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be able to lie out of what money is due them for even what to others would be a comparatively short and unimportant time. As probably even the most hardened advocate of reform in the direction of diminishing and restricting the privileges and rights of a bankrupt would feel constrained to admit that such a person is at least entitled to live (notwithstanding the dictum of the learned judge who, in the case of a criminal convicted before him, "failed to see the necessity") and to obtain the necessaries of life for himself and his dependants, there would appear to be the strongest equitable reason for giving to those creditors whose claims are founded upon the providing of such necessaries the right to a first claim upon the funds of the bankrupt estate. Accordingly, sec. 116 makes the novel and highly important provision that the fees of medical attendants and the accounts of shopkeepers and warehousemen for household and domestic supplies (but not including accounts for furniture) made to the bankrupt or his family and dependants residing in his house shall be preferable to those of all ordinary creditors, under the limitation that such preference shall be limited to debts contracted within three months prior to the date of sequestration. (If it be conceded that creditors who supply the bankrupt or his family with "necessaries" are equitably entitled to preferential treatment, why, it may parenthetically be asked, should not the landlord who supplies him with "a local habitation" not be entitled to participate equally with the other preferential creditors, at least to the extent of a similar privilege with regard to the rent?) Provision is further made, as in the case of wages, that such preferable claims may be paid out of the first funds in the trustee's hands without waiting for the lapse of the statutory period, and, in the case of a company, that the assets of the individual partner's estates shall be alone available for preferable payment of the privileged claims incurred or owing by the individual bankrupt partner. There can be little room for doubt that these provisions will meet with all but universal approval.

Discharge of Bankrupt.—The provisions with reference to the bankrupt's discharge on composition, which are contained in secs. 130 to 138, do not differ in material particulars from those presently existing. The bill, however, proposes to enact that, if the offer of composition be made at the meeting for the election of the trustee, the majority of the creditors present which shall be necessary to entertain such offer and the security for its payment shall be three-fourths in number and value, instead of, as at present, a bare majority in number and nine-tenths in value, and that a similar majority shall be

necessary to enable the offer so made to be accepted at the meeting held after the examination of the bankrupt. In like manner, to enable a subsequent offer made at the second meeting or any subsequent meeting called for the purpose, to be entertained or to be accepted at a later meeting, the majority necessary is to be three-fourths in number and value, instead of a majority in number and three-fourths in value, as at present. But if the offer be made and entertained at the first meeting of creditors the bill proposes, in order that the offer shall be actually decided upon at the second meeting only by those creditors whose claims are entitled to a ranking, to introduce a provision by virtue of which the trustee shall be obliged to examine and adjudicate upon the claims lodged prior to the meeting at which the offer is made, so that only those creditors whose claims are admitted shall finally decide upon the acceptance or rejection of the offer. To safeguard the rights of the creditors, however, provision is made that after his adjudication on claims the trustee must allow an interval of not less than seven days to elapse to enable any creditor whose claim has been wholly or partially rejected to appeal against his deliverance. Sec. 136 provides that the cautioner's liability, which by the Act of 1856 was restricted to two years, shall be still further restricted to one year from the date of the deliverance approving of the composition.

With regard to the bankrupt's discharge on dividend, the bill proposes to make such sweeping alterations and amendments as to almost amount to a revolution of present procedure. In the first place, the bill inferentially lays down the maxim that a bankrupt is of right, and not merely as a matter of privilege, entitled to his discharge on payment of a dividend (provided only it exceed a certain limited pecuniary value), wholly irrespective of the wishes or desires of his creditors, the discretion of the judge, or the lapse of any specified period or periods of time. At present, in order to obtain his discharge, besides satisfying the Court that a dividend of not less than 5s. in the £ has been paid out of his estate, or that the failure to pay such dividend has arisen from causes for which he cannot be justly held responsible, the bankrupt must further either perforce obtain the consent of a certain proportion of his creditors, the majority necessary varying inversely as the lapse of time from the date of his sequestration to that when the application is made, or he must possess his soul in patience for a period of at least two years from that date. The bill, however, by sec. 139, provides that the bankrupt may at any time after the meeting held for his examination petition the

Court to be finally discharged of all debts contracted prior to his sequestration, and that he shall be absolutely entitled to such discharge provided only (1) he has obtained from the trustee a favourable report with regard to his conduct in complying with the provisions of the Act (which, though it may be prepared by the trustee at any time after his examination, cannot be demanded until the expiration of five months from the date of the sequestration); and (2) that he is able to satisfy the Court that his estate has yielded a dividend or composition of not less than 6s. 8d. in the £, or that the failure to pay such an amount has arisen from causes for which he cannot justly be held responsible, to determine the fulfilment of either of which conditions the Court shall have power to require him to submit such evidence as may be reasonably necessary. Renewal of the application refused in the first instance may, as now, be made at any time, provided the minimum amount of the composition has in the meantime been paid. The revolutionary character of these provisions may be judged from the consideration of two highly important facts. In all past

legislation the right of a debtor's creditors, for whose behoof from the moment of insolvency he holds and administers his estate, to have a controlling voice in the determination of the question whether a bankrupt who has merely paid a dividend or composition on his debts is legitimately entitled to his discharge or not at any particular period short of one when to offer opposition might legitimately be inferred to be due not so much to equitable regard for their rights and interest as to motives prompted by feelings of malice and oppression, has been universally conceded. And, further, it has hitherto been in accordance with the policy on which all bankruptcy legislation has proceeded that the Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, should possess a discretionary power to grant or refuse the discharge, or to delay consideration of it for such period as might appear to be dictated by the interests of the creditors, or, finally, to annex such conditions and limitations to it as the justice of the case might appear to require. Thus, to take only one example of the many which will readily occur to any one having experience of bankruptcy proceedings, where a bankrupt happens to be possessed of a large alimentary allowance or of a valuable expectancy, equitable consideration of the creditor's rights generally suffices to impose a condition that, unless the bankrupt agrees to some arrangement whereby some part at least of such beneficial right is made available to his creditors, his right to an immediate discharge is negatived, or at least postponed, for a

reasonable time. Under the provisions of the bill, however, it would appear that in future, provided his estate has yielded a dividend of not less than 6s. 8d. per £, and that he has obtained a favourable report from the trustee (which, as has been seen, has in the past been, as a general rule, only too easily obtained), the bankrupt's right to his discharge within at the most five months from the date of his sequestration is absolute, no power of objecting being reserved to his creditors, and no discretionary power either to postpone the period or to annex equitable limitations and restrictions being vested in the Court. Such a departure from principles hitherto recognised as dictated both by equity and expediency can be justified only on grounds of the clearest necessity, arrived at after the fullest discussion and consideration.

The Trustee's Discharge.—The bill follows generally the lines of the Act of 1856. But in sec. 150 it introduces provisions which are bound to be recognised as of great utility. The section provides that the previous discharge of the trustee shall not prevent or invalidate his granting the necessary report on the bankrupt's conduct required as a precedent to his discharge; and where in any bankruptcy and after the trustee's discharge there has emerged any right to property or assets which should, if known, have been made available for division among the creditors at the time, it shall not be necessary to proceed with the election and all the formalities incidental to the appointment of a new trustee, but it shall be competent to the said discharged trustee or any creditor to bring the facts under the notice of the Court, and on such conditions as the Court may deem fit, and even dispensing with the election of a new trustee, the former trustee shall be bound to pay over the proceeds of such subsequently emerging property or assets to and among the creditors formerly ranked in the sequestration. And sec. 151 provides that an appeal against the minute fixing the rate of the trustee's remuneration must be brought within six months from the date of the minute, after which it becomes final and not subject to review.

Judicial Factor on Estates of Deceased Debtors. The bill proposes that in future it shall be competent to one or more creditors of a person deceased to the extent of £50, instead of £100, in the event of the deceased having left no settlement, to apply by summary petition either to the Court of Session or to the Sheriff of the county in which the deceased was domiciled or carried on business, for the appointment of a judicial factor. At present such a petition is competent only to the Supreme Court,

Though it would be impertinent to suggest that the provisions of the bill have received that full and detailed consideration which the importance of its subject and the arduous labours of those who are responsible for its present shape deserves, it may be permissible to hope that some idea, more or less satisfactory, of the scope of the more important alterations and amendments of the law which it proposes to effect has been afforded in this and the preceding articles.

Finally, it will generally be regarded as a matter for genuine regret that the prospect of the passage of the bill through Parliament in the not distant future seems now even further from realisation than it did when the first of these short and imperfect articles was penned. W. WALLACE.

Literature.

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. By the Right Hon. the Earl of
Halsbury and other lawyers. Vol. i. London: Butter-

worth & Co.; Glasgow and Edinburgh: William Hodge &
Co. (Price 25s. net.)

To present, in any number of volumes, a complete statement of the whole law of England-in a form that is neither an encyclopædia nor a digest of cases-is an undertaking of the very greatest magnitude, and one that naturally takes its place among the record achievements of this and past ages. Such a work has long been spoken of among eminent members of the legal profession. Its advantages in consolidating that which forms the subject-matter of thousands of volumes have for long been obvious to judges and practitioners alike. But the mere magnitude of the task has hitherto prevented anv serious attempt being made to carry it into execution. From this, the first volume ample assurance that the long-talked-of Laws of England will in good time reach the stage of actual completion an idea of that magnitude is obtained. In the preliminary planning of the scheme every conceivable thought seems to have been exercised to ensure a publication worthy of the name, and the selection of the large editorial staff which is to carry it into being, as well as the organisation of that staff, reflects the greatest credit on those responsible for the inception of the undertaking, as may be judged from the first volume. The Laws of England is to be no ordinary compilation of statutes and cases, but a work dealing with every branch of the law, supported by references to decisions, authorities, and statutes. It is to be a series of treatises on every branch of the law, each being taken in its proper order, by experts in the individual branches. The treatises are made to fit into each other by means of cross references, which also provide against the same matter being dealt with twice, and

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