply the use of special apparatus on the ship, information regarding them could hardly have been of practical interest to the majority of shipmasters.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY to their Servants at Common Law and under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. By C. Y. C. Dawbarn, M.A., Barrister-at-law. Third edition by the Author, with notes on the Canadian Law by A. C. Forster Boulton, M.P. London Sweet & Maxwell. Toronto: Carswell & Co. (10s. net.)

:

This is the third edition of a work dealing with the whole field of employers' liability, an edition rendered necessary by the supersession of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, by that of 1906. Naturally, the part treating of the new Act occupies much the larger part of the volume, as the common law and the Act of 1880 are fairly well understood, while workmen's compensation is still a comparative novelty and full of the complexities and difficulties caused by the adoption of a new principle. Mr. Dawbarn has abandoned the commentary on each section, which is usually the handiest form of introduction to a new statute, though he prints the Act with a special red margin to its pages to enable the reader to consult it easily. His endeavour is to show the practitioner what he must prove in actual practice, and consequently he devotes one chapter to the essentials of an application, another to possible defences, another to possible indemnification, and so forth. Certainly, to a lawyer called upon to prepare a case, this method of explanation would be the most convenient, placing all together the points which he would otherwise be obliged to seek out for himself in the various sections. On the other hand, as Mr. Dawbarn admits, to gain a thorough knowledge of the Act one. would require, besides his commentary, to read the Act through as often as one's patience would permit."

Mr. Dawbarn gives his views on the vexed subject of casual labour. He is inclined to make the definition more narrow in its application than some other commentators, and exclude as not casual every case where the job is performed after